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Preface
This book is about the thinking in which we engage when we
reflectively decide what to do, and when we reflectively reach conclusions
as to the correct answers to questions. Some philosophers rigorously
separate our choices of action from our adoptions of belief, on the ground
that we have choices as to what to do, but no choice as to what to believe.
I treat the two together when considering processes of deliberation, but
separately when considering the rationality of conclusions.
The main objective is to identify a way of looking at ourselves and at
our deliberations that is adequate to our lives. It must accommodate both
our conception of ourselves as free, rational and self-directed subjects, and
the phenomenology of deliberation. It must also identify a place for us that
will feel like home, doing justice to our status as subjects, within the world
as we relate to it when we practise the natural sciences. The central claims
are not about how we are, but about how we should look at ourselves. A
key task is to show that this limited ambition, which is forced on us by the
need to avoid metaphysical implausibility, nonetheless allows us to develop
a position that has sufficient strength to do its work. The aim is to show
something that is all too easily taken for granted. This is that we can limit
ourselves to a strictly naturalistic ontology, while still having access to a
generous idiom that allows us to speak of ourselves as free in the exercise
of our rationality.
London is a wonderful city in which to engage in philosophy. I owe an
enormous debt to the many people who run and participate in its seminars,
allowing the all-important public exchanges of ideas that drive private
thinking forward. I am also very grateful to the staff of the British Library,
of the University of London’s Senate House Library, and of Cambridge
University Library. Finally, my thanks go to my publisher, and especially
to the editor who saved me from many mistakes.
Richard Baron
Midsummer 2009
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A note on references
References in the text give the author and the title. Full details can be
found in the bibliography. I have given references in forms that are
independent of edition, such as section numbers, when such references
identify passages with sufficient precision. This approach should be
increasingly useful with the rise of the electronic text. When page numbers
are given, they relate to the editions that are cited in the bibliography.
Roman numerals have been converted into Arabic numerals when they
merely give volume, chapter or section numbers, rather than being parts
of titles.
References to works by Plato and by Aristotle include Stephanus and
Bekker numbers respectively. References to works by Descartes include
volume and page numbers in the Adam and Tannery edition, in the form
AT 7: 123. References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason include the usual
A and B page numbers, in the form A76/B101. References to other works
by Kant include volume and page numbers in the Prussian Academy
edition, in the form Ak.1: 234.
I have used English titles of works in other languages when the works
are well-known by those English titles. In borderline cases, I have erred on
the side of the original language.
English translations of texts in other languages are taken from the
editions that are cited in the bibliography.When no English edition is cited,
translations are my own.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
Deliberation
The principal topic of this book is howwe deliberate. In the first three
chapters, I concentrate on processes of deliberation. In chapters 4 and 5, the
discussion broadens out to encompass both the conclusions that
deliberators reach, and the relationship of those conclusions to the starting
points of available information and of methods of using it. In chapter 6, I
discuss some problems in the philosophy of science. That chapter ends
with a link between the scientific view of the world and the proposals that
are made in chapters 2 and 3.
Each of the first three chapters includes one stage in the discussion
of the process of deliberation. In chapter 1, I set out the work to be done.
I motivate the discussion, outline a model of deliberation, put forward two
contrasting views of the process, the program view and the view that sees
deliberation with mastery, and argue for the latter view. In chapter 2, I set
out a way to see deliberation with mastery, argue that we must overlook
the causal closure of the physical, and start to develop a picture of
ourselves that will make the overall proposal acceptable. In chapter 3, I
develop this picture further, argue that my proposal is both acceptable and
adequate to the task, and consider other approaches that are in play in the
same field.
In section 1.1, I start by distinguishing between processes of
deliberation and the conclusions that deliberators reach, then set out why
we can treat choices of action and adoptions of belief together when we are
concerned with processes. I then set out the motivation for the argument.
This is the need for a philosophy that is true to our lives, meaning both our
1
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self-conception and our experience of deliberation. Finally, I discuss the
idea of a way of looking at ourselves and at our deliberations.
In section 1.2, I set out a model of our processes of deliberation. A
selection stage, in which we select both weights to attach to pieces of
evidence and a method of argument, is followed by a calculation stage. I
discuss the acceptability, and the limited implications, of the degree of
idealization that is involved in the use of this model. I pick out the evidence
of which the subject is aware, and the prior inclinations of the subject, as
the rational antecedents of the process. I also address the risk of doxastic
voluntarism.
In section 1.3, I set out the program view, the view that sees a process
of deliberation as the execution of a program that is foisted on the subject.
The contents of the program will reflect both the prior inclinations of the
subject to think in certain ways, and the evidence that has come to the
subject’s notice.
In section 1.4, I first argue that it is important for us to attribute a
strong form of freedom to ourselves. I then argue that the program view is
inadequate to our self-conception as free, rational and self-directed
subjects. I put forward a different view, that of deliberation with mastery.
If we take that view, then we see the subject as freely making an
intervention in the process that is extraneous to the program. I set out three
arguments for taking that view, arguments that are respectively based on
our self-conception, on our social relationships and on the phenomenology
of deliberation. In section 1.5, I compare the view that sees us as
deliberating with mastery with other views.
1.1 Our processes of deliberation
In this book, I argue for the desirability of taking a particular view of our
processes of deliberation. I go on to set out what we need in order to be able
to see our deliberations in that way, and the philosophical consequences
of having what we need. We take the recommended view when we see
ourselves as weighing the pros and cons in a certain way before deciding
what actions to perform, and when we see ourselves as handling evidence
2
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in a certain way before acquiring beliefs. Seeing a process of deliberation
in the recommended way is, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for us
to see the conclusions, the decisions or the beliefs, as rational. It is not
necessary, because conclusions can be seen as rational so long as they are
appropriately related to the information that was available. Our view of the
process, abstracted from its content, is not then important. Seeing a process
in the recommended way is not sufficient, because an eccentric can be seen
as reasoning in that way even if he reaches a bizarre decision or belief. He
may have a bizarre way of attaching significance to the pieces of
information that are available to him, or a bizarre way of making use of
that information.
We therefore need to distinguish between two ways of considering
conclusions. If we take the recommended view of the process of
deliberation, that supports our self-conception as free, rational and self-
directed subjects. As a result, we respect the conclusions of one another’s
deliberations. We do not force people to act, or believe, differently, nor do
we try to trick them into acting or believing differently. We confine any
attempts to change their minds to rational persuasion.We are also inclined
to take our opponents’ views seriously even if we have confidence in our
own, contrary, views. I shall attach the label “deliberation with mastery”
to the view of the process that I recommend. Viewing a process of
deliberation in that way not only supports an appropriate self-conception.
It also accommodates the phenomenology of deliberation. I shall argue
that to view a process in the recommended way, we must incorporate non-
naturalistic elements, and that wemust adopt a non-naturalistic conception
of ourselves. We can also consider conclusions in another way, and ask
whether actions or beliefs are rational. We then consider the content of the
conclusions, and the content of the processes that gave rise to them. I shall
refer to conclusions that are appropriately related to available information
as rational actions or rational beliefs.
Actions and beliefs
I am concerned both with our choices of action and with our adoptions of
belief in response to factual questions. Specifically, I am concerned with the
choices and adoptions where systematic reflection is to be expected. We
3
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choose many actions and acquire, or hold, many beliefs without reflection.
There are some actions, such as walking to a nearby shop when one needs a
bottle of milk, that it would be preposterous to choose by a process of
systematic reflection. Likewise, it would usually make no sense for someone
to reflect systematically in order to work out which town he was in, even
when hewas away on holiday. There are other actions that one could sensibly
choose, and questions that one might sensibly answer, by a process of
systematic reflection, although the effort would not normally beworthwhile.
Examples include a choice between taking a bus and taking a train to the
other side of town, and the question of how far the Moon might be from
the Earth. (For the latter, one would just consult the most convenient
encyclopedia.) Finally, there are decisions and questions where systematic
reflection is not only natural, but expected. A decision on whether to invest
a large sum of money in equities or in bonds would be one example. A
controversial academic question, for example the question of which English
king, Richard III or Henry VII, was responsible for the deaths of the Princes
in the Tower, would be another. In the latter case, one would reflect on the
evidence with a view to coming to believe one answer or the other, but
without expecting to have a choice as to which belief to adopt.
It does make sense to treat actions and beliefs together. It is true that
a process of reflection on evidence will ideally leave us with no option as
to what to believe, whereas with actions we are not constrained in the same
way. (We may be constrained in a different way, in that one action might
strike us as the only sensible or moral action, but that would not be the
same sort of constraint as the constraint to adopt beliefs that the evidence
unambiguously favoured, unless the requirement to act in such a way as to
achieve one’s ends, or the requirement to act in accordance with a given
system of morality, was some sort of fact about the world.) Despite this
difference, there is an important similarity. The process of arriving at beliefs
ideally involves systematic reflection on the available evidence, whenever
the question to be answered is a sophisticated one, the truth is not obvious
to the prospective believer, and it is not appropriate simply to defer to
experts. Deference might be inappropriate because the experts were divided
on the question, because the prospective believer was herself an expert, or
because the question was of such a nature that no particular type of person
4
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was especially authoritative. Likewise, certain actions are ideally chosen
after systematic reflection on the pros and cons of the options. The
similarity of the processes makes it appropriate to discuss deliberation in
relation to actions and in relation to beliefs as a single type of process.
When I set out a model of deliberation in section 1.2, it will become clear
that the element of choice that is involved in relation to beliefs is
unobjectionable because of its location in the process.
“Actions” and “beliefs” should be taken to refer exclusively to actions
and beliefs that one would expect to be chosen or adopted following
systematic reflection, except where otherwise specified. Choices of action
and adoptions of belief in these categories make up only a modest
proportion of human life, but they are still important. What we do in such
cases is a measure of the human powers of thought that we rightly
celebrate. Howwe see what we do can support our self-conception as free,
rational and self-directed subjects.
Since my concern is the process of choosing actions or of adopting
beliefs, rather than its outcome, the fact that the outcome may be more
strongly constrained for beliefs than for actions will not affect the
argument. It is worth noticing that the choice of an action and the adoption
of a belief have in common, not only the process but its end-point, a
commitment to the action or to the belief. That commitment may be
provisional. Actions can be interrupted, and they may not even be started
if there is a change of mind before the time for them. Likewise, beliefs can
be changed. But there is still a commitment that marks the end of the
process of deliberation. I shall not investigate the process of action beyond
that moment of commitment. I shall, therefore, not be concerned with the
links between the will and bodily mechanisms. Nor shall I be concerned
with the puzzles that are set by phenomena like deviant causal chains, when
an agent achieves an intended result by unintended means, his intended
means failing or being pre-empted.
Motivation
The motivation for the argument is that we need a philosophy that is true
to our lives, and one that finds places for the things that are important to
us. This is not a need that we would feel if we were studying an alien race,
5
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the members of which we did not consider to have mental lives that were
anything like our own. A mere natural history would then be sufficient,
and the standards of adequacy to be observed would be those of the
natural sciences. But for ourselves, we need more. We would be
discontented with an account of ourselves that was no more than natural
history, an account that merely recited the facts as they might equally well
appear to a non-human observer who had no sense of what it was like to
live a human life. We would feel the pinch of Wittgenstein’s remark, “In
the world, everything is as it is and everything happens as it happens: there
is no worth in it” (Tractatus, 6.41; on the interpretation of this remark and
of the surrounding text, see Wiggins, “Wittgenstein on Ethics and the
Riddle of Life”).
I shall concentrate on two broad aspects of our lives, to which a
satisfactory philosophy must be true. The first aspect is our self-
conception. We see ourselves not as mere computers, but as free, rational
and self-directed subjects who can stand back from evidence and decide
how to proceed. The concept of the rational and self-directed human
subject is under attack as “an invented Western tradition that has had its
day” (Thrift, “I Just Don’t Know What Got into Me: Where is the
Subject?”, page 84). But most of us still see ourselves as rational and self-
directed subjects, and in so doing we honour a proud and productive
tradition. The second aspect is our inner experience. I shall use the term
“experience” in a broad sense, to include both the experience of external
objects, such as trees, and the experience of states, such as the state of being
in a room that is heated to 30 degrees centigrade or the state of having an
empty stomach, whether or not the subject brings those experiences to
reflective consciousness. I shall use the term “inner experience” to refer to
our experience of having experiences, and also to our conscious experience
of deliberation, of decision and of action. Inner experience is the species
of experience that makes up a large part of the content of our inner lives.
It includes both the phenomenology of the more basic level of experience
of external objects and of states, and the phenomenology of deliberation,
of decision and of action. The phenomenology of sensory experiences
differs from the phenomenology of deliberation, of decision and of action,
but deliberation, decision and action do have their distinctive
6
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phenomenologies. If they did not, we could not compare our experiences
of deliberation, of decision and of action, but in fact we can.
This does not mean that there is a phenomenology that is objective in
the sense that a very wide range of rational beings, whether or not human,
could grasp our phenomenology. My view is that there is no such objective
phenomenology. But that does not preclude claims that the inner
experiences of two creatures are in general similar, or that two specific
events in the lives of different creatures are subjectively similar. Even if
inner experiences cannot be compared directly in any objective fashion,
objective biological similarity can make it very likely that the inner
experiences of two creatures are in general similar. When they are in fact
similar, the creatures concerned can recognize that similarity through their
interactions, and in particular through their conversations, without having
to invoke biological theory. Indeed, such recognition supports the claim
that biological similarity is accompanied by experiential similarity. When
general experiential similarity exists, it is also possible to pick out specific
events and recognize their subjective similarity. This way of proceeding
does not, however, give us any way of appraising two specific events in the
lives of different creatures for experiential similarity, when we do not detect
that the creatures have similar inner experiences in general. And there is
no guarantee that biological difference would lead to experiential
difference.
A consequence of the motivation, the need for a philosophy that is
true to our lives, is that although the views that are put forward here might
strike human beings as correct, they would not appeal to all rational beings.
To the extent that a potential for universal appeal is a condition of
objectivity, I cannot claim objectivity. As it happens, there is another reason
for not claiming objectivity. The picture that I shall build up would not be
plausible if it were claimed to state facts, rather than having its status
limited to that of a legitimate view of the way in which we make some of
our decisions and reach some of our factual conclusions. The legitimacy of
the view does not imply that there is anything in the world, in addition to
the things that could be mentioned in a mere natural history, or that those
things actually have any non-natural properties. Despite these limitations,
the resulting picture gives us worthwhile results, while not licensing the
7
DELIBERATION
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 7
free-for-all that might be feared to be the result of a move from telling it like
it is to deciding how to look at our activities. We can get rich sounds from
our blue guitars, on which we do not play things as they are (Stevens, “The
Man with the Blue Guitar”).
The notion of a view
I shall take the notion of a view, a way of looking at things, including
ourselves and episodes in our lives, to be unproblematic. I shall not discuss
this notion as a theme in itself. The success of the argument in section 3.5,
to the effect that something as weak as a way of looking at things can do
the work that needs to be done, will be essential to the acceptability of this
relaxed attitude. That argument needs to show that nothing stronger than
a mere way of looking at things is required. Anything stronger might well
be philosophically problematic.
Others would not be so relaxed. Jürgen Habermas, for example,
attaches great significance to the epistemic dualism that comes with the
distinction between the impersonal observer perspective and the social
participant perspective. He considers this dualism to be unavoidable
because of the interlocking of the perspectives. That interlocking is itself
unavoidable because scientific observers are inevitably engaged in social
scientific practice (“The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the
Problem of FreeWill”). For Habermas, the challenge is to reconcile the two
perspectives within a single overall picture. If one sets up the problem in the
terms that Habermas chooses, that is a formidable challenge. If I were to
cast the view of our processes of deliberation that would be given in a
natural history and the view that I recommend in the respective roles of
the impersonal observer perspective and the participant perspective,
admittedly an imperfect casting, I would be faced with a comparable
challenge. But I do not need to set up the problem in the terms that
Habermas chooses. Habermas is disinclined to allow the self-sufficient
existence of scientific knowledge, in that he will not allow the participant
perspective to be subordinated (ibid., pages 30-31). He also has a strong
sense of the semantically mediated causality of reasons (ibid., pages 29-
30). I differ fromHabermas on the first point. On the second point, I do not
rely on the existence of any causality beyond physical causality. These two
8
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differences allow me to see the interlocking of perspectives as looser than
he would allow. Consequently, I do not find the interlocking to be as
problematic as he considers it to be.
Having said that, I do seek a complete picture that is, so far as
possible, integrated. I am not content merely to introduce a convenient way
of looking at ourselves or at episodes in our lives. I therefore set out the
relationship between the view that I recommend and the view of ourselves
and of the world that is given by the natural sciences. My desire to integrate
our subjective view of our deliberations with our view of the world as a
collection of natural objects that interact with one another causally is one
of the driving forces of the argument. That desire leads me to recommend
seeing extraneous interventions in the causal network, interventions that
give a direct link between the two views, and then to analyse the supposed
origins and operation of those supposed interventions to the greatest
possible extent. Sadly, this turns out to be far less than the extent to which
the origins and operation of ordinary physical causes can be analysed. I
also discuss the element of mystery that attaches to my proposal by virtue
of the narrow limits of the analysis. I recognize the need to argue that this
element of mystery is acceptable.
Finally, the view of our processes of deliberation that I propose is a
view that we do not often adopt explicitly. Rather, it is implicit in our self-
conception and in our attitudes toward others. It is most likely to come out
into the open when we consider how to accommodate the phenomenology
of deliberation. But even a view that is mostly implicit in our ways of
thought needs to be examined for its implications and for its fit with our
other thoughts. In what follows, I shall generally take the implicit nature of
the view as read, but I shall issue occasional reminders.
1.2 A model of deliberation
In order to discuss our processes of deliberation, we need a model of them.
I shall set out a model in some detail here. This will help to make clear the
work that needs to be done.
Suppose that an agent has to choose between a range of options, and
9
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that the choice is one of sufficient significance and complexity that it is to
be made through an articulated process of reasoning. She will select a
method of argument to use. She will also consider pieces of evidence,
taking some of them to be weighty enough that they should have
considerable influence over the choice. (I shall use the term “evidence” to
cover information that can influence a decision as to what to do, as well as
information that can lead us to adopt beliefs. This will include information
about the agent’s current desires.) Then she will use the chosen method of
argument in order to move from the evidence to a decision. How she
chooses to argue, and how she weights the evidence, will both be
consequences of two things. The first is the evidence that has come to her
notice, some of which she may have sought out following preliminary
deliberation on what sorts of consideration should bear on the decision,
and some of which may influence how other items of evidence are
weighted. The second is her set of prior inclinations. Those inclinations
will encourage her to reason in certain ways, and to regard certain types of
evidence as more significant than other types. The prior inclinations may
result from prior factual knowledge, from prejudices, from character traits,
from specific mental capacities or their absence, or from any other feature
of her mind. She may be conscious of some inclinations, for example, a
policy of reasoning as mathematically as possible, and unconscious of
others, for example, an aversion to doing anything that might lead others
to criticize her. The latter inclination might lead her to attach great weight
to evidence about other people’s opinions, without her realizing why she
did so.
Consider, for example, someone who is wondering whether to leave
her job in banking and re-train as a social worker. Evidence will include
levels of earnings and of job security in banking and in social work, the
success rate in the social work training programme, her feelings as to
whether she enjoys work in banking and whether she would enjoy social
work, and her views as to how work in each of the occupations would fit
with her values, such as a value of promoting economic growth or a value
of helping people who are in difficulty. She will weight these pieces of
evidence, perhaps attaching great importance to her own financial security
or attaching great importance to the degree of alignment of each
10
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occupation with her values. She will choose a method, for example to
follow the recommendation of the single most heavily weighted
consideration or to accommodate the greatest possible number of
reasonably weighty considerations. She will then argue to a conclusion,
which will be her substantive decision.
The process of arriving at a belief will parallel this. The subject will
have a question, and will wish to answer it. He will select a method of
argument, assemble evidence, weight the evidence and then reason to a
conclusion. Within the natural sciences, there may be little rational choice
as to method, or as to weights to attach to pieces of evidence. One
recalcitrant piece of evidence can be enough to bring down a whole theory.
But even in the natural sciences, there are still important choices to be
made. It is just that the choice of method may be a choice of the type of
experiment, a choice that must be made in order to allow the gathering of
evidence. And even if there are no choices to be made, the model can still
be applied in a degenerate form. In the humanities, we can expect more
choice. A historian of ideas, for example, who wanted to discover the lines
of influence that related a previously neglected author’s work to the works
of earlier and later authors, might decide that the appropriate method was
to establish the views of the author and of those who came before and after
him on a range of significant questions, and then to draw up family trees
of those views. He would then go out and review the texts to find the
necessary views. Or he might heed Quentin Skinner’s warning against the
mythology of doctrines, the idea that each author must have had a view on
each one of a given set of topics (Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding
Method, chapter 4, section 2). Then he would adopt a different method,
and collect different evidence. As to the weighting of evidence, a
medievalist who wanted to knowwhat really happened on a given occasion
but who was dependent on limited sources that omitted details, or that
sometimes contradicted one another, might decide to attach great weight
to the accounts that were given by one or two chroniclers, because they
were known to have given accurate accounts of other events. Alternatively,
he might select as method a careful analysis of all of the available sources,
noting their agreements, their contradictions, how they came to be created
and the implications for their reliability, and let the weighting of evidence
11
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emerge from the application of that method. (For an example of this latter
method, see Mortimer, “The Death of Edward II in Berkeley Castle”.)
An actual process of deliberation may be both more complex and
more haphazard than the model would suggest. For choices of action, it is
almost certain to be more haphazard. But I do need to set out a clear and
well-defined process of deliberation, in order to conduct a philosophical
argument. While the model may be empirically inadequate to actual
processes of deliberation, idealization can be justified, given my purpose.
This is to ground our self-conception. The best ground is likely to be our
supposed use of an ideal process of deliberation. If a choice of action or
an adoption of belief is seen as the outcome of some well-defined process,
that will greatly facilitate our regarding it as reached in a way of which we
can be proud, rather than merely as reached. So long as my idealization, in
the sense of simplification, is also an ideal, in the sense of something
admirable, and so long as it is also not greatly at variance with reality,
idealization should do no harm to the argument. The acceptability or
otherwise of a given level of divergence from reality need not be measured
purely by seeing how many steps in the idealized process can be matched
with steps in actual processes. Elizabeth Anscombe noted, in relation to
practical reasoning, that it sets out steps that can be revealed by analysis:
“But if Aristotle’s account were supposed to describe actual mental
processes, it would in general be quite absurd. The interest of the account
is that it describes an order which is there whenever actions are done with
intentions” (Intention, section 42). Likewise, my idealization can do its
work if it reflects a pattern that is there to be uncovered.
There is one obvious respect in which the idealization is at variance
with reality. This is the distinction between weighting pieces of evidence
and selecting a method of argument. These cannot in practice be separated.
A method of argument may well incorporate an approach to weighting
evidence, and the attachment of particular significance to certain types of
evidence may recommend one method of argument over another. There
are also instances in which the selection of a method is absorbed into the
stage of weighting, by virtue of the content of concepts. If, for example,
there is evidence that a given action would significantly benefit a close
friend, and that evidence is given great weight, that must count very
12
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strongly in favour of performing the action. Only methods of argument
that respected the content of the concepts of friendship and of benefit
could sensibly be selected. If there were no other weighty considerations,
nothing would need to be added to the method beyond such respect for the
content of the concepts. A decision to perform the action would follow
directly. But such considerations will not matter, because I shall treat the
weighting of evidence and the selection of a method of argument together.
They are identified separately in order to show what is involved, not to
suggest that they must be undertaken separately.
More generally, we must be careful not to read too much into the
idealized picture, because doing so might give rise to the misleading
appearance of more serious divergence from reality. Two things in
particular should be noted. First, there is no implication that we engage in
calculation that is free of prejudice. Prior inclinations influence selections,
both of weights and of methods. Second, the idealization does not entail
that the process be one of collecting premises for a deductive argument,
and then reasoning after the manner of the examples in a textbook of logic.
We are concerned with arguments that have starting points, in the form of
pieces of evidence, but the arguments can be in any style. My idealization
is, for example, compatible with the models-based form of reasoning that
is described by Philip Johnson-Laird in How We Reason. In his view, we
reason by constructing mental models in ways that allow us to simplify the
reasoning process. We may, for example, reason deductively, with a risk of
error, by constructing some models of the world that take into account
some of the pieces of evidence (ibid., chapter 8). If we were to take the
modelling process to be something that we chose, then a decision to use a
limited number of models that reflected limited parts of the evidence could
be regarded as the selection of a method. The decision as to which pieces
of evidence to ensure were taken into account by the models could be
regarded as the selection of weights to attach to pieces of evidence. If a
piece of evidence was treated as one that had to be taken into account, then
it would ipso facto be regarded as reasonably weighty. The selection of
which models to construct might also be regarded as the selection of
weights. We would construct models in which the pieces of evidence that
we considered to be weightiest played significant roles. If, on the other
13
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hand, we inevitably reasoned by building models, mymodel of deliberation
could still be applied. The place in the model-building process of the
selection of weights could survive as just described. We could also still find
room for a choice of method, in that we could use models as ways of
carrying through deductive, inductive or abductive reasoning. Deduction
would require the construction of a set of models in which pieces of
evidence were directly represented as propositions that were undoubtedly
true. Induction would require the construction of models that incorporated
various presumed regularities in the phenomena that were of interest, and
that also incorporated relevant observed regularities. The presumed
regularities could then be tested to see whether they could legitimately be
inferred from the observed regularities, using mathematical techniques such
as correlation and the analysis of variance. Abduction would require the
construction of models that incorporated various supposed facts in
addition to the evidence, and then the selection of the model that gave the
most satisfying picture overall.
We can identify the evidence that has come to the notice of the
subject, and the subject’s prior inclinations, as the rational antecedents.
The word “rational” does not in this context indicate rationality in the
evaluative sense. It merely indicates that these antecedents exist in logical
space, taken to be the home of propositions as well as of concepts, rather
than in the physical world. Thus the prior inclinations should be taken to
be propositions, such as the proposition that the subject is averse to risk,
rather than their being facts that could be reported in propositions.
Likewise, pieces of evidence should be taken to be propositions. (The fact
that the subject will actually be driven forward by physical realities, and not
by propositions, does not matter. We identify the rational antecedents in
order to understand the logical course of the subject’s deliberations, so it
is appropriate for us to think in terms of propositions, and it does not
matter that they are causally inert.) The rational antecedents can be seen
as collectively setting the subject on a course that leads to a decision or to
a belief. They lead to the selection of weights to assign to pieces of
evidence, and to the selection of a method of argument that will use those
weighted pieces of evidence. I shall call this the selection stage. It is
followed by the calculation stage, in which the selected method is applied
14
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to the weighted evidence. The final result is the substantive decision as to
what the subject is to do, or the adoption of a substantive belief as to the
correct answer to the question posed. The selections of weights and of a
method are merely intermediate decisions.
We can now see how objectionable doxastic voluntarism is avoided, in
cases where the subject deliberates in order to answer a question and
thereby add to his stock of beliefs. The idea that we might choose our
beliefs has been opposed by David Hume (An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, section 5, part 2) and by Bernard Williams (“Deciding to
believe”), among others. Not everyone accepts the case against
voluntarism, but the case is strong enough that voluntarism is best avoided.
The element of choice that is implicit in mymodel of deliberation is located
too early in the process for it to fall to the standard objections to doxastic
voluntarism. It is merely a choice as to how to weight the evidence and how
to work from the evidence to a conclusion that the subject must then
accept, unless the subject regards the conclusion as so implausible that he
goes back and enquires as to whether he made the right choices at the
selection stage. This is not to allow that a subject can choose a belief and
then find a way to get to it by making appropriate choices at the selection
stage. Such manipulation is ruled out by our understanding of what it is to
investigate a question with a view to finding out the answer. That is, it is
ruled out by an extension of Williams’s argument against doxastic
voluntarism, that it is characteristic of beliefs that they aim at truth
(“Deciding to believe”, page 148). It is also worth noting that a belief that
someone holds following systematic deliberation can hardly be held by him
without deliberate affirmation. It would, therefore, not be appropriate to
identify an independent voluntary companion to such a belief, whether
acceptance (Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance) or opinion
(Dennett, Brainstorms, chapter 16).
1.3 The program view
If we see an instance of deliberation as following a course that is indicated
by the rational antecedents, then we can see it as the execution of a
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program. The content of the program would be determined by all of the
rational antecedents, both the prior inclinations and the evidence. Its
execution would include both the selection stage and the calculation stage.
There is no need to see the program as actually encoded in the subject’s
head. Setting out the programwould merely amount to describing a pattern
that was there to be uncovered. What is important is that if we see the
course of a deliberation as the execution of a program, and if we are aware
of the content of the supposed program, then we see the way in which the
deliberation must go, or the range of courses that it may follow, if the steps
taken are all to accord with some logic of reasoning. In so doing we extract
all that can be extracted from the rational antecedents by way of
explanation of the course of the deliberation. The taking of any course
that fell outside the range would not be explicable merely by reference to
the rational antecedents. I shall use the term “the program view” for the
view of deliberations that sees them merely as the execution of programs,
the contents of which are derived from the rational antecedents, without
any interventions that are extraneous to the programs. Note that because
each program captures the entire contents of the rational antecedents,
including not just prior inclinations but also current evidence, the program
will change as new information is acquired. Similarly, the programs that
were associated with different deliberations by the same subject might be
significantly different, although stability of character would imply stability
of prior inclinations, so that there would be similarities between the
programs.
If a deliberation is regarded in that way, the subject will be said to
follow the program. I shall also refer to the making of choices that could
be made on the execution of a supposed program as complying with the
program, and to the making of other choices as going outside the program.
There is a vital distinction between following a program and complying
with it. When a subject is seen as following a program, its execution is the
only thing that is seen as directing her, the only explanation of how she
decides. It may not direct her every choice, but choices that are not
explained by the program are not explained at all. The fact that she
complies does not, however, mean that the program’s execution need be
seen as the only source of direction. We might also see an extraneous
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intervention. But for following not to be seen when there is compliance, we
must see an intervention that made no difference to the course of the
deliberation, but that would have made a difference if it had been different,
and that would have explained the difference made. It is not enough to see
the absence of an intervention that could have been present. This point will
come up again in section 1.4, when I propose seeing extraneous
interventions, and not merely the possibility of such interventions.
A program cannot in the abstract direct anyone. Only its execution,
which imports the notion of pressure to move onward in accordance with
the instructions in the program, can do that. But we can think in terms of
action of the mental on the mental, if we wish. Direction solely by the
program would at the mental level amount to the subject’s having no
extraneous thoughts, but only the thoughts that one would have in
executing the program. Physicalism in the philosophy of mind is not
required in order to make sense of this notion of direction, although it is
not excluded either.
The rational antecedents will often not be sufficient to allow us to see
a program that could only follow one course, even if it were properly
executed. But that will not matter. The program would still capture all of
the explanation of the course of the deliberation that could be extracted
from the rational antecedents. It is also important not to see the program
as consciously written or chosen by the subject. It should be seen as foisted
on the subject, because the subject does not at the highest level choose how
to think. Choices that the subject makes as to how to proceed are made
within the selection stage, which can be seen as the execution of the first
part of the program. Those choices may include the conscious construction
or selection of lower-level programs that the subject then uses in order to
carry through the deliberation, including programs that help the subject
to make choices that arise within the context of the deliberation as a whole.
We can only identify courses for a program to follow if we use some
logic or other. Should not that logic too be regarded as something that is
chosen at the selection stage? And would not its being so regarded
undermine the very idea that there was any set course for a program to
follow, in advance of its execution? There is something in this objection,
just as there is something in Quine’s view that even the most central
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elements in our fabric of belief, our logical laws, could in extreme
circumstances be candidates for revision (“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”,
section 6, pages 42-43). But we need not be overly concerned. In order to
have any discussion at all about deliberation, we must assume that some
sort of logic should be regarded as given, and not as chosen on each
occasion of deliberation, even chosen implicitly or by default. The logic
that is taken to be given should not be a logic that we would regard as
specific to a given type of human being, or even as specific to human beings
generally, as opposed to other rational beings. If it were such a specific
logic, its use would be better classified as following from rational
antecedents at the selection stage, and therefore as selected in the course of
execution of the program. (It could not, however, be seen as following from
rational antecedents unless at least some minimal logic were already in
place.) We should also be wary of parts of logic, the legitimacy of which
is seriously disputed. We might, for example, feel safer if we could manage
without parts of logic to which intuitionists would object. On the other
hand, there would be no reason to exclude parts of logic merely because
there were arguments for treating them as parts of mathematics rather than
as parts of logic itself. And once worries about contested parts of logic had
been laid to rest, the topic-neutrality of logic, together with its close
integration with mathematics, a body of knowledge that gives every
indication of being the key to the structure of the whole of the Universe,
would reassure us that we could legitimately regard a substantial part of
standard logic as given. That would be enough to yield a course, or a
limited range of courses, that a process of deliberation should follow, given
the rational antecedents. That in turn would support taking the program
view.
The outcome of the execution of a supposed program, the substantive
decision or belief, might not be inevitable, even if deliberation accorded
with the given logic. Random elements might be present in the program,
either at the selection stage or at the calculation stage. The subject might,
for example, have cast a die at some point, perhaps because her rational
antecedents led her to want the thrill of trusting to chance. Leaving such
thrill-seeking aside, there are many occasions on which the rational
antecedents are insufficient to yield unique selections of weights and of
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method, or on which the application of a given method of argument to the
available evidence is not enough to calculate a unique outcome. The subject
just has to decide, for no reason that could be given within the subject’s
own reasoning. Such an occasion can also be regarded as one on which a
die is cast. The die may, however, be loaded, reflecting prior inclinations or
the available evidence, so that one outcome is more probable than others.
Indeterminacy at the level of reasoning can also arise out of the subject’s
use of concepts that are not precisely defined. I shall not treat mere
indeterminacy, from whatever source it may arise, as taking us beyond a
process that can be regarded as the execution of a program, whether or
not we can identify statistical regularities, for example, that a given
outcome arises 70 per cent of the time. This does not, however, mean that
we should routinely expect substantial under-determination. Sometimes
only one outcome will be at all likely. If an action is being chosen, there may
be only one obvious thing for someone of a given character, as represented
by her prior inclinations, to do. If a question is to be answered, the evidence
may overwhelmingly favour just one possible conclusion. And in any case,
we should not regard a lack of determinants of the course of a deliberation
as leaving open a choice of programs, because the subject is not to be seen
as choosing the program at all. There will be one program that will
incorporate all and only the information that can be extracted from the
rational antecedents. The effects of a lack of determinants should be
reflected within that program, by building in appropriate indeterminacy.
The selection stage is not often conspicuous to us. It is easy not to see
it as the execution of the first part of a program, because it is easy not to see
it at all. It often involves no conscious reflection. Some evidence just strikes
us as particularly significant, and we just start to argue from the evidence
to a decision or to the adoption of a belief, without being aware of selecting
a method of argument. Sometimes a subject does stop and think about her
selections of weights and of method. But in all cases, we can see the process
of making selections as moving like the execution of a program that is
generated by the available evidence and the subject’s prior inclinations, and
that has as outputs the selections that are made. The process may amount
to a movement to only one possible result that is explained by prior
inclinations alone, with current evidence having no effect. Examples are
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when the subject only ever uses one method of argument for decisions of a
given type, such as a minimax method, and when she always attaches the
greatest weight to evidence of a particular type, such as evidence as to how
the well-being of her family would be affected. Even then, the process is
there, and it can be seen as the execution of a program.
The process has so far been described at the level of reasoning, not at
the physical level of brain cells. Alongside the evidence and the prior
inclinations, we have states of the subject’s brain that correspond to
awareness of the evidence and to inclinations to think in certain ways. I
shall identify these states of the brain as the natural antecedents. They
participate in the causal mechanism. They underpin the mechanical nature
of deliberation, making it possible for the subject to engage in extended
reasoning. The fact that a causal physical process and a process of
deliberation that operates according to rules of logic should march in step
need not be a great mystery. In order to explain the fact that this happens,
we need evidence of a physical organ of sufficient complexity to allow its
states and changes to encode processes of reasoning, along with good
reason to expect the processes of reasoning to be correlated with the states
and changes of the physical organ. It is obvious that we have organs of
sufficient complexity, although the details of how our brains work are not
at all obvious. We should also expect correlations, because we have devised
processes of reasoning that fit the capacities of our brains to handle them.
To quote Angela Carter, “Our external symbols must always express the
life within us with absolute precision; how could they do otherwise, since
that life has generated them?” (The Passion of New Eve, page 6). A full
explanation would, however, require more, because we are to a significant
extent constrained by external facts to use some methods of reasoning
rather than others. We cannot simply select whatever methods of reasoning
happen to suit our grey matter and expect to be successful. We must use
sound deductive systems, because we live in a world that stands as a model
to our premises. We therefore need to explain how it is that we have brains
that can use the methods that work, when our brains might have been just
as complex but unable to use those methods. That is a question for
evolutionary biology, rather than for philosophy. I return to the coincidence
problem more generally in section 4.2.
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1.4 The case for mastery
We wish to support our self-conception as free, rational and self-directed
subjects. The program view is perfectly adequate on the side of rationality.
It relates the course of a deliberation to the rational antecedents, making
that course explicable. The problem lies on the side of freedom and self-
directedness. I can now indicate the way in which the program view would
be inadequate, and how to remedy that inadequacy. Under the program
view, the subject is seen as following a program, without making
extraneous interventions, and not merely as complying with a program.
The lack of extraneous interventions will be central to the inadequacy. The
remedy will consist in seeing such interventions.
We must first consider the reasons why we should see ourselves as
free. The efforts of philosophers to accommodate freedom of the will in a
causally determined world make it clear that freedom matters to us. But
there is a more specific reason for wanting freedom, which can persuade us
that the freedom that we need to see is of a sort that is incompatible with
determinism. I submit that the primary need is not to support our self-
conception as free, but to support our self-conception as self-directed. We
want to feel that we, as subjects, are in charge of ourselves, that we lead our
lives, and specifically our deliberations, and that we are not led. Wematter,
as subjects, before we even get close to moral considerations. Moreover,
our conception of ourselves as subjects who are in charge must be
significant. It must add something to the overall picture.
This is why the program view is inadequate. That view allows us to
look at the subject in either one of two ways, and each is as good as the
other. On the one hand, we can see the subject as in charge. The program
that she follows is her program, and it reflects her characteristics and
knowledge. She has guidance control (Fischer, “Compatibilism”, section
8). On the other hand, we can see the program that is foisted on the subject
as in charge. The subject then appears merely as an obedient part of the
mechanism of the world. Nothing is gained or lost when we switch from
one way of looking at the subject to the other. The accounts that are given
are equivalent. We could even stop talking in terms of subjects, as opposed
to biologically delineated parts of the mechanism. The subject could
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dissolve into the mechanism. She would then be seen simply as driven by
the physical mechanism, although we could still describe the course of her
life in the language of programs, by talking about her evidence, her
inclinations and her reasons. So under the program view, nothing is gained
by identifying the subject as in charge, and the subject is liable to be
demoted. The subject is, therefore, not significant enough to answer to our
self-conception.
If, on the other hand, we see ourselves as having a freedom that is
incompatible both with determinism and with the program view, we can
secure the importance of the subject. We are to see ourselves as having
alternative possibilities, as being able to do other than we in fact do.
Specifically, we are to see ourselves as able to go outside our programs, and
to do so under our control rather than by accident. That would be
incompatible with the program view, because choices that were seen as
possible but that would not be explained by a subject’s programwould still
have explanations. They would be explained as the subject’s choices. We
can also secure the indispensability of the subject, and of the subject’s
position in charge. The subject would be indispensable because the possible
choices would need to be seen both as controlled and as explicable, and
not as accidents, so the subject would have to play her explanatory role.
And switching to the view that subordinated the subject to the program
would mean losing something, because it would not then be possible to see
explanations for choices that were not explained by the program. Finally,
seeing us as having the proposed type of freedom would be incompatible
with seeing us as determined. I shall explore the relationship with
determinism in section 2.2.
This, then, is the challenge. If we can find a way to see ourselves as
free in this strong sense, a sense that certainly measures up to our self-
conception, then we can also see ourselves as self-directed in a way that
measures up to our self-conception. I shall in due course support this
argument for seeing ourselves as free with other arguments for seeing
freedom. Some of those other arguments will not be so hostile to
compatibilist conceptions of freedom, but they will be perfectly
accommodating to incompatibilist conceptions. There may be other ways
to secure an appropriate sense of self-directedness. But the fact that
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incompatibilist freedom can do the job so straightforwardly, together with
the existence of the other arguments for seeing freedom, means that it is
worth concentrating on this line. It is also worth noting that if we see a
free choice between a range of alternatives, that gives content to the notion
of being self-directed. If we saw someone as self-directed but as limited to
directing himself along one course, the self-direction would seem rather
hollow.
Having set out the link between seeing freedom and seeing self-
directedness, I shall concentrate on freedom. But first, two asides are in
order. The first one is that although we are to see ourselves as having the
strong freedom that has been described, we are not to see ourselves as
actually exercising it to the extent of doing something that is not
naturalistically explicable. The second aside is that we should not think of
avoiding the argument that we need to go beyond the program view by
thinking of a subject as choosing a program. The program that is seen
should be the one program that captures all of the information that can be
extracted from the rational antecedents, and that does not add anything
more. If we were to seek freedom under the program view by seeing the
subject as able to choose one from a range of different programs to run, we
would be brought no nearer to a picture that measured up to our self-
conception. We would need to see the choice as made by following a
super-program, in which case we would see that as the one comprehensive
program, or as a choice with no identifiable source, or as a choice that was
equivalent to a choice to go outside a program.
If we are to see ourselves as free in the required way (henceforth
simply “free”), we must see any given subject as able to make choices of sets
of weights and of a method that go outside the supposed program, without
seeing her as cast adrift. We must see that any such choice would be made
under the subject’s control, and that it would have an identifiable source in
the subject rather than coming from nowhere. The source must be a
deliberate intervention that is extraneous to the program. Furthermore, it
would not be enough to see the subject’s control over the course of a
deliberation merely as a control that could hypothetically have been
exercised if the subject had gone outside the program, but that was not
exercised because the subject in fact complied with the program.When the
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subject makes an actual choice of weights or of method that complies with
the program, we must see her as exercising the same type of control that we
would have seen as exercised if she had gone outside the program. The
extraneous intervention must be seen as made, even when it would make no
difference. There are two reasons for this. The first is that our self-
conception involves seeing ourselves as actually exercising our freedom,
not merely as holding the ability to do so in reserve. The second is that the
phenomenology of free and controlled choice arises in actual deliberations.
This need, to see the subject as actually proceeding in the same way that we
would want to see her as proceeding if she were to go outside the program,
highlights a significance of our taking it that we have free choice. It is one
that is just as important as the usual significance of giving us a satisfying
feeling that we could, if we wanted, jump out of the causal tramlines that
steer the world’s development. By considering the personal control that we
would want to see as making up for the lack of worldly controls with which
we would be faced if we did jump out of the tramlines, we can see the
personal control that we expect to exercise even when we remain within
those tramlines.
What this amounts to is that we should see the subject as exercising
mastery over the selection stage. The subject should be seen as exercising
control over the actual selections of weights and of method, in the same
way that she would be seen as exercising control if she were to go outside
the program. She must be seen as actually making extraneous interventions.
Then she will not be seen as following the program, but as choosing how
to proceed, even if her choice actually amounts to compliance with the
program. That is what I mean by deliberation with mastery. (She need not
be seen as considering whether to comply with the program, as a question
in which the program is mentioned. She need only be seen as using her
freedom. Nor need she identify individual rational antecedents as such,
although she must identify pieces of evidence in their role as evidence.) I
shall now fill out this picture a little, before supplementing the argument
for seeing ourselves as deliberating with mastery that has just been given,
the argument that is based on our self-conception, and adding two more
arguments. I shall discuss the implications of seeing mastery in chapter 2.
There are usually many logically possible options at the selection
24
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 24
stage, even if, on account of physical determinism, only one set of weights
and only one method are actually available to a given subject on a given
occasion, and even if complying with the program would make only one
outcome of the selection stage possible. (I discuss the link between physical
determinism and compliance with the program in section 2.2.) We do not
need to see all of the many logically possible options as open to the subject.
But we should see the subject as having a free choice between all of the
options that she could consider, given her general mental capacities and
her background knowledge. When I write of the options being seen as
open, or of the generally available options, or of the possible sets of weights
or the possible methods, I shall mean this range, narrower than the full
range of logically possible options, but wider than the range that
immediate circumstances and physical determinismwould allow. The range
is also wider than that which the subject’s prior inclinations would allow.
That is, she should be seen as well able to break free from her specific habits
of thought. They are not to be assimilated to the general mental capacities
that are to be seen as limiting the subject. The distinction is in general clear
enough, even though there are borderline cases in which something may be
treated either as a specific habit of thought, or as a limit on general
capacities.
It is the selection stage that matters, because once selections have been
made, a subject enters the calculation stage and there is only one rational
way of carrying that through, although that way may involve deliberately
inserted randomness or the use of ill-defined concepts, so that the outcome
may not be inevitable. A re-consideration of where the calculation was
going while it was still in progress could be perfectly rational. That would,
however, be a re-consideration of the selections of weights and of method,
rather than being either an arbitrary decision from within the process of
calculation to change course, or the commission of an error in calculation.
Likewise, a discovery in the course of the calculation stage that there was
not enough material to lead to a unique outcome could quite reasonably
lead to a decision to cast a die. But that would amount to re-opening the
selection stage, in order to choose a method of argument that involved
casting a die whenever the calculation stage would otherwise grind to a
halt.
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In outline, there are three arguments that favour seeing mastery over
the selection stage. The first argument is that doing so supports our self-
conception as free, rational and self-directed subjects. We see ourselves as
standing back and deciding freely how to conduct our deliberations, where
the available choices include choices that would mean over-riding the
influence of rational antecedents and thereby going outside our supposed
programs. Our rationality then consists in our making sensible choices, and
in implementing those choices properly in chains of reasoning that are
sometimes elaborate. The second argument is that seeing open choices as to
how to proceed has the highly desirable effect of giving us good grounds to
debate with other people properly, considering their views on merit and not
dismissing what they say because we disapprove of their known or assumed
ways of thinking. That desirable attitude toward people helps to make us
members of a society, rather thanmembers of a pack. The third argument is
that seeing open choices accommodates the phenomenology of deliberation.
The argument from self-conception
The basic argument from self-conception has already been given. We need
to see ourselves as having a full range of options, including options that
would involve going outside programs, and as selecting whichever option
we do take in a way that keeps us in control. That argument can most easily
be supplemented in relation to adoptions of belief.
If we see ourselves merely as following programs, that does allow us
to view the adoption of beliefs as a process that takes account of evidence,
and that uses respectable methods of argument from evidence to
conclusions. But we do not regard our beliefs merely as foisted on us by
pieces of evidence. (Remember that I am specifically concerned with the
formation of beliefs that are answers to questions where there is no
substitute for reflection, and no easy recourse to experts who already know
the answers. These are not cases in which the significance of the evidence
is obvious.) We regard ourselves as choosing to attach significant weight to
certain pieces of evidence, and as choosing how to use the weighted
evidence to argue to a conclusion. Of course we have our habits of thought,
which steer such choices, and we may be very glad to have habits that we
see as particularly effective in steering us toward the adoption of true
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beliefs. But we see ourselves as free to start approaching the world
differently if we wish. We would see such a change of approach as a free
choice, to which the subject was not led by antecedents but which was also
not a random or uncontrolled change of mind. The independent mind that
we admire is to be seen as potentially independent of its own inheritance,
as well as being independent of the thoughts of others.
If someone does not see himself or herself as deliberating with
mastery before adopting at least some beliefs, no knock-down argument is
available. If anyone does not think that it is important to see himself or
herself as someone who adopts beliefs in the light of reflection, but not as
someone who arrives at beliefs mechanically, my advice is to look within
and to consider what one expects of oneself as a human being. Two
pointers may help.
The first pointer is based on what we expect of other people. We
assume that we can have rational discussions with others, and that we can
persuade them, or they us, by putting forward reasons for adopting various
beliefs. (One analysis of what we expect can be found in the discussion of
the conversational stance in Pettit and Smith, “Freedom in Belief and
Desire”.) If we thought it appropriate to see other people as acquiring
beliefs by following programs, so that their beliefs or methods of thinking
could be changed by putting in their way whatever stimulating propaganda
would do the trick, we would not have the esteem for them that we do have.
We would lack that esteem, even if we actually had no inclination to use
propaganda or other tricks. This would be so, even if we saw other people
as following sophisticated programs that had layered structures with
higher-order rules of procedure to control the application of lower-order
rules, that made thorough checks against existing beliefs and against
standards of evidence before new beliefs were acquired, and that had been
developed through experience and through internal reflection. If we would
have a low regard for people whomwe saw as acquiring beliefs by following
programs, rather than by standing back and deliberating in ways that were
not predetermined by antecedents, then we cannot rest content with the
same conception of ourselves.
This consideration incidentally makes clear the strength of the
conception of mastery that is involved. Someone who is seen as acquiring
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beliefs by following a sophisticated programwith a layered structure is still
seen as open to manipulation. Sophistication would make it possible to use
stimulating propaganda to change people’s inclinations to reason in certain
ways, or their inclinations to weight pieces of evidence in particular ways,
rather than to change beliefs directly. Consider the rational animal,
possessed of selective attention and a capacity to deliberate, whomMartha
Nussbaum sets at the centre of Aristotle’s theory of human development
(The Fragility of Goodness, pages 285-287). Admirable though that
creature is, he could still be seen as acquiring beliefs by following a
sophisticated program, unless we went beyond Aristotle and saw him as
deliberating with mastery.
The second pointer is that seeing ourselves as beings who adopt
beliefs from a position of mastery, and not as beings who arrive at beliefs
by following sophisticated programs, is satisfyingly incompatible with
seeing ourselves as mere links in the causal chains of the world. Not only
would few of us like to think of ourselves as mere links. Our experience of
living indicates to us that we are not mere links. Those who maintain that
there is no valid characterization of the world but the scientific
characterization, could argue that the experience of living was deceptive.
They could point out, correctly, that we may soon have an explanation, in
neurological terms, of how we get the feeling of being more than mere
causal links. The existence of such an explanation might be thought to lead
to the immediate victory of those who considered only the scientific
characterization to be valid. But that would not follow. We could
acknowledge the scientific result in theory, and it would change our
conception of ourselves just as profoundly as the theory of evolution has
changed our conception of ourselves. But for the purposes of living, we
would still see ourselves as more than followers of programs.
The supplement to the basic argument from self-conception in
relation to the choice of actions follows the same pattern as the supplement
in relation to the adoption of beliefs. Often we act out of habit, or because
of momentary impulses which, on reflection, we may regard as irrational
or at best non-rational. But sometimes we act deliberately, on the basis of
pieces of evidence that we regard as reasons for given actions, but without
seeing ourselves as reaching our choices of action mechanically. Our self-
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conception includes that strong sense of free and rational agency. To adapt
Immanuel Kant’s “I think” (Critique of Pure Reason, B131), there is an “I
do” that must be able to accompany those of my actions that are chosen
following systematic reflection, and that should be seen as more than, “This
is what my well-stocked and sophisticated brain computed was the most
effective way to achieve my goals (including my goal of acting in
accordance with my ethical standards)”. If we see the “I do” as more than
that, without seeing our choices as random or as lacking identifiable
sources, then we see ourselves as agents who are free, as well as rational.
As with adoptions of belief, two pointers may help to persuade those
who do not think that it is important to see ourselves as choosing some of
our actions through deliberation with mastery. The first pointer is the same
as the second one that was offered in connection with belief. We do not
wish to see ourselves as mere links in causal chains. The second pointer is
that if an agent sees himself as having decided on an action through a
process that involved a free but controlled choice that was not attributable
to antecedents, then he must see himself as owning the action. He cannot
see it merely as something that happened with his involvement. I submit
that it is satisfying to be required to see our actions as owned by ourselves.
The argument from society
Our social relationships are not relationships between ourselves and objects
in the world. We relate to others as fellow subjects. In Peter Strawson’s
words, we take up a participant attitude toward other people, not an
objective attitude (“Freedom and Resentment”, page 9). A similar point is
made by Carol Rovane, when she elaborates on the essential social role of
the recognition of one another as persons (The Bounds of Agency, pages
48-49), although she does so in the context of an ambitious project to give
an ethical criterion of personhood, defining persons as agents who can
engage in agency-regarding relations. In a more philosophically
adventurous spirit, it could be argued that a participant attitude would be
necessary for a collective consciousness to exist. The argument could, for
example, be that a participant attitude would be required in order for the
individual to take up the first-person plural perspective that KayMathiesen
has argued to be the route to the creation of such a consciousness
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(“Collective Consciousness”). I do not, however, claim that there is in fact
any collective consciousness.
The argument from the nature of our social relationships to the
desirability of at least implicitly seeing people as deliberating with mastery
comes out if we focus on debate, which is the social form of deliberation.
Debate may issue in a decision on what to do collectively, just as individual
deliberation may issue in a decision as to how to act. Alternatively, debate
may be used to try to answer a theoretical question, just as an individual
can deliberate in order to arrive at a belief. There may be no need for all of
the contributors to a debate to accept the same conclusion, when the aim
is to answer a theoretical question, but the desire of contributors to arrive
at the truth means that a single agreed answer would still be the ideal
outcome.
When we debate with others, we ideally see the others as making
contributions that we do not see as accounted for merely by antecedents,
whether rational or natural. We see contributions as expressions of the
contributors’ views, and not merely as expressions of their natures. The
difference is one of perception. The views that someone adopts and
expresses will in fact be determined by his nature and by the evidence that
he has encountered, but to see his views as his considered opinions, rather
than as things to which he happens to have been led by virtue of his
biological nature and his nurture, is to see them in a new light. That is the
light in which we should see them in order to answer to our notion of
rational debate. We do not then see ourselves as debating with entities that
arrive at their contributions merely by following programs, but as debating
with people who exercise mastery over the selection stages of the processes
that generate their views. Moreover, seeing other contributors in that light
allows us to take up the participant attitude toward them that is the ideal
in all of our social relationships. We see them as engaging in debate in the
same way that we see ourselves as engaging. We do not see ourselves as
mere objects in the world, mechanically reaching and stating our views.
And we should not see other contributors like that either.
If we see other contributors as arriving at their views through
deliberation with mastery, that has an important effect. If we see mastery,
then we do not see views as following mechanically from the interaction of
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prior inclinations and the evidence. Consequently, we should not feel
entitled to ignore the views of other contributors on the ground that their
views merely reflect the influence of prior inclinations on the selection
stage. It is useful in a debate to bring evidence to bear, to discuss the
weights that should be assigned to pieces of evidence and to dissect the
methods that others have in fact used to work from evidence to conclusions,
but it is pointless to tell a contributor that he only says what he does
because of his prejudices, his past experiences or his financial or other
interest in the outcome. We need to recognize the status of contributors as
persons whom we see as deliberating with mastery, in order to
depersonalize debates while still fully recognizing individual contributors’
ownership of, and responsibility for, their views. The supposition of
mastery blocks our perception of the inevitability of the influence of how
the contributors happen to be, leaving us with their views alone. At the
same time, it leaves the views connected to the contributors and to their
natures. That is essential to our comprehension of a debate, whether as
contributors or as observers. (The one class of debates where this
connection would not matter, so that it would not matter if we broke the
connection between content and contributors, is the class of debates in
mathematics and in the natural sciences where our interest is in the content
of the debates, rather than in the history of the disciplines, and where that
content is already unambiguous. In such cases there would be no human
element, and no hermeneutic work to do. Outside that special class, the
interlocking of perspectives that Habermas identifies, and that I discussed
in section 1.1, should be taken seriously, even though it may be looser than
Habermas allows.)
More generally, if we see others as deliberators with mastery, that
helps us to see ourselves as members of a society, rather than as individuals
who happen to be surrounded by other members of the species homo
sapiens. The latter vision of ourselves would be most unsatisfactory, even
if the others did us no harm, or if the whole group was well-structured in
a hierarchy like a pack of wolves. It is hard to persuade someone who does
not already accept this proposition to agree with it. I can, however, offer a
pointer. Would you consider yourself to be a member of a society if its
other members regarded you merely as an entity in the causal network,
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even one who took account of evidence that appeared to recommend given
beliefs and actions but in a way that did not involve mastery over how the
evidence was used? Others would then feel free to disregard your views,
because they could be attributed to your prejudices or other characteristics,
rather than feeling that your views should be considered on their own
merits. Going to the other extreme, would you consider yourself to be a
member of a society if all of its other members put you on a pedestal and
thought that your views should be considered on their merits, but did not
expect you to have the same attitude toward their views? Reciprocal
recognition that people’s views should be considered on their merits has a
significant role to play in a society in the modern sense. Groups of people
that to varying degrees did not incorporate this reciprocal recognition have
existed in the past, and such groups still exist today. They can to that extent
be regarded as packs rather than societies, or as societies fromwhich some
people, those whose views are not automatically considered on their merits,
are excluded by systematic, if sometimes unconscious, oppression. Such
oppression is literally anti-social. To the extent that views expressed
amount to factual assertions, we can also regard it as a form of testimonial
injustice (Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, section 1.3).
The foregoing considerations need not deter us from arguing
forcefully for our own views, whenever we engage in debate. But if we
regard other people’s views as worthy of consideration without reference
to their origins, while still recognizing people’s ownership of their views,
that encourages us to limit ourselves to the use of rational persuasion and
to forswear manipulation. Rational persuasion means argument that
proceeds on the basis that the other party will fully understand what is
being said, and in which tricks or disreputable methods, such as strawmen
or the selective use of evidence, are not used unless by accident, and are
admitted if they are noticed. This view can be compared with Carol
Rovane’s view. She identifies agency-regarding relations, that is, relations in
which agents attempt to influence one another but aim not to hinder one
another’s agency (The Bounds of Agency, page 72). But despite the
substantial overlap, what she would regard as agency-regarding persuasion
differs at the margins from what I regard as rational persuasion. I include
in my category attempts to persuade another person to change his rational
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point of view, something that Rovane would exclude from her category
(ibid., pages 88 and 129-131). I would, however, exclude attempts to
undermine someone’s integrity to the point where he was left with no
rational point of view. Rovane would include in her category hypnosis and
deception to which the subject had submitted voluntarily as part of a
course of therapy (ibid., page 96), while I would exclude them.
A participant attitude toward those with whom we debate, and a
restriction to rational persuasion, do not merely keep debate affable. They
can also have considerable political significance, even though politicians
themselves are the first to transgress and to use propaganda. If we take up
a participant attitude and stick to rational persuasion, that will prevent us
from imposing our own ideas of rationality on other people. We will not
argue that the modification of their habits of thought or of their specific
views through propaganda would be justified because it would be for their
own benefit. The limits on the proper conduct of debate therefore have a
role to play in blocking the slide from Kantian autonomy to tyranny that
was noted by Isaiah Berlin (“Two Concepts of Liberty”, sections 3 to 5).
It would be inappropriate to take trouble over debating partners when
they were plainly wrong. An expert in a technical field would be quite right
to refuse to spend much time debating with someone who stuck to an
untenable position, andwho showed no desire to be educated. But even then,
the expert should choose between attempts at rational persuasion and simply
ignoring the opponent. The opponent’s views would still be considered on
their merits. It is just that it would be obvious to the expert that those views
had nomerit. There are, however, many topics of debate forwhich there is no
division of people into those who already know the answers, and others who
need only ask them to supply the answers. There may be no single correct
answers to be found, or theremay be single correct answers that are unknown
and that are hard to discover. Beliefs as to the answers to such questions are
the beliefs that were singled out as half of my topic in section 1.1. The
humanities, the social sciences and practical ethics and politics are rich sources
of questions to which there are unlikely to be single correct answers. Instead,
we can expect each question to have a range of plausible answers, and awider
range of implausible answers. (There are, of course, degrees of expertise on
many such questions, andwemay bewell advised to debatewith some people,
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while ignoring others who stubbornly advocate implausible answers.)
Practically any field of knowledge can yield examples of questions to which
there should be single correct answers, but that we are not able to answer and
may never be able to answer. There are plenty of questions inmathematics and
in the natural sciences that we can formulate precisely but that we cannot yet
answer, althoughwe reasonably hope to be able to do so eventually. There are
also questions of historical detail that we know have single correct answers,
but that we may well never be able to answer, while at the same time we feel
the need to reach provisional conclusions because the unknown truth of the
matter would colour our understanding of significant people or events.
When we debate a question that has no single answer or no currently
accessible answer, a view of people as deliberating withmastery has a special
role to play. Not only does it ground the attitude that we should assess other
people’s views on their merits. It does so more solidly than could be done by
our recognizing that we did not ourselves possess a generally accepted answer
to the question, so that we should not dismiss other people’s answers. We
might be wholly convinced of the correctness of our own answer, andmight
regard its general acceptance as inevitable in time. If we did not see the
purveyor of a rival answer as having deliberated with mastery, we could
dismiss her answer as arising out of a faulty process at the selection stage, or
as being the mechanical result of inappropriate prior inclinations.
Furthermore, it is important that we should be able to accommodate the
firm holding of our own view, alongside awillingness to consider other views
on their merits. When there is no consensus, it is not always appropriate to
be tentative and to ground our attitude to other people’s views on the thought
that they have as good a prospect of being right as we have. It is part of being
human that we sometimes have the courage of our convictions. We should
ground our attitude in a way that allows for our own conviction, and should
not found it on obligatory pusillanimity. At the same time, we should not be
so dogmatic as to ignore Cromwell’s admonition to “think it possible you
may bemistaken” (The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, volume 2,
letter 136, 3 August 1650).
The argument from phenomenology
When someone is deliberating, he may consciously take the view that his
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brain merely follows a course that reflects the rational antecedents. In
retrospect, he may see how rational antecedents made it most unlikely that
he would have reached any other conclusion than the one that he actually
reached. If he deliberates out loud, others who know him may note the
course of his deliberation and may not be surprised. And an observer who
could monitor all of the atoms in the deliberator’s brain and the incoming
stimuli could predict the course that his brain would take. The deliberator
can accept all of that, but when he is deliberating, it does not feel like that
at all. He has a clear feeling that the choices of sets of weights to attach to
pieces of evidence and of methods of argument that are in general open to
him, are all on this occasion open to him, and that any selections that he
might make would be made under his control, not at random. That is, it
will seem to him, at the time, that he deliberates with mastery, even though
others at the time, and he in retrospect, might see the process of
deliberation as amounting to the following of a program. This is the
argument from phenomenology. If we see ourselves as deliberating with
mastery, we have a straightforward way to accommodate the
phenomenology of deliberation. I shall set out an additional argument
from phenomenology in section 3.2.
1.5 Mastery and other views
In this section, I outline two groups of views that give useful points of
comparison. The first group comprises views that, in one way or another,
directly incorporate the awareness of free choice. The second group
comprises analyses of deliberative processes that allow for considerable
sophistication, but that do not take us beyond seeing ourselves as following
programs. That limitation will lead up to the challenge that will be faced in
chapter 2, the challenge of how to see ourselves as deliberating withmastery.
The awareness of free choice
Mastery over the weighting of pieces of evidence and over their use in
deliberation may be compared with the first of the three gaps in the process
of deliberation, decision and action that John Searle identifies (Rationality
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in Action, pages 12-17 and chapter 3). This is the gap between having all
of the reasons for choosing each of the options, and making a decision.
The agent does not feel that he is driven by the reasons to make a particular
choice. They do not appear to be sufficient for the outcome. The other two
gaps, one between decision and action during which the agent could change
his mind, and the other between the stages of an extended action during
which he could decide to discontinue the action, can be seen as variants of
the same gap. The agent remains in control. He is not driven onward by
the reasons for the course of action that he actually chose or by the fact that
he has already made his choice.
This does not mean that Searle and I are saying the same thing,
although several of the differences amount to differences of emphasis,
rather than disagreement. Searle links the gap directly to freedom of choice
of outcome, whereas I think in terms of the subject’s mastery over the
considerations that bear on the decision, both the available evidence and
the subject’s prior inclinations. This is largely a difference of presentation,
but it is not entirely so. I would not make the strong connections between
rationality, free choice and alternative possibilities that Searle makes (ibid.,
pages 142 and 201-202), unless it was on the clear understanding that this
was merely a claim that we needed to see things as if the implications of
those connections held good. Searle says that we need to treat the gap as
real in order to live as we do (ibid., pages 70-73). While I agree, I
concentrate on three specific features of our lives: our self-conception, our
social interactions and the phenomenology of deliberation. Finally, my
merely claiming that we can and should see instances of deliberation as
involving mastery, rather than claiming that mastery corresponds to real
features of the world, has the consequence that I do not feel the pressure
that Searle feels to align an account of deliberation with the facts of
neurology (ibid., chapter 9).
Another view is that of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations,
chapter 4, section 1). He sets out how we assign weights to the various
considerations that might bear on a decision. The assignment of weights
on one occasion will influence assignments on future occasions by setting
a precedent, but not an inviolable one. Nozick also argues that the
assignment of weights on a given occasion can set a precedent under which
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that assignment is itself subsumed (ibid., pages 300-301). He addresses the
risk of seeing our choices as random and uncontrolled by arguing that a
choice can be explicable without its falling under a covering law, and he
uses our own experience of choosing in making that argument (ibid., pages
301-306). Nozick’s views criss-cross with mine, but our basic approaches
are different. He seeks to develop the naturalistic framework, and to use
our own experience of choosing in order to give us insights into that
developed framework. I shall argue in chapter 2 that we should go beyond
the naturalistic conception of ourselves.
Finally, Lucy O’Brien puts forward a particular significance of our
standing back and considering the options that are open to us, when she
argues that an agent’s awareness of her actions results from her “acting on
the basis of an assessment of possibilities for acting” (Self-Knowing
Agents, pages 114-122 and 182-190). The range of actions that is involved
is much wider than the range with which I am concerned, actions that are
chosen after the agent has stood back and considered both the significance
of the evidence and the use that should be made of it. Indeed, O’Brien
notes the risk of an over-intellectualist account of an agent’s grasp of her
basic actions, actions that are performed directly, without doing anything
else (ibid., page 186). Furthermore, O’Brien has a different goal frommine.
Her goal is to put self-knowledge on a firm footing. There is no reason to
think that she would for her purposes need to impute to agents the strong
sense of mastery for which I argue.
Sophisticated programs
A leading analysis of deliberation before action is given in chapter 5 of
Berent Enç’s bookHowWe Act. A study of Enç’s proposal will show why
such analyses are not in themselves enough to allow us to see mastery, even
though they may well achieve the aims of their authors.
Enç offers a causal model of deliberation. It relies on event causation,
and not on agent causation, so its naturalistic credentials are impeccable.
He starts by considering the behaviour of animals in response to threats.
Such behaviour can be represented by us in the form of conditionals. If
certain sensory inputs are present, take some given evasive action. There is
event causation within the animal, but no deliberation. Furthermore, the
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operation of such a sequence of causes and effects has nothing much to do
with the conditional. The conditional is our gloss on something that is not
intrinsically a piece of logical reasoning leading up to a decision to perform
the action that is identified by the consequent. The consequent does not get
detached as an instruction, or as a recommendation that can then enter
into further reasoning within the animal. Enç then argues that we move up
to something qualitatively different from such behaviour when the
causation and the conditionals come together, with representational states
causing behaviour by virtue of their conditional content. Consequences of
possible actions can be ranked in order of preference by reference to higher-
order priorities, allowing us a subtlety of reasons-based decision-making
that takes us far away from automatic reactions, but only if those
consequences are themselves represented articulately. Finally, Enç’s
approach allows him to address the phenomenological feel of free choice.
He argues that the role of conditionals in his model requires the agent to
have the feeling that she could do any one of a range of different things, a
feeling that she could have by imagining herself as adopting each of the
options.
Enç addresses the criticism that a naturalistic causal account of action
appears to leave no place for the agent (ibid., pages 133-135). He then goes
on to tackle the criticism that such an account seems to give an inadequate
role to reasons. This second criticism is close to the one that I would make,
which is that the available role for reasons is inappropriate, rather than
inadequate, because it leaves no room for mastery. Reasons are not seen as
operating in the right way for my purposes, purposes that differ from Enç’s.
A review of Enç’s response to the criticism that he considers will show that
my criticism could not be addressed by Enç’s proposal. This follows from
the fact that Enç’s description of the process of deliberation leaves us seeing
the subject as effectively following a program, despite the complexity of
the process that he describes.
Enç accepts that rational action must result from the weighing of pros
and cons of possible actions (ibid., page 136), and I have no quarrel with
that, although others do.Markus Schlosser disputes that acting for reasons
necessarily involves deliberation (The Metaphysics of Agency, pages 189-
193). While Schlosser may be right, there are some types of action, such as
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the action of agreeing to a business plan, which must, if undertaken for
reasons at all, involve the weighing of pros and cons. If I can show that
seeing mastery would require more than proposals such as Enç’s could offer
us in relation to those types of action, that will do for my purposes.
The kernel of Enç’s response is his claim that we can account for
deliberation on pros and cons in naturalistic terms, provided that some of
the states of the deliberator are representational, and that those
representational states play their causal role by virtue of their conditional
content, content on the lines of “If I do this, then that will happen” (How
WeAct, pages 136-137). The agent’s conscious responsiveness to conditional
content is certainly significant. But Enç’s approach merely has the subject
work through the consequences of alternatives and select the most desirable
option. Once all of the facts about consequences and preferences are in, the
computation proceeds as if merely following a program.My concern is that
this does not allow us to see deliberation with mastery.
Enç recognizes the need for variability in weightings (ibid., pages 222-
223), but he does not go into detail as to the mechanism of variation.
Indeed, he appears to rest content with the variation of weightings in
response to circumstances. Fortunately, a possible mechanism is available.
Harry Frankfurt distinguishes between first-order desires, such as the desire
to take a dose of a drug and the desire to be free of addiction to that drug,
and second-order desires, such as a desire that the desire to be free of the
addiction should prevail (“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person”, pages 327-329). Such a hierarchy of desires certainly allows for
flexibility in weights and in the use that is made of pieces of evidence in
argument. It also allows for the production of reasoned arguments as to
why certain choices were appropriate. In short, it gives us most of what we
want, and it can do so within a naturalistic framework. It is true that Enç’s
diagrams of decision-making processes include boxes labelled “higher
order of preferences”, but these appear to be general preferences that allow
the evaluation of consequences, rather than second-order desires in
Frankfurt’s sense (Enç,HowWeAct, pages 157, 158 and 171). It is not clear
whether they could lead to the flexibility to which second-order desires
could lead. But it does not matter for my purposes whether either Frankfurt
or Enç has the correct approach, because what they offer is still not enough.
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It is not enough because the addition of a layer of higher-order
desires, or even several layers, would merely make the program more
complex. Seeing a subject as deliberating with mastery involves seeing him
as standing above any program.Making a programmore elaborate cannot
give us what we need. For the same reason, the two-level theory of the mind
that is given by Keith Frankish, in Mind and Supermind, cannot give us
what we need. (Frankish distinguishes a special category of supermental
states and processes, which are of general application and of which we can
be consciously aware. We can use these states to regulate lower-level mental
processes of which we are not generally conscious, and to resolve tangles
that afflict those lower-level processes.) Not even the rich and sophisticated
model of self-governance that Michael Bratman develops in Structures of
Agency will suffice.
In order to see ourselves as deliberators with mastery, we do need the
sort of complexity of structure that is offered by proposals such as those
of Enç, Frankfurt, Frankish and Bratman.We also need the meta-symbolic
ability, the ability to symbolize our symbols, that is described by Hans Lenk
in “Humans as Meta-symbolic and Super-Interpreting Beings”. Without
that ability, we would not be able consciously to evaluate our lower-order
preferences by reference to our higher-order preferences. These things are
necessary, but insufficient. With the complexity that they allow, we can see
ourselves as attaching weights to pieces of evidence, as putting the weighted
pieces of evidence into play and as selecting methods of argument that take
us from weighted evidence to conclusions as to what to do. We can also
see our selections as made under the guidance of higher-order principles,
rather than their being random or without identifiable sources. We can
then see that the choices of weights and of methods of argument can be our
choices. They are choices that make sense and that can be justified. We can
even see our choices of higher-order principles in the same light, by taking
those choices to be made under the guidance of yet higher-order principles.
We are well into the realm of which Kant wrote, when he stated that “only
a rational being has the capacity to act according to the representation of
laws, that is, according to principles” (Groundwork of theMetaphysics of
Morals, Ak.4: 412). We also have enough to give us the reflective distance
between our incentives to act and our decisions that Christine Korsgaard
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identifies (Self-Constitution, section 6.1.7). At least, we can have that
reflective distance so long as “incentives” has its ordinary meaning, and is
not read so broadly as to encompass all of the rational antecedents of our
deliberations.
Building in all of this brings us almost to the point where we can see
ourselves as deliberators with mastery, so that we can see ourselves neither
as followers of programs, nor as lacking control. But it does not quite get
us there, because when a subject gets above the top of the hierarchy of
principles, he stands above the program but is no longer guided entirely by
the highest-order principles, so that the process is seen as being at least to
some extent out of control. On the other hand, when the subject is guided
entirely by the highest-order principles, he no longer stands above the
program. A position of mastery that was thus conceived would be unstable.
A subject might see himself as above the highest-order principles, but he
could at best only see himself as sustaining that position for an instant. He
would need those principles to catch up with him, in order to maintain
control. (This would not imply an indefinitely large number of layers of
principles, with a new layer being added at each instant. The principles
could catch up by the subject’s sinking back down.) Even this momentary
mastery might be impossible to conceive coherently.
The instability at best, and incoherence at worst, of a position of
mastery as thus conceived is highlighted by an argument that is put forward
by Simon Blackburn (Ruling Passions, chapter 8, section 3). He argues that
when we deliberate about what to do, we look outward at the world rather
than looking inward at our desires and inclinations. We should not see
ourselves as pushed around by our desires and inclinations, but should
welcome their influence because they constitute us, or at least the more
stable ones do. They are not external forces. Likewise, Christine
Korsgaard’s vision of a subject who adjudicates between desires, rather
than being carried along by the strongest desire, is a coherent and stable
vision because the subject has contentful principles according to which he
makes his decisions, albeit principles that he has in his view legislated for
himself (The Sources of Normativity, page 100). Correspondingly, it would
seem to be a mistake for a subject to see an internal queen who would sit
above all of his desires, inclinations and principles and weigh them in the
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balance, as well as weighing the relevant evidence about the state of the
world, when working out what to do. That would seem to be, in Leibniz’s
words, “une prosopopée ou fiction un peu mal entendue”, “a prosopopoeia
or fiction a little ill-conceived” (“Remarques sur le Livre de l’Origine du
Mal, publié depuis peu en Angleterre”, section 16, in Essais de Théodicée).
We may add a standard objection to anything like the picture of a queen
who sits above all rational antecedents, which is that the queen would lack
any character, so that her decisions would be random. I shall return to this
objection in section 3.8. My response will be to keep the queen’s operation
mysterious, so that her decisions cannot be characterized either as random
or as non-random.
If we seek an account of what we usually do, Blackburn is right. We
take our desires and inclinations as given. Sometimes we review our first-
order desires in the light of our higher-order desires, along the lines that
have been proposed by Frankfurt, but Blackburn need not find that
objectionable. What he does find objectionable is the idea of weighing all
of our desires and inclinations in the balance, along with the evidence that
we have. He goes beyond Leibniz’s point, by arguing that if we are
concerned with what to do in a given situation, the last thing we want to
do is divert our attention from the immediate problem to our thoughts
about it (Ruling Passions, page 254). Blackburn’s point could be disputed
whenever the problem was of a type that made systematic deliberation
appropriate, and whenever we wanted to be wary of the influence of our
prejudices, but in any case the point does not bear on my model of
deliberation with mastery. I am only concerned that we should see the
subject as standing back and freely choosing how to weight the evidence
and which method of argument to use. The subject can be seen as not
merely following a program that captures the content of the rational
antecedents, without being seen as thinking about his prior inclinations.
Even so, the other difficulties stand. We must look for another way to see
mastery.
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CHAPTER 2
How to see mastery
If we should see ourselves as having mastery, we must understand how
to see ourselves in that light, and the implications of doing so. This chapter
covers that ground.
In section 2.1, I baldly assert that we should simply see mastery, and
note that in order to make this assertion acceptable, a fuller picture must
be developed and must be related to our scientific view of the world. In
section 2.2, I set out the relationship between deliberation with mastery
and the causal closure of the physical. The latter must be overlooked in
order to allow us to see the former. This raises the question of how we are
to see deliberation as being appropriately controlled. In section 2.3, I
introduce a way to supply the required control. In section 2.4, I set out two
conceptions of humanity, one of which is the right one for my proposal.
Setting out these conceptions highlights the non-naturalistic nature of my
proposal.
2.1 The assertion of mastery
My proposal is simply to see a subject, when he deliberates, as having
mastery, in that he has control and does not merely follow a course that is
indicated by the rational antecedents. We need not see the subject as bound
to follow such a course, even if we ignore the option of flouting the
accepted logic and also ignore the possibility of a failure to implement that
logic correctly in grey matter. We can see the subject as making free, but
controlled, choices at the selection stage of deliberation. Those choices
have an identifiable source in the subject.
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Suppose, for example, that someone is always inclined to discount
consequences of an action that lie more than five years ahead, because of
the uncertainty of such distant consequences. Suppose in addition that in
fact he always adheres to that policy, but that he is, so far as his general
capacities go, able to consider breaking with the policy. Then on the
approach that is being proposed here, he should be seen as having the
option, on each occasion of deliberation, of breaking with his policy,
becoming less concerned about uncertainty and starting to consider
consequences that lie in the distant future, without flouting the logic of
deliberation that is taken as given. Furthermore, we should not suppose
that any lack of control would be involved in any such deviation from the
normal policy that might take place. (It may not actually take place. We are
only considering how we should react to a deviation that we are to see as
possible, even though physical determinism may mean that it is not in fact
possible.) Nor should we see control as being supplied by any higher-order
policy, because we need to see the subject as having freedom to go outside
the program that would capture the entire content of the rational
antecedents. Thus I propose a flat denial that the subject’s progress toward
a conclusion should be seen either as the working out of a mechanical
process, or as random and uncontrolled. Even when there is no change of
policy, no going outside the program, we should see the subject as freely
deciding to proceed in a way that happens to amount to compliance with
the program. A subject’s change of policy, suddenly considering
consequences ten years hence when he had previously only ever considered
consequences that lay up to five years ahead, would not in everyday life be
likely to disturb us. We accept that people sometimes change their minds.
The current discussion is simply meant to expose what is involved in our
regarding such a change of mind as always an option for the subject,
without regarding it as an option, the exercise of which would amount to
the operation of any kind of mechanism that governed the thought of the
subject and that would ensure that he took up the option, or the exercise
of which would have no identifiable source.
My bald assertion that mastery should be seen will naturally give rise
to a suspicion that my proposal has the advantages of theft over honest
toil. To defend the proposal against that charge, I must develop a full
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picture of ourselves as exercising mastery, and must establish that this
picture gives us useful results, while also being satisfactorily related to the
picture of ourselves and of the world that the natural sciences give us.
These tasks will occupy me in this chapter and the next.
2.2 Causation and control
The place to start is the relationship between seeing people as deliberating
with mastery, and seeing them as physical beings who are embedded in the
causal network. We are to see the subject as having a range of options. She
is to be seen as able to choose any one of a range of courses of deliberation,
including courses that are not indicated by the rational antecedents, so that
she could go outside the program that captured their content. But we
cannot see the subject as having such a choice, even if we do not see her as
exercising it, if we take full account of the determinism that we see at the
level of physics. A link between determinism and compliance with the
program is given by the fact that our processes of reasoning and the courses
of development of our brains do generally march in step. Given that we
generally reason in accordance with our rational antecedents, the
deterministic course of development of a subject’s brain will in general
correspond to compliance with her program. This link only holds most of
the time, not always, although it could be argued to be necessary that it
does hold most of the time. But the fallibility of the link will not matter
here, because the argument will be based on the fact that if mastery is seen
on a given occasion, a wide variety of options must be seen as open to the
subject on that occasion. It will only matter that determinism in the course
of development of the subject’s brain would not allow such a range. It will
not matter whether or not the course of development that was physically
possible would correspond to compliance with the program.
References to determinism might appear to assume too much. Our
physical theories also allow for randomness. But that randomness is
irrelevant in this context, for two reasons. First, if the randomness is based
on quantum mechanics, even a single brain cell is too large and too warm
for quantum effects to be of any significance. Second, we cannot expect
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randomness to turn up obligingly at appropriate moments, to give us the
choices that we want to see ourselves as having. This second reason for not
relying on appeals to randomness applies not just to randomness that is
based on quantum mechanics, but also to randomness that is taken by
neuroscientists to arise at higher levels. Examples are when synaptic
transmitter release is modelled stochastically and, to move up to an even
higher level, when the successive states of activity of a network are
modelled as aMarkov chain (Dayan and Abbott,Theoretical Neuroscience,
pages 178-180 and 273-276). Likewise, we cannot rely on the lack of strict
psychophysical laws, laws that might rigidly link mental and physical
descriptions of the same events, a lack for which Donald Davidson argued
(“Mental Events”, part 2). There might be psychophysical laws that were
not loose enough, or that were not loose in the right ways, even though
they were not perfectly strict. I shall also make some points about the lack
of help from the multiple physical realizability of mental states below. In
short, we must face determinism squarely. But the claim that this is a
problem still requires an argument in its support.
The precise claim is that we must, when we see the subject as having
mastery over the selection stage, overlook the causal closure of the physical.
We must do so even though the outcome of the selection stage will never
in fact differ from any outcome that would be predicted by an analysis of
physical processes, nor should we ever expect it to differ from such an
outcome. We are to overlook what the natural sciences tell us about causal
processes, not fly in the face of the predictions that the sciences allow us to
make.
The doctrine of the causal closure of the physical must first be
defined. I shall take it to be the doctrine that “every physical phenomenon
that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical cause” (Montero,
“Varieties of Causal Closure”, page 174). This formulation does allow that
some physical phenomena might lack sufficient causes, and that possibility
needs to be excluded in order for my argument to go through. We can
exclude it because we are not in the realms in which quantum effects are
relevant, and because there are no other specific reasons to think that
physical events might just happen. It is true that even though an event of
the type with which we are immediately concerned would not be influenced
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by quantum effects, it might have had ancestors in its causal history that
were so influenced. But while that would make space for a lack of sufficient
causes for the event with which we were concerned, there would be no
reason to think that there would have been a gap in physical causal history
that could have accommodated a mental cause, a possibility that would
create problems for my argument. The gap would have been too small for
anything that had determinate mental content to fit into it. It could not
have accommodated enough information. And there would be no reason to
think that any appropriate non-physical cause would have been around at
the time when the gap existed, ready to take advantage of it. Finally, if we
combine the exclusion of a lack of sufficient causes with the doctrine of the
causal closure of the physical, that excludes causal action of the non-
physical on the physical, or at least makes it idle. This exclusion is also
needed in order for the argument to go through.
Three facts together mean that we must overlook the causal closure of
the physical in order to see the subject as having the options that we want
to see her as having. The first fact is that the brain is embedded in the causal
network, just like any other object. The second fact is that there cannot be
a difference in mental states unless there is a difference in physical states.
(The difference in physical states might be inside or outside the subject. I
do not wish to dismiss externalism about mental content.) Any
scientifically plausible account of the humanmindmust make it dependent
on the physical states of the world, and primarily of the brain, to that
extent. The third fact is that the correspondence between those physical
states and the mental states of a given person must be stable in the physical-
to-mental direction. If it could vary from moment to moment, we would
have no explanation of how we were able to engage in extended processes
of reasoning. That ability needs to be explained by the existence of a
reasonably stable, although not necessarily immutable, function from the
states of a person’s brain and of the surrounding world to her thoughts.
Only a physical brain has the inertia that can keep a train of thought on
track, and the effects of that inertia must be transmitted to the train of
thought via a stable correspondence. It follows that a given course of
development of a subject’s brain is only going to correspond to one course
of reasoning, and that the correspondence must be settled in advance. It
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cannot be varied to any significant extent as the reasoning progresses. I
shall now explain why these three facts require us to overlook the causal
closure of the physical.
We are to see the subject as having open to her a range of possible
sets of weights to attach to pieces of evidence, and a range of possible
methods of argument. The making of one selection, of weights or of
method, rather than another, would require the course of development of
the subject’s brain to remain appropriately aligned with the subsequent
course of reasoning, even if the differences between the possible selections,
and hence the differences between the possible subsequent courses of
reasoning, were considerable. It would only be possible for the course of
development of the subject’s brain to remain appropriately aligned with
the course of reasoning, after the making of one or another of a range of
significantly different selections, if one of two alternatives applied. The
first alternative would be for the choice between the selections to be
governed by some physical process that would also steer the brain into
continued alignment with the course of reasoning, whatever choice was
made. The second alternative would be for the choice to steer the brain.
The course of development of the brain would have to take a sudden turn.
This would require a deflection of the physical world from its course by
something that was purely non-physical, in the sense that it did not even
have a physical counterpart with which it was correlated for reasons other
than action of the non-physical on the physical. If there were such a
counterpart, we would have an instance of the first alternative. As I am
about to argue that the first alternative would be unacceptable, rather than
useless, such physical counterparts of the non-physical items under the
second alternative must be avoided.
The first alternative would be unacceptable because physical
determinism, the causal closure of the physical, the physical nature of the
brain, the dependence of the mental on the physical and the stability of
the correspondence between physical and mental states in the physical-to-
mental direction would mean that we could not see the subject as having
open choices. The physical process could only go in one way, so the choice
between selections could only go in one way. We must therefore adopt the
second alternative and see the choice as steering the brain, that is, see the
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purely non-physical as acting on the physical. But we cannot see that as
happening, so long as we have the causal closure of the physical in view, and
also require physical phenomena to have sufficient causes. I conclude that
if we are to see deliberation with mastery, we must overlook the causal
closure of the physical. But we must not expect ever to see an actual
deflection of the physical world from its causal course. We will never need
to find actual action of the non-physical on the physical, in order to explain
the alignment between the course of development of a subject’s brain and
the course of her reasoning.
Where does that leave the indeterminacy of reasoning that we can
often expect to be allowed by programs, as distinct from physical
indeterminacy? The playing out of indeterminacy of reasoning would not
satisfy our desire to see ourselves as making free and controlled choices.
And as it happens, its playing out would not require us to see anything that
conflicted with the causal closure of the physical. Indeterminacy at the level
of reasoning need not be underpinned by anything strange at the physical
level, not even physical indeterminacy. Indeterminacy in processes of
reasoning could, for example, arise out of the subject’s use of loose
definitions of concepts, while the use of a specific set of definitions of
concepts, whether tight or loose, could correspond to any one of a wide
range of different brain states. Each initial brain state could participate in
an entirely deterministic evolution of the physical world, but each different
initial brain state would lead to a different path of physical evolution, those
paths corresponding to potentially (but not necessarily) different outcomes
of the process at the level of reasoning. The non-existence of
psychophysical laws that are strict in the mental-to-physical direction, a
non-existence that allows each mental state to be correlated with any one
of a range of possible physical states, is a necessary condition for
indeterminacy at the mental level on the back of determinism at the
physical level. It is necessary because if there is no difference between two
states of the world at the physical level, there can be no difference at the
mental level. And the causal processes in question are deterministic.
Quantum effects are irrelevant in this context because of the size and
warmth of brain cells. Nor are causal processes indeterministic by virtue
of the need to model certain brain processes stochastically. That need
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merely reflects our inability to handle detailed information that captures
the full physical complexity of a large system.
There is another necessary condition, which is that the indeterminacy
should be built in at the level of reasoning. It may, for example, be built in
through the subject’s use of loose definitions. The causal mechanism
cannot on its own, without looseness that is given at the level of reasoning,
generate the same effects as would result at the level of reasoning from, for
example, using loose definitions. The causal mechanism obviously could
not do so in the absence of multiple realizability. Adding multiple
realizability does not do the trick, for two reasons. The first reason is that
the physically possible courses of evolution of the brain from its possible
initial states would be most unlikely to correspond to the logically possible
courses of loose reasoning, unless that range of initial states of the brain
was primarily defined by sources of looseness that were given at the level
of reasoning, such as loose definitions. The second reason is that multiple
realizability need not in itself open up a range of possible paths at the level
of reasoning. We can see this by considering a process of reasoning that
uses tight definitions and a precise logic, eliminating indeterminacy at that
level. Such a process can still be realized in a variety of different ways at the
level of brain cells. Feedback loops and other control mechanisms will,
however, ensure that all of the different evolutionary paths, paths that start
with the different initial states of the brain, include only states that
correspond to stages in the correct path at the level of reasoning. At least,
they will ensure that happy outcome absent malfunctions of the brain. The
fact that our brains can keep themselves on track like this is one aspect of
their ability to handle the processes of reasoning that we use.
These arguments about loose reasoning have parallels in arguments
that are directly related to mastery. There are two good reasons why we
should not expect multiple realizability to allow us to accommodate
mastery over the selection stage, without overlooking the causal closure of
the physical. The first reason is that it would be a miracle if the range of
possible courses of physical evolution of the brain corresponded to the
range of choices that must be seen as open to the subject. The second
reason is that a brain can follow determinate courses of reasoning, despite
being liable to realize any given course of reasoning in any one of a variety
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of physically different ways, so that multiple realizability need not open
up the options that we might hope it would open up.
Those who do not believe in suspension of the causal closure of the
physical might be tempted to reject my entire project at this point. That
would be premature. I do not myself believe that such suspensions actually
occur, nor do I believe that there is a special form of causation, such as
agent causation, alongside ordinary physical causation. The project will
be saved from the objection that causal closure is never suspended by the
fact that the proposal is only to see deliberation as if the causal closure of
the physical were not there. There is no claim that it is in fact not there. But
there is still a debate to be had about the legitimacy of overlooking the
causal closure of the physical. It would not be legitimate if it required us
to contradict the results of the natural sciences. Overlooking causal closure
does not require us to contradict empirical data at the level of
measurements that can be taken, even if we do find sufficient physical
causes for physical phenomena whenever we bother to look for them. Just
for once, Hume’s point that causal necessity is not straightforwardly visible
is helpful (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 7, part
2). Nonetheless, the principle of the causal closure of the physical is on the
border between being physical and being metaphysical. The more that it
can be regarded as metaphysical, the less the danger that overlooking causal
closure would amount to contradiction of what the natural sciences told us.
But even if that defence were to fail, I could derive support from the
legitimacy of partial descriptions of the world, fromwhich physical details
were omitted. I discuss that legitimacy in section 3.6.
If we have to overlook the causal closure of the physical in order to see
a subject as deliberating with mastery, we have a problem of how to see
our processes of deliberation as subject to appropriate control. We do not
want to see ourselves as mere ciphers, without prior inclinations, whose
deliberations do not reflect our own characters. Nor do we want to see our
choices of action or adoptions of belief as lacking sufficient identifiable
sources. The existence of a logical course that can be described as the
execution of a program, and that can be physically embodied, addresses the
need for control very well. But if the subject were seen as free to go outside
the program, not by flouting the accepted logic but by breaking free from
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the effect of her prior inclinations, if the underlying physical causal
mechanism were not seen as all-powerful, and if no new source of control
were brought into view, could that be satisfactory? My proposal does not
require us to ignore the influence of prior inclinations. We can see them as
having influence, subject to due consideration. But if that consideration
were to be seen as uncontrolled, there would be a danger that we would
have to see the process that was influenced by the prior inclinations as
uncontrolled too. We might have to say that a selection stage could have
turned out differently, leading to its being followed by a different
calculation, which would in turn have led to a different substantive
outcome, for no particular reason. The consequent picture of ourselves
would not measure up to our self-conception.
2.3 Coping without causation
A consequence of the need to overlook the causal closure of the physical,
and the need to tackle the problem of control, is that the best approach is
to see human beings, when engaged in deliberation, as points of origin.
Their decisions at the selection stage on how to weight evidence, and on
how to argue, should be seen as originating in themselves at times of
decision, with no prior causal or computational history, rather than as
consequences of rational or natural antecedents. There is no suggestion
that rational antecedents should be disregarded by the subject. Indeed,
pieces of evidence may by their nature suggest weights. Thus one piece of
evidence might be that information from a given source was generally
reliable, and that might lead to significant weight being given to other
pieces of evidence that were derived from that source. But the substantive
choice of action or the adoption of the substantive belief, the final product
of a process that is seen as one of deliberation with mastery, cannot simply
be seen as having emerged mechanically from the antecedents, whether
rational or natural. We need to see a special contribution from the subject.
This is the free selection of the set of weights to attach to pieces of
evidence, and of the method of argument. In that sense the subject is to be
seen as a point of origin, as the identified source of the free decisions. This
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does not mean that the subject’s special contribution should be seen as
making any practical difference. We must acknowledge that the outcome
would have been the same, and that we would have anticipated the same
outcome, even if we had not seen this special contribution as having been
made. We know that the subject is part of the physical world, and that the
world is not in fact going to veer off its causal paths, save on account of
mere indeterminacy.
Decisions that are seen as originating in the subject at the time of
decision, and not as following from antecedents, will be regarded as the
results of a process that I shall call subject origination. Decisions as to
weights and methods will be seen in that light when we see the subject as
having mastery over the selection stage. When a human being engages in
subject origination, I shall speak of her being a point of origin. I shall use
the term “originator conception” for the conception of human beings as
such points of origin.
So far, the problem has been re-labelled rather than solved. In chapter
3, I shall say more about subject origination. I shall also set out a concept
of the subject under which we can see ourselves as engaging in subject
origination. But I shall make a start here with a brief description of how
the process is envisaged, and of how instances of it should be seen as
related to the causal network of the world.
We are to overlook the causal closure of the physical. We are to see a
causally efficacious extraneous intervention at the selection stage of
deliberation. The supposed causal effect is the steering of the brain into a
particular course which will then match the course of reasoning that
follows from the subject’s free but controlled choices of weights and of
method. The causal efficacy of such an intervention would have no place
in nature. But we need to see an intervention if we are to see the subject as
freely choosing from the full range of sets of weights to attach to pieces of
evidence, and from the full range of methods of argument, that would in
general be available to her. And the intervention needs to be seen as causally
efficacious, in order to explain how the brain then keeps up with the mind.
The fact that the intervention would, if it were real, be causally idle,
because the world never in fact deviates from its normal causal paths, does
not remove the need for it to be seen as efficacious.
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This overlooking of causal closure is not a matter of imposing dead
ends on causal chains just before the moment of decision, which is what
would be needed if the subject were seen as entirely within the causal
network. Instead, it is a matter of seeing the subject as able to act from
outside the causal network. There is also no suggestion that we should
elaborate the picture into one that involved a homunculus within the
subject, tempting though that might be. The introduction of such a
creature might seem to be an easy way to give the subject control. But it
would only generate a regress, when we asked who controlled the
homunculus, or land us back where we started, if the homunculus were
seen as embedded in the causal network. My proposal does not involve
seeing as inserted into the causal flow anything more than the emanations
of the subject, whose nature as the source of those emanations is not
further specified. The originator conception of human beings is the
conception of them as points of origin of such emanations. Whenever we
see a human being as deliberating with mastery, we see an instance of
subject origination. Whether the consequences are as envisaged by the
subject should, of course, be seen as depending on the working out of the
many causal currents that started before the deliberation, as well as on the
subject’s input. The new causal current that is seen as starting with the
subject merges into the stream of the world, like a tributary flowing into a
river. What happens downstream of that point will be very greatly affected
by the flow of the main river upstream of that point.
On the specific point of control, I must admit to the issue of a
promissory note that is not backed by any gold, even if my proposal might
not quite amount to theft. No mechanism of subject origination is
specified. It would not even be possible to specify one while retaining the
function of subject origination, because the efficacy of any mechanism
could only be explained if it, or some other mechanism, the states of which
were for good reason in a stable correspondence with its states, were seen
as embedded in a causal network. Such embedding would be needed in
order to account for the embedded mechanism’s functioning, that is, for
the efficacy of its parts as those parts acted on one another. Thus I assert,
but do not account for, the subject’s control over the selection stage of
deliberation. My defence against a charge of theft is that I only propose
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seeing people as engaging in subject origination. I do not assert that there
is any real process of subject origination.
In the same vein, I should emphasize that seeing deliberations as
conducted with mastery, and hence as involving subject origination, does
not entail commitment to the proposition that different choices could in
fact have been made, that is, to the principle of alternate possibilities that
has been proposed as a litmus test both of freedom and of moral
responsibility, although its status as a litmus test of moral responsibility
has also been attacked (Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility”). Such a commitment is avoided because we merely adopt
a way of looking at processes of deliberation.
2.4 Two conceptions of humanity
I have introduced the originator conception of human beings. In this
section, I shall contrast it with the naturalistic conception. This will bring
out the non-naturalistic nature of my proposal.
Applying the naturalistic conception, we see ourselves from the
outside, objectively. In practice this means that we see ourselves simply as
animals, physical beings in the world who are subject to all of the natural
laws of the world, and as vehicles of processes within the life of the mind,
including processes of selection and of calculation, that are embodied in
our grey cells. We write natural histories of ourselves. We note that it is
perfectly possible that everything that we think and do is determined, even
though multiple layers of processing within our brains give us a remarkable
subtlety of thought and of conduct. If we apply the naturalistic conception,
we can perfectly well adopt the program view of our deliberations.
Applying the naturalistic conception means describing ourselves in
terms that only bring out features that would be visible to a very wide range
of rational beings. Such features include not just physical features, but also
features that are given in terms of information theory. In broad terms, they
are the features that could be picked out by scientific theories, including
the theories of psychology. (I shall discuss the extent to which intentional
descriptions could be used in section 3.7.) The point of singling out the
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naturalistic conception is that whenwe apply it, the accounts that we give are
uncontentiously intellectually respectable. Their widespread accessibility,
well beyond the human race, testifies to that respectability.We can apply the
naturalistic conception without having to justify our doing so.
The reference to a very wide range of rational beings involves a
vagueness that is sadly unavoidable. It is tempting to eliminate the
vagueness by referring to all rational beings, but that would go too far. The
conduct of some of the natural sciences, including those that encompass
the scientific study of humanity, requires use of the concept of causation
in a form that incorporates the notion of causal necessity. As will emerge
in section 6.4, we cannot be sure that this concept would be shared by all
rational beings, although we can assume that it would be shared by a range
of possible or actual rational beings that was much wider than humanity
alone. The use of intentional descriptions would further narrow the range
of rational beings that could comprehend our naturalistic descriptions of
ourselves.
Applying the originator conception, we see ourselves as points of
origin of our decisions as to how to weight evidence and as to what
methods of argument to use, rather than merely as followers of programs.
This reflects our own sense of deliberation. Correspondingly, we want to
see more than would be allowed if we saw ourselves merely as the loci of
complex interweavings of many causal chains. We would have no reason to
see ourselves as any more than such loci if we saw our brains merely as
implementing programs that captured the content of the rational
antecedents of deliberations. It is, however, interesting to note a tendency
among some philosophers who, like me, seek a picture of ourselves that
we can accept as true to our lives, to take as a starting point the idea that
many causal chains come together in each human being. One example is
the discussion of activity, initiation and guidance control in Fischer,
“Compatibilism”, sections 6 to 9. Another is the point that is made by E.
J. Lowe, that the unity of an action is only reflected in the agent, and is lost
in the ramified causal chains that stretch into the past, even when we only
go far enough back to see those chains as running all over the different
parts of the agent’s brain (Personal Agency, section 5.4). Lowe does not,
however, make his point in order to rest content with a straightforwardly
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naturalistic account. He makes it as part of an argument for a non-
Cartesian substance dualism.
Application of the originator conception to ourselves brings out
apparent features that would not be visible to nearly so wide a range of
rational beings as the range that could appreciate a natural history of
humanity. A rational being without inner experience that was sufficiently
like our own would not appreciate either our attitude toward ourselves, or
our inner experience of free but controlled deliberation, and could at best
only apply our originator conception to us in a purely formal, contentless
way. (Such a being might, however, apply something analogous to the
originator conception to himself and to others who were like him. And he
might also try to apply his conception to us, while suspecting that this would
misrepresent our inner experience.) Application of the originator
conception takes us beyond the bounds of natural histories of ourselves. Its
application also requires us to overlook the causal closure of the physical,
a closure that is taken for granted in the natural sciences. For both of these
reasons, the originator conception is a non-naturalistic conception. Any
claim that it is legitimate to use the originator conception requires argument.
The naturalistic conception of ourselves cannot be discarded, or even
played down. The scientific enterprise, which is the primary field of
application of the naturalistic conception of everything, ourselves included,
has been so successful in helping us to understand and manipulate the
world that it must be a correct way of approaching the world. It is probable
that much of the detail of current scientific knowledge gives us final and
correct answers on the subjects with which the natural sciences deal, even
though in some areas, including fundamentals such as the nature of matter,
new revolutions may well lie in store. But if we were to limit ourselves to
the naturalistic conception, we would be unable to use the notion of
deliberation with mastery to support our self-conception and to
accommodate the phenomenology of deliberation. We would lose an
opportunity to construct a philosophy that would help to make us feel at
home in the world.
The Davidsonian tradition
I have now said enough to be able to comment on the relationship between
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my approach and a strong philosophical tradition that would oppose the
view that acknowledging the causal closure of the physical would debar us
from simultaneously seeing ourselves as going through rational processes
of choice of action. This is the Davidsonian tradition that reasons can
themselves be causes, albeit in the way of singular causes, the operations
of which are not apt to be brought under rigorous covering laws that would
be of much use in prediction (see Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and
Causes”, and the large literature that takes its rise from that paper). A
significant paper that is broadly within that tradition, while not wholly
agreeing with Davidson, Jennifer Hornsby’s “Agency and Causal
Explanation”, starts by considering two points of view, just as I adopt two
conceptions of ourselves. Hornsby argues that an action can be seen from a
personal point of view as a person’s doing something for a reason, and from
an impersonal point of view as a link in a causal chain (ibid., section 1).
The difference between the Davidsonian tradition and my proposal is
this. Working within the tradition, we come to each instance of human
conduct, apply the two points of view to it, and then seek to reconcile
them. I propose choosing one or the other conception of ourselves first,
according to our purposes, then going out and looking for instances of
deliberation to view under the chosen conception. Davidsonians seek local
reconciliations. I seek a modus vivendi between two global conceptions.
This difference is easily explained. Davidsonians are primarily interested in
why choices are made, and specifically in explaining the relationship
between the outcomes of causal processes and the outcomes that make
sense in the light of the reasons of which agents are aware. I am primarily
interested in the process of deliberation. My concern is with supposed
freedom rather than with actual rationality. For a process to be seen as one
of deliberation with mastery, the causal closure of the physical must be
banished from the scene from the outset. Davidsonians and I need not
disagree. We simply have different concerns.
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CHAPTER 3
Subject origination
In this chapter, I argue that the concept of subject origination can do
the job that it has to do. I also compare my approach with some approaches
of other philosophers. In section 3.1, I locate subject origination and the
originator conception in relation to the naturalistic conception of ourselves
and in relation to agent causation. Section 3.2 covers the phenomenology
of subject origination. Section 3.3 covers both the need to be able to enter
into one another’s heads, and what is involved in doing so. In section 3.4,
I consider the range of beings to which we would attribute subject
origination. Robots and aliens are both likely to be excluded, but for
different reasons.
In section 3.5, I argue that the concept of subject origination is
sufficient to do its job. There are two types of sufficiency at stake,
sufficiency of content and sufficiency of status. Content is supplied from
elsewhere. The status in question is that of being a mere way of looking at
our processes of deliberation. I consider two specific aspects of the work
that the concept of subject origination might do, the explanation of human
actions and the attribution of responsibility for those actions. In section
3.6, I consider the legitimacy of use of the concept of subject origination.
The relationship between the view of ourselves that is given when it is used
and the scientific view is crucial here. I also consider the standards which
ensure that the view that is given is not an arbitrary view.
In section 3.7, I consider other approaches that are in play in the same
field as subject origination. Agent causation differs from subject
origination primarily because its proponents mostly seek to establish the
existence of something that is in the world, alongside event causation. The
intentional stance, as proposed by Daniel Dennett, contrasts with the
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originator conception because it could be adopted while conceiving of
humanity in purely scientific terms. There would, however, be significant
difficulty in arriving at the correct intentional stance to adopt without
drawing on our own inner experience. In section 3.8, I propose a concept
of the subject that allows us to see ourselves as engaging in subject
origination.
3.1 Subject origination and other views
If we adopt the naturalistic conception of ourselves, that gives us a view of
each process of deliberation. We see the process as a series of events
alongside other events in the world, all of which fall within the network of
causes and effects. (If we characterize the process at the level of reasoning,
we do not see physical causes and effects, but we do see a process that is
tied to a progression of physical causes and effects.) If we adopt the
originator conception of ourselves, that gives us a different view. There is a
supposed causally efficacious extraneous intervention at the selection stage,
and the outcome of that stage is seen as explained by more than the
operation of a program. When we see the process in that way, we see it as
involving subject origination. We then see the subject as a point of origin.
The term “subject origination” is a convenient way of bringing out what
we need to see, the extraneous intervention. But its use, in addition to use
of the term “deliberation with mastery”, not only marks this specific way
of supporting our self-conception. It also leaves open the possibility that
subject originationmight be seen in contexts other than that of deliberation.
The view of human deliberation that is afforded by the naturalistic
conception is likely to be thought of as the more substantial view, and
rightly so. It sets our deliberation in the context of scientific theories that
hold over a far wider area than that of human life. Psychology, in the form
in which it applies to us, may be a discipline that can only be applied to
human beings, but our psychological nature depends very largely on our
biology, and human biology has a great deal in common with the biology
of other animals. Biology is in turn intimately bound up with chemistry,
and chemistry with physics. Our theories of chemistry and of physics, to
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the extent that we have got them right, apply across all or most of the
Universe, and they apply both to the animate and to the inanimate. Once
we see how the scientific view of our mental lives is set within this much
wider context, we can see that it is much more substantial than any view
that lacks such connections to our view of the rest of the world.
The view of human deliberation that is afforded by the originator
conception lacks this degree of integration with the rest of our knowledge.
There is no direct link with independent areas of our knowledge, such as
physics and chemistry. There are direct links with history and with the
other humanities, in which we see people as rational agents who decide
what to do and then act, and in which we see art and literature as capturing
our inner sense of living and loving. But as the word “humanities” suggests,
these disciplines are not independent of our conception of ourselves as
beings who have distinctive characteristics, simply by virtue of being
human. In the light of this lack of direct links with independent disciplines,
I cannot claim that the view of human deliberation that is based on the
originator conception is anything more substantial than a view. It cannot
be a robust foundation for conclusions about the true nature of the world.
If we took it to be something more substantial than a view, and attributed
reality to what was seen when we adopted the originator conception, we
would make unjustified claims. If, for example, we were to take the
supposed extraneous interventions to be real events in some non-physical
realm, we would advance a claim that was at best unverifiable, and at worst
a mere indulgence in mysticism.
I limit the degree of mystery that inevitably attaches to use of the
concept of subject origination by accepting that the view that we get is
only a view, and nothing more, although I would need a generous notion
of verification, one that was not limited to reliance on the physically
measurable, in order to rebut a charge of creating space for unverifiable
claims about instances of human deliberation. The challenge is to show
that this minimal position allows the view to have sufficient status, both to
support our self-conception and to accommodate the phenomenology of
deliberation.
A rather stronger claim than that of subject origination, a claim that
agents are causes in a way that cannot be reduced to the causation of events
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by other events, is the core of the various doctrines that go under the name
of agent causation. The claim is stronger because agent causation is
generally taken to be as real as event causation, although event causation
itself may or may not be taken to be real in any strong sense. Subject
origination as advocated here might be construed as a variant of agent
causation without this presumption of equal reality, although the accuracy
of that construal would depend on its precise content. My claim is not that
we are points of origin, but that it is legitimate and productive to see us as
points of origin. I do not formulate the doctrine of subject origination as
a variant doctrine of agent causation, for three reasons. First, it is more
straightforward to define a position from scratch than it would be to
identify a specific form of agent causation from among those on offer,
modify it and then add enough commentary to ensure that the desired
position was stated. Second, I am concerned with processes of explicit
deliberation that lead up to choices of action or adoptions of belief,
whereas the proponents of agent causation are mostly interested in actions
in general, whether or not they follow explicit deliberation, and are often
not much interested in adoptions of belief. Third, I wish to avoid
commitment to the libertarian incompatibilism that often, although not
always, accompanies the advocacy of agent causation. In broad terms, I
would be an incompatibilist if I did not think that we could make do with
merely seeing ourselves as if we were points of origin. I shall return to agent
causation in sections 3.7 and 3.8.
3.2 Phenomenology
In section 1.4, I set out an argument from phenomenology to the
desirability of seeing ourselves as deliberating with mastery. I shall now set
out an additional argument from phenomenology, not to mastery but
directly to the originator conception. It is the conception that fits our
experience of life from inside our own heads, and in particular our
experience of deciding what to do and then acting.
When an agent deliberates and decides what to do, he has the clear
impression that he is at the head of a causal chain, rather than being an
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intermediate link in a causal chain. To the extent that the agent is aware of
the influence of the past, he sees that influence as being in one of two forms,
neither of which is seen as lying on a purely causal path to his decision.
The first form is that of giving rise to facts that can be taken to be reasons
for making certain choices, facts the status of which as reasons can be
accepted or rejected, and the use of which in deliberation is under the
agent’s control. The second form is that of causes of the current physical
state of the world, a state that will open up some options and close off
others. Influences of this second form are causes of the range of options for
the substantive decision as to what to do, not causes of the choice that is
made. There is substantial overlap between these two forms. The physical
state of the world can be captured in facts, some of which can be taken to
be reasons for choosing certain actions. But this overlap does not amount
to extensional coincidence. Some facts about what happened or about what
was done may be taken to be reasons for making certain choices, without
those facts being reflected in the current physical state of the world.
Adopting the originator conception allows us to do justice to this
impression that we are at the heads of causal chains. It allows us to see
ourselves as we appear to ourselves, as people who consider what to do,
choose options and act, with our choices not being determined by natural
antecedents. Even if someone making a decision believes in general terms
that the choice he is about to make will be determined by antecedent states
of himself and of the rest of the world, and by the operation of natural
laws, because he knows that his mental processes are closely tied to physical
processes, he still has a sense that the path to the outcome runs through a
stage at which he weighs considerations and constructs an argument, from
a position of mastery, rather than running only through purely causal
chains, and that he is to that extent at the head of a new causal chain.
Under my model of deliberation, the free choices are seen as made at the
selection stage, but the consequence is that the substantive decision is also
seen as originating with the subject. A given substantive decision is reached
because of the choices that are made at the selection stage.
This argument is an argument for adopting the originator conception
in general, not specifically in relation to deliberation. The strongest sense
that we have of being at the heads of causal chains is associated with our
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actions, rather than with our deliberations. The agent has a sense of
causing something to happen, while his action appears to him to be
uncaused. But if we adopt the originator conception in order to
accommodate that phenomenology, the conception is then available for use
in relation to deliberation.
It might seem that we should not allow phenomenology to have much
influence on our consideration of philosophical questions. The natural
sciences give us ample grounds to think that the world works in ways that
are quite different from the ways that surface appearances would suggest.
But I see no reason not to allow phenomenology a role, given that I seek a
philosophy that will be adequate to our experience, and that I am only
using phenomenology to argue that we should see ourselves as points of
origin, not to argue that we are in fact points of origin. I would not support
reliance on phenomenology to tell us facts about the world.
3.3 Entering into other people’s heads
In this section, I shall discuss the notion of entering into other people’s
heads, treating their experience as if it were our own. We need to be able
to do that in order to relate to people as subjects rather than as objects. I
shall only discuss our relationship to others as deliberators. I shall not
discuss the totality of our social relationships. Having argued for the need
to enter into other people’s heads, I shall elaborate on what is involved in
entering into someone’s head for this limited purpose. The notion of
entering into someone’s head will turn out to be a useful tool in
determining the extent and the limits of sensible attributions of subject
origination.
I refer to entering into heads rather than to standing in shoes, in order
to indicate something more intimate than imagining oneself being in the
same external circumstances as another person. “Putting oneself in
another’s shoes” can imply something more intimate than that, but it need
not. The disadvantage of referring to heads rather than shoes is that it
suggests a picture of a Cartesian soul moving from one head to another,
something that would not be suggested by a picture of a whole body
64
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 64
stepping into a pair of shoes. No such Cartesian implication is intended.
In relation to experiences of deliberation, an observer’s being able to
treat a deliberator’s experience as if it were her own would amount to her
being able to have gone through the same sequence of thoughts as the
deliberator, and to have experienced that sequence as a process of
deliberation. Someone who could not do that might say that she could not
have gone through the sequence of thoughts at all, or she might say that she
would have had a cascade of thoughts that she could not have experienced
as a rational interior monologue that had the form of deliberation. (The
latter option would not amount to being able to treat the deliberator’s
experience as if it were her own. She must be able to treat the experience
as if it were her own, without drastically altering the place of the process
in the economy of thought. Apart from anything else, it would not be the
same experience, except perhaps at the most atomistic level of qualia, if it
were not experienced as deliberation.) The requirement to be able to have
experienced the same sequence of thoughts as a process of deliberation
does not directly import any requirement for the observer and the
deliberator to have qualitatively similar inner experience. But there may be
an indirect requirement when emotions play a significant role in
deliberations, or when the contents of thoughts cannot be divorced from
their occurrence in particular types of mental life. Such an indirect
requirement could arise in connection with ethical or aesthetic thoughts,
but it would not arise in connection with mathematical thoughts.
Why should we need to be able to treat other people’s experience of
deliberation as if it were our own? The reason is that this is the only way
for us to see it as experience at all. We need to be able to do that because
without that ability, we would not be able to relate to others as people who
were like us, as members of the same society who chose actions and
adopted beliefs in the same ways that we did.
There are two reasons why seeing experience as experience requires us
to be able to treat it as if it were our own experience. One reason is related
to experience in general, and the other is specific to the experience of
deliberation. The general reason is that experience has to be appreciated
directly. It cannot be seen as something that goes on in the world and that
we can only observe, on pain of losing its character as experience. If
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someone describes to us experiences of which we have no direct inkling,
we cannot get any sense of his experiences as such. The reason that is
specific to the experience of deliberation is given by the indexicality
argument that is set out by Karsten Stueber, although he makes a different
use of the argument (Rediscovering Empathy, pages 161-165). The
argument is that we can only see thoughts as reasons for actions if we see
them as thoughts that have indexical content for the thinker, rather than as
thoughts that happen to occur to a person. The only way for someone other
than the thinker to get that indexical content into her grasp of the thoughts
is for her to see the thoughts as ones that might have been her own
thoughts. There is a third reason, given in the words of Immanuel Kant: “If
one wants to represent a thinking being to oneself, one must put oneself in
his place, and so foist one’s own subject on the object that one wishes to
consider” (Critique of Pure Reason, A353). This remark is easy to interpret
in a way that makes it obviously correct if one does not attach highly
specific senses to the notions of representation and of putting oneself in the
other’s place. It would be harder to find an interpretation that was
uncontentiously correct if one did attach highly specific senses to those
notions, for example, senses that would make Kant an advocate of
simulationism avant la lettre. I shall, therefore, not rely on Kant’s point.
What is involved in entering into someone’s head?
The notion of entering into another person’s head is, like the related
notions of standing in his shoes and of empathy, clear enough so long as
one does not demand great precision. But it would be good to have as much
precision as might be had without unduly restricting the notion, and
without forcing commitments to specific philosophical positions that one
did not have independent reason to adopt. There are after all many
different, but related, notions in play in the general area of entering into
someone’s head, as has been demonstrated in a different context by Peter
Goldie (The Emotions, chapter 7).
In the context of this book, there is no need for a notion of entering
into people’s heads that would cover all experiences. The focus is on
deliberation. There is no need to cover the sharing of someone’s emotions,
or sense of excitement, or anything like that, except to the extent that the
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impact of emotions and the like must be felt in order to have a direct
appreciation of an instance of deliberation. That extent may be modest,
but it is not negligible. A subject may, for example, choose an adventure
after due deliberation because he feels excited about it, and the act of
choosing may itself feel exciting. An observer could not appreciate what it
was for the subject to go through that process of deliberation, allowing her
to treat the experience as if it were her own experience, without having a
sense of what it was to be excited at the prospect of an adventure. The
process of making the choice would be so greatly influenced by a desire for
excitement that the observer could not do justice to the nature of the
process, unless she had a direct appreciation of what it was to be excited.
Without that direct appreciation, she would be unable to follow the
sequence of thoughts as a process of deliberation, because she would not
grasp how excitement could be the driving force of the train of thought
while that train remained a rational and controlled process. Only an
observer who recognized the feeling itself would find that a description of
the feeling was enough to make sufficient sense of the process as one of
deliberation.
Once we have narrowed the field of interest to that of deliberation, the
first point to note is that entering into the heads of others need not be a
practice that is devoid of standards, a mere general feeling of empathy.
There is no need for a practice that has something to do with empathy to
lack standards. Consider for a moment other practices that also have
something to do with empathy.We do not see a lack of standards in the use
of the methods of Verstehen, understanding, and of Nacherleben, re-
experiencing, that were identified by Wilhelm Dilthey (“Das Verstehen
anderer Personen und ihrer Lebensäußerungen”). Max Weber’s
methodological remarks make the point more strongly (Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, part 1, chapter 1, section 1.1, “Methodische Grundlagen”).
He ties Verstehen as closely as possible to the use of public data. Indeed,
he explicitly denies that Nacherlebbarkeit, the possibility of re-
experiencing, is necessary, while acknowledging that it is useful (ibid.,
paragraph 2). He does not discard empathetic understanding, but shows
that its use can be controlled by embedding that use in a procedure that is
not itself empathetic. We can also note the rigorous analyses that are used
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in social anthropology, where empathy is involved in the sense that the fact
that anthropologists are human determines their approaches to the
societies that they study. (For examples that are given in the context of a
survey of the whole discipline, see James, The Ceremonial Animal, pages
56-59 on classifications as lived-in models of the world, and pages 79-83 on
dance and its social and political roles.) The possibility of rigour in
empathy is important because we should not distance entering into
someone’s head from empathy, in the way that we might be tempted to do
if we equated the notion of entering into someone’s head with some version
of simulationism. Simulationism is a theory of how we manage to work
and play together, and of how we sometimes manage to predict one
another’s conduct. What is important for success is that the simulator
should start from the same position as the person simulated, and should
end up with thoughts close to those that the person simulated ends up by
having. Empathy is not intrinsic to simulation, nor need it be invoked in
order to distinguish simulationism from theory theory. My concern here is
with the recognition that another person’s process of deliberation is like
our own, not in the sense that it has the same qualitative feel but in the
sense that we could have experienced the same sequence of thoughts as a
process of deliberation. This is different from the concerns that
simulationism is intended to address. Empathy must be involved. But it is
not a mere general feeling. If we take entering into a deliberator’s head to
involve treating his sequence of thoughts as if it were our own, that picks
out a particular form of empathy. It amounts to thinking on the same
wavelength, rather than having the same inner sensations.
A consequence of the definition is that there are identifiable limits to
the range of heads intowhichwe can enter. Entering into the head of someone
who is engaged in deliberation requires seeing his sequence of thoughts as
something that one could have experienced as one’s own process of
deliberation. There is no need to require the observer to use a particular
mechanism, such as running a simulation of the subject’smind inside her own
mind, or engaging in something along the lines of method acting in order to
forget herself and immerse herself in the character of the subject. (Some
possible mechanisms are, for a different purpose, analysed in Goldman,
Simulating Minds.) Nor need we require the observer to assume herself to
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retain her own psychological make-up, values and knowledge. She should
allow herself to imagine coming to resemble the subject to whatever extent
was necessary, except that she should be limited to hypothetical adoptions of
the subject’s make-up, values and knowledge that would be within her actual
capacity. This constraint is needed in order to avoid vacuity. Any observer
could always say that if she were like the subject, she would have experienced
the subject’s sequence of thoughts as a process of deliberation. But it would
not always be possible for her to say that if she were as like the subject as she
could imagine her actual self becoming, she would have experienced the
subject’s sequence of thoughts as a process of deliberation.
We can identify some of the obstacles to entering into another
person’s head that might arise. One obstacle would be a bizarre logic, such
as one in which modus ponens did not operate. Another obstacle would
be a set of values that the observer could not imagine herself holding, such
as a set that led to extreme human suffering’s being accorded minimal
ethical significance. A third obstacle, which might overlap both with the
first and with the second, would be a bizarre standard of relevance of
contextual features. Context matters in practical reasoning, making some
chains of reasoning go through and blocking others. (For an analysis of
the phenomenon see Price, Contextuality in Practical Reason.) We would
find it hard to imagine not considering certain features of a context to be
of great significance. We would, for example, expect someone who was
thinking about whether to grow a new genetically modified crop outside
the laboratory for the first time, to attach great significance to the scope for
the crop to reproduce in an uncontrolled fashion. It would be hard to
imagine anyone not taking much trouble to assess that risk. We would also
find it hard to imagine a substantial lack of coherence between our
background beliefs and our evaluation of the significance of consequences
of given actions. We would, for example, find it hard to enter into the head
of someone who was a great advocate of freedom of speech in general, but
who thought that when debating the merits of proposed laws to ban speech
that might offend members of particular religious or ethnic groups, the
consequences for freedom of speech should not be given significant weight.
Attributions of subject origination can be regulated by virtue of such
limits. If we could not experience a sequence of thoughts as a process of
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deliberation, then we would be prevented from seeing it as an instance of
deliberation with mastery. That in turn would eliminate any motive to
attribute subject origination. We would not be completely prevented from
seeing deliberation with mastery, but we would be effectively prevented
because seeing deliberation with mastery would be entirely unmotivated,
unless we grasped the process as something that we could have experienced
as a process of deliberation. Without that grasp, any attribution of
deliberation with mastery would be contentless. It would therefore be
unmotivated. The notion of deliberation with mastery is one that is only
given content by the experience of deliberation. There are no natural facts
about the world that correspond to mastery. I set out an additional control
over attributions of subject origination in section 3.6.
The obstacles to entering into another person’s head would be
obstacles to seeing someone as deliberating in a way in which we might
ourselves deliberate. They would not be decisive obstacles to understanding
in a detached way that someone’s brain had worked in a given way to yield
a given conclusion. To that extent, we could still attribute deliberation,
even though any attribution of deliberation with mastery would be empty
and unmotivated. We would simply regard the subject as rather strange.
Any civilized society would, however, simply ignore the actions and beliefs
of a human being who was like that, and would give him the space to do
his own thing, so long as he did no harm to others.
Finally, three caveats must be entered. The first caveat is that claiming
that one would be able to have a given experience is not the same as actually
being able to have it. Such claims should, however, be a good enough guide
for our purposes. They should be good enough because of the (usually)
fairly dispassionate nature of the experience of something as a process of
deliberation. Thinking about having experiences of this particular type is
not likely to be significantly easier or harder than having them. But this
does not hold when strong emotions or other feelings play conspicuous
roles in a process of deliberation. Faced with examples of that nature, we
would have to proceed more cautiously. We would need to be more ready
to doubt an observer’s claim to be able to have the required experiences,
especially if the emotions or other feelings were not commonplace ones.
The second caveat is that there is unlikely to be any independent check
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on an observer’s claim to have a direct experiential grasp of a sequence of
thoughts as a process of deliberation. We cannot yet measure the states of
neurons and read off experiences to any more than a very limited extent,
nor can we predict with confidence how sophisticated such technology
might eventually become. We can rely on the fact that we live in a society
in which what people say makes sense to other people, and we can
reasonably hope that our interactions would detect at least some
groundless claims to have direct experiential grasp, but that is all.
The third caveat is that we must work with a broad concept of
experience, as set out in section 1.1. If someone deliberates and decides, she
does not experience the process in the same way that she experiences the
world through her senses. There is nonetheless an experience of
deliberation and of decision. Those who disagree with this, and who think
that there is nothing apart from passive experience of the world (including
bodily states) and the non-experiential recognition of facts, such as the fact
that one has made some decision, will be unable to accept the argument.
3.4 The range of attribution of subject origination
One consequence of the fact that use of the concept of subject origination
is motivated by our self-conception and by the phenomenology of
deliberation, is that the concept is unlikely to find much application in
relation to non-human entities. There are two aspects to this. One is the
lack of motive to attribute subject origination, and the other is the difficulty
of attribution even when we have a motive.
Lack of motive
If we consider the computers and robots that we have made or that we can
foresee ourselves making, we strongly suspect that they have no inner
experience. In particular, we do not think that they have any sense of being
points of origin. We can imagine what inner experience they might have if
they had any at all, because their outer lives are often small fragments of
what could be the outer lives of human beings who were enhanced with
fast processor chips, infallible memories or strong arms, and because we
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arrange for them to receive inputs from the external world that are often
analogous to the inputs that our sense-organs allow us to receive. These
things follow from the fact that we design computers and robots so that
they can do specific jobs that arise in the context of our own way of life.
If we did ever come to believe that they had inner experience that was like
our own, we might then think that they would have a sense of being points
of origin, so that we would be tempted to attribute subject origination to
them. But even then, there might be no point in attributing deliberation
with mastery to them, because we might feel no need to regard them as
our equals or to integrate them into our society. We would also be strongly
deterred from attributing deliberation with mastery or subject origination
to them by the fact that their workings were obvious to us, an obviousness
that would follow from the fact that we had built them. It would be
perfectly clear to us precisely how they fitted into the causal network. It
might be thought that this last point would extend to human beings. It is
true that the more we come to know about how our brains work, the harder
it will be to view ourselves in ways that imply any form of independence
from the causal network. But the positive reasons that we have for
attributing deliberation with mastery and therefore subject origination to
ourselves, our desires to support our self-conception and to accommodate
the phenomenology of deliberation, will continue to have force.
Difficulty of attribution
If we were to encounter aliens, we might well want to attribute deliberation
with mastery and subject origination to them. If it was evident from what
they had achieved that they were as sophisticated as we were, then we
would seek to understand them as beings who were like us, at least to the
extent of seeing them as beings who used evidence in deliberations that led
to choices of action and to adoptions of belief. But we might find that it
was very difficult to interpret the conduct of aliens in anything like the
terms in which we interpreted human conduct, even at the minimal level of
attributing deliberation, with or without mastery. The attribution of
deliberation to aliens would be particularly difficult when their lifestyles
were so different from ours that we could not even interpret their actions
sufficiently to relate those actions to pieces of evidence that we might have
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hoped to see them as considering to be reasons. In such circumstances, we
could only attribute an empty form of deliberation. We would not be able
to attribute content to the aliens’ deliberations. Such an attribution would
be comparable to the attitude of an observer who saw someone’s actions as
rational by standards that were incomprehensible to her. I shall argue in
section 4.2 that such an attitude would make no sense.
Sometimes aliens would be closer to us than that, and we would have
no difficulty in seeing them as deliberating. Could we then attribute
deliberation with mastery and subject origination to them?We might very
well want to do so, if we regarded them as rational beings who were like
ourselves, and if we were able to enter into social relationships with them.
They in turn might want to attribute subject origination, or something that
was analogous to it, to us. But if the aliens were very different from
ourselves in their inner experience, we would not be able to attribute
subject origination to them in any contentful way. Our lack of grasp of the
aliens’ inner experience would include a lack of grasp of anything that
might correspond to our sense of being points of origin. And the
application of our concept to them would then misrepresent their inner
experience.
3.5 The sufficiency of subject origination
I have argued that we should see ourselves as points of origin in order to
support our self-conception, and in order to accommodate the
phenomenology of deliberation. I now need to argue that if we merely see
ourselves as points of origin, and overlook the causal closure of the
physical, that is sufficient to do this work. There are two aspects to the
question of sufficiency. The first is that of sufficiency of content. The
second is that of sufficiency of status. Can a mere way of looking at our
processes of deliberation do the work?
Sufficiency of content
The concept of subject origination does not have enough content to do its
work in isolation. I need to show that the necessary content can be supplied
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from other sources, in a way that is consistent with the content of the
concept of subject origination.
The content that subject origination affords us has already been
described. The concept allows us to see ourselves as having mastery over
the choices that we make at the selection stages of deliberations, choices
that are seen both as open and as under our control. I shall identify three
deficiencies of content, and indicate how the deficiencies might be
supplied. The point of doing this is to show that there is no danger of
setting up a concept of subject origination that is sufficient to do the very
limited amount of work that it can do on its own, but that is left isolated
from the resources that are needed for it to be of any greater use.
The first deficiency of content is that use of the concept of subject
origination does not in itself give us access to inclinations, emotions or
other aspects of our mental make-up. It is vital that the wider content of
our minds should be available. Our concept of deliberation does not
amount to the selection of one from a range of options that are written
neutrally in black ink on a white sheet of paper. Every option is already
coloured by our inclinations and by our emotions. A concept of a process
of deliberation as abstract and colourless would not be our concept at all.
It would reduce decision to random selection. The fact that our
deliberation is not wholly dispassionate is one truth in David Hume’s
remark, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (A
Treatise of Human Nature, book 2, part 3, section 3, page 415). The
mastery that we can see ourselves as having contradicts Hume’s imputation
of slavery, if we take the passions to be among the rational antecedents.
But we do see ourselves as masters over ourselves, with all of our
characteristics, not as masters over mere ciphers. Fortunately, use of the
concept of subject origination does not rule out access to the wider content
of our minds. Use of the concept only prevents us from seeing that wider
content as all-powerful.
The second deficiency of content is that use of the concept of subject
origination does not in itself give us access to descriptions of external
circumstances. Such descriptions, including the histories that lead up to our
choices, must be included in order to give a full picture of our deliberations,
and they are not included merely by virtue of seeing someone as a point of
74
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 74
origin. They are supplied by records of the facts, as they appear to the subject,
as they appear to any other peoplewho are involved and as theymight appear
to disinterested observers. Such records are available on the basis of the
naturalistic conception of ourselves and of the world, supplemented by the
originator conception that accommodates our understanding, from the inside,
of what it is like to weigh evidence. Use of the concept of subject origination
does not cut us off from the external facts.
The third deficiency of content is that use of the concept of subject
origination does not in itself give us any way to discriminate between the
rational and the irrational. Seeing oneself as a point of origin does not
make one’s choices of action or adoptions of belief rational. We do need
standards of rationality, and we cannot leave them entirely up to the
individual. I shall address this point by arguing in sections 4.2 and 5.3 that
rationality can be taken to be rationality for us, with the standards of
rationality coming from our society.
Sufficiency of status
I now turn to the claim of sufficiency of status, the claim that the concept
of subject origination can do its job even though it is only to be taken to
give us a way of looking at our processes of deliberation. Its use should
not be taken to imply the identification of anything in the world beyond the
things that would feature in a naturalistic inventory, nor to imply the
attribution of additional real properties to those things.
One could dismiss the concern by pointing out that the job is to
support a mere self-conception and to accommodate a mere way in which
things seem, the phenomenology of deliberation. A mere way of looking
at our deliberations should suffice to support conceptions and to
accommodate appearances. But that would be too quick. It would not take
account of the possibility of an argument that paralleled the no miracles
argument in the philosophy of science. I shall turn to that argument first,
and then test the claim of sufficiency by reference to our need both to
explain what we do and to attribute responsibility for our actions.
No miracles
The concept of subject origination is remarkably useful. Not only do we get
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a view of humanity that supports our self-conception. We can also use that
view to give coherent and satisfying accounts of our own and other people’s
lives. Such accounts can be given when we see people as making free but
controlled choices. A satisfying account of a human life is an account that
mentions such choices, rather than an account that is given wholly in terms
of mechanical responses to the world. Biographers may try to explain why
their subjects chose certain actions and adopted certain beliefs, and we do
understand people better, and find accounts of their lives more satisfying,
when we are shown the long-term influences of their education or the
momentary pressures under which they made important decisions. But if
a biographer succeeded totally, so that a life was seen as the inevitable
working out of impersonal historical forces, whether long-term or
transient, global or personal, the subject would be reduced to a cipher and
the account would not satisfy us. (In order for the concept of subject
origination to make its full contribution to the formulation of coherent
and satisfying accounts of human lives, we need to extend its use beyond
choices where systematic reflection is expected. When we use the concept
in relation to simpler choices, it may be hard to discern a selection stage and
then a calculation stage. But the extension to simpler choices is perfectly
legitimate. If all that we can see is that someone simply acted on reasons,
we can say that there was a selection stage at which the reasons in question
were automatically given substantial weight and at which some obvious
method of argument was chosen by default. Mymodel of deliberation can
be applied because when a choice is made for reasons, the subject must
accept that the reasons are significant enough and must make use of them
in some specific way. The subject could have attached no weight to the
reasons, or could have used them differently, even if he did not in fact pause
to consider those options.)
It is odd that the concept of subject origination is so useful. A leading
argument for scientific realism is the no miracles argument, as set out by
Hilary Putnam (“What is mathematical truth?”, page 73). The claim is that
the success of the natural sciences can only be explained if scientific
theories state how the world actually is, given that otherwise their success
would be a miracle. The success of the argument in establishing scientific
realism is contested, and I make no claim that it succeeds. But the argument
76
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 76
clearly needs to be answered, and a parallel argument could be formulated
for subject origination. Given that it is so productive to see people as points
of origin, allowing us to see them as deliberators with mastery, it is odd
that use of the view of someone as a point of origin does not involve a
claim about the true nature of the world. Furthermore, it cannot involve
such a claim, on pain of metaphysical implausibility.
In fact, the issue is independent of the debate between scientific
realism and anti-realism. I deny that a process’s being seen as one of
deliberation with mastery, and hence as one in which the subject is a point
of origin, is a matter of its having some complex of natural properties,
even though each occurrent thought must be embodied in a physical entity.
The debate between realism and anti-realism arises in connection with
entities and properties that are accepted, on all sides, to be the concern of
the natural sciences. Once we move away from natural entities and
properties, as we do when we consider subject origination, we must
reconsider the validity of the claim that it would be a miracle if successful
explanations did not refer to real things or their real properties. The
significance of moving away from the natural realm is that we do not then
seek to explain what happens in the way that scientific accounts explain
what happens. We do not seek contrastive explanations, a point to which I
shall return later in this section. Arguments that are used in the debate as
to whether realism or anti-realism is the appropriate philosophy for the
natural sciences cannot then have any more than analogical relevance.
A related consideration weakens even the analogical relevance of
arguments that are used in the debate in the philosophy of the natural
sciences. Amainspring of that debate is that there are, or have been, several
theories covering the same ground, as with the Newtonian theory of space
and time and the Einsteinian theory of space-time. We expect contests
between theories to be resolved, unless it can be shown that the theories are
equivalent. That is, we expect some naturalistic theories of the world to be
better than others, and we expect to be able to make at least a provisional
judgement as to which of several competing theories is the best available
theory. When we see some of our mental processes as involving subject
origination, we have no such ambition. We merely claim that processes of
deliberation make sense to us if they are seen in the given terms. We do not
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claim that this is a better way of seeing them than any other way.We do not,
for example, assert that the originator conception should supplant the
naturalistic conception.
Explanation and responsibility
We expect theories to explain what happens, including human choices of
action and adoptions of belief, in at least some sense of explanation,
although not necessarily the scientific sense.We also expect our conception
of human action to give us grounds for attributing responsibility, so that we
feel justified in apportioning praise and blame, reward and punishment.
How does the concept of subject origination fare? On the one hand,
application of the concept allows us to see people as standing back and
freely considering the evidence and how to use it when choosing actions
and adopting beliefs. An imputation of subject origination opens up a
route to the imputation of a strong form of personal responsibility. On the
other hand, the concept only gives us a way of looking at what people do,
and we might expect that fact to limit what we could get out of its use.
On explanation, subject origination fares well so long as we only seek
to make sense of what people do, and do not seek contrastive explanations
or predictive powers. If we give an account of someone’s conduct in terms
of free but controlled choices, terms that imply subject origination, the
account can make sense to us. We can get a coherent and satisfying account
of the subject’s life, an account which allows us to identify with the life as
our kind of life. This is particularly so if we extend our use of the concept
of subject origination to choices where systematic reflection is not
expected, as described above. This is not a matter of seeing why the subject
did certain things. We could see that merely by considering the external
facts that the subject might take to be reasons for certain choices, along
with facts about the prior states of the subject, and working out how a
human being in those states, faced with those external facts, would be likely
to respond. Rather, it is a matter of seeing a life as one that the subject
leads, and not as one that leads the subject. A life that the subject leads is
the sort of life with which we can identify, and the sort that makes sense to
us. A way of looking at the subject’s processes of deliberation should
suffice for this purpose, because a mere presentation of a life should be
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enough to allow us to identify with that life. Identification with a life does
not require that the life should in fact be of the nature that is imputed to
it, so long as one is faithful to the natural biographical facts. Such facts are
not contradicted by viewing the subject as engaging in subject origination.
Accounts that make sense are important. Jaegwon Kim draws our
attention to the need to be able to give accurate rational accounts of what
we do, simply in order to keep a grip on our notion of agency (“Reasons
and the First Person”). A mere way of looking at the subject’s life should
suffice for that purpose, although it is also true that an account which
mentioned reasons without mentioning freedom, and which made no use
of the notion of subject origination, would suffice for Kim’s specific
purpose. Moving up to the largest scale, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued
for the importance of narratives that stretch through whole lives, and
beyond them, in making sense of human actions (After Virtue, chapter 15).
Furthermore, the whole-life narratives would need to be of types with
which readers could identify. Actions only come to make sense to us, in the
way that MacIntyre describes, when a life within which they are set is seen
as our, human, kind of life, a life that involves free but controlled choices.
For these purposes too, a way of looking at the subject’s life should suffice.
What a mere way of looking at a process of deliberation cannot give
us is a contrastive explanation, an explanation of why the subject chose
one option rather than another (at the substantive level of the action
chosen, rather than at the selection stage of deliberation). An ability to
construct contrastive explanations would be tantamount to an ability to
predict. A contrastive explanation would amount to saying that X rather
than Y happened at a given time because conditions at some earlier time,
or contemporaneous environmental conditions, were Z. That sort of grasp
of the way in which the world worked would give the tools for prediction.
We cannot often predict the course of a life as it progresses, but we can still
see how the course that is taken makes sense. Sometimes we are not at all
surprised at a subject’s choices, because the reasons for making those
choices rather than the obvious alternatives strike us as overwhelming. On
other occasions, we are surprised by what someone does, yet in retrospect
see the choices that he made as fitting into a coherent life, or a segment of
a life, that he has led. If we can see that, then we have a form of
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explanation. But as with whole-life narratives, the explanation will only
carry conviction if it is given in terms with which we can identify. That will
require it to refer to choices that we see as free but controlled. The fact that
the lack of a contrastive explanation of the course of a life, and the
associated lack of predictive ability, do not amount to a lack of explanation
is one of the truths in Kierkegaard’s comment, “It is quite true what
philosophy says, that life must be understood backward. But then one
forgets the other principle, that it must be lived forward” (Kierkegaard’s
Journals and Notebooks, volume 2, JJ:167, page 179; Danish text in Søren
Kierkegaards Skrifter, volume 18, JJ:167, page 194).
The distinction between contrastive explanation and explanation does
not depend on any thought that prediction would, impractically, require
us to trace micro-physical causal chains. Nor does it depend on any
thought that contrastive explanations must be couched in physical terms.
Suppose that we confined ourselves to the concepts and propositions that
were used by the subject, with no reference to states of his brain, and went
on to make two claims. The first claim would be that a subject would
always perform a given action if the reasons normatively required that
action and if there was no specific obstacle to the action. The second claim
would be that given the first claim, prediction was possible, even within
the confines of the concepts and propositions that were used by the subject.
Even then, the availability of explanations would not imply the availability
of contrastive explanations. As Joshua Gert has argued, there is a gap
between reasons that justify actions and reasons that require them, and the
gap is not merely a matter of the quantity or weight of reasons (Brute
Rationality, pages 20-21 and passim). We could have justifying reasons,
explaining actions in retrospect, which did not require those actions. The
justifying reasons would therefore not have made the actions predictable,
even on the basis of the two claims that have just been proposed, and
however weighty the justifying reasons might have been. It should, however,
be noted that Gert explicitly limits his claim to the practical realm, and
does not extend it to the theoretical realm of the adoption of beliefs. So his
argument does not lead to doxastic voluntarism. Furthermore, his concern
is with justification and requirement, notions that are applied to actions
themselves, rather than with the process of deliberation. Thus his argument
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does not yield the sense of control over the influence of reasons on our
choices, at the time of making them, with which I am concerned. Another
useful perspective on the issue is given by Carl Ginet, who argues for the
sufficiency of anomic reasons-based explanations of actions (“Reasons
Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account”).
Moral responsibility for actions would be very hard to establish on
the basis of a mere way of looking at processes of deliberation. We can say
that attributions of responsibility in themselves make perfect sense. Within
a narrative that we construct about a person in which we apply the concept
of subject origination, we say that certain actions were his actions, that
they were chosen by him, so that he is responsible for them in the sense of
owning them. But that leaves unanswered the question of whether we
should move on to responsibility in the moral sense, the sense that
legitimizes reward or punishment. To put the question in an acute form,
how could we possibly think that a mere way of looking at people, a way
that deliberately ignored the full effect of physical causation, was enough
to justify putting people in prison?
There is a large and inconclusive literature on the relationship between
different concepts of free will and the legitimacy of attributions of moral
responsibility. Use of the concept of subject origination is not going to yield
a solution. If anything, use of that concept would encourage the
recognition of a fissure in our thinking. On the one hand, we may construct
narratives that presuppose the legitimacy of seeing subject origination, and
we may use those narratives when attributing responsibility, in the sense of
attributing ownership of actions. (We might also make such attributions
independently of narratives of that type, but without the benefit of
undeniability of ownership that was noted in section 1.4.) On the other
hand, we may reward and punish people in order to encourage conduct
that we find especially desirable and deter or prevent conduct that we find
especially undesirable. The attribution of ownership of actions is a
necessary but insufficient conceptual support for the legitimacy, as opposed
to the usefulness, of practices of reward and punishment. Grounds for a
move from the attribution of ownership to the attribution of moral
responsibility would make good the insufficiency in the support. The
search for such grounds is the search for a way to get an ought from an is,
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or rather, in the current context, the search for a way to get the ought of
reward and punishment from the as-if-it-is of humanity as seen when we
implicitly or explicitly attribute subject origination. Alternatively, one could
re-think the conditions for attributing moral responsibility. One could, for
example, argue that the agent’s possession of guidance control was
sufficient (Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control).
3.6 The legitimacy of subject origination
The argument so far has been that there are good reasons to attribute
subject origination, and that the concept can do its job even though use of
it only amounts to adopting a way of looking at our processes of
deliberation, and does not imply a claim about the contents of the world.
This is not enough to make a full case for use of the concept. We should
also consider the legitimacy of our use of the concept, by reference to
general standards. As part of that work, we need to consider the
significance of the lack of scientific explanation for subject origination.
Subject origination and standards of legitimacy
I claim that it is legitimate to see our deliberations as conducted with
mastery, and hence as involving subject origination, and to overlook the
causal closure of the physical. I do not claim that this is the only legitimate
view. A scientific view that sets us, and our deliberations, entirely within the
causal network is equally legitimate.
For a view to be legitimate, it must not contradict other legitimate
views. Its adoption must also allow us to see something that cannot be seen
when we adopt those other views, or that cannot straightforwardly be seen
when we adopt them, otherwise there would be no motive for its adoption.
Finally, what is seen must not be arbitrary. There must be some things that
it would be a mistake to see. If that were not so, but the view licensed a free-
for-all, then adoption of the view would yield no worthwhile information.
A view of our deliberations as involving subject origination does not
contradict the scientific view, because the former view can do its job while
we regard it merely as a way of looking at our deliberations, and do not
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regard its adoption as involving any claim that a deliberator could in fact
choose any one of a range of options. Even so, there is an issue to resolve.
If we view our deliberations as involving subject origination, that implies
turning down in advance the offer of the natural sciences to give
comprehensive accounts of the phenomena that are of interest. Given the
power of the natural sciences to explain surface appearances by deep
structures that relate diverse phenomena, and the impressive, if incomplete,
achievements of the natural sciences in deriving vast chunks of our
knowledge from physics, this attitude is in need of some defence. It would
be perfectly reasonable to challenge the ambitions of the natural sciences
by arguing that some things were beyond their powers of explanation,
although it is unclear whether such arguments would succeed. The
arbitrary exclusion of the natural sciences from certain areas of work
would be much more dubious.
To defend the view that sees our deliberations as involving subject
origination against this charge, we must recognize that it is a view that can
only be taken on the basis of the originator conception of ourselves,
whereas the scientific view of our deliberations is one that can only be
taken on the basis of the naturalistic conception of ourselves. I avoid a
charge of illegitimately refusing to allow the natural sciences free rein by
positing two different conceptions of ourselves, conceptions that answer to
different needs but the relationships between which we can legitimately
discuss. We can for example conclude, as I have, that application of the
originator conception involves one specific difference from application of
the naturalistic conception. We overlook the causal closure of the physical.
Everything else that we see when we apply the naturalistic conception,
including our spatio-temporal location, our biology and our ability to
cause events to occur by acting, we also see when we apply the originator
conception.
There are clear reasons for the difference between the two
conceptions. They answer to the needs of two different types of observer
of humanity, the human participant in human society and the more
detached, scientific observer. Our inner experience and our self-conception
give us good reason to adopt the originator conception. But when we
observe humanity in our capacity as natural scientists, such things are of
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no interest to us. The point is reinforced by the consideration that any
results in the natural sciences should be accessible to a far wider range of
rational beings than human beings. Many such beings would not even be
able to comprehend our inner experience or our self-conception. Thus in
the role of practitioners of the natural sciences, we need to stick to the
naturalistic conception of ourselves. Only a conception that eliminates the
specifically human point of view, and that limits us to that which would be
visible to a much wider range of observers than human beings, is fitted to
the conduct of the natural sciences.
We must ask whether this distinction between the originator and the
naturalistic conceptions is of the right kind to legitimize ignoring some of
the results of the natural sciences when we adopt the originator conception.
Anything that we thought about ourselves and other people that
contradicted scientific results would certainly be unacceptable. To that
extent, our scientific knowledge should remain with us at all times. But we
do not need to contradict our science in order to see our processes of
deliberation in a non-scientific light. All we need claim is that if we describe
the decisions that are involved in the selection stage simply as taken by us,
that is an adequate description for the purposes at hand. Those purposes
are to support our self-conception, to accommodate the phenomenology
of deliberation and to make sense of our lives. A self-conception and the
accommodation of phenomenology can both be based on a partial view of
human beings, one that leaves out the naturalistic detail that would bring
the role of the causal network to the fore. And we make sense of our lives
by giving coherent and satisfying accounts of what we do. Again, a partial
view is enough. By way of analogy, it is perfectly legitimate to describe a
natural system in terms of the transmission of information, for example,
the information that is transmitted by a dancing bee as to the location of
suitable plants, while leaving out physical details such as an account of
how bees manage to fly. We can abstract the task of conveying the
information from its physical realization, and see how the same task could
have been accomplished using different physical means.
This analogy may seem to be inappropriate. While we can abstract
information from its physical embodiment, we can always trace particular
physical embodiments and relate them to the information. We may, for
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example, show how there are enough atoms, in an adequately manipulable
and readable form, to hold and transmit the information. Such a link with
the physical is much less obvious when we come to something that is
expressly not to be captured by a scientific view, choices at the selection
stage of deliberation that are open but that are controlled by the subject.
But the link to the physical can still be made. In the case of information,
the correspondence of information with a physical realization is token-
token. A particular piece of information is, on a particular occasion, held
and transmitted in a particular physical form. Different physical forms
could be used on different occasions, the only requirements being sufficient
manipulable and readable complexity in the physical material, and a
context that was sufficient to yield semantics for the actual physical form
that was used. That context would itself be embodied in a physical form
that could be different while still allowing the context to perform its role.
Likewise, individual instances of deliberation must be physically embodied,
and the material must have sufficient complexity, but only a token-token
correspondence is needed. No particular embodiment is required, so no
characteristics of any particular embodiment need be associated with any
one instance of deliberation. This allows a perfectly good analogy with the
holding and transmission of information. The analogy is only meant to
make the point that one can freely abstract meaningful accounts, omitting
physical detail. There is no intention to use the analogy, or the token-token
nature of the correspondence, to argue that an instance of deliberation
could break free from all physical embodiments, and thereby actually break
free from the causal network, so that it could actually have involved
different choices from those that were in fact made.
Even so, a feeling of unease may remain. A theory of information can
sit very happily alongside a theory of matter, and different parts of a single
well-integrated body of mathematical knowledge are used to formulate
both theories. The two theories even come together in dramatic ways, as
they do in theories that relate the capacity to hold information to spatial
regions and their boundaries (Bekenstein, “Information in the Holographic
Universe”). Similar things could have been said if I had chosen any other
analogy that was based on two different parts of the natural sciences. We
do not see anything like the same integration between the view of humanity
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that is given by the naturalistic conception and the view that is given by the
originator conception. We even know that we must not seek integration,
because if we adopt the naturalistic conception we must accept the causal
closure of the physical, whereas if we adopt the originator conception we
must reject it. Any feeling of unease reflects a recognition that we cannot
claim that the view of humanity that is given by the originator conception
is simply a picture of how things really are. We can, on the other hand,
reasonably make that claim on behalf of the view that is given by the
naturalistic conception. Unfortunately, we have to step onto the thin ice of
views that cannot be said simply to tell it like it is, if we are to have a
satisfactory understanding of our lives. A continuing feeling of unease is no
bad thing, if it reminds us not to read too much into the deliverances of
such views.
One other possible clash between the originator conception and the
natural sciences must be considered. It would not be acceptable to identify
a homunculus or a Cartesian soul lurking anywhere within a human being.
John McDowell writes of the danger of applying a narrow form of the
naturalistic conception, one that finds no place for spontaneity of action.
He argues that such a conception would tend to drive us to locate
spontaneity either in a non-natural realm or in a specifically inner realm
(Mind and World, pages 89-91). McDowell’s response is a more inclusive
naturalism, one that finds space for the realm of reasons as our second
nature. My proposal means sticking with a narrower naturalism than that
which might easily result from pursuing McDowell’s proposal. But I am
not driven to regard the spontaneity that appears under the originator
conception as something non-natural, because I only offer the originator
conception as a way of seeing ourselves. There is no claim that we are in
fact as we seem to be when we apply the originator conception, whether as
a matter of natural or of non-natural fact, so the non-natural does not
enter the picture. I also avoid being driven to locate our spontaneity in some
inner realm, because when we view an episode of deliberation as involving
subject origination, that does not require us to move the episode from an
outer realm to an inner one. No additional actual event is identified, so no
location, inner or outer, need be found for one.
The second requirement to establish the legitimacy of the view of our
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deliberations as involving subject origination is to show that the adoption
of this view allows us to see something that cannot be seen if we adopt
other legitimate views, or that cannot straightforwardly be seen if we adopt
them. This has already been established. If we see our deliberations without
using the concept of subject origination, we see ourselves merely as
creatures of the causal network. That would leave us without any obvious
way to support our self-conception, or to accommodate our inner
experience of deliberation. There are, of course, plenty of compatibilist
proposals that would allow us to see ourselves merely as creatures of the
causal network without undue discomfort, but their acceptability is
disputed. And as argued in section 1.4, such proposals would not secure
the desired status of the subject as essential and as in charge.
The third requirement is to show that what is seen when we view our
deliberations as involving subject origination is not arbitrary. There must
be some things that it would be a mistake to see. Some accounts of how
specific individuals deliberate must be rejected. There is a perfectly good
control over what it is correct to see. It is that what we see must yield
coherent and satisfying accounts of people’s lives. The accounts that we
construct implicitly attribute subject origination because they refer to
subjects as deliberating and as deciding, in a way that we see as both free
and controlled and that we do not see as amounting to following programs
that have been foisted on the subjects. If some such accounts do not make
sense, then the deliberations should not be seen in that light and subject
origination should not be attributed, whether implicitly or explicitly.
This control is nowhere near as rigorous as the controls in the natural
sciences over the conclusions that may be drawn from experimental data.
The control also relates only to entire accounts of lives or of segments of
lives, possibly short segments, that are given in human terms. Such an
account must include not only all of the significant events in a given period
and the subject’s relationships with other people, but also emotions and
impulses. The control could not operate in relation to the very partial
account that would be given by cataloguing only episodes of deliberation,
or by cataloguing all actions along with a commentary that referred only
to the subject’s conscious reasons for his actions. It is also only rarely a
control that applies directly to an isolated attribution of subject
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origination. There are few occasions on which we cannot reasonably see a
process of deliberation as having involved subject origination. Those are
the occasions on which we cannot enter into the heads of the deliberators.
Much more commonly, the control will be a control over accounts of
sequences of decisions and of actions, including the decisions and actions
that we would not expect to be preceded by systematic reflection. Is the
agent seen as making decisions that we can, when we take them together
as a sequence in a single life, relate to character, to motives and to
circumstances in a way that presents the subject as someone who makes
free but explicable choices and who leads a coherent life rather than being
led? Fortunately, that gives us an indirect control over the attribution of
subject origination. If we cannot see a sequence of decisions as both free
andmaking sense, we will not see the subject as leading our kind of life. We
will then have no motive to attribute subject origination, even though we
may recognize that the subject’s inner experience might give him a motive
to attribute it to himself.
The control can work because we explain what people do in ways that
make sense to us, given our own experiences of living, of making choices
and of acting. Some accounts make sense and some do not. We can see this
by considering novels. Extraordinary things may happen to characters, or
the characters may inhabit physical environments or societies that are very
unlike our own, but we still have a sense of whether the descriptions of
their motives, their reflections and their decisions make sense. In a good
novel they do make sense, and we can relate to the characters. In a bad
novel, they do not make sense. The characters are too robotic, or their
decisions are too outlandish. We can also see the importance of our
possession of the materials with which to construct accounts that make
sense by noticing the disconcerting effect of not having those materials.
The filmCinq fois Deux, directed by François Ozon, gives five scenes from
a relationship in reverse order, from divorce to first encounter. Only by
watching the whole film can one properly interpret the scenes that are
presented first. As scenes that are shown later upset initial interpretations
of scenes that are shown earlier, confusion mounts.
If the control were based purely on the experiences of an individual
who was taking a view of people’s lives that involved implicit attributions
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of subject origination, it would not be much of a control. Some individuals
are inclined to formulate eccentric accounts of other people’s lives.
Fortunately, there is a social dimension to the control. An account of
someone’s life in human terms, an account that implicitly attributes subject
origination and that involves our seeing the people described as like us, is
an account that we can share with others. If we converse with others, we
soon find out whether we interpret people in the ways that others do. If we
do not, then we should reflect on our own ways of looking at people. It is
possible for one person to be correct and for everyone else to be mistaken,
but it is unlikely when we are dealing with matters of such widespread
human experience as daily life. One demonstration of the existence of
shared standards is the fact that it is possible to systematize the ways in
which we interpret narratives in order to bring out the relationships
between actions and other actions, events and situations. (One such
systematization is given in Kafalenos,Narrative Causalities.)
The practical effect of the control that what we see must yield
coherent and satisfying accounts of people’s lives depends on the nature
of our own way of life, as human beings. A way of interpreting human
lives can yield interpretations of individuals that make perfect sense to us,
but that would make no sense to at least some aliens. Similarly, their modes
of interpretation of the conduct of their own kinds might yield
interpretations that made no sense to us. That is, there is no universal
standard of correctness to be had. This reflects the fact that we do not,
when we attribute subject origination, see some objective and very widely
visible natural feature of the world. Instead, we make use of a way of
looking at our lives that reflects our own experience of life from the inside.
Only others with a similar experience of life can be expected to be able to
share that way of looking at our lives.
Coherent and satisfying accounts of human lives have a lot to be said
for them. They are essential to our senses of who we are. It is also possible
to argue for the strong, and debatable, thesis that “a life as led is inseparable
from a life as told” (Bruner, “Life as Narrative”, page 708). But two notes
of caution must be sounded. The first cautionary note is that that there
are philosophical arguments on the other side. Galen Strawson argues that
consciousness of a personal narrative that unifies one’s life in even a
89
SUBJECT ORIGINATION
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 89
moderately strong sense need not be important (“Against Narrativity”).
The second cautionary note is that a desire to construct coherent and
satisfying accounts can lead us astray. Take what happens when people are
told about a woman who has studied philosophy, who is very concerned
about discrimination and social justice, and who has been politically active.
People often estimate that the probability that she is both a bank teller and
an active feminist is higher than the probability that she is a bank teller.
Including feminism makes for a more satisfying account, but the
probability of a person’s having two given qualities cannot be higher than
the probability of that person’s having a specified one of the two (Tversky
and Kahneman, “Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction
Fallacy in Probability Judgment”, page 297).
This does not mean that the addition of beliefs to enhance coherence
always diminishes probability. The reason is that probabilities that are
conditional on evidence can have a role, as in the example of Tweety the
penguin (Olsson, “The Place of Coherence in Epistemology”, section 3).
Olsson’s paper as a whole examines the relationship between coherence
and truth. His gloomy remarks in sections 7 and 8 about the failure of
coherence to be truth-conducive do not worry me. I maintain that we seek
coherent and satisfying accounts in order to make sense of human lives,
regardless of whether that search improves the ratio of the number of our
true beliefs to the number of our false beliefs.
The lack of scientific explanation
The acceptance of subject origination requires acceptance of a mystery,
something that is not scientifically explained. I shall now describe this
mystery, and then reflect on whether we can live with it.
The mystery is that of the person who is a point of origin. We have
got used to scientific explanations of what lies beneath the surface of
everyday objects, the molecular structures that explain their properties. We
can go deeper, explaining molecules in terms of atoms and atoms in terms
of fundamental particles. Wherever our science has got to, there is some
bedrock, something unexplained that we just have to take as given. But that
bedrock is far beneath our everyday world, and to that extent our everyday
world is thoroughly explained. Furthermore, we may well find that today’s
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bedrock can be penetrated tomorrow, when we discover a new and deeper
explanation that will become, at least for a while, the new bedrock. The
person as a point of origin, on the other hand, is simply a given. We have
a sense that we are such people, and the natural sciences may well come to
offer us explanations of why we have that sense. But the natural sciences
are not going to offer us an explanation of how it is that we are points of
origin. Any naturalistic explanation would take us back wholly into the
causal network, where no such points of origin could be seen.
This does not mean that there is nothing to be said to enlarge our
understanding of the person as a point of origin. But in order not to destroy
the supposed status of the person as a point of origin, anything that was
to be said could not resemble a scientific explanation. At least three
approaches are available. The first approach is poetic or other artistic
insight into what it is to be human. The second approach relies on grasping
other people’s inner experience as experience, using the analogy of our
own inner experience. Our own sense of what it is like to deliberate and to
decide is a rich and familiar one, even though its detail may be hard or
impossible to put into words that would be comprehensible to non-human
beings, and we can take it that other people have similar senses of
deliberation and of decision. The third approach is to note that if we take
ourselves and others to be points of origin, we can understand both our
own deliberations and the deliberations of other people by seeing that they
mesh together, in a way that makes sense of both. The meshing together is
evident when we make choices to which others respond, and when we
respond to their responses and to their own choices. If we see everyone as
deliberating in the same way, making free but controlled choices, we can
gain insights into how societies function.
All three approaches are valuable, but none of them gives us
explanations in a sense that would be comparable to scientific explanation.
This is obvious with the first, poetic or other artistic approach. But all three
approaches take a lot of what is to be explained for granted. The first
approach takes for granted our ways of responding to poetry or to the other
arts. That is, it takes for granted that we find such things meaningful, but
we only find them meaningful because we respond as human beings who
have a human appreciation of life from the inside. The second approach
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takes a lot for granted more directly and more obviously. It works outward
from our own experience, in which we feel that we are points of origin,
using that experience as a surrogate for an explanation of what it would be
for someone to be a point of origin. The third approach takes for granted
that the problem of how to comprehend life as experienced is a problem to
be solved, rather than one to be dissolved as a phantom problem. Only on
that basis can the third approach be used to support the idea that we and
other people are points of origin. The support is that seeing people as
points of origin helps to explain the social phenomena of debate, of
agreement and of compromise. It is taken for granted that these
phenomena need an explanation in terms that are faithful to their
appearance to us, as opposed to an explanation in the very different terms
of brain cells and of human animals as they are seen biologically.
We are therefore left with the person as a point of origin, as something
that defies scientific explanation or anything like it. Not only do we not
have a scientific explanation. We can see that we are not going to get one,
because a scientific explanation would inevitably locate the person wholly
within the causal network, making it impossible to see the person as a point
of origin. Is this a mystery with which we can live? I think that we can. The
inexplicable is not intrinsically offensive, so long as it does not pretend to
be of the same kind as something explicable. If we were to accept such
pretenders, we would be in danger of wandering into the realm of
purported supernatural forces. Encroachment on the province of physics,
by anything other than that which is within the scope of current physical
theories or that which we can reasonably hope to bring within the scope of
future physical theories, is not welcome. We can avoid such difficulties by
not taking subject origination to be a feature of reality. I shall return to the
element of mystery and to the relationship with the natural sciences in
section 3.8, in connection with a concept of the subject that allows us to see
subject origination.
3.7 Other approaches
In this section, I shall discuss two approaches that are in play in the same
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field as subject origination. The first is agent causation. The second is the
theory of the intentional stance, as presented by Daniel Dennett. I shall
end the section with comments on the idea of a psychological theory that
is detached in the sense of not reflecting our inner experience. The
approaches that I discuss in this section are of wide application. They can
be used far beyond the narrow field of those choices of action and
adoptions of belief where systematic reflection is expected.
Agent causation
Several positions that differ in detail can be gathered together as variant
doctrines of agent causation. The core of these positions is that agents are
causes in some special way that is not reducible to ordinary event causation.
Doctrines of agent causation are controversial, and there are plenty of
objections to them. Can the doctrine of subject origination avoid the
objections?
It can avoid them, because the objections to doctrines of agent
causation rely for their force on the claims of those doctrines to identify
something that is in the world, just like event causation, and that explains
actions by virtue of actually having causal efficacy. Subject origination, on
the other hand, is specifically not claimed to be as real as event causation.
Some examples of objections to agent causation will illustrate the point.
(Discussions of objections such as the following include Clarke, “Agent
Causation and the Problem of Luck”; Lemos, “Flanagan and Cartesian
free will: a defense of agent causation”; O’Connor, “Agent Causation”;
Schlosser, “Agent-causation and agential control”; Schlosser, The
Metaphysics of Agency, chapter 1.)
Against agent causation, there is the argument that agents would need
to be special substances that could be causes in themselves, unlike the
everyday natural substances that are widely thought to enter into causal
processes only through events that involve them. There is the objection that
the notion of causation plays no explanatory role at the beginning of a
causal chain, because to say that the agent caused the first event would only
add something to saying that he was its agent if he did something to cause
that first event, which would mean that it was not the first event (Davidson,
“Agency”, pages 52-53). There is the argument that only events, which have
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the property of occurring at particular times, could explain why other
events, including actions, should occur at particular times. There is the
disturbing contrast between the ready application of the concept of causal
sufficiency to the ordinary causation of events by other events, and the
difficulty of applying that concept to agent causation. There is the related
difficulty of attributing adequate control to the agent when the agent could
have performed any one of a range of different actions. The notion of
responsibility for one’s actions, whether moral responsibility or more
general causal responsibility, can be undermined, because it can seem to
be a matter of luck which action an agent chooses. Finally, it can be argued
that naturalistic causal accounts that involve events can relate our conduct
to the reasons that we have for acting in certain ways, while accounts that
invoke agent causation cannot do so because states of our brains that
correspond to reasons could not have appropriate effects, given the
assumptions that are needed in order to make sense of agent causation.
There are answers to all of these objections, and many of the answers
are offered in the papers on agent causation that are cited above, although
the sufficiency of the answers is disputed. But subject origination can
remain untouched by the objections, because there is no claim that the
concept picks out something in the world over and above the objects, the
properties and powers of objects and the events involving objects that are
picked out by the natural sciences. Use of the concept is merely an
alternative way of looking at the reality to which the natural sciences apply
the concept of event causation.
This is also the reason why the use of two different conceptions of
ourselves, the naturalistic conception and the originator conception, does
not give rise to the problems that can be associated with having two
different explanations of the same event. We may explain an event in terms
of the world’s going on in accordance with the laws of nature, and we may
also explain the event in terms of the subject’s having deliberated in a way
that is implicitly seen as having involved subject origination. The problems
that can arise from having two different explanations are discussed by
Jaegwon Kim in “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”. He
sets out a metaphysical principle of explanatory exclusion, that two
explanations “can both be correct explanations only if either at least one
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of the two is incomplete or one is dependent on the other” (ibid., page
275). He adds an epistemological principle, that “no-one may accept both
explanations unless one has an appropriate account of how they are related
to each other” (ibid., page 275). The user of the two conceptions of
ourselves can comply with the epistemological principle. The account of
the relationship between the two explanations of a given instance of
deliberation is located not at the scene of the deliberation, but way back in
the idea of selecting conceptions to use in order to make sense of the world
and of our lives. Furthermore, the user of the two conceptions need not
worry about falling foul of the metaphysical principle. When the concept
of subject origination is used, that is not in itself an attempt to explain
why one action was performed rather than another. Contrastive
explanations are not provided, and to that extent explanations in terms of
subject origination are incomplete. The user of the two conceptions
remains subject to any difficulties that may be associated with offering an
explanation of the outcome of a deliberation in terms of the subject’s
reasons for selecting options, as well as an explanation in neurological
terms. But he is not subject to such difficulties on account of his use of the
two conceptions, except in the indirect sense that a user of the originator
conception in the context of deliberation sees the subject as weighing and
using evidence, so that he can hardly avoid giving explanations in terms of
reasons.
One specific objection to agent causation does, however, merit
particular attention, because it appears to present a strong challenge to the
idea that the concept of subject origination can do the work that it is
intended to do. This is the objection that the agent might lack adequate
control. As noted in section 2.3, I can only issue a promissory note that is
not backed by any gold. I simply assert that we should see ourselves as
deliberating with mastery, free but in control. But if we merely see ourselves
as engaging in subject origination, it is not self-evidently unacceptable to
see ourselves as in control. Timothy O’Connor writes, “Agent-causal events
are intrinsically actions – the exercising of control over one’s behaviour. It
is senseless to demand some further means of controlling this exercise of
control” (Persons and Causes, pages 58-59). This is a contentious claim if
one wishes to integrate the exercise of control into a naturalistic conception
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of the world. It is much more secure if one has no such ambition.
I shall return to the relationship between my approach and agent
causation in section 3.8, once I have set out a concept of the subject that
accommodates subject origination. The fact that the concept is not one of
a subject that is a worldly addition or enhancement to the physical person
has a bearing on the relationship.
The intentional stance
I shall now discuss the intentional stance as presented by Daniel Dennett,
the stance from which people are regarded as rational agents with beliefs
and desires (Dennett, The Intentional Stance, pages 15-35). I shall read
Dennett as advocating a type of intentional stance that could be set out
using only the resources of the naturalistic conception of ourselves. In
particular, our sense of what it was like to have certain experiences would,
on my reading, have no essential role to play. References to Dennett should
be read as references to Dennett as interpreted in this way. I cannot be sure
that the real Dennett would agree with this reading, because he does not
tackle the issue in precisely these terms. But passages in which Dennett
discusses issues in the area of simulation give no reason to think that my
reading of him is mistaken (The Intentional Stance, pages 53-54 and 98-
101). If we adopt such a naturalistic reading of the intentional stance, that
marks a difference from the originator conception. I shall ask whether,
despite that difference, we would still need to rely on inner experience in
order to identify the intentional stance that was appropriate to a given set
of creatures.
I shall also refer to the intentional stance, meaning the stance in
general, and to an intentional stance, meaning a particular way of
interpreting behaviour by using a particular set of concepts of beliefs,
desires and so on. I shall take it that an intentional stance is a correct one
for a set of creatures, although not necessarily the only correct one, when
it allows its users to systematize and predict the creatures’ behaviour by
attributing thoughts that explain the occurrence of certain behaviours.
Stances may therefore possess degrees of correctness. The requirement to
allow systematization and prediction means that an intentional stance must
allow both the thoughts that are attributed to creatures, and their
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behaviours, to be described using a modest number of central concepts
which fit together in a structured way. A stance that merely allowed the re-
statement in an intentional vocabulary of all of the micro-physical detail
of the world would not be any good.
I shall discuss the community’s route to an intentional stance. I shall
leave to one side the development of the individual, and how the individual
comes to grasp an intentional stance that is used within the community.
This focus on shared intentional stances tends to induce a theory theory
approach to folk psychology, rather than a simulationist approach. If we
reflect on the shared intentional stance of a community, we are very likely
to state it in theoretical terms. But I do not argue for theory theory at the
level of the individual. That which may best be captured in theoretical
terms when describing a community, could still be implemented in a
simulationist way in the individual members of that community.
Use of the originator conception is more daring than the adoption of
an intentional stance. An intentional stance could perfectly well be applied
even if one saw humanity in purely naturalistic terms. Using the naturalistic
conception, it is perfectly possible to say that someone works extra hours
because he is ambitious and wants to get promoted quickly, just as it is
possible to say that the climate in north-western Europe is heavily
influenced by the Gulf Stream. Both remarks involve a high degree of
abstraction, but there is no need for naturalistic descriptions to be given in
terms that reduce everything to individual particles. A naturalistic reading
of the first remark would not, however, capture any sense of what it was
like to choose actions out of ambition, to give up hobbies and to put
oneself under pressure in order to have a successful career. In order to have
a sense of that, one would have to be a human being who could experience
such feelings as ambition. That would go beyond the intentional stance as
presented by Dennett.
This difference between Dennett’s intentional stance and my
originator conception neutralizes what would otherwise be a source of
disagreement between us. In chapter 7 of The Intentional Stance, Dennett
finds a place for the intentional stance in the conduct of science and in the
expression of scientific results. I agree that it has such a place, even though
neither our sense of being points of origin, nor our sense of what it is like
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to have given motivations or emotions, can feature in any statement of
scientific results. Such senses are tinged with the specifically human
experience of life, so they could not be grasped by a much wider range of
rational beings. It is, therefore, essential to the relationship between
Dennett’s intentional stance and the sciences, that our senses of being
points of origin and of what it is like to have given motivations and
emotions fall outside the scope of the intentional stance.
While I am in extensive agreement with Dennett, I do not regard his
intentional stance as free-standing. Our adoption of it depends in practice
on our inner experience, in a stronger sense than he allows (The Intentional
Stance, pages 53-54). The reason is that before we can take an intentional
stance, we must identify the specific types of belief, desire and the like that
it is appropriate to attribute to the creatures concerned. We use our inner
experience to identify the concepts that we should use. If we did not have
that inner experience to guide us, we would be faced with too wide a range
of possible sets of concepts to use. Furthermore, it needs to be our inner
experience that we use, our experience of having experiences, of
deliberating, of deciding and of acting, rather than our experience in
general. We can only identify the concepts to use if we stand back from
our ground-level experiences, such as the experience of seeing a tiger, and
consider what it is like to see a tiger, and the associated feelings of
fascination and of fear. My concern is that while the patterns of conduct
that are revealed by taking an appropriate intentional stance may or may
not be real, it would not be at all easy for a detached observer, without the
benefit of inner experience in common with the creatures observed, to
identify any such appropriate stance. (Different, but related, concerns are
set out in Haugeland, “Pattern and Being”.)
There is a way to avoid making the identification of an appropriate
intentional stance dependent on our inner experience. We could start with
outward behaviour and changes in internal physical states, and guess which
concepts to use in order to take an intentional stance. But we would be
very lucky to find the right set of concepts in that way. It is not easy to
imagine how difficult it would be to find the right set of concepts, because
our knowledge of our own needs, desires, and ways of thinking and acting
is deeply ingrained in us. If we imagine being confronted with aliens, and
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trying to take up an intentional stance toward them, that can give some
impression of the difficulty. The logic of this way of looking at the problem
is that we could not draw on our own experience, because we would have
no reason to expect the aliens to have inner experience that was anything
like our own. We would be thrown back on outward behaviour and on
changes in internal physical states as our only resources. If, for example, the
aliens often came close to one another, we could not assume that this
reflected a need to bond with one another or to reinforce hierarchies. We
could not even assume that they had a propensity to promote their
individual survival, although it is unlikely that they would last long enough
for us to meet them if they had no propensity to behave in ways that at
least did not impede the survival of their species. If we found a set of
concepts that did allow us successfully to systematize and to predict their
behaviour, that would be evidence that we had got it right, but we could
expect to spend a long time guessing before we had such success. This is
enough to make the dependence of the identification of an appropriate
intentional stance on our inner experience a fact for all practical purposes.
There is, however, one circumstance in which this conclusion would not
hold. If the aliens had outward behaviour that was very similar to our own,
we could use the intentional stance that we used toward human beings. We
would then succeed in systematizing and predicting the aliens’ behaviour.
Correspondingly, the argument about aliens does not show that our inner
experience has any essential role in extending our existing intentional
stance to new human beings whom we meet, because their outward
behaviour is usually like our own. But as will be argued below, this does not
exclude a vital role for inner experience in our first formulating an
intentional stance toward human beings.
Another way of making the point is to consider the problem of radical
translation, the problem of making sense of a language when we have no
starting point and have to work entirely from linguistic and non-linguistic
behaviour, and the related problem of radical interpretation, the problem
of trying to make sense of the speakers of an unknown language by
attributing mental states to them. Quine and Davidson argued for the
importance of the principle of charity, a principle that has various
formulations but the core of which is an assumption that speakers of a
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language mostly tell the truth and mostly get things right. In practice, this
assumption means that we would try to interpret an unknown language in
ways that would maximize agreement between its speakers and ourselves.
A useful supplement is a principle of humanity. This principle invites us to
assume, so far as we can, that the speakers of an alien language are like us.
This supplement is arguably essential when the problem is that of radical
interpretation. (A brief account of the early history of both principles, with
references, is given in Dennett, The Intentional Stance, pages 342-344.)
We could not legitimately apply either principle to any significant
extent when trying to identify an appropriate intentional stance toward
aliens. Starting with the principle of charity, what counted to aliens as
getting things right might be very different from what we would regard as
getting things right. What was salient for themmight be very different from
what was salient for us. Convincing examples cannot be offered because
they would have to be incomprehensible to us, but we can get an idea of one
direction in which such examples might lie by considering Wittgenstein’s
articulate but incomprehensible lion (Philosophical Investigations, part 2,
section 11, page 190). For us, the salient facts about some animals in the
bush are the number and species of the animals. For a lion, the salient fact
might be the ratio of the number of lions that could be fed by killing the
animals to the effort that would be required in order to kill them. This is
not a wholly convincing example, because we could calculate the ratio in
which the lion might be interested by finding out how many animals, of
which species, were present. But if I could give incomprehensible examples,
that inferential link would be broken. Turning to the principle of humanity,
any assumption that aliens were like us would be wholly unfounded.
It might appear that we could at least count the conceptualization
and recording of the environment in a way that would promote the survival
of the species as getting things right, but even if we could make that
assumption, it might provide very little help in the interpretation of aliens’
behaviour. It would be especially unlikely to be helpful if they lived in an
environment where survival was not difficult because there were hardly any
threats, so that an imperative to promote the survival of the species could
not be seen as a significant motive for much of their behaviour. I therefore
contend that there are narrow limits to how much we can be confident
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would be achievable by considering what beliefs and desires a being ought
to have, given the shape of its ecological niche (compare Dennett, The
Intentional Stance, pages 49-50).
We should also consider the global version of charity for which
Karsten Stueber argues (Rediscovering Empathy, section 2.1). In his words,
“Radical interpretation implies only that to justifiably attribute a belief,
an interpreter must be able to attribute a sufficiently large enough belief
system with a certain amount of structure and complexity” (ibid., page
76). While this version would appear to be immune to the objection to the
use of the principle of charity that I have raised, it would unfortunately
not help us in interpreting aliens. We would not have enough clues to allow
us to attribute any large system of beliefs that was usefully structured. We
might manage to attribute some large and complex system on the strength
of patterns of cerebral and external activity. But we would probably only
be able to attribute a system that was not well-structured using a modest
number of intentional concepts, because we would not be able to identify
the key concepts. That would make the system useless in the
systematization of behaviour. It would also be useless in the prediction of
behaviour, because the data that were available to a predictor would be
limited and would be given in terms that used broad-brush behavioural
concepts. Those data could not then be related systematically to the
attributed complex system of beliefs. For me, such difficulties matter. For
Stueber and others, including Davidson, the point of reflection on radical
interpretation is not to interpret aliens, but to use reflection on that extreme
task in order to understand what is involved in the interpretation of human
beings. For me, what matters is the contrast between the interpretation of
aliens and the interpretation of human beings.We need to put the two tasks
side by side, giving them equal prominence, in order to see how important
it is that the interpreter be of the same kind as those whom he interprets,
in our case the human kind.
There is an apparent refutation of the conclusion that the
identification of an intentional stance depends on access to inner
experience of the appropriate type. This is that we do appear to succeed in
making sense of the behaviour of animals, when we use some of the
resources of our intentional stance toward human beings. We can see
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animals, and especially our domestic pets, as exhibiting such things as joy,
determination and defensiveness. We can use such concepts to interpret
their behaviour, and to relate it to goals that we see them as having. We
must be wary of misinterpretation, driven by an inclination to
anthropomorphize, but we do seem to get somewhere, even though animals
are very different from human beings and probably have very different inner
experience, to the extent that they have inner experience at all. If we can get
that far with animals, why should we not be able to get somewhere with
aliens, merely on the basis of their outward behaviour and changes in their
internal physical states, without having to spend a long time guessing the
appropriate concepts to use in formulating an intentional stance? My
response is that while animals differ from us, they do have quite a lot in
common with us, including needs to eat, sleep, maintain a comfortable
temperature and reproduce. We have also fitted some of them, especially
our domestic pets, into our own lives, giving several points of contact
between our way of life and their ways of life, and we have chosen and bred
species that can fit in well with our lives. Our pets may be mentally distant
from us, but they are not so distant in their form of life as we should expect
aliens to be, save that our pets are very distant from us in their level of
mental sophistication, while aliens might be closer to us in that respect.
Another argument can be brought to light by considering how we
might have arrived at a satisfactory intentional stance toward human
beings. Our inner experience in itself may well have no intrinsic, necessary
structure. Such a lack might be thought to imply that we would have had
to develop a theory of our own inner experience, structuring it in some
way, before we could have used that experience to help us to identify the
correct concepts to use in formulating an intentional stance toward human
beings. But it seems more likely that we would have had to structure our
inner experience and people’s behaviour in tandem, because reflection on
the set of inner experiences would not by itself have yielded principles that
would have determined an appropriate structure for that set. Inner
experience might or might not then have had an essential role to play in
determining the appropriate concepts to use in categorizing and structuring
behaviour. That is, it might be that we could have structured the behaviour
without reference to the inner experience, although we might still have
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needed reference to changes in internal physical states. If inner experience
were dispensable in that way, then the formulation of an intentional stance
might not depend on inner experience after all. An appropriate structure of
behaviour, given in terms such as those of meeting needs, avoiding dangers
and complying with social norms, would directly yield an appropriate
structure of beliefs, desires and intentions. That would suggest that even
when faced with aliens, we might be able to manage without access to their
inner experience.
We should start with the question of why behaviour is amenable to
any straightforward systematization at all. The answer is likely to be that
the Universe is a sufficiently inhospitable place that only creatures with
elaborate patterns of behaviour that embodied consistent responses to their
environments would be able to evolve to a high degree of sophistication.
This thought directs our attention to a specific way in which wemight hope
to manage without access to inner experience, and work merely from
behaviour and from changes in internal physical states to an intentional
stance, without spending ages guessing which intentional stance to apply
to some aliens until we found that one of our guesses worked. The clue is
in the phrase “consistent responses”. In order for us to see responses as
consistent, we would need to have an appropriate way of classifying states
of the environment, so that we could say which states were sufficiently
similar to make sameness of response explicable. Such a classification
would be based on the needs of the creatures concerned, and on the
perceptual apparatus that they used. Thus if a creature was of a kind that
needed water regularly, any state of the environment that involved a
shortage of water, however caused, should lead to water-seeking. Similarly,
if a creature was of human size and physical frailty, and also of a kind that
gathered information about immediate dangers visually, then any state of
the environment that produced the same condition of the visual cortex as
a charging bull, including a hallucination, should lead to a sharp movement
sideways when the real or apparent bull appeared to be too close to be able
to change course. If we were to classify states of the environment in terms
that reflected both the needs of the creatures and their perceptual abilities,
we might be able to identify appropriate sets of beliefs, desires and so on
by analysing their physical needs and their perceptual apparatus.
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We cannot, however, be sure that this approach would work. First, as
already noted, aliens might have needs that were so different from ours,
and that were defined by reference to such different ends, that we would not
get far in identifying those needs. Second, while we might be able to analyse
an alien’s perceptual system from the outside, and work out that it had, for
example, a certain power of discrimination between different patterns of
electromagnetic radiation, or between different patterns of physical
pressure, we would not know what the perceptions signified to the alien.
Sometimes, there would be behaviour that we could correlate with the
perceptions in order to get some idea of what was signified. If, for example,
someone sits calmly until he is given an unusual stimulus, and then
immediately runs from the room, it is reasonable to conclude that he takes
the stimulus to indicate the presence of something that he wishes to avoid.
But sometimes, there would not be behaviour that would allow us to
deduce the significance of perceptions. A perception might have a
significance which meant that it gave the perceiver new dispositions that
were never actualized, because the appropriate conditions never arose.
Thus someone might see a high mountain, decide that it looked like a good
place to go when seeking calm and detachment from everyday life, but then
never feel the need for a period of calm and detachment. In other cases,
there would be behaviour that we could only use to deduce the significance
of perceptions if we already had a full understanding of the creature’s way
of life, an understanding that we would not have if we were still seeking an
appropriate intentional stance. There are perceptions that have delayed
effects on behaviour, often in connection with other perceptions and in
ways that we only notice because we do have a full understanding of our
own way of life. A woman may see a display of watches in a shop window,
then two days later notice some birthday cards in another shop, remember
that her son has a birthday soon and go back to the first shop to buy him
a watch. An alien could only link the perceptions to the behaviour, and
make sense of the whole pattern, if he already knew about the significance
to us of family relationships, of birthdays and of present-giving. We would
likewise be unable to work out the significance to aliens of their
perceptions, merely on the basis of their behaviour and of changes in their
internal physical states, except in the simplest cases such as that of
104
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 104
suddenly running from the room when given a particular stimulus, unless
we already understood their way of life. It may well be true that members
of any species that has evolved to a sophisticated level have consistent
responses to states of the environment, with those states of the
environment being classified in a sophisticated way by reference to the
creatures’ needs and their perceptual abilities. But it does not follow that
we could reliably work out what was significant to them, and determine
an appropriate intentional stance, on the basis of our observations of their
apparent needs, their perceptual apparatus and their behaviour. Without an
understanding of what was significant to them, we would spend a long
time guessing until we found an intentional stance that was correct, in the
sense that it allowed both the systematization and the prediction of
behaviour.
Turning to ourselves, the task is much easier because we do have
access to our own inner experience, and because we are well aware of our
own needs and of our way of life. Thus we have a direct route to an
understanding of the significance of different perceptions, and a basis on
which we can construct an appropriate intentional stance toward human
beings. We are directly aware of the devices and desires of our own hearts,
and that is why we can interpret other people. But even with this advantage,
it is still not clear how we could first have arrived at the rich intentional
stance that we now use so effortlessly. After all, our inner experience had
to be structured, as well as our outward behaviour.
A key point is one that applies equally to biological evolution. There
is no need to leap straight from the simplest to the most complex, whether
from single-cell life forms to human beings or from practically no
intentional stance to a full stance. Evolution depends not just on chance,
but on chance plus selection. Small changes that confer some advantage
can become securely embedded, and can provide jumping-off points for
the next round of small advances (Dawkins,ClimbingMount Improbable,
chapter 3). We see a parallel effect in theoretical studies. There was, for
example, no single leap from the mathematics of Pythagoras to the
mathematics that we have today, but a long sequence of new ideas, each
thoroughly tested as it was put forward and then incorporated into the
mathematical tradition if it was recognized as an advance, or discarded if
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it was not. There is no reason why the development of our intentional
stance toward human beings should not have benefited from such an effect.
There is even specific support for such an effect in the interdependence of
theory and inner experience. As we evolve an intentional stance, or any
other folk-psychological understanding of human beings, it starts to feed
back and shape our inner experience. Once theory develops to a new level
in a way that roughly fits inner experience that has not already been
theorized to that level, we pick out the inner experience in a way that fits
the new bit of theory. That helps to give the new bit of theory a firm
foundation. We can, for example, have the experience of postponing
immediate gratification in order to gain some advantage later on. We can
be aware of it as that experience, with its own distinctive phenomenology,
once we have a corresponding level of psychological understanding of what
human beings sometimes do. We can also identify a mechanism of
transmission of an evolving intentional stance in the stories that we tell,
and a mechanism of development in that those stories can be changed and
can become more sophisticated. That development is greatly accelerated
when people become conscious of the role of stories in capturing
psychological insights, and start to write stories in order to make particular
psychological points. The role of stories is set out by Daniel Hutto in Folk
Psychological Narratives. There is also adaptive advantage in developing a
sophisticated intentional stance. The most unpredictable things in the
world are our fellow human beings. If we can understand them, we can
both work with them and work around them. That greatly enhances our
ability both to survive and to prosper. Finally, a gradual evolution of an
intentional stance could have had a starting point in the most basic
experiences and drives, as when pangs of hunger lead us to seek food.
I stated above that we might have to determine the structures of our
inner experience and of our behaviour in tandem. That thought raised the
question of whether we might be able to manage without reference to the
inner experience of aliens when working out how to structure their
behaviour. We probably would need to structure our own inner experience
and our own behaviour in tandem, because the range of different structures
into which experiences on their ownmight fall would probably be too wide.
But this does not mean that inner experience would be redundant. The
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development of the two structures in tandem would be guided by the need
to arrive at a reflective equilibrium between them. A necessary condition for
equilibrium would be that inner experiences, and the behaviours that one
would correlate with them on the basis of parallels between the two
structures, should be apt to one another. They would need to be apt over
extended sequences, and not merely at the level of momentary experiences
and behaviours. Thus, an inner experience of slight anxiety on account of
a distant threat should be correlated with the behaviour of keeping an eye
on the threat, an inner experience of greater anxiety on account of a
reasonably near threat should be correlated with making preparations to
avoid the danger, and an inner experience of fear on account of an
immediate danger should be correlated with immediate evasive action.
That is, we should expect a rising scale of concern to parallel a rising scale
of preparedness. The concept of making preparations, with its associations
of planning, of timescales, of foreseen needs and of motivation by
awareness that the unprepared may suffer, could then have a place in the
intentional stance that we would adopt toward human beings. Such an
exercise in establishing the aptness of correlations that were given by
parallels between the two structures would take us beyond the correlations
between momentary experiences and behaviours that could be
apprehended directly, without formulating structures, such as the
correlation between fear and running away. There would indeed be a three-
way reflective equilibrium between the structure of inner experience, the
structure of behaviour and the content of the intentional stance, with the
content of the stance embodying the aptness of the correlations that were
given by structural parallels. While we can legitimately see ourselves as
developing an intentional stance by reference to inner experience and
behaviour, the fact that unique structures of inner experience and of
behaviour, and therefore unique parallels, would not be forced on us by the
natural facts, means that we should not see a one-way relationship of
dependence, in which an intentional stance emerges from, but has nothing
to contribute to, the structuring of inner experience and of behaviour.
I do not claim that the equilibrium constraint would uniquely
determine either the structure of experience or the structure of behaviour.
But I do claim that inner experience would have an important role to play
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in identifying what it was about behaviour that made it apt to external
circumstances, and hence in influencing the choice of concepts to use in
the intentional stance, concepts that would make clear how we should
systematize whatever behaviour we observed. The inner nature of the
experience, its presence in the inner life of the subject, is vital here. A
perception that is described in terms of what is being perceived, or in terms
of the states that it produces in perceptual areas of the brain, is not of
obvious significance. Why should an approaching tiger matter? The
significance becomes obvious if we ask the subject how he feels about the
tiger, but only if we can grasp the point of what he says. We can do that
because he is another human being, and is therefore sufficiently like us.
The significance might also become obvious if we noted that areas of the
brain that corresponded to certain preferences or emotions were activated,
but only if we knew that activity in those areas of the brain corresponded
to those preferences or emotions.We would only know that if experimental
subjects had reported their thoughts and feelings at times when we knew
that those areas were active, and if they had given those reports in terms
that we, as human beings, could understand. Thus there is no getting away
from accounts that are given in terms that reflect the specifically human
experience of life. I have not shown that it would be impossible to arrive at
a structure of behaviour that was adequate to yield an appropriate
intentional stance without reference to the inner experience of the creatures
concerned, but I hope to have shown that reference to inner experience is
the high road to an intentional stance, and that any other road would be a
long and winding one.
We should also consider specifically simulationist approaches to folk
psychology. Several approaches come under this heading, but they all
involve ways of understanding human beings that are only likely to be
available to those who have been brought up in human communities, and
who have human inner lives. (Correspondingly, a simulationist approach
might be used by an alien, but only to understand aliens of the same type.)
Jane Heal sets out the need for a simulator’s cognitive apparatus to be
sufficiently similar to that of the person simulated (“Understanding Other
Minds from the Inside”, page 30). Alvin Goldman acknowledges that the
use of simulation to predict what someone else will do capitalizes on
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similarities between the minds of the simulator and of the person whose
actions are to be predicted (Simulating Minds, page 20). Karsten Stueber’s
Rediscovering Empathy gives a central role to re-enactive empathy,
something one would only be likely to have if one shared enough
experiences with the person who was being understood. Daniel Hutto’s
Folk Psychological Narratives sets out a process of listening to stories as a
way of acquiring folk-psychological competence. While an adult outsider
could read the stories, he would need the right concepts in order to
distinguish their significant content from insignificant details, and in order
to understand the significant content. So this story-telling account would
not diminish the importance of having appropriate inner experience. The
points that are made in this paragraph about the need for mental
similarities between simulator and simulated are, however, only points
about what makes simulation feasible. So they do not contradict the point
made in section 3.3, that simulation is not essentially a matter of having
empathy. Nor indeed would mental similarity, or reliance on it when
simulating another person’s mental processes, entail the presence of
empathy in the sense of sharing a feeling.
The practical need for those who would take up an intentional stance
tomake use of the resources of their inner experience, and for that experience
to be at least roughly like that of the objects of the stance, extends to
functionalism. Functionalists need to identify the functions that are to be
performed by different states of the brain. The state of fear, for example, has
the function of leading to heightened awareness, and to increased readiness
to flee. We ask what functions need to be performed, in order for a being to
lead a life of a given type. If that type is defined in intentional terms, we will
in practice need to make use of our own inner experience in order to define
the type, so that we can identify the functions. (This conclusion does not
follow if we define the type of life in non-intentional terms. We may, for
example, define the type of “life” of a robot non-intentionally. But we then
individuate the robot’s behaviours, and identify the functions to mention in
a functionalist analysis, by reference to the list of tasks for the robot to
perform that has determined the robot’s design.)
Giving a more substantial role to our inner experience might address
some of the difficulties that functionalism faces. We could allow ourselves
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to see the functions as essentially infused with the phenomenal nature of
the experiences that allowed the identification of those functions. The
difficulties in question are those that are captured in the thought
experiments of the Chinese room, the China brain and the inverted
spectrum. One reason why they count as difficulties is that we want a
philosophy of mind to be adequate to our experience of life. Functions
look as though they can be defined in purely structural terms, linking
perceptions and behaviour, without any specific experiential content,
whereas our lives are full of experiential content.
Such a move would be radical. It would give inner experience a role
not merely in identifying an appropriate functional analysis, but in
formulating its content once it had been identified. That would in turn
threaten the notion that there was a place for a functional analysis in the
expression of scientific results, because those results need to make sense
even to beings who do not have inner experience that is anything like our
own. The corresponding place of the intentional stance in the expression
of scientific results would likewise be threatened by giving such a role to
inner experience. I do not advocate this radical move, but I shall now use
the thought to pose the question of whether a detached psychological
theory, one that held well back from any such move, would be adequate.
Detached psychological theories
A detached psychological theory is one that is formulated in terms that are
independent of the phenomenal nature of our experience, not just our
sensory experience, but also our experience of thinking and of acting. It is
detached in the sense that an observer who was not a participant in human
life, an alien who was psychologically detached from us, could grasp it.
What would we think of such a theory?
The argument so far has only shown that the resources of our inner
experience would in practice be needed in order to identify the appropriate
functions or psychological concepts, in terms of which to formulate a
theory. Once they had been identified and assembled into a theory that
allowed us to systematize and predict people’s behaviour, the methods that
had been used to identify them would become irrelevant to their
appropriateness. The theory might well be capable of application, in a
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scientific way, by a detached observer who sought to systematize or to
predict human behaviour. The observer would not need to rely on the
deliverances of his own inner experience, or on his inner experience’s
bearing any relationship to the inner experience of human beings. The only
requirement would be that the observer had access to the necessary data.
Those data might include states of the brains of subjects, and what subjects
would say in reports of their internal reflections if they were asked, as well
as the outward behaviour of subjects.
The significance of the practical need for reference to our inner
experience when constructing a psychological theory can indeed be limited
in this way. A detached observer might work like that, although it would not
all be plain sailing. Much would depend on the type of psychological
theory that was involved. A humanistic psychology, for example, could not
be used in such a detached way. Furthermore, the centrality of the fact that
our thoughts are about things might mean that there was an obstacle to
the existence of a wholly successful detached observer. This would be the
obstacle that is identified by Galen Strawson’s argument that intentionality
that is attributable merely on the basis of behaviour, without reference to
experience, cannot be full intentionality (Mental Reality, section 7.8; the
point is also argued in relation to the intentionality of emotions in Goldie,
“Emotions, feelings and intentionality”). But even leaving aside such
restrictions and obstacles, if we pursue the idea of a detached observer who
uses a theory that is decoupled from inner experience, we find that we are
led back to the significance of inner experience by a different route.
It is tempting to think that the methods that were used to identify the
concepts to use in a theory would automatically be irrelevant, once the
concepts had been identified. An obvious analogy is that while Newton
may have been inspired by the fall of an apple, his theory of gravity would
have been exactly the same even if no apples had ever existed after that
moment of inspiration. The analogy is, however, misleading. The content
of a theory of gravity is unaffected by what types of organic matter, if any,
happen to exist. The significance of a theory of gravity is likewise
unaffected, except in the indirect sense that gravity helps to determine
which types of living thing can exist and what they can do, and that it will
only have that influence if living things do exist. The content of the
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psychological theory that we may envisage being used by a detached
observer might likewise be unaffected by the nature of the inner experience
of the observer, or of the human beings to which it applied. But its
significance certainly would be affected by its detachment from the inner
experience of human beings.
The theory that is envisaged would simply be a scientific theory that
allowed its users to systematize and to predict human behaviour. It would
set out how certain states and behaviour were typically followed by other
states and behaviour. It might also set out deeper structures that explained
such surface regularities. There would be no need for the theory to claim
perfect regularities. It might say that a given state, in given circumstances,
was followed by given behaviour 70 per cent of the time and by different
behaviour 30 per cent of the time. That is, seeing our choices and behaviour
in the terms of such a theory would not necessarily take away our sense
that we could do things other than the things that we actually do. But there
would be a clash with our sense of how we deliberated. The theory would
identify all of the sources of the outcomes of our deliberations. The sources
would include our desires and our thoughts about evidence, seen as
operating within a context of character traits rather then as physical causes.
That is, a detached psychological theory could speak of occurrent thoughts
and standing dispositions as causes, without reference to the electro-
chemical events and states that were their physical counterparts. (The
contents of the thoughts and dispositions would have to be given in terms
that would strike us as inadequate, because the terms would be divorced
from our inner experience, but the contents could still be given in terms
that were sufficient to allow the systematization and prediction of
behaviour.) These sources of the outcomes of our deliberations would be
the things from which the outcomes followed, whether with perfect
regularity or merely with statistical regularity. The theory would therefore
omit any notion of deliberation as more than following a program, because
it would find no place for the stage of standing back and reviewing options
at the selection stage in a way that was independent of antecedents, and
that would allow for a controlled and explicable break with those
antecedents. Such a theory would to that extent not be adequate to our
inner experience, even though a detached observer who did not have inner
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experience that was like our own might well regard the theory as adequate
because he would have no grasp of what was missing. Furthermore, the
phenomenological inadequacy would exist whether or not one considered
that the adoption of a view of deliberation as involving mastery and subject
origination was the appropriate way to accommodate that phenomenology.
This argument applies to psychological theories, regardless of how
they are created. It would therefore apply whether the observer had
identified the concepts to use through a grasp of human inner experience
or through lucky guesswork. The argument is tinged with circularity. A
detached psychological theory would not strike us as adequate, but our
sense of its inadequacy would depend on possession of our type of inner
experience. The shape of the argument is, however, more that of the first
turn of a spiral than that of a flat circle. We start from the phenomenology.
The felt inadequacy of a detached psychological theory that shows no trace
of the phenomenology drives us round to take the phenomenology
seriously, as something that should be reflected in our psychological
theories. So we do not end up back where we started, at the fact of the
phenomenology and a mere feeling toward it, but one level above that
starting point, with an articulated desire to take the phenomenology
seriously.
This conclusion does not undermine the view that there are places for
the intentional stance and for functional analyses in the conduct of science
and in the expression of scientific results. We can expect to need to go
beyond the scope of the sciences in order to identify an appropriate
intentional stance or functional analysis, but once we have done so we can
use that stance or analysis within the scientific enterprise. Nonetheless, a
psychological theory that was limited to the use of an intentional stance or
of a functional analysis in that scientific way would strike us as inadequate,
because it would be a detached theory (compare Goldie, “Emotions,
feelings and intentionality”, pages 248-250).
3.8 A concept of the subject
We need a concept of the subject that will allow us to see ourselves as
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engaging in subject origination. Such a concept of the subject is, like the
concept of subject origination itself, initially pressed on us within the
narrow field of choices of action and adoptions of belief where systematic
reflection is to be expected. But if we secure the concept within that narrow
field, we can then use it more widely.
Setting out the concept amounts to elaborating the originator
conception. A concept of the human being as a mere object that was within
the world, even a very sophisticated object, would not suffice because a
subject that was seen in that way would be seen simply as falling within
the world’s causal network. The subject could be seen as a locus of events,
but not as an originator of them, because there would be no way to see it
as generating causally efficacious extraneous interventions.
Another constraint is that our concept of the subject must locate each
of us in space-time. Location is fundamental to our lives. We can only
experience things to the extent that information about them reaches our
locations, and we can only do things to the extent that we can influence
the world from our locations.
Finally, we want a concept of the subject that will minimize any
mystery. Mysticism may be a wonderful source of life-changing
experiences, but mystery is an unwelcome element in sober philosophical
theories. The concept that is put forward here unfortunately does involve
a little bit of mystery, because of the need to have a concept of the subject
that does not lead to our seeing it merely as an object that is within the
world. Fortunately, the mystery does not intrude on the province of the
natural sciences.
I shall use the term “boundary concept” for the concept of the subject
that I offer. Its inspiration is a remark that was made byWittgenstein, “Das
Subjekt gehört nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt”, “The
subject does not belong to the world. Rather, it is a boundary of the world”
(Tractatus, 5.632). I take this remark as my starting point, and do not
commit myself to the use that Wittgenstein makes of it, nor to the uses
that other philosophers have made of it. I am not, for example, concerned
with the question of whether “I” is a referring expression. But I shall take
Wittgenstein’s words at face value. He says that the subject is a boundary
of the world, not that it is located at a boundary.
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I shall now elaborate on the concept of the subject as a boundary of
the world, the boundary concept, in two ways. I shall first develop a visual
image that may be useful, although we must be wary of drawing
conclusions on the basis of any such image. Then I shall develop the logic
of the concept.
The image is that of the boundary of a small hole in the world. I shall
take the hole to be a three-dimensional region of space, so that the boundary
is a two-dimensional surface that completely encloses the region, and that
also persists through time. The surface is located where a person’s body is
located. It is an interior boundary of the world, not a boundary that runs
right round the outside of the world. That which is below the surface is off
limits, not part of the world. The surface itself is not within the world,
because something is only within the world if there are points that are parts
of the world on both sides of it. The image must not be put under toomuch
pressure. If the interior, the hole, were not part of the world, one could cause
difficulties by asking whether either that interior or its boundary could even
be spatial. I shall not, however, take up such concerns. The image is only
meant to be rough and ready, and I shall not rely on it in the argument. It
also does not matter to the argument whether we take the world to include
or to exclude the points that constitute the surface itself, although I think
that the image is more satisfactory if those points are taken to be included,
as the last points that are parts of the world.
Three choices of surface naturally suggest themselves. The first is the
skin. The second is the surface of the brain. The third is a tiny sphere. None
of these choices is ideal, but each is suited to certain circumstances. Most
of the time, in our ordinary encounters, it is natural to feel that the limit
of a person is his or her skin. But doctors regard what is under the skin as
within the world, to be studied and acted on like any other part of the
world. For them, any boundary of the world must retreat so as to leave the
body within the world. It would be natural to take the subject back to the
surface of the brain, given that thinking, feeling and deciding are
concentrated in the brain. But even that would not always be appropriate.
There are doctors and others for whom the brain is very much within the
world, with all of its parts amenable to study and to treatment. One could
question whether the concept of the subject as an entity that was not to be
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analysed had any role to play when the brain was analysed in such a way,
given that our sense of self depends on several parts of the brain working
together, and that there is no one kernel of grey cells that can be said to be
the self. But to the extent that there was a role for the concept, one could
take the subject to be the surface of a tiny sphere, with all of the physical
parts of the body outside it. Alternatively one could abandon the pursuit
of an appropriate image at this point, on the basis that it was not sensible
to identify the subject with the surface of a region that was outside the
world, while simultaneously seeing the subject as a product of the
interaction of sub-personal systems that were within the world. There is a
specific reason why it would not be sensible to continue to pursue an
appropriate image. That which is below the boundary is to be treated as off
limits. If the boundary can be identified with the surface of the body or of
the brain, then all or most of what is in fact the causal mechanism of
thought is screened off. That makes it easy to overlook the causal processes
that take place. It is then easy to overlook the causal closure of the physical,
because gaps can be seen in the physical causal network. That in turn
allows us to see deliberation as conducted with mastery, and as involving
subject origination. (This is only meant as an indication of how the image
could be taken. It cannot be used in argument, because to do that, one
would also have to establish that all and only the right parts of the causal
mechanism were screened off.) If, on the other hand, the image leads us to
see nothing physical as screened off, because the boundary is reduced to the
surface of a tiny sphere, then this connection between the content of the
image and the idea of overlooking certain causal processes is lost.
Fortunately, the image of the subject as a surface that is a boundary
of the world is no more than an image. We are free to vary the image,
choosing whatever surface may be appropriate to the occasion, or not to
bother with the image. The image is put forward to capture the idea that
the subject is not wholly embedded in the causal network, because there are
no parts of the world on the far side of the surface, but equally that the
subject is not part of some mysterious other world. I shall now analyse this
idea, leaving the image behind.
The great master of things that are not fully represented by the
phenomena, and that on some but not all interpretations form a separate
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world from the phenomenal world, was Immanuel Kant. The noumena,
things as they were in themselves, were placed off limits. The concept of a
noumenon was a mere limiting concept, a way of identifying the
unknowable without saying anything about it. By trimming the ambitions
of a realist view of the world, Kant could avoid both a paralysing
scepticism and the otherwise devastating conflicts of transcendental ideas,
the antinomies. The subject, the “I” in “I think”, was also kept apart from
the phenomena, for different reasons. Doing so made possible the freedom
that was essential to Kant’s view of human beings as potentially moral
creatures. This concept of the subject also had to be a mere limiting
concept. The subject had to be something that was inferred from its role
and that was not visible in itself, both for the sake of freedom and in order
to avoid entanglement in the mistaken inferences of rational psychology.
Only the minimal properties that followed from the subject’s role could be
attributed to it. (The key passages in theCritique of Pure Reason are A254-
255/B310-311 on the concept of a noumenon, A345-348 and B403-409 on
the subject as thinker and no more, and A532-558/B560-586 on freedom.)
The final product was by no means free of tension. As Jerrold Seigel puts
it, “Kant both sought and avoided the unification of the empirical and
intelligible forms of the self” (The Idea of the Self, page 316).
The subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept can be taken
to be a replacement for Kant’s intelligible subject. It is likewise a being that
is not to be understood in terms of physical mechanisms, but with the
difference from Kant’s intelligible subject that it has a location in an
independent and pre-existing spatio-temporal world. I shall return to the
idea of locating the subject in that pre-existing world in section 6.6.
Features of the subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept
cannot be deduced from the way in which it is made up, in the way that the
features of an organism, such as its mass, its maximum speed and its
intellectual capacities, might be deduced from its physical structure and
from the arrangement and chemistry of its cells. There is no structure to
inspect. The subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept is a
construct, used to fulfil a particular role in our understanding of ourselves
and of the world. We are free to incorporate in the construct whatever
features we choose, subject only to the three constraints of non-
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contradiction of our existing knowledge, plausibility and the avoidance of
any more than minimal mystery. Such constraints might appear to allow far
too much liberty, and even to license an ad hoc construct, the existence of
which would prove nothing, precisely because it was ad hoc. But if we
found that we had a simple and straightforward construct, which
nonetheless did useful work because the subject as so conceived could be
seen as engaging in subject origination, then we might regard the construct
as worthwhile, and as able to tell us something about ourselves and about
our relationship to the world. I shall, however, refrain from incorporating
into the boundary concept anything more than is necessary in order for
the subject to be seen as engaging in subject origination.
This minimalism is not meant to restrain the construction of fuller
concepts of the subject in response to other considerations. One would
need something fuller if one were building a theory of the subject that
would explain the psychology of our relationships to ourselves and with
one another, or a theory that would explain specific philosophically
significant features of the subject, such as immunity to error through mis-
identification, but I shall leave those avenues unexplored. More generally,
a concept of the subject with which we could identify would need to be
much fuller than the boundary concept. Both the great richness of any
acceptable concept of the subject, and the scope for variety in such
concepts, are amply demonstrated by two contrasting books, Charles
Taylor’s Sources of the Self and Jerrold Seigel’s The Idea of the Self. The
minimal boundary concept of the subject with which I shall work would be
far too thin a concept to be acceptable. But I can set that issue to one side,
and develop only a minimal concept, because its use to allow us to attribute
subject origination in no way precludes the use of other concepts for other
purposes.
The boundary concept must accommodate our sense that we are
points of origin, rather than intermediate links in causal chains. It is a
desire to accommodate this sense that leads me to present the subject as
something that is not within the world. That presentation allows us to see
the subject as the source of free but controlled extraneous interventions
which are not seen as arising out of the execution of programs that are
foisted on the subject. The interventions are seen as emerging from the
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boundary, but we cannot see any origins of those interventions. The subject
as it is conceived using the boundary concept cannot be seen as having a
physical or quasi-physical structure, and cannot be seen as the locus of
physical or quasi-physical events within itself. Such features would also be
ruled out by the constraint of plausibility. We must not say anything about
the subject that would require a quasi-physical world to accommodate its
features, alongside the physical world, or anything that would require some
new category of physical feature or event within the subject. Furthermore,
such features would undermine the deliberate limitation on the status of
the originator conception that makes its use merely a way of looking at
people who are parts of the physical world, rather than its use affording us
a vision of a non-physical world or of strange features of the physical
world. Correspondingly, the boundary concept only applies to the whole
person, not to the sub-personal mechanisms that are both mental, although
easily arguable to be reducible to the physical, and vital to our abilities to
perceive, to choose and to act.
The boundary concept must also assign each of us a location in space-
time. Location is fundamental to our lives, to what we can perceive and to
what we can do. The subject must have a location in the world, even though
the subject under the boundary concept is not seen as being within the
world. There need be no difficulty here. Each person’s boundary is an
interior limit of physical space. It is located in physical space, where the
physical person is located.
Going beyond the obvious importance of location in space-time for
the way in which we live, specifically philosophical concerns also argue for
the importance of location. Quassim Cassam argues the case in detail in
Self and World. He uses a range of arguments to make the case that a
unified and self-conscious subject must be embodied. Ingmar Persson uses
the importance of embodiment to give an argument against general
scepticism about the external world (“Self-Doubt: Why We are not
Identical to Things of Any Kind”, sections 2 and 3). Brian O’Shaughnessy
argues that awareness of one’s body is required for the proper use of one’s
senses (The Will, volume 1, part 2). All of these authors argue for
embodiment, which is more than mere location, but embodiment implies
location.
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The subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept can be seen
as meeting such embodiment requirements, because the boundary is linked
to a physical body. It is not linked as something attached to a physical body
like a Cartesian soul, even one that is much more closely integrated than a
pilot in a ship, to use Descartes’ image in theMeditations (Meditation 6,
AT 7: 81 (nauta), AT 9: 64 (pilote)). It is linked more in the manner of a
feature of the physical body. To revert to visual images, the boundary is
like the surface of the body, not something additional but an inseparable
feature of the body. But we must not push this image too far. We can only
continue to apply the boundary concept so long as the body is alive and has
cerebral functions of appropriate kinds, whereas the surface of a physical
body exists regardless of the state of animation of the body. We must also
remember that use of the boundary concept of the subject does not imply
the existence of anything over and above the body. The inseparability of
the subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept amounts to the
fact that living physical bodies of an appropriate degree of similarity to
ourselves, and only they, can be brought under the boundary concept, and
that they can be seen as being selves that fall under that concept, not as
possessing selves that fall under that concept. These limits to the
implications of the use of the boundary concept mean that I need not be
embroiled in debates about whether or not people are identical to bodies,
or are constituted by bodies, nor need I be embroiled in related debates
about the nature of, and the criteria for, personal identity. We would also
be free to associate a subject as it was conceived using the boundary
concept with two bodies, if Anthony Quinton’s fantasy of a double life
that was led in two places, with times awake in one place matching times
asleep in the other, were a reality (“Spaces and Times”, sections 5 and 6).
Finally, the subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept must
be seen as a unified subject. It is fundamental to the way in which we regard
ourselves and one another that each one of us is seen as a single person.
Inner conflicts are resolved before decisions are made. We know what we,
and other people, think and do, not what parts of ourselves or of other
people think and do. Irresoluble conflicts may be the stuff of novels, but
most of life is more straightforward than that, and when there is a conflict,
a resolution is sought. Division of the subject is a peculiarly debilitating
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mental condition, precisely because our way of life and our societies
presuppose integrated selves. (For a full exploration of the philosophical,
rather than the practical, significance of a unified rational point of view,
see Rovane, The Bounds of Agency.)
The motivation for use of the boundary concept of the subject is
simply that it allows us to see deliberation with mastery, subject origination
and the unity of the subject, without sacrificing location or embodiment.
Having said that, use of the boundary concept does not explain how
subject origination works. Only the corresponding physical processes
remain amenable to explanation, and their explanation remains firmly the
province of the natural sciences, which only consider things that are within
the world. There is therefore a certain mystery, the creation of which is the
price of allowing for subject origination. I shall now outline both the
continuing role of the explanations that are offered by the natural sciences,
and the extent of the mystery.
The role of scientific explanations is unchanged by the introduction
of the boundary concept. There is no suggestion that use of the boundary
concept brings something new to the world, something like a soul that is
additional to the physical body. Rather, use of the boundary concept is an
alternative way of looking at what is already there. Thus the mechanisms
of the brain continue to be the condition for consciousness and the source
of consistency in our thoughts, words and deeds. Our characters,
dispositions, knowledge and actions are consequences of physical states,
and not of anything non-physical. We can therefore tackle Schopenhauer’s
problem without being led to his conclusion. He points out that a person
is conscious of himself in two different ways, as a representation and as a
will (TheWorld asWill and Representation, volume 1, chapter 19). In place
of these two modes of awareness, I have the person as he or she appears
under the two conceptions, naturalistic and originator. But I do not see
what is given under the originator conception as reality, in the way that
Schopenhauer sees the Will, because the originator conception merely
affords us a way of looking at people. Those people are and remain natural.
The mystery that is generated by use of the boundary concept is not
some supernatural world beyond the reach of the sciences. It is a limit to
our investigations. The progress of science has accustomed us to the view
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that there are no ultimate mysteries. There are plenty of things that we do
not yet understand, doubtless including things that we do not yet realize are
there to be understood. But we feel that any given mystery is open to
scientific investigation, and that there is a good chance that we will in due
course solve the mystery.Wemay come across newmysteries in the process.
If, for example, we explain the behaviour of atoms in terms of their
constituent particles, we are faced with the question of why those particles
behave as they do. But those newmysteries will succumb to science in their
turn. At least, there is no reason to think that they will not. A pre-ordained
limit to our investigations would be a mystery indeed.
The subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept amounts
to such a limit. Nothing that is conceived in a way that makes it amenable
to scientific study can, as so conceived, also be seen as engaging in subject
origination. If something is conceived in a way that makes it amenable to
scientific study, everything that it does is seen either as caused, or as arising
merely by chance. It is therefore seen as a locus of events but not as an
originator of them. This must include the choices that it makes at the
selection stages of deliberations. In order to avoid seeing everything done
either as caused or as arising by chance, the subject needs to be conceived
in a way that puts it beyond the reach of scientific study. Furthermore, we
need to go down that route as soon as we start to think about how we live.
We recognize that implicitly seeing ourselves as points of origin is
important, both in our individual lives and in our relationships with one
another. We then have reason to apply the boundary concept to ourselves,
because that allows us to see ourselves as leading the kinds of lives that we
know we do lead.
Setting a limit to our investigations is important for another reason.
A standard objection to seeing a subject as master over all rational
antecedents is that the subject is then seen as lacking any character, so that
its decisions must be seen as random. But if we cannot see any origins of
the subject’s decisions, while we still take it that they do have specific
origins, then we cannot say that those decisions are random, any more than
we can say that they are not random. This is the reply, promised in section
1.5, to Leibniz and to those who take up that criticism of the image of the
queen.
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The mystery could be avoided. We could decide not to think about
how we lived. But that would greatly impoverish our mental lives. It would
eliminate a great deal of the point of literature, of philosophy and of the
study of history. But it would not impoverish the natural sciences. The
boundary concept accommodates our sense of leading our lives. This is
something that would not interest someone who took a scientific view,
because scientific views are purged of the specifically human. Science need
not feel the pinch of the mystery, because the mystery amounts to placing
a territory out of bounds to scientific investigation when science has no
interest in that territory anyway.
The mystery could be replaced by something else, equally impure and
a touch disturbing when regarded from a scientific stance. Thomas Nagel,
in The View fromNowhere, plays off subjective and objective views of the
world against one another. He accepts that there will always be some
tension between the two types of view (ibid., chapter 5, section 6). Living
with that tension is an alternative way to accommodate our lives as subjects
in an objective world.
The boundary concept and other philosophers
The boundary concept is a minimal concept of the subject. More
substantial concepts have been the topic of much philosophical debate.
The minimal nature of my concept means that it neither raises nor
addresses many of the philosophical issues that surround more substantial
concepts. It is, however, still instructive to survey some of those
philosophical issues, both in order to underline the minimal nature of the
boundary concept, and in order to show that arguments that use it can be
conducted without first engaging with those issues.
Gilbert Ryle considered it to be a mistake to seek some given thing
that would answer to the pronoun “I”, beyond identifying the person one
was by name and address. We might think that we needed something extra
in order to account for the ways in which we thought and spoke about
ourselves, but careful attention to our language would show that this was
not so (The Concept of Mind, chapter 6, section 6). Ryle’s arguments
prompt the thought that the boundary concept of the subject might be
redundant. But in fact the concept does useful work. The work in question
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is not to supply some extra thing that answers to the pronoun “I”, in the
way that Ryle argued to be unnecessary. Instead it is to allow us to see each
person as a point of origin. If we are to make sense of subject origination,
we need to identify points of origin. The boundary concept’s job is simply
to allow us to identify those points.
Before Ryle, David Hume stated that he could never observe himself,
but only perceptions (ATreatise of HumanNature, book 1, part 4, section
6, page 252). The subject as it is conceived using the boundary concept is
likewise unobservable, but does that matter? If we wanted the subject as it
was conceived using the boundary concept to play certain roles, such as
the role of accommodating introspective perception, that would have
important consequences, limiting the range of acceptable theories
(Shoemaker, “Introspection and the Self”). But use of the boundary
concept does not lead us into such entanglements because we only use the
concept in order to pick out points of origin. Incidentally, one issue that is
thereby avoided is the issue of whether the subject has intrinsic, as opposed
to relational, properties (Shoemaker, “Introspection and the Self”, pages
122-123). This chimes nicely with my refusal to give the boundary concept
any content beyond what is required for it to perform its function. We
might be tempted to develop the boundary concept to domore. Specifically,
it might be made the underpinning of care about the future, because that
future was the subject’s own future. In order for the subject to be seen as
fulfilling its duty of care, it would have to be seen to act for its own reasons
rather than just letting the future happen. And if the subject were seen
merely as an element in the causal network, it would be easy, although not
inevitable, to see its future as just happening to it. That would be even
further fromwhat we would need to see than the minimally active, because
deliberately passive, letting the future happen. The originator conception
would prevent us from seeing the subject as passive. Application of the
originator conception would in turn imply use of the boundary concept.
We might go on to find an answer to Hume in a boundary concept that
was developed to accommodate a caring relationship to the future. The
subject’s projection of itself, as conceived using the boundary concept, into
its own future might give it enough substance for it to see itself as real, and
to that extent to appear to itself, even though it would still not be an object
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of sense perception. Such an approach would lead us into the line of
thought of Heidegger in Being and Time.
A different approach to the subject is set out in Susan Hurley’s book
Consciousness in Action. The subject is not taken to be a mysterious nexus
between perceptual input and behavioural output, something that it would
be difficult to treat as a natural part of the world. Both the idea of the
given, ready-made perceptual content, and the idea of the giving, actions
considered as isolated emanations of a black-box subject, are attacked as
myths. A complex picture of personal and sub-personal systems is built
up. That picture integrates perception and action. The contents of
conscious states are sharply distinguished from the sub-personal vehicles of
those contents. On the one hand, the emphasis on action is something that
I have in common with Hurley, because many deliberations lead to action.
On the other hand, the subject as it is conceived using the boundary
concept is very much an input-output subject. It receives information, then
as part of a deliberation it makes choices at the selection stage that
ultimately lead to actions. The input-output picture that Hurley confines
to sub-personal systems is one that I extend to the whole person at the
selection stage, although the processing of information that leads up to the
selection itself, and the subsequent calculation stage, can be seen as
performed by sub-personal systems. There is, however, an important
difference between the application of the input-output picture to sub-
personal systems and its application to the whole person. Sub-personal
systems are embodied in mechanisms within the world, such as systems of
cells. We can always look inside the box that represents such a system and
see how certain inputs lead to certain outputs. The whole person, as it is
conceived using the boundary concept, is not open to such inspection. The
boundary that is the person is a recipient of inputs and a point of origin of
outputs, and there is nothing to be seen underlying those roles. It is not
that any magical or mysterious processing goes on behind the boundary.
Processing goes on in the physical world. The boundary plays the logical
role of the locus of free choice at the selection stage of deliberation, rather
than actually playing any efficient role in the middle of a causal chain. The
fact that the subject as a boundary is merely posited in its role, and is not
described as a mechanism within the world, is enough to save the subject
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from disappearing into the distance as more and more of our cognitive
processes are analysed in terms of neural mechanisms.
My input-output picture of the whole person does not set me at odds
with Hurley, because our aims are different. Hurley’s concept of the subject
is a naturalistic one. I seek a concept of the subject that will do justice to
our self-conception and to our inner experience. We experience, think and
decide. We see ourselves as points of origin. We do appear as input-output
selves, both to ourselves and to other people with whom we interact
socially, even if a detached observer might find it more satisfactory to see
us in a different light, and even though we only need to see our whole selves
as input-output selves in relation to the selection stages of our
deliberations. Someone who adopted the originator conception of human
beings, and who therefore adopted the boundary concept of the subject,
could equally well, for other purposes, adopt the naturalistic conception of
human beings and adopt Hurley’s view in full. Contradiction would be
avoided because the conceptions would be different.
Helen Steward, in “Fresh Starts”, offers an approach to agent
causation, rather than to the subject, that is based on her view that
causation is a folk concept that covers a wide variety of relationships. She
argues that the concept can easily allow both for talk of substances as
causes and for talk of events as causes. If that is accepted, then it becomes
possible to avoid the discomfort that is likely to attach to saying that event
causation is the norm, but that human agents are a special case in that they
engage in substance causation. As with Hurley, my relationship to Steward
is determined by the fact that she is looking for something in the world,
while I seek no addition to the inventory of the world that is given by the
natural sciences. Steward argues that the obstacles that stand in the way of
our seeing the world as open to the inclusion of fresh starts, heads of causal
chains that are not to be traced back to previous causes, should not be
taken to be insuperable but are open to challenge. The doctrine of subject
origination does not need to accommodate such fresh starts as real features
of the world.
I can likewise avoid certain difficulties that surround mental
causation, such as the problem of the implications of the principles of
causal closure and of non-overdetermination, and the problem of the
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alleged causal inertness of the mental. (For discussions of the first problem
see chapters 6 to 8 of Walter and Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism andMental
Causation. For the second problem, see chapters 9 to 11 of the same book.)
I am not driven to seek mental causes in the world, because I do not seek
agential causes in the world. This also allows me to disregard the challenge
to folk psychology that is given by Ramsey, Stich and Garon in their paper,
“Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology”. The
challenge in question is that folk psychology assumes propositional
modularity, which is argued to be incompatible with connectionism. The
incompatibility has been disputed (Frankish,Mind and Supermind, chapter
6). But in any case the alleged incompatibility does not affect my proposal,
because the argument for incompatibility relies on incorporation into the
doctrine of propositional modularity of the claim that propositional
attitudes play a causal role. This is a claim that I do not need to make. Such
a causal claim would even be at variance with a view of deliberation as
conducted with mastery, and not as the following of a program, if the claim
went so far as to allow propositional attitudes to be sufficient causes of
outcomes. The claim that propositional attitudes play such a strong causal
role may, however, be sustainable when one takes a different view of
deliberation.
Finally, E. J. Lowe, in Personal Agency, presents a special version of
agent causation that is supported by two key arguments. The first
argument, that all causation is fundamentally substance causation,
eliminates an otherwise awkward contrast between scientifically
respectable event causation and mysterious agent causation. The second
argument, that there are causally efficacious non-epiphenomenal volitions,
gives a way of conferring agential control. Furthermore, our actions are
not random. They are performed for reasons, which in Lowe’s view not
only are not causes, but must not be causes if our actions are to be both free
and rational.
Lowe is, like Steward and others, looking for a satisfactory picture
that is wholly based on things in the world, although Lowe is clear that
important things may fail to feature in a purely physical description of the
world. Volitions have real work to do in Lowe’s theory, so they must be real.
That fact is reflected in a key difference between Lowe’s approach and my
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own. I am happy to see the physical facts, facts that can only allow for
determinism and randomness, as capturing all that can objectively be said
about the world. Relatedly, I do not conclude that there need actually be a
causally efficacious will, even though my argument that we should see
ourselves as deliberating with mastery is motivated by similar concerns to
those of Lowe, who says that we must not see ourselves as reasoning
automata or as caused to act by our reasons (Personal Agency, sections 4.7
and 7.9). Another difference between Lowe and myself is that I locate
freedom, as seen but without any claim as to its reality, at the selection
stage of deliberation, not in any volition that is the direct impulse to action.
I have a specific concern about Lowe’s approach which leads me to
think that his proposal is no better than mine, although no worse either.
Lowe asserts that control comes from our volitions, and that our actions are
not random because they are performed for reasons. He does not offer, and
does not want to offer, a physical mechanism of control. But only a
physical mechanism, or mental action on the physical, can actually control
physical action. Lowe naturally chooses the latter option, but he thereby
introduces an element of mystery into his proposal that is no less unnerving
than the element of mystery in my proposal. He does give arguments to
show that we should not rule out the sort of action of the mental on the
physical that he needs, but to say that something is not ruled out is not to
argue convincingly in favour of its actuality. Lowe freely admits that there
is an incompleteness in his proposal at this point (ibid., section 8.5). My
unbacked promissory note on control represents a comparable
incompleteness in my proposal, although I at least have the defence that I
am not asserting that there actually are open but controlled choices, only
that we can see our deliberations as if there were such choices.
In the first three chapters, I have argued that the naturalistic
conception of human beings is not adequate to our experience or to our
self-conception. There are therefore good reasons to adopt the originator
conception. In chapter 4, I shall set out some connections between the
concept of rational action, action that is the result of a process of
deliberation that we see as rational, and a range of other concepts. Then
in chapters 5 and 6, I shall discuss a range of questions in epistemology
and in the philosophy of science.
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CHAPTER 4
Rational action
In this chapter, I move on from how we see processes of deliberation,
to how we evaluate their results. The results are, however, not to be
evaluated in isolation. If a choice of action is to be seen as rational, the
agent must be seen as having deliberated appropriately. This shift from the
inner to the outer is described in section 4.1. I use the concept of rational
action as a centrepiece, around which to arrange several other concepts. In
section 4.2, I explore the relationships between rational actions and
reasons, and survey the attitudes that an observer of a putatively rational
action might have toward its rationality. I also touch on the source of our
standards of rationality. In section 4.3, I discuss the concept of self-
consciousness and its relationship with the concept of action. In section
4.4, I discuss the concept of consciousness, and note the limited extent to
which consciousness need be understood for present purposes. In section
4.5, I discuss the concept of choice and the constraints on our attributions
of choice.
4.1 From the inner to the outer
The focus so far has been on the process of deliberation. There are benefits
in seeing people as deliberating with mastery, and in overlooking the causal
closure of the physical. That much concerns seeing the process as non-
mechanical. But if we want to attribute rationality, we must look at
deliberation in a different way. We must consider the content of the
evidence that is available to a subject, the actual weights that the subject
attaches to pieces of evidence, and the method of argument that the subject
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selects. A move from the inner to the outer, from the view of the process as
not proceeding mechanically to consideration of the content of the process
and of the result, is appropriate because the conclusions of deliberations,
and the relationships between the content of those conclusions and the
content of the supposed reasons for them, are what we take to indicate a
subject’s quality of thought. We do not credit the wild eccentric with a
rationality that makes it worth our while to pay any attention to him, even
if we regard him as deliberating with mastery.
The move that is intended here is not a complete move from process
to result. The rationality that is at stake is not simply a rationality of the
conclusions of deliberation, considered in isolation. A conclusion will be
considered to be rational if it is related to the starting point in evidence by
an appropriate set of weights and an appropriate method of argument. But
if a judge of rationality would not have chosen the action, or adopted the
belief, that the subject chose or adopted, that would not be sufficient to
make the choice of the action or the adoption of the belief irrational.
Rational action is neither intensionally nor extensionally equivalent to ideal
action. Likewise, rational belief, in the sense that I intend, is neither
intensionally nor extensionally equivalent to correct belief, because we may
conduct research rationally while still not arriving at the correct answers to
our questions. I shall open the discussion in terms of rational action. The
rationality of holding beliefs will come to the fore in chapter 5.
Several concepts are in play here. We can only make sense of the
concept of rational action if we can make sense of the concepts of a reason
and of rationality. Furthermore, only a self-conscious being can decide that
he or she will do something. Self-consciousness in turn demands
consciousness. And rational actions are actions that are chosen on the basis
of reasons, so we must be able to make sense of the concept of choice in
order to make sense of the concept of rational action.
These concepts can all be arranged around the concept of rational
action. Rational action is something with which we are all familiar. We
engage in it constantly. We recognize it in ourselves and in others, whether
or not we understand its true constitution. It is a suitable centrepiece for the
complex of concepts with which we are concerned, both because of its
familiarity and because there are reasonably direct connections between it
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and the other members of the complex. These connections are largely
connections of presupposition. The other concepts are presupposed by the
concept of rational action. If they make no sense, then the concept of
rational action will not make sense either.
The concept of rational action is sophisticated, so it would not be the
obvious starting point if we were trying to ground the whole complex in
other concepts that were generally taken to be less problematic, such as
concepts that originated in the natural sciences. But I shall not attempt
such an exercise in grounding, whether reductive or otherwise. I also
recognize that the philosophical issues that are associated with all of these
concepts are large. I shall only offer a sketch map. I shall position my
concerns within the wider philosophical landscape, but I shall not attempt
to resolve debates in the terrain that surrounds my own.
4.2 Rational action and reasons
The most directly connected concept is that of a reason. A rational action
is an action that is performed for reasons. But it is not only that. An action
may be seen as performed for reasons, but not be seen as rational because
the reasons were not good enough to justify performance of the action.
If someone performs an action for reasons and someone else then asks
why he did what he did, he will have something to say to her, something
that will go beyond the absence of reasons not to have performed the
action, even though going for a walk “for no particular reason” is not to be
condemned as irrational. What he can say will amount to the reasons he
had, and the questioner will often accept that they were sufficient reasons.
If the questioner does not accept the putative reasons that are given, and
replies that they were not really reasons, or that they were insufficient, we
can expect a dialogue to ensue. The agent may offer an explanation of why
the putative reasons were reasons, or sufficient reasons, or he may offer
additional reasons. He may also explain the description under which he
brought the action at the time, lest there be some misunderstanding there.
The questioner may well grasp the point eventually, perhaps concluding
that she would not herself have performed that action for those reasons, but
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that the action was nonetheless rational. Any rationality that is attributed
will not be rationality by the agent’s lights, but rationality by the
questioner’s lights. There is a sequence of four attitudes, all of which
appear to be possible but the second one of which actually makes no sense.
The first attitude is that the action was not rational. This is the likely
attitude if the questioner considers that the agent’s weighting of evidence,
or his chosen method of argument, was unacceptably peculiar. That is, it
is the likely attitude toward the truly bizarre eccentric. It is also the likely
attitude when the questioner recognizes that the agent went through a
process that resembled deliberation, but considers that reasons did not
really enter into that process because the putative reasons would not have
been able to play their required roles in a genuine process of deliberation.
This could be because the putative reasons were, in the questioner’s eyes,
irrelevant to the decision that was to be taken. Instead, there was what she
would regard as some non-rational process, with the putative reasons being
seen by her as made up independently. Rationalization is not rationality.
The questioner could also see rationalization when she thought that the
reasons supplied were perfectly relevant reasons, but when she thought that
they had been misused in the supposed process of deliberation, because
either the logical structure of the process, or the relationship between that
structure and the reasons, was unsatisfactory. In such cases, it would
however be difficult for the questioner to spot that something was amiss.
As will be apparent from this paragraph, a decision that merely happens to
accord with what we would regard as good reasons is not rational in the
sense that I intend. The process is important, as well as its result.
The second attitude of the questioner is the one that would be needed
for an attribution of rationality by the agent’s lights that was not an
attribution of rationality by the questioner’s lights. This attitude is that the
action was rational by the agent’s standards, which the questioner could
not grasp. (If the questioner could grasp, but could not accept, the agent’s
standards, the first attitude would be appropriate.) This attitude makes no
sense because rationality is not something highly technical. The concept
of rationality plays a role in the everyday understanding of people on which
we rely in our social interactions. The technicality of a process of
deliberation is no bar to a grasp of the rationality of the ensuing action,
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even though it makes perfect sense for someone to say, “I am sure that he
had his reasons, but I cannot understand them because they are too
technical for me”. The agent might, for example, have carried out a
business transaction using complicated legal formalities, and the questioner
might be unable to understand the detailed reasons for the formalities. But
there would be something that the agent could say, and that the questioner
could grasp. The agent might say that the point of the formalities was to
reduce a tax liability. That simplified account would allow the questioner
to see the action as rational. There are some apparent exceptions. For
example, a mathematician might set out the steps in some complicated
work that he was doing in order to establish a particular result, and lay
people might be unable to comprehend the result, nor would it have any
practical application that might strike lay people as sufficient to motivate
the work. In such cases, it might seem that a questioner would have to
acknowledge the incomprehensible rationality of the actions. But such
exceptions are rare, and are liable to turn out only to be apparent
exceptions. The mathematician could certainly explain to a questioner the
notion of solving a complicated problem by roundabout means, the notion
of a proof on which one could rely and the notion of adding to our
knowledge out of interest, or because the addition might contribute to the
acquisition of further knowledge, even if the mathematician could not
explain the content of his work to lay people.
Another reason why there is no space for attributions of
incomprehensible rationality is that if a questioner attributes rationality
to an action, she implicitly claims that she comprehends the agent’s
reasoning sufficiently to have at least a rough sense of how he might have
reached his decision, even if she would never actually think like he does.
Two arguments that are closely related to each other can be used to support
the view that the questioner must have at least some comprehension of
how the agent reached his decision, if she is to make any attribution of
rationality. The first argument is that a state of the world cannot contribute
to making an action rational for the agent, that is, serve as an internal
reason for the action, unless the agent has phenomenal consciousness of
that state of the world (Eilan, “Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and
Consciousness”). If that is correct, then a questioner will be unable to
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appreciate that an agent acted rationally, unless the questioner has at least
some grasp of the agent’s form of awareness of the world. It might be
enough for the questioner to have only a very limited grasp. If we started
with human beings and worked outward to stranger and stranger aliens, we
might reach other limits to comprehensibility before reaching this one.
Nonetheless, the argument can be used to support the view that an ability
to grasp the processes of thought of others to some degree is important.
The second argument is that a questioner can only properly understand a
process of choosing an action as rational if she can appreciate what matters
to the agent. She must therefore be able to grasp the emotions of the agent,
at least to some extent. Those emotions cannot be grasped in a detached
way, nor can one have an adequate detached grasp of concepts such as “the
dangerous”. From a wholly detached point of view, a questioner could only
grasp “the dangerous in the view of the agent”, not “the dangerous” as it
was from the agent’s point of view (compare Goldie, “Emotions, feelings
and intentionality”, pages 244-246). Such considerations contrast with my
remarks in section 3.3, about the lack of need for qualitatively similar inner
experience in order to enter into another deliberator’s head, but there is no
contradiction. In section 3.3, the task was merely to grasp a sequence of
thoughts as a process of deliberation. Here, the task is to attribute
rationality to the deliberator’s conclusion. That attribution could be
withheld, even if one saw the deliberation as following an intelligible
course.
The exclusion of attributions of incomprehensible rationality does
not exclude an acknowledgement that others might have standards that
played a comparable role in their lives to the role that our standards of
rationality play in our lives, even though those other standards might be too
alien to make any sense to us. But our inability to make sense of those
standards would prevent us from applying those standards to particular
actions. The best we could say about the actions of such mysterious beings
would be that a given action might, for all we knew, conform to standards
that played a normative role for them that was comparable to the normative
role that standards of rationality played for us. That would also be the
worst that we could say about their actions. We could not condemn the
actions as irrational, any more than we could honour them as rational.
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Global incomprehension would require us not to reach a conclusion on the
status of the actions.
The third attitude of the questioner is that the action was rational,
even though the questioner might not herself have performed it on the
strength of the reasons given. The questioner might not have attached the
same weights to the pieces of evidence as the agent did, or she might have
preferred a different method of argument, but she could still see that the
agent might reasonably have thought as he did. Alternatively, the questioner
might not grasp the reasons in all of their technical detail. The fourth
attitude is that the action was rational, and that the questioner would have
done the same thing on the strength of the reasons given. These last two
attitudes both make perfect sense.
The exclusion of attributions of incomprehensible rationality goes
hand in hand with the view that rationality is in practice rationality for us.
We have no access to standards other than our own standards. This is,
incidentally, the reason why we can solve the coincidence problem, the
problem of explaining why it is that intentional reasons-based explanations
of conduct and non-intentional physical explanations march in step. (See
Schlosser,TheMetaphysics of Agency, pages 123-126, for a recent analysis
of the problem.) The standards of rationality that we have created govern
our identification of some pieces of evidence, and not others, as potential
reasons for given actions. They also govern our identification of some
constructions that use evidence, and not other constructions, as rational
justifications for given actions. If agents use acceptable constructions that
use appropriate evidence to reach their decisions on what to do, those
constructions amount to acceptable reasons-based explanations of their
actions. We have chosen our standards because those standards allow us to
make sense of human beings. If we had chosen standards that led to the
identification of types of reasons-based explanation that did not march in
step with the physical progress of the world, we would have found that our
reasons-based explanations did not work. If we had tried to use
explanations predictively, people would not have acted in the ways that the
explanations would have led us to expect. If we had tried to use
explanations to explain actions after the event, either we would not have
been able to find explanations for actions that were performed, or we
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would only have been able to find them because our standards allowed such
a great variety of types of explanation that an explanation could have been
found to fit almost anything. Standards that were so lax would barely have
amounted to standards at all, and they would have been useless in
identifying types of explanation that could have been used in prediction.
Given that we want standards that steer us toward at least some success in
prediction, it is not surprising that we have chosen standards that lead us
to identify explanations that work, given the physical facts about human
beings, about their way of life and about their environment. So it is not too
difficult to find alignment between reasons-based and physical
explanations of human conduct. It would probably have been a great deal
more difficult if the standards had not been chosen by us and tailored to
our way of life, but were universal, binding on all rational beings and purely
discovered, rather than being at least partly invented. Finally, the fact that
it is possible for there to be pairs of reasons-based and physical
explanations that march in step is no great mystery. Each human brain is
both sufficiently complex, and sufficiently consistent in its physical
operation.
Judging rationality
There is no available standard of rationality that we can be confident is
independent of culture. But the risk that standards of rationality are
culture-relative does not mean that there is a free-for-all in attributions of
rationality. While anyone may claim that his actions, or specified actions of
another person, are rational because he sees them as such, there is no
reason for us to accept such claims unless the actions satisfy our own
standards of rationality.
In order to have a concept of rationality that is sufficiently stable and
widely enough used to be useful, we need the right sort of standards to
govern the attribution of rationality to actions, neither too strict nor too
lax. There are three points to consider. First, the range of propositions that
a judge of rationality would in principle accept as reasons for a given action
must be appropriate. Second, the judge must require the agent to have an
appropriate degree of justification for belief in the propositions that are
cited as reasons. It would be appropriate to deny that an action was
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rational if it was chosen on the basis of a supposed reason that the agent
had too little justification for believing, but the standard of justification
should not be set too high. Third, the judge must apply appropriate
standards to the ways in which the propositions that are cited as reasons are
used in choosing actions. The judge should require a degree of logic, but
should not be too strict on this point. On all three points, the judge should
apply appropriate standards, not merely quirky personal standards. Before
turning to the source of appropriate standards, I shall make two incidental
points. The first concerns the distinction between internal and external
reasons, and the second is specific to external reasons.
The first incidental point is that we need not worry about the
distinction between internal and external reasons, because we are
concerned with judgements as to whether agents select their actions
appropriately, given the data that are available to them, including data to
the effect that further relevant data can be obtained and considered, and
those further data themselves. We can limit ourselves to internal reasons,
propositions that can motivate the agent given his existing set of
motivations and assuming, if necessary, that he is better informed about
the state of the world, including himself, than is in fact the case. (The
limitation to data that the agent has or that he can obtain imposes an
additional restriction, because there may be unavailable data that would
motivate the agent if only he could obtain them.) We need not concern
ourselves with external reasons, propositions that are reasons but that
could not motivate the agent. But once we understand internal reasons, we
will be able to understand external reasons on the same pattern, assuming
that there is any such thing as an external reason. It is true that judgements
of rationality will reflect the propositions that the agent could in fact
consider as possible reasons. But in the course of consideration of an
action’s rationality, the propositions will simply be potential reasons for
the action. It will be taken for granted that they could be reasons for the
agent, but that fact about them will not be reflected in the course of the
consideration.
It might seem that there was a special situation in which the
requirement for the agent to have justification for his belief in the
propositions that were putative reasons would prevent this easy move to
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an understanding of external reasons. This would be when the reasons were
external because the agent could have no access to estimates of the
probabilities of the truth of the propositions that were any more than
baseless guesses, on account of something more fundamental than a lack
of resources to expend on gathering data. But there is no problem here. We
can ignore the issue of justification when considering external reasons,
because we can simply take the propositions concerned to be true, and then
consider whether they would be reasons for given actions if the agent did
justifiably believe them. Even the existence of external reasons that were
external because the agent could not understand the propositions that gave
those reasons would not debar us from having a reasonably general
understanding of external reasons, even though their existence might make
it difficult to arrive at a completely general understanding. The agent’s
inability to understand propositions might reflect limited mental capacity.
We could then suppose the deficiency to be made good without changing
what would or would not be a rational choice of action, except in the
proportionately rare circumstances where mental capacity would
significantly affect the range of reasonable actions. Examples are when
possible actions would include applying to a university, so that intellectual
capacity mattered, and when they would include having children, so that
emotional capacity mattered.Wemight save the day even in cases like these
by supposing the agent’s mental capacities to be enhanced for the purposes
of deliberation, while also supposing the agent to take into account that his
capacities would be reduced to their actual level after the deliberation had
been completed.
The second incidental point is that the requirement for an agent to
make appropriate use of propositions that he takes to be reasons would be
no bar to the extension of our understanding to external reasons. External
reasons could be imagined to sit within an argument for a given action that
a different agent might have constructed and that could be appraised on
its own merits, independently of what sorts of argument the agent might
himself construct. It is worth noting that a special form of externalism
lurks here. Once we get beyond relatively simple relationships between a
desire for a certain outcome, a belief that a certain action will bring it
about and a decision to act, and move on to more complex relationships
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between beliefs and actions, an agent may be aware of reasons for an action
and may have an intuitive sense that they are reasons for that action, but
may be unable to articulate the connection between the reasons and the
action in the way that someone with a better grasp of logic could articulate
it. This would be an externalism of rationality rather than of reasons. It
could be dissolved by an assumption that an agent might have been
intellectually more capable than was in fact the case, a parallel move to the
standard assumption that he might have been better informed than was in
fact the case. That move should be uncontentious except in the cases, such
as application to a university, where intellectual capacity would itself affect
the rationality of possible actions. It would not go as far as the more
contentious move of identifying the use of certain value-inducing patterns
of thought as a necessary condition of practical rationality, as in Thomas
Nagel’s book, The Possibility of Altruism.
The source of standards of rationality
We can now reflect on the source of appropriate standards for a judge of
the rationality of an action to impose. There are three points that a judge
must decide, whether propositions are of the right nature to be reasons for
a given action, whether the agent has sufficient justification for believing
those propositions, and whether the agent uses them in an appropriate way
in choosing the action. The only source of standards that is in practice
available is the same for all three points. It is the society within which the
judge lives and works. This does not have to mean the whole population of
her town, her country or the world. In an academic discipline, where the
action to be judged is likely to be the action of conducting research in a
particular way in order to answer a difficult question, it means the society
of experts in that discipline. In a practical art, such as making violins or
flying aeroplanes, it means the society of skilled practitioners. In everyday
life, on the other hand, it may well mean the general population.
It is clear that the only people to whom we can turn in the search for
standards are the people around us, although they do include our ancestors,
whose wisdom has helped to form our current culture. But this lack of an
accessible external standard need not be depressing. It does not mean that
we must be subservient to the majority, or that we must be governed by the
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dead hand of the past. It is perfectly legitimate for a judge of rationality to
reject generally accepted standards in relation to the three points on which
she must decide, although the majority may then decline her judgements.
We can nowmove on to the concepts that underpin our understanding
of the agent’s reasoning before he takes action, the concepts of self-
consciousness, of consciousness and of choice.
4.3 Self-consciousness
Self-consciousness is essential because the rational subject must think, “I
shall do this”, and not merely, “This will be done”. The intrinsic link
between rational action and the sense of oneself has been set out by John
Perry in “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”. If I am to act on the
basis of reasons that I recognize as such, I must think of myself as myself.
Perry uses this point to argue against a traditional proposition-based
approach to at least some of our beliefs, but the point stands independently
of that use. Lynn Rudder Baker develops the point. She argues that a strong
form of self-awareness is needed in order to account for the strength of
motivation that such awareness can support, as when Oedipus blinded
himself on realizing what he himself had done (Persons and Bodies, pages
76-79). Baker, in line with Perry but giving a fuller analysis, distinguishes
between a strong form of first-person awareness that involves
conceptualizing oneself as oneself, and a weak form that merely involves
situating oneself perspectivally (ibid., pages 59-69).
The grounding for the sense of self that I shall offer here is a logical
grounding, not a psychological or neurological one. It is also a grounding
for the sense of self, rather than a grounding for the self that is sensed. Our
inner sense of action plays a critical role. This is one truth in Nietzsche’s
claim that one does not say “I”. Instead one does “I” (Also Sprach
Zarathustra, part 1, section 4, “Von den Verächtern des Leibes”). It is
action, not the observation of oneself or of others, that grounds a sense of
the self of which one is conscious as oneself, and hence that grounds self-
consciousness. I shall take self-consciousness to require an object that one
correctly regards as oneself, so that when there is no such object, there is
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no self-consciousness. There would certainly be none of a sort that would
allow rational action. Indeed, rational action requires the correct
identification of a physical object, rather than an object of any type, as
oneself.
Limitations on our action have an important preliminary role to play.
We cannot instantaneously jump around the Universe in order to perceive,
or act on, different things. Such limitations give a practical sense of what
it is to be a physical being (although not yet a sense of what it is for oneself
to be a physical being), within a world of physical beings and subject to the
world’s physical laws, including the laws that require everyday forms of
influence to be local, rather than at a distance.We acquire that sense simply
by acting, and finding that change can only be effected locally. There is no
circularity in using the concept of action at this point in the argument,
because it need only be action in general, not action on the basis of reasons.
We have a direct capacity to act which means that we can act without
relying on a conscious sense of self. Indeed, non-human animals
presumably do precisely that. In parallel with this, even an agent who lacks
self-consciousness can have a sense of the here and now, acquired by
reaching out and touching the world and by perceiving the world and
changes in it that follow his actions, although he must lack a sense of
himself being here present.
Armed with a practical sense that effective action is generally local,
the agent can work out the practical ways in which it is possible to effect
change. He can articulate the principle that the person who is here present
is the one who must put in some effort in order to effect change here and
now. That allows him to conclude that some things that happen here and
now are consequences of the actions of the person who is here present.
They are not consequences of changes elsewhere that magically transmit
their influence over some distance. That allows an explicit identification
of the body here present as the agent. All that remains is to identify the
agent as oneself. Doing that will give the indexical that is needed. It will do
so by linking a train of thought to a physical body that acts. It would,
however, be a mistake of a Cartesian flavour to think of the train of thought
as belonging to a mental “I” that was waiting to be hitched to a physical
body. It would be better to say that we could only speak of some thoughts,
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and that we were not entitled to give them a self-conscious owner until we
gave them a physical owner (compare Lichtenberg’s comment on the
Cogito, Sudelbücher K.76: Schriften und Briefe, volume 2, page 412). In
order to avoid making such a mistake, we must see the subject as acquiring
self-consciousness and identifying himself with the agent here present at
the same instant.
A subject can appreciate that the agent who is here present is himself,
giving the necessary identification, because he is directly aware of acting.
A subject recognizes an action as his own because he directly initiates it,
and because he senses it as an exercise of a personal power to produce
change. As above, there is no circularity in using the concept of action at
this point in the argument, because it need only be action in general, not
action on the basis of reasons. It is recognized as action in the world, rather
than an internal fantasy, because the agent perceives the resulting change
in the world. A fuller argument that we can avoid circularity is given by
Lucy O’Brien (Self-Knowing Agents, page 88). She gives a fundamental
role to the agent’s awareness of his actions, claiming that this awareness is
an awareness by means of the production of actions, rather than by means
of the reception of data, and that this awareness does not presuppose a
capacity for first-personal reference and thought. The awareness by
production that O’Brien identifies can also be invoked earlier in my
argument. It allows the subject to identify actions and an agent from the
start. He is not limited to thinking in terms of changes in the observed
arrangement of limbs that are correlated with changes in the observed
arrangement of objects with which those limbs come into contact. I shall
return to O’Brien’s work in section 6.4, in order to show how we can avoid
illegitimate circular reliance on the concept of causation.
As Perry has shown, the indexical is essential to action on the basis of
reasons that the subject recognizes as reasons. I have just indicated how
action in general, rather than action on the basis of reasons that the subject
recognizes as such, can give us a route to the indexical. I shall now argue
that we have to rely on action and on our sense of action.
It is hard to see what else, apart from action, could ground the
identification of a particular being in the world as oneself that is needed to
support the concept of rational action. (Compare the importance that can
142
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 142
be attached to a putatively conscious machine’s possession of a capacity
for action. See Aleksander,TheWorld inMyMind,MyMind in theWorld,
pages 46-47 and 177.) Observation of the beings in the world from some
neutral standpoint could not do the job. Observation of which being in the
world responded without mediation to one’s decisions to act could do the
job, but that would involve both action and a sense of action. A sense of
action would be required in order to identify what was going on as
decisions to act. Identification of the being that was located at the point of
origin of one’s own spatio-temporal frame of reference, the point with co-
ordinates (0, 0, 0, now), as oneself might be enough, but this would not
get us away from the need for action. It would not do so because a subject
would need a sense of his having a spatio-temporal location, in order to
make sense of the idea of his being located at some given co-ordinates. If
he were not to use the route to the indexical that was outlined above, he
could only get that sense by performing some action, if only the minimal
action of processing sensory data. The mere passive reception of data, as
impressions on a wax tablet, would not even be enough to give a sense of
one’s being located in time. That sense could only arise out of the tagging
of data with indicators of their order of reception, and a review of the
serial order that was thus constructed. (I take it that time exists, in a sense
that is strong enough to give an order of reception, independently of our
having a sense of our location in time. The spatio-temporal world is
conceptually, as well as historically, prior to our insertion into that world,
as will be argued in section 6.6.) That tagging and review would amount
to active processing. Furthermore, it would only give the subject a
conscious sense of his having a location in time if he were conscious of the
tagging as an action, because he could only understand what the order of
the tags signified if he was aware of how they had come to be assigned.
The subject could most easily obtain a conscious sense of his having a
location in space by changing his position and seeing how the available
data changed, as various objects came into view or fell out of view. A sense
of having a spatial location might also be obtained by noticing specific
features of the data such as the clarity of edges, or the interruption of some
edges by others when one object partially occluded another, and
interpreting those features as consequences of the values of newly-invented
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variables that were called “direction” and “distance”. But those variables
could only be interpreted as “direction from me” and “distance from me”
if the subject also moved, or at least changed the orientation of his sensory
organs, and saw how the observed features changed as he did so.
Movements and changes in orientation would constitute actions, and their
effects on sensory data would only serve to give the subject a conscious sense
of his having a location in space if he was aware of them as his actions, so
that he understood the changes in sensory data as consequences of changes
in his own location, or in the orientation of his own sensory organs. As
Gareth Evans put it, in the context of a more elaborate argument and with
the emphasis on a wider class of actions than those that directly change
perceptions, “An egocentric space can exist only for an animal in which a
complex network of connections exists between perceptual input and
behavioural output” (The Varieties of Reference, page 154).
The argument that a subject would need to be aware of movements or
of changes in orientation, or of processes of tagging, as actions, in order
to get a conscious sense of his having a location in space-time, might not
appear to work. Would it not be enough for him to be aware that a
movement, a change in orientation or a process of tagging had occurred,
without having a sense that its execution was an action? This objection can
be dismissed. The reason is that the task is not just to give the subject a
sense of space and time, but to give the subject a sense of his having a
spatio-temporal location, so that he can identify the being that is here
present as himself. (The subject must be seen as acquiring self-
consciousness, acquiring a sense of his having a spatio-temporal location
and identifying the being that is here present as himself, all at the same
moment.) A description of a process that took place, and an output that
included both sensory data and a statement that the data had been
collected from a place at 54 degrees 43 minutes north, 20 degrees 31
minutes east, and 5 in the morning local time on 22 April 2009, would not
be enough. The vital extra information would be that the location from
which the data had been collected was the subject’s location. Once a subject
was in the habit of identifying a being in the world as himself, it would be
enough to give the subject some co-ordinates and to tell him that they were
his co-ordinates. But that would only be enough if the subject already had
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a sense of himself as a spatio-temporal being. In order to gain that sense
in the first place, he would both have to perform actions, and have to be
aware of them through his sense of action. He would also have to note their
effects, either in changing current sensory data (for spatial location) or in
regimenting historical sensory data (for temporal location).
So there is an intimate relationship between the concept of action and
the concept of self-consciousness, whichever route to the essential indexical
we use. We need to act, and we need to be aware of acting, in order to have
self-consciousness of a type that will allow us to progress to rational action.
In the other direction, we do not need self-consciousness in order to act, but
we do need self-consciousness in order to see what we do as our own
actions. Only that can make it possible for us to see ourselves as considering
what we should do in the light of evidence, and only thus can we see
ourselves as acting rationally.
With a sense of oneself well-grounded, one can attribute self-
consciousness to others, on the perfectly reasonable ground that the
evidence of their appearance and conduct strongly suggests that they are
like oneself. I do not claim that this is, as a matter of psychology, the order
of procedure. As children, we may well develop our senses of ourselves in
parallel with our senses of others. I also do not claim that our attribution
of self-consciousness to others is in practice the affirmation of a
proposition to that effect, rather than its being a deep feature of our way
of life. As Wittgenstein remarked, “My attitude towards him is an attitude
towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul” (Philosophical
Investigations, part 2, section 4, page 152). But once our senses of ourselves
and of others have been developed, we can locate their logical foundations
in action and in the similarity of others to ourselves. This is, however,
subject to the point that the development of a full concept of the self, as
distinct from the minimal concept that is necessary to support the concept
of rational action, would require a great deal more.
4.4 Consciousness
A creature could not have self-consciousness that was sufficient to allow
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rational action if it did not have consciousness of objects in the world. The
reason is that it would have no sense of acting on the world, not that it
would lack a sufficiently complex brain. It would be perfectly possible for
a creature with a complex brain to lack a sense of action and therefore lack
self-consciousness of the required sort, either because it was cut off from
the world and received no sensory inputs that correctly indicated the effects
of its conduct, or because it had those inputs but could not bring the data
to consciousness in the sense of being aware of its own experience.
To start with the lack of correct inputs, a brain in a vat, supplied with
inputs that were like those that an embodied brain would receive from
perception and from action, could come to be in a state that had the
phenomenology of self-consciousness. That state might be regarded as one
of self-consciousness. But it could not be self-consciousness of the sort that
would allow rational action, because of the lack of a physical object that
the creature correctly identified as itself. The apparent body would not
really be there. Even if the entire body existed, in the vat, the creature would
still fail correctly to identify an object as itself because all of the creature’s
descriptions of the body’s situation would be radically false. The creature
would pick out a body that was supposedly walking down the street, when
no such body would respond without mediation to the creature’s decisions
to act. (The body in the vat might be immediately responsive, if the vat
allowed space for thrashing about and if the body was not paralysed, but
it would not be walking down the street.) That is, I do not see a mere
identification of some physical object or other as oneself, an identification
that might appear to be made correct by the existence of neural pathways
connecting brain to body, as sufficient to meet the standard of correctly
identifying a physical object as oneself that must be met in order to allow
for rational action. At the other extreme, if a brain controlled a body that
was acting in the everyday world and that was receiving sensory inputs in
the ordinary way, the whole creature could have self-consciousness of the
required sort, even if the brain was stored somewhere far away from the
rest of the body, and communicated with the rest of the body by radio. But
it would be important that the body was the brain’s sole, or overwhelmingly
main, point of contact with the external world. That would be necessary
in order to ensure that the creature was not merely playing at being where
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the body was, as in Evans’s example of a remotely controlled submarine
(The Varieties of Reference, pages 164-167).
Turning to the importance of consciousness of data, the most natural
way to characterize the bringing of data to consciousness would be to speak
of the data being placed in the schema, “I perceive ...”. But that would give
a false impression of a conceptual circle. The sense of self would not only
be seen, correctly, as grounded in action and in observation of the results.
It would also appear to be essential to reflection on what one observed,
reflection that was in turn necessary to ground self-consciousness because
without that reflection, one could not realize that one’s actions had
consequences in the world and were therefore actions of the self located in
the world. In fact, there is no circle here. The data that are supplied by
observation do need to be brought to consciousness, but this can be done
without using the indexical at that point. One can move a book and say,
“The book was on the desk but now it is on the shelf, a change that is a
consequence of the action that has just been performed”. One does not
need to say, “I saw the book on the desk and now I see it on the shelf”.
Only some aspects of the concept of consciousness in general are
philosophically problematic. It is not problematic that an organism should
receive data from its environment and change its internal state or its
conduct accordingly. It is not even problematic that an organism should do
so intelligently, recognizing dangers and ways to satisfy its needs so as to
avoid the former and take advantage of the latter, although that clearly
requires considerable sophistication. It is not easy to build robots with
comparable skills that they can exercise outside artificially simple
environments. The philosophical difficulties really start when we reach
what David Chalmers has called the hard problem of consciousness. This
problem is to explain why we have an experienced inner life, a life full of
qualia, and to explain what our experience is (Chalmers, “The Hard
Problem of Consciousness”).
Not all philosophers agree that there is a problem here. Daniel
Dennett argues that the very existence of the hard problem, over and above
a collection of easier problems, is an illusion (Sweet Dreams, chapter 3).
Daniel Hutto considers the hard problem to be both insoluble and a
consequence of a mistaken approach to the topic (“Impossible problems
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and careful expositions: Reply to Myin and De Nul”, page 50). But when
we reflect on the experience of seeing a landscape, of hearing music or of
rubbing our fingertips on velvet, there does appear to be something special
going on. It is something that seems to be impossible to explain by reference
to the interaction of material components, as Leibniz noted with his image
of a thinking and feeling being that was enlarged to the size of a mill, so
that we could walk in and observe its mechanism (Monadology, paragraph
17). But we should not just accept Leibniz’s view. Recent advances in
neurology, and particularly the identification of processes by which
disparate pieces of neural activity may be synthesized into a single
experience, disclose possibilities that he could not have considered.
Fortunately, the hard problem does not need to be solved in order to
have a grasp of the concept of consciousness that is sufficient for present
purposes. Action must be taken on the basis of the lessons of experience,
and in the light of current empirical data, if it is to be rational. But the
lessons of experience could be recorded, and the data could be taken in, in
ways that would allow them to play their roles even if there were no qualia.
An account of rational action need not depend on an account of qualia as
they might attach to experience and to data, even if our experience is in
fact infused with qualia. Rational action also requires self-consciousness,
but that too should be achievable in the absence of qualia. It is true that in
deliberating, in deciding and in acting, we have particular feelings that are
special types of quale. No doubt the presence of such feelings is important
in our psychological development, in our coming to acquire senses of
ourselves, of others and of our place in the world. But those feelings should
be dispensable. If “I shall do this” could make sense in the mouth of a
zombie, a being who was devoid of all qualia, including those that were
associated with deliberation, with decision and with action, then an
account of qualia would not be needed in order to give an account of
rational action. I see no specific reason to doubt that “I shall do this” could
make sense in the mouth of a zombie, both to the zombie himself and to
we who observed him, so long as the zombie could be directly aware of a
movement as an action, the awareness being by means of the movement’s
production. That much would be needed in order for the zombie to have a
concept of action, and hence to have self-consciousness as a being in the
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world. It would therefore be needed in order for us to attribute self-
consciousness to the zombie, because we would not wish to attribute
self-consciousness to a being whom we did not see as himself holding that
he had self-awareness. It would therefore be needed in order for us to see
the zombie as engaging in rational action. But a zombie’s awareness that an
action was his own could be supplied if his sub-personal mechanisms
attached “action” tags to certain movements, tags which would create
direct awareness by means of the production of those movements. It seems
unlikely that such tags would need to bring any qualia in their train. It
would, however, be important for the tagging to be done by sub-personal
mechanisms that could simply tag movements without considering the
significance of the notion of action. The tagging should merely have its
effect on the whole zombie. If the tagging were done by the whole zombie,
circularity would threaten.
The senses of choice and of action that zombies had would differ
from our senses because our rich inner experience would not be available
to them. Furthermore, our interactions with zombies would not be like our
interactions with human beings. Despite these differences, the central
concepts of self-consciousness and of rational action would still be
applicable to beings for whom the hard problem of consciousness did not
arise. The ability to apply those concepts should therefore be independent
of possession of a solution to the hard problem, even when the concepts are
to be applied to beings for whom the hard problem does arise. The validity
of this extension to beings with qualia would depend on the absence of
relevant differences between the contents of the concepts of self-
consciousness and of rational action when they were applied to beings who
had qualia, and their contents when they were applied to beings who did
not have qualia. But given that the concern is with the logical, rather than
the psychological, content of the two concepts, I see no reason to think
that there would be such relevant differences. Even if the addition of qualia
did lead to relevant differences in content, not all useful results would
necessarily be lost. The logical relationship between the two concepts that
existed in the absence of qualia could still be available to us in their
presence, even if we lacked a full understanding of qualia, so long as the
presence of qualia made parallel differences to the contents of both
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concepts, allowing their relationship to be preserved. An analogy would
be that if y = 3x, this relationship remains the same, and is accessible, even
if we are only given that y + 7 = 3x + 7.
These conclusions are subject to three caveats and a limitation. The
first caveat is that it might not be possible to tag certain movements as
actions in a neutral way, without any qualia, and for those tags still to have
the necessary significance to the subject. The question is that of whether
“action” can be a qualia-free tag. The answer is not clear. But I draw
comfort from the distinction between knowledge of qualia and knowledge
of how, for example, red things look. That distinction can be used to
ascribe a better grasp of sensory experience to zombies than one might
expect (Raffman, “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised”). If zombies could
have a grasp of sensory experience that allowed them to know how red
things looked, it would be implausible to deny them a direct awareness of
actions. The second caveat is that there are arguments that phenomenal
consciousness plays a role in our economy of thought that is essential to
rational action (Eilan, “Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and
Consciousness”). If any required phenomenal consciousness were of a type
that was beyond zombies, rather than being of a type that Raffman’s
arguments would allow them to have, they might not be able to act
rationally. The third caveat is that zombies might not be possible, a question
on which philosophical debate continues. If zombies were not possible, it
would be risky to argue to the possibility of something else on the basis of
an assumption, for the sake of argument, that they were possible.
The limitation is that our sense of making decisions is not a sense of
purely abstract, dispassionate choice. Options are coloured by our feelings
and by our emotions. Feelings and emotions have their effects on our
deliberations through the qualia of felt urges to do some things rather than
others. The prospect of one action may give the agent a pleasant feeling,
while the prospect of a different action may give him an unpleasant feeling.
It is arguable that feelings and emotions operate through qualia essentially.
In that case, algorithms that operated without qualia, but that happened
always to lead to the same results, would not be adequate substitutes. So it
is not clear that zombies could be guided in the making of their choices by
anything that could be said to correspond to our feelings and our emotions.
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To that extent, they would be denied full access to our sense of choice of
action on the basis of reasons, and hence to our sense of rational action.
A consequence is that a zombie might well not be able to attribute
rationality to our actions, because such an attribution would rely on the
attributor’s comprehension of the agent’s process of thought. In order to
have that comprehension, one would need to have at least some sense of
what it would be like to think like the agent. A zombie might only be able
to attribute rationality to the actions of zombies who were sufficiently
similar to himself. Likewise, we can only attribute rationality to the actions
of beings who think in ways that are sufficiently similar to our own ways
of thought, and the possession of human-like qualia is an important
element in our similarity to others. It would be a mistake to assume that we
could always regard zombies who were like us, save for their lack of qualia,
simply as cut-down human beings, so that we could always appraise their
actions for rationality simply by leaving out the influence of feelings and
substituting unemotional algorithms. Sometimes, the less than human is
the incomprehensibly inhuman. None of this means that we need a full
philosophical understanding of qualia in order to understand the concept
of rational action. We may only need to have the qualia, in order to use the
concept in relation to other beings who have qualia. Either radically
different qualia, or a radical lack of qualia, may block the practical
application of the concept. Likewise, as will emerge in the next section,
subjective similarity of experience is needed in order to make attributions
of choice, although no particular type of experience is needed merely in
order to grasp the concept of choice.
4.5 Choice
The final concept to consider is that of choice. We can only see an action
as rational if we see the agent as having chosen the action for reasons. We
must therefore understand the concept of choice, in order to understand the
concept of rational action. It is tempting to say that this requires us to see
that the agent could have decided otherwise, either deciding on another
action or at the very least deciding to refrain from the action. But then we
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run into the fact that the agent is a physical being, and that the physical
world offers only determinism and randomness, leaving no room for free
but controlled choice. In order to make progress, we need to understand
precisely what concept of choice is needed to underpin the concept of
rational action.
Consider a mathematician who sees how to prove a result that has
previously only been conjectured. She writes out the proof. All of her
thoughts and actions may be determined, in the sense that the prior
positions and states of elementary particles, and the laws of nature, may
ensure that certain neurons fire and that her hand picks up a pen and then
moves the pen in certain ways. Her action in writing any given line of the
proof is, however, rational, on two levels. On the first level, she wishes to
write out the proof in order to enlarge our mathematical knowledge. On
the second level, the contents of each line are not arbitrary. Either the
proposition that is expressed by a line will follow from what has been
expressed in previous lines, or it will be an axiom or an established result.
The two levels are not independent. The mathematician will only write out
something that counts as a proof, and that enlarges our mathematical
knowledge, if the contents of each line are allowed by the rules of proof.
But however we may analyse these levels of rationality, we can say that the
writing of each line is a rational action. Each line is written because it
contributes to the overall goal, and it says what it does because its contents
both comply with the rules of proof and take us closer to reaching the
demonstrandum. Having said that, there may be no rational alternative.
There may be only one way to prove the result, or only one way that is
feasible given the current state of mathematical knowledge.
The point of this example is that an action may be rational, even when
no other action would have been rational. This does not import any non-
physical determinism. The mathematician is not forced to act as she does
by considerations that exist within the space of reasons. She could write
something different in a given line of the proof. That would, however, not
be rational, unless she was deliberately composing an inadequate proof in
order to see whether people would spot the mistake. Absent such unusual
intentions, she can only act rationally by doing, or trying to do, precisely
what she does in writing out a correct proof. (The qualification that she
152
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 152
might only try allows for the fact that someone who makes a mistake can
still be acting rationally.)
The constraint to only one possible rational action is not one that
commonly applies in its pure form. The constraint does not always apply to
mathematicians when they wish to demonstrate results, because there may
be alternative demonstrations. It does not apply when a mathematician is
searching for a proof. It would then be perfectly rational to write down all
sorts of things that would not in the end feature in a proof. In the natural
sciences there may bemany ways to establish results, andmany experiments
that are worth trying in the search for results. And in everyday life, a wide
range of alternative rational actions is normally open to us.
Despite the contrast between the example of a mathematician writing
out a proof and much of life, the example does make a point that is of
general application. An action’s rationality does not require a freedom to
have done otherwise that is given at the level of reasons. That is, there is no
need for there to be two or more alternatives that are acceptable by
reference to reasons. It may seem obvious that a freedom to have done
otherwise that is given at the level of reasons is not essential, so that an
action can be rational even when it is the only rational action. But the point
needs to be noted, because it follows that we do not need to worry that
physical determinism might make it impossible for actions to be rational.
We need not worry because rationality can exist even when there is no
choice at the level of reasons. Physical determinism could not make such a
lack of choice any worse. It would rule out other actions, but they would
have been irrational anyway, and their being ruled out would hardly be a
threat to the rationality of the actual action.
Although the existence of alternative possibilities might not matter
for the rationality of a choice of action, it still seems that it ought to matter
for the fact of choice. What could single out actions as chosen, apart from,
at a minimum, our ability to see that the agent could have gone in a
different direction or, if it we could not see that, the presence of some
special factor that explained why we could not see that? I mention special
factors in order not to require that whenever there is choice, there must be
at least the appearance of alternative possibilities. Harry Frankfurt
describes a disturbing case (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral
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Responsibility”, section 4). Jones chooses to do X, without any
intervention, but Black would have intervened surreptitiously to change the
workings of Jones’s brain and body if Jones had been on the point of
choosing to do Y instead. This case is disturbing because Jones does
choose, even though we cannot see him as having been able to choose
differently. But such cases are special and contrived. We can only see them
as examples of choice against a background of more straightforward
examples of choice where we can at least suppose that the agent could have
chosen differently. The contrived nature of Frankfurt’s example does not
vitiate its philosophical significance, but it does limit that significance when
we are concerned with choice, rather than with the moral responsibility
that was Frankfurt’s immediate concern.
No natural feature of the world looks promising as a mark of choice.
Within the world as described naturalistically there is only what happens,
and perhaps what might have happened if random events had turned out
differently. A purely naturalistic description of the world, whether fully
detailed or partial, makes it impossible for us to see that a putative chooser
could have deliberately chosen differently, although she might have
stumbled into something different. She could have done something different
with a sense of deliberate choice because some earlier event had turned out
differently as a result of randomness, but by the time of choosing, that
event would have taken place and its outcome would have been fixed. There
would still have been no controlled choice that was open at the time of
choosing, nor could we see the putative chooser as having had options that
were open to her. The different action would have been the only option in
the revised circumstances.
Instead of looking at natural features of the world, we should seek
other grounds for regarding certain conduct as chosen. But these grounds
must not allow arbitrary attributions of choice. One attraction of linking
choice to natural features of the world is that it would prevent arbitrary
attributions. If something had to be found, we could not cheat and imagine
that it was there. Can we do just as well even if we do not rely on natural
features of the world?
We cannot do quite as well, but we can do something by recognizing
our own sense of choice and then recognizing that others are like ourselves.
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My proposed criterion of an action’s being chosen is that it should follow
from an episode that we see as being, to the putative chooser, subjectively
like the episodes that occur when we make choices. We know what it is to
make choices. We have just as clear an internal sense of choice as we do of
action. We naturally take it that other human beingsmake choices in the same
way that we do. Indeed, we need to do so. To refuse attributions of choice to
someonewould be to distance ourselves from him, to treat him as not human,
because we would refuse to interpret his conduct in the way in which we
standardly interpret the conduct of human beings. That sort of distancing is
not ruled out by logic. We might do it occasionally, perhaps in extreme forms
of cases of the sort that Peter Strawson cites as making an objective attitude
rather than a participant attitude appropriate, cases of abnormality or of
immaturity (“Freedom and Resentment”, page 9). But we could not practise
such distancing universally without forswearing the concepts and attitudes on
which our lives as social beings depend. We would become like the objective
anthropologist who is too remote to understand, andwho “gets a sort of stony,
distant look on his face” (Pirsig, Lila, page 33). Nor are we in a position even
to consider practising such distancing universally, at least notwithout stepping
well outside our normal habits of thought.
The view that other human beings make choices in the same way that
we do is not just essential. It is also well-supported by the facts that we are
physically very similar to one another, both internally and externally, and
that we successfully relate to one another in a social world where it is taken
for granted that people choose what to do. Indeed, the prevalence of
individual choice is so fundamental a feature of our lives that we rarely
notice it. In order to notice how all-pervasive choice is, we must contrast
human beings, who have very diverse lifestyles even within a single town,
and many opportunities to change their lifestyles, with other social
animals, even chimpanzees, who have much more limited lives. The
explanation of the contrast lies in our innate abilities and in our history. But
that naturalistic explanation does not detract from the weight of evidence
that other people make choices in the same way that we ourselves do. One
could not live in a human society without continually making choices. Even
someone whose life settles into a stable routine makes trivial choices, such
as choices of what to eat or of whether to stay indoors when it is raining.
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And settling into a routine will itself have involved choices.
There is no local inevitability about an individual’s having a given way
of life, no inevitability that springs from that individual’s own nature and
his immediate environment. Some individuals are predisposed to stable
routines in general, and others are predisposed to instability in general, but
that does not lead any given individual into a particular routine or into a
particular sequence of changes. Influences that originate beyond the
immediate environment may steer the individual into one routine, or one
sequence of changes, rather than another. There may be global inevitability.
If the whole Universe is deterministic, it will be inevitable that an individual
should have a particular life, determined in all of its details. And all of the
influences on a human being will have been transmitted to that human
being or to his immediate environment through long causal chains. Exact
reproduction merely of the last segment of each causal chain would lead to
a physically identical life. But when we think about what an individual
does, and about whether a human being should be seen as making choices,
our vision is already narrowed to that human being and his immediate
environment. It does not encompass the whole history of the Universe that
lies on or within the light-cone that reaches back from him. All of that
history would be implicated in determining the precise nature of the last
segments of the causal chains that reached him.
This lack of local inevitability is related to an important role of the
notion of choice in making the conduct of human beings comprehensible.
We find ourselves in such diverse, changing and unexpected circumstances
that it is implausible to think of ourselves as having tables inside our heads
of all possible circumstances and of appropriate responses, prepared in
advance, or even as having algorithms that could generate any required
entries in hypothetical fixed tables on demand. We have to make up our
lives as we go along. The scientific explanation of how we do that can be
just as straightforward as the scientific explanation of how a computer can
play a game of chess against any opponent that it meets and can improve
with practice, even though when it was programmed no-one knew which
opponents it would have to face, and even though it does not contain a
table of all possible games or an equivalent algorithm. But the scientific
explanation of the behaviour of a chess-playing computer need only refer
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to the internal workings of the computer, clearly defined in terms of circuits
and programs, and to the inputs that have been received, with those inputs
all being in a very well-defined form, the moves that were made in games
of chess. Human beings are much more complicated, their brains do not
work in the crisp and well-defined ways that digital computers work, at
least not unless we dig down far below the level of neurons and look at
individual molecules, and the environmental influences are not at all
precisely defined, again unless we dig down to the level of individual flashes
of light, sounds and touches, or perhaps even deeper. The concept of choice
allows us to simplify and to tell a comprehensible story that paints a clear
picture of someone’s life, whether over a day or over several years. We say
that someone made certain choices, choices that we may well be able to
relate to his character and to his previous choices, and that he acted
accordingly. We make up for the lack of detail by using our intuitive sense
of how human beings behave, and therefore of what makes an account of
a day or a longer period a coherent story. This does not make it possible to
predict anyone’s conduct with great confidence, but it does allow us to
make sense of conduct in retrospect. It is not surprising that historians who
are not in the grip of fashionable theories recognize the importance of
choices that are made by individuals (Roberts, “Postmodernism versus the
Standpoint of Action”, pages 256-260).
Here we find the first control over attributions of choice. It parallels
the control over attributions of subject origination that was described in
section 3.6. We should only attribute choice when the attribution plays a
valuable role in giving an account of the conduct of the subject. We should
not, for example, attribute choice to someone who is sleepwalking, or
whose conduct springs from post-hypnotic suggestion. But even after such
special cases are ruled out, the bounds of acceptability are wide. Choices
that most of us would regard as crazy are still choices. The bounds of
choice will be set wider than the bounds of rational choice, so long as we
accept that a choice that is made for no reason, or one that is made
contrary to what the available reasons would suggest, is still a choice. We
can and should accept this. Someone can recognize that he makes a choice
even when he has no reasons-based answer to the question, “Why did you
do that?”. We might not, however, accept the attribution to a creature of
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choices for no reason or contrary to reason, when such supposed choices
were the norm and there were few if any choices for reasons. A creature’s
choices that are not made for reasons may need to be in a minority for them
to count as choices, because their status as choices may be parasitic on the
status of similar episodes that are choices for reasons.
In section 3.4, I discussed the attribution of subject origination to
computers, to robots and to aliens. The attribution of choice follows a
similar pattern. There is not much point in attributing choice to our
computers or to our robots, because we know very well how they work
their way from inputs to outputs. There would probably be great difficulty
in attributing choice to aliens, because their outer lives and their inner
experience would probably differ greatly from our own. Here we see the
second control over attributions of choice, a control that amounts to a re-
statement of my proposed criterion of choice. Choice is only to be
attributed if the attributor sees an episode that she can regard as being, to
the putative chooser, subjectively like the making of a choice by herself is
to her. We probably could not do this with aliens, because their inner
experience would probably be too different from our inner experience.
Likewise, there are limits to how far we can go with other animals, both
because we cannot be confident of our grasp of whatever inner experience
they might have, and because we have no idea what it would be like for our
mental horizons to be as limited as their horizons are. We know what it is
to be excited, or to be hungry, so we may have that much in common with
other animals. But we cannot know what it would be like for feelings at
that level to be the entire content of our mental lives, so that we would not,
for example, have a sense of the difference between next week and next
year. I claimed in section 4.2 that rationality was, in practice, rationality for
us. Likewise, choice is choice for us. We attribute choice where other beings
would not do so, and they would attribute it where we would not do so.
This is an application to choice of Wittgenstein’s remark, “We only say of
a human being and what is like one that it thinks” (Philosophical
Investigations, part 1, section 360, page 96).
To expand on the argument of the previous paragraph, similarity of
inner experience matters directly in relation to attributions of choice, in a
way in which it did not matter in section 3.3 when the task was to enter
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into the heads of deliberators. The nature of a deliberation is largely given
by the thoughts that constitute the deliberation. Those thoughts can often,
although not always, be given independently of the nature of the inner
experience of the thinker. A choice is different. It is a single momentary
episode, the nature of which is given by reference to its phenomenology
and to the fact that its effect is to narrow down a list of options to just one
option. To see an episode as a choice is to see it as something, the chooser’s
experience of which is like our experience of choice. Only that perceived
commonality of experience gives substantial content to the concept of
choice. Thus similarity of inner experience is in general a precondition of
attributions of choice, although it would be over-ambitious to claim that
such similarity was logically necessary.
So there is for us a choice when there is an episode that precedes or
occurs alongside an action, and it makes sense for us to see that episode as
the making of a choice, both because seeing it like that plays a valuable
role in giving an account of the subject’s conduct, and because we can
impute subjective similarity to our own episodes of choosing. We directly
recognize such episodes in ourselves. Our immersion in society means that
we directly recognize them in other people. We do not stop to look for
evidence of choice, but take it for granted that other people choose in the
same way that we do. We might recognize choices being made by non-
human beings, although we cannot have any confidence that we could do
so, both because we have not met non-human beings who are as
sophisticated as ourselves, and because even the interpretation of the
mental life of our closest relatives, the apes, is fraught with difficulty. We
can get an idea of the level of difficulty by considering the meticulous
analyses, and the many remaining uncertainties, that are set out by Barbara
King in her book, The Dynamic Dance: Nonvocal Communication in
African Great Apes.
In reflecting on the possibility of seeing others as making choices, it
is important to heed the words, “it makes sense for us to see that episode
as the making of a choice”. I do not claim that a choice is an episode with
a set of natural properties that make it a choice, properties that would be
detectable by any observer of natural features of human beings and of the
world who had the appropriate equipment. An episode is, to us, a choice
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if we can sensibly see it as one. It and we between us do have natural
properties that might well allow any observer who had both the
appropriate equipment and an adequate ability to interpret states of our
brains to say that we would regard it as a choice, but that would take us on
to properties of ourselves. It would also still leave the putative choice as a
choice for us, not a choice in itself. (The requirement for the observer to be
able to interpret states of our brains takes us back to the discussion in
section 3.7. Not just any observer of natural features would do. An
observer whose own inner experience was too different from that of human
beings would not be able to interpret states of human brains in the required
way.)
Choice justified by reasons
If the concept of choice is to underpin the concept of rational action, it
must be the concept of choice for reasons. A reason that plays the sort of
role in the process of choosing an action that allows us to see the action as
rational, in the sense of seeing that the choice was arrived at in an
appropriate way, has to be a reason that the agent can articulate on
demand. Some things are meant to be excluded by this formulation. If, for
example, someone’s brain is wired up in such a way that he will always
reach for anything sweet, a state of his brain of which he is unaware, that
fact about his brain should not count as a reason for his choosing to eat
chocolate on a given occasion, although the fact will explain to others why
he eats the chocolate. The state of his brain is not a reason in a way that
would make a given act of eating chocolate an instance of his choosing to
eat chocolate for reasons. A reason that the agent can articulate on
demand, on the other hand, has a power of justification in the view of the
agent, whether or not others would be sufficiently impressed by the
justification to regard the action as rational. That is, the agent would
consider statement of the reason to be an appropriate way to answer the
question, “Why did you choose to do that?”.
Some such reasons could be natural features of the world. The
chocoholic might become aware of the state of his brain, and might then
cite that state as the reason why he ate some chocolate. (The reason would
become articulable when he actually became aware of the state of his brain.
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It would not be articulable, in the sense that I intend, when he was merely
capable of becoming aware of the state of his brain.) That state would then
have justificatory power, to the same extent that “I did it because that is the
sort of thing I like to do” has justificatory power. At least, it would have
justificatory power to the same extent unless the inclination to eat sweet
things led the agent to act against the actual or potential outcome of
reflection on what he really wanted to do. An inclination that existed
independently of reflection on what the agent wanted to do, but that
inclined the agent to act in ways that were consistent with the conclusions
of reflection that he had undertaken or that he would undertake if he
bothered, would not be debarred from having justificatory power. This
would be so even if the inclination was irresistible, unless the reflection
really amounted or would amount to rationalization.
It would be unfortunate if we were to debar our pre-reflective
inclinations, which are consequences of our natural features, from having
justificatory power. If we limited justificatory power to preferences that
were chosen from scratch, rather than admitting inclinations that existed
in advance but that had passed muster, or that would pass muster, before
the court of reflection, then the range of actions that we could justify would
be implausibly narrow.
Whether or not reasons for a given action had their origins in natural
features of the agent, their justificatory power could not be equated with
natural features of the agent or of the world. An agent’s perception of a
reason as having justificatory power would correspond to natural features
of himself, and those features would be visible to an observer of natural
features who was able to monitor and interpret the states of the agent’s
brain. (As with attributions of choice, not all possible observers would have
the necessary ability to interpret.) Likewise, the influence that the
perception of justificatory power had on the agent’s conduct would
correspond to natural features, and would be visible to, and explicable by,
any suitable observer. But the power itself would not be visible to all such
observers, and it would not be the same thing as any set of natural features.
Justification for actions amounts to their legitimation. This is something
that a naturalistic description cannot do. A naturalistic description simply
tells us how things are. It is devoid of the specifically human
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presuppositions that lead us to see that certain actions are justified in
certain circumstances.
A response to this line of argument would be that there is indeed no
such thing as justification for actions, and that there are only delusive
feelings of justification. One could take that line, but doing so would, like
limiting ourselves to a detached psychological theory, leave us with
accounts of our lives that would strike us as hopelessly inadequate. We do
have a clear sense of justification for our actions, and individual
justifications are given by our reasons for our choices of action. Our sense
of justification can be unsettled in individual instances, when we discover
that the reasons that we give for actions are not accepted by others as
adequate justification. We may think again, and either amend our reasons
or withdraw claims that given actions were justified. But very often that
does not happen. The frequent acceptance by others that our reasons give
adequate justification reinforces our sense that our reasons do indeed have
justificatory power. The facts that any proffered justification might be
rejected by others, that on reflection we might accept their rejection and
that we cannot reliably predict the occasions of rejection, only show that
we can make mistakes in believing that given reasons justify given actions.
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CHAPTER 5
Knowledge
This chapter is concerned with epistemological questions. In
section 5.1, I explore the source of those questions and set out the high
price of avoiding them. We would have to keep propositions, as
potential objects of propositional attitudes, out of the picture. That
would in turn require an inhuman detachment from those around us.
In section 5.2, I identify a connection between seeing ourselves as
deliberating with mastery and the concept of knowledge. In section
5.3, I make a move from the inner to the outer that parallels the move
that was made in chapter 4, by considering criteria for a belief to count
as held rationally. The ability to respond to challenges is central here.
After arguing for the importance of this ability, both as evidence that
a belief has been acquired rationally, and as having an intrinsic
relationship to our standards of rationality, I consider the possibility
of rational computers. I then consider the sources of our standards of
rationality. In section 5.4, I consider scepticism. I start by identifying
one type of scepticism, the claim that we cannot have satisfactory
justification for our beliefs, and the bearing of our concept of
rationally acquired belief on that scepticism. I then argue that if the
sceptic is to unnerve us, which is the most that he can do if we forswear
certainty, he must use the purely structural form of his argument. I
then argue that he fails because he is insufficiently liberal in the variety
of structures of justifications that he will admit. Even circular
arguments can provide justification, so long as the circles are large
enough, despite the consequent potential for equally good
justifications for contradictory conclusions.
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5.1 Epistemological questions and their source
The traditional, and still unresolved, questions of epistemology cover a
wide field. What are the conditions for a belief to count as knowledge? In
particular, how does the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true
belief need to be modified? How, if at all, should the sceptic be answered,
whether his scepticism be local, related to specific types of knowledge, or
global, putting all or most of our claims to have knowledge at risk in one
fell swoop? How may knowledge be classified, as a priori or a posteriori,
or in some other way, and what falls within each category? In this section,
I shall investigate the source of questions like these and whether we might
avoid them altogether.
A necessary condition for questions that are related to knowledge to
arise at all is the existence of things that might be known. Propositions must
exist and must be potential objects of propositional attitudes, such as the
attitude of belief. (I do not wish to pre-judge the sense of existence that is at
stake here. The point is meant to be taken in a way that would be acceptable
to those whowere not Platonists about propositions. But I do need to take it
that we have relationships, of belief and the like, to propositions. It might be
possible to re-phrase the account that I shall give to accommodate, for
example, a paratactic theory of indirect discourse, but it would certainly be
awkward to do so.) To put the subject matter of epistemology in the broadest
terms, it is some of our relationships to information that we consider as
information. (I shall for convenience use the term “proposition” to mean a
formulated piece of information, whether correct or incorrect. It may ormay
not be a complex of smaller pieces of information.) To understand where
the questions of epistemology come from, and the conditions under which
we might be able to block them at source, we need to understand which
conceptions of the world and of ourselves must bring propositions into the
picture in such a way that they are potentially objects of propositional
attitudes. Being in the picture will mean being a potential topic of discourse.
Mentioning, rather than merely using, propositions would therefore mean
that they were in the picture. Being in the picture will not necessarily mean
being seen as an object in the world, although anything that is so seen
certainly will be in the picture.
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If propositions are in the picture in such a way that they are
potentially objects of propositional attitudes, that will open up a route to
epistemological questions. If such a route is opened up, we should not then
take the unprincipled option of avoiding the questions simply by refusing
to reflect on our knowledge. My general approach has something in
common with Ernest Sosa’s distinction between animal knowledge, mere
apt belief, and reflective knowledge, apt belief, the aptness of which the
subject can defend against sceptical doubts (A Virtue Epistemology, page
24). If defence is a possibility, we should think about the implications of its
being possible. Once reflection on our knowledge is an option, because we
have brought propositions into the picture in an appropriate way, we have
no principled choice but to take up the option. But if we did not have to
bring propositions into the picture, or not in an appropriate way, we could
decline to bring them in, or to do so in such a way, on the principled ground
of an application of Occam’s razor. We could then legitimately avoid the
questions of epistemology.
I shall speak of propositions being exposed to propositional attitudes,
as shorthand for their being exposed to being objects of propositional
attitudes. Whether propositions need to be brought into the picture in ways
that would expose them to propositional attitudes will depend on our
conception of the world. We can start with the purely physical conception,
in which we see only particles, forces and probability distributions. We can
then go on to admit the full range of naturalistically defined entities and
properties, apart from those that are defined within psychology. If we go no
further than that, we have what I shall call the intention-free naturalistic
conception. Using this conception, we do not attribute beliefs, desires and
the like to human beings, so we do not take up the intentional stance
toward them. It is to be distinguished from the intention-laden naturalistic
conception, in which we do take up the intentional stance, but remain
naturalistic by not attributing subject origination. These two forms of
naturalistic conception of human beings would be available to far wider
ranges of rational beings than ourselves, even if beings who did not have
inner experience or outward behaviour that was like our own would have
to rely on guesswork in order to identify an appropriate intentional stance
to adopt toward human beings.
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We use propositions in formulating a picture of the world under the
intention-free naturalistic conception.We also find that we have to mention
them. There is an important level of sophistication, essential to the practice
of our sciences, at which we pick out regularities and at which we say that
the same types of thing happen in different places. This involves mentioning
propositions, but in a harmless way. We may pick out a mathematical
relationship and refer to it, or we may comment that the same type of
mathematical relationship occurs in different circumstances. In so doing,
we mention a proposition, one that defines a variable by giving a specific
equation, or we mention a specific type of proposition, such as linear
equations, but we need not mention the proposition or the type in a way
that would expose any proposition to propositional attitudes. “Here the
equation is y = 3x + 4z”, and, “All of the variables in this system are related
by linear equations”, are both propositions that can be objects of
propositional attitudes if we bring them into the picture. But the
proposition that is mentioned, y = 3x + 4z, and propositions of the type
that is mentioned, linear equations, are not themselves exposed to
propositional attitudes, because of the embedding within larger
propositions. We can keep epistemological questions at bay, so long as we
do not need to mention the larger propositions as wholes. We can avoid
doing so if we can state the content of our science with all propositions
that are mentioned, either directly or implicitly through mention of their
types, being buried within propositions that are merely used.
Holding this line between, on the one hand, use and mention that is
out of the reach of propositional attitudes, and on the other hand, mention
that is within the reach of propositional attitudes, does require the drawing
of a clear boundary between the observer, who uses propositions, and the
world. If the observer were regarded, by himself or by us, as being in the
world in his capacity of observer, then the propositions that he used would
have to enter the picture in ways that would expose them to propositional
attitudes. He would be seen as observing that p, or that not-q, in a way
that made room for explicit assent. If he were not seen in that way, with
room for explicit assent, then he would not be seen as an observer, but
merely as an object in the world that changed its internal states in ways
that reflected other changes in the world. If, for example, a red light came
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on, his brain would change in certain ways. It would be a step beyond that,
bringing propositions into the picture in ways that would expose them to
propositional attitudes, to say that he observed that a red light came on.We
can, however, draw the boundary between the observer and the world, with
just one reservation. The reservation is that there are delicate, and still
unresolved, questions about the role of the observer in connection with
quantum mechanics.
Leaving that reservation to one side, all that we would need would be
a conception that allowed us to view the world as an object of study, from
which the observer as observer was excluded. Propositions that were
entertained by the observer would not then be in the picture, even though
the observer’s brain cells would be in the picture. I shall refer to the
objective conception of observation to capture the idea of the world’s being
an object for the observer, who is not, as observer, in the picture. This is a
matter of the relationship between the observer and the world, rather than
a matter of how the contents of the world are seen. The intention-free
naturalistic conception, the intention-laden naturalistic conception and the
originator conception, on the other hand, are conceptions that allow us to
see the contents of the world in particular lights.
Use of the intention-free naturalistic conception of the world would
allow us to avoid bringing propositions into the picture in a way that would
expose them to propositional attitudes, so long as the process of
observation could be brought under the objective conception. (If we
actually thought about the process under that conception, rather than
merely regarding the process as apt to be brought under that conception,
then the questions of epistemology would be brought down on us. This
would happen because we would think about the observer and his
relationship to the information that he gathered. The words, “could be
brought under the objective conception”, must therefore be read as, “could
be brought under the objective conception by some hypothetical super-
observer whose thoughts we did not reproduce or contemplate within our
ownminds”.) Use of the intention-laden naturalistic conception would not
allow us to avoid bringing propositions into the picture as potential objects
of propositional attitudes, because its use would involve attributing beliefs
to people. We could then ask whether they knew the propositions that they
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believed, andwhat types of knowledge they could have. Use of the originator
conception for the purpose of seeing deliberationwithmasterywould present
the same danger.Wewould see people as standing back and considering pieces
of evidence and possiblemethods of argument before deciding how to proceed
to conclusions. That would bring propositions into the picture as objects of
propositional attitudes. We would then have to be ready to tackle
epistemological questions. Whether we can avoid epistemological questions
therefore hinges on the extent towhichwe canmake dowith the intention-free
naturalistic conception. We can get an idea of how difficult it would be to
avoid including propositions in the picture as potential objects of
propositional attitudes by considering a few examples where the importance
of propositions is, to us,manifest.My chosen examples are laws of nature, the
data, programs and output of computers, and human thought.
Laws of nature
A law of nature is, at the very least, a statement of an observed and
predicted regularity. It may well be more than that, although philosophical
opinions differ as to what, if anything, the additional properties of laws
might be. A purely physical description of the world, giving the locations
and movements of particles or other information at that level, might not
appear to be able to disclose law-like regularities. It might seem that the
regularities would be present, but unnoticed. But that would be too narrow
a view. Propositions that recorded the regularities could be formulated and
included in the description, so that they would be mentioned, but as noted
above in connection with mathematical equations, they would not need to
be mentioned in such a way as to expose them to propositional attitudes.
(The advancement of science, as opposed to the mere statement of current
knowledge, would require us to expose propositions to propositional
attitudes, because we would have to debate which propositions were true,
and by implication, which ones we knew or believed. At least, that would
be so unless we could do all of our sorting of true propositions from false
ones at some sub-personal, non-self-conscious, level. And we would
certainly need to expose propositions to propositional attitudes if we
wanted to say things like, “All of the results that have been obtained in
John’s laboratory are correct”.)
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There is no reason to think that we would need to expose propositions
to propositional attitudes in order to accommodate additional properties of
laws of nature. The most likely additional properties are some form of
necessity, and membership of a set of propositions with some specified
characteristic. Possible characteristics of sets of propositions include that of
beingwell-structured by relationships of implication, and that of being stable
in the face of the outcomes of any circumstances that could transpire given the
truth of all members of the set (Lange, Natural Laws in Scientific Practice,
chapters 2 and 3). Onewould have tomention propositions, thereby bringing
them into the picture, and notmerely use them, in order to notice necessity or
membership of a set of propositions with some given characteristic.
Furthermore, one would have to notice necessity in order to enquire into its
nature and sources, and one would have to notice membership of a set of
propositions with a given characteristic in order to consider the significance
of that membership for the status of a proposition. But this does not mean
that considering the possibility of holding propositional attitudes toward the
propositions in question would help to explain either necessity, or the fact
that propositionsweremembers of a set with a given characteristic. This lack
of explanatory usefulness would make adequate an approach that kept the
mentioned propositions at a distance from propositional attitudes.We could
do all that we needed to do in order to state our current knowledgemerely by
using propositions such as, “Necessarily, an object that is released in a
gravitational field is accelerated”, or, “The proposition thatwhen hydrogen is
mixed with oxygen under appropriate conditions, water is formed, is a
member of our set of natural laws”. Such propositions as wholes would
merely be used. They would merely play roles in forming our expectations
about the world, and in guiding our conduct. The propositions that were
embeddedwithin them, andmentioned, would be kept at a distance from the
surface, so that they were not potentially objects of propositional attitudes.
Likewise, an analysis of laws of nature that did not attempt a reduction to
non-nomic properties, such as the analysis that is proposed by John Carroll
in “Nailed toHume’s Cross?”, would not require us to mention propositions
in such away as to expose them to propositional attitudes, so long aswe only
wanted to state some of our current knowledge by identifying certain
propositions as laws of nature.
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We must consider an objection to this approach. The proposal
appears to be to use some proposition, p, and also to use the proposition,
Necessarily(p). How could we recognize that the same proposition, p, was
used in the former case and mentioned in the latter, without mentioning p
in isolation? The answer is that this task of recognition does not need to be
performed. Once we recognize that we have a law, and move up to saying
“Necessarily(p)”, we stop saying “p”. That is, we do not need to make the
connection between the two propositions, because the new one supplants
the old one.
Our computers
I shall now turn to the data, the programs and the output of computers.
When we look at data, programs and output, we know what the data
represent, what the programs do and what the output tells us. We might,
for example, see the data as figures for births in different regions in a given
year, and a program as a way of estimating the need for schools in those
regions five, ten and fifteen years hence. Propositions would be seen as
expressed over and over again, in ways that exposed them to propositional
attitudes. A datummight be seen as expressing the proposition that 100,000
children were born in region B last year. A program might be seen as
expressing the proposition that if the numbers of births in regions B, C, D
and E in a given year were w, x, y and z, then the number of children
starting school in region C five years later would be some specific function
f(w, x, y, z). Some output might be seen as expressing the proposition that
we would need six more schools in region D ten years from now. The
meanings of data, of programs and of output are obvious to us because we
collect data, and write programs, in order to get the output that we want.
All of the data, the programs and the output are invested with meaning,
and can be explained. Sometimes the explanation of a program is merely
that someone was having a bit of fun practising his programming skills,
but that is still enough to make sense of the program. We can arrange for
data to be collected automatically, and for them to be processed using
programs that a computer has devised or modified without reference to
human beings, but even then, we can understand what is going on by
tracing the story back to human beings who wanted to do something.
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Those human beings could in turn work their way forward through the
story and interpret what was going on, just as if they, rather than the
computer, had written the programs and collected the data. They would
then see the data, the programs and the output as expressing propositions.
They would also see those propositions as exposed to propositional
attitudes.
In the light of this, how could we keep epistemological questions at
bay? The origins in human intentions of programs, even those that are
written by computers, and of the collection of data, mean that we could
only do so if we could also avoid bringing propositions into the picture as
potential objects of propositional attitudes when we considered human
beings under the naturalistic conception. The link between human
intentions and computer programs is close enough to make that a
precondition of success. I shall turn to human thought shortly. If we could
prevent propositional attitudes from getting a grip in connection with
human thought, that should suffice to dismiss the claim that the “thoughts”
of computers when they themselves wrote programs, collected data and
“interpreted” output would require us to bring propositions into the picture
as potential objects of propositional attitudes. Meanwhile, considering
computers in isolation, it might seem to be straightforward to keep
propositions out of the picture entirely. A computer is a physical object.
Electrical charges enter it, move around within it and emerge from it. The
processes of input and output are also physical, involving the movement of
keys and the distribution of electrical charges on a screen. We could
describe everything in purely physical terms, without loss.
To be precise, we would not lose information by falling back on a
purely physical description, one that did not mention the propositions that
we in fact used when talking about the data, the programs and the output.
A purely physical description would capture all of the complexity that a
description that mentioned those propositions would capture. (In fact it
would capture more complexity, because we are normally highly selective
in what we describe, overlooking most of the physical detail in the world.)
Every detail would be captured in the sense that if the set of propositions
that could correctly be asserted were different, something in the physical
description of the world, either inside or outside the computer, would also
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be different. But we would lose intelligibility. The most natural and
informative way to describe what goes on in and around a computer is to
state the propositions that are expressed by the data and the output, and
to state what is accomplished by the execution of its programs. What is
accomplished can be expressed by stating propositions that set out the
functions from inputs to outputs, and adding that the execution of
programs involves inserting the inputs and calculating the corresponding
outputs. So must propositions come into the picture in ways that would
expose them to propositional attitudes?
When we fall into describing the world, excluding human beings and
perhaps some higher animals, as if the entities in the world had
propositions in mind or were deliberately carrying out certain tasks in
order to achieve goals that they had formulated, we must remind ourselves
not to anthropomorphize. But if we describe human beings without
mentioning their beliefs and intentions, as propositions in their heads, then
we lay ourselves open to Sidney Morgenbesser’s reported characterization
of the views of the behaviourist B. F. Skinner: “You think we shouldn’t
anthropomorphize people”. Computers seem to fall somewhere in
between, but closer to human beings than to the rest of the world because
we design, build and program computers, and feed themwith data, in order
to accomplish tasks that we have chosen. We can even see computers as
extensions of ourselves that are active participants in our mental processes,
rather then their being mere external tools (Clark, “Reasons, Robots and
the Extended Mind”, section 4). Such a view might tempt us to
anthropomorphize computers, although that temptation could be resisted
because if a computer is seen as an extension of oneself, it is not granted
the status of an independent being. (Resistance becomes harder if a
computer is seen as an extension of a group of human beings who are
collaborating on some project, because it is not then seen as an extension
of any one human being. It can then easily be seen as an additional member
of the group.) Regardless of whether we should see computers as
extensions of ourselves, a severe loss of intelligibility would result from
not mentioning propositions when explaining what computers did. We
would suffer this loss even if the computers in question wrote their own
programs and collected data themselves, having been created by us with
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the ability to perform those tasks or to learn how to perform them. This
amounts to a serious challenge to the idea that we could have an adequate
conception of the world that did not mention propositions in ways that
exposed them to propositional attitudes. It is a serious challenge because
the propositions would certainly be exposed to propositional attitudes if
they were entertained by the people who had set the computers their tasks.
The challenge can be met, but when we consider the terms on which
it can be met, we will see the high price of keeping epistemology and its
questions at bay. The price will turn out to be the maintenance of a rigidly
detached stance, from which we do not see the programmers and users of
computers as entertaining propositions. It is hard to imagine detaching
ourselves from the human world to this extent, but it is just about possible
to imagine doing this thing that we almost certainly cannot do. The reasons
for looking at computers, rather than moving directly to human beings,
are that it is easier to imagine our achieving the necessary detachment if we
focus only on our computers, and that looking at the relationships between
computers and their human programmers and users highlights the
significance of the specifically human element. Another way to help us to
imagine achieving the necessary detachment is to consider encounters with
aliens and with their computers, in which detachment would be forced on
us. Identifying the reason why detachment would be available to us in
relation to them will help to bring out the cost of detachment in relation
to human beings.
Aliens and their computers
Suppose that we came across things that some aliens used in the ways that
we use computers, and suppose that we saw those things in action, but that
the way of life and patterns of thought of the aliens differed greatly from
our own, as they probably would. We might well suspect that the things
we had found were analogous to our own computers, but we would be at
a loss to impute content to the processes that went on inside them. We
could observe and describe the physical components and the electrical
impulses, or some other mechanism of state transformation if different
technology were used, but the differences in way of life and patterns of
thought of the aliens would mean that we could not impute propositional
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content, or even assume that it was appropriate to characterize the
processes in terms of propositions at all. We could give a global measure
of the information content. We could probably go further and record
certain regularities of input, process and output, but with no idea of what,
if any, significance the aliens would attach to the things that were picked
out by the terms that we used in stating those regularities. Despite this lack
of grasp of what was going on, and even despite our awareness of the lack,
we could give a full “natural” history of the objects that we had found by
describing the components and impulses. This is something that we would
consider to be perfectly adequate if we were studying animals that were
much less sophisticated than ourselves, rather than studying artefacts.
Now suppose that we met the aliens who had built the computers. We
could have the same attitude toward them. We could give a complete
natural history of them, but we could not impute specific thoughts or
intentions to them, or even assume that any such characterization would be
appropriate, because we would not understand them at all. To recapitulate
the discussion in section 3.7, philosophers have shown us how to make a
start when parachuted into a strange society with a completely unknown
language. It might be thought that those methods could be used here, but
they could not. Use of the principles of charity and of humanity relies on
an assumption that those who are to be interpreted have a fair amount in
common with ourselves. We would have no right to use those principles
when we were dealing with radically different aliens. We could try out
various intentional descriptions of the aliens, and we might be fortunate in
finding one that worked, in that it allowed us to systematize and to predict
their behaviour. If we did so, we could reasonably construct a detached
psychological theory of the aliens, in the sense that was given in section
3.7. But there is no reason to expect that we would be so lucky.
If we had a natural history of the aliens, and a “natural” history of
their computers, histories that did not impute propositional content, would
anything be missing? We would have a suspicion that something would be
missing, but we would be at a complete loss to say what it was. Having
reached such an extreme point, of having no conception of what might be
missing, we would not be entitled to assert that nothing would be missing,
but we could stop worrying about whatever it was that might be missing.
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At most, we might be able to say that it was something that would, if it
were known, appear to us as something like intentional understanding.
What is more, we could stop worrying ad hoc, on the facts of this instance
alone. We would not have to forswear ad hoc attitudes and take up a
general ontological anti-realism, a view that since the putative missing
thing would be outside our framework, the question of its existence did
not even arise. (Such a general position would arguably be inappropriate
anyway, because we might be able to see the missing thing as something
that lay at an impossibly remote point on a scale, the near end of which was
within our framework. This would be the scale of types of intentional
understanding.) We can get a sense of the level of ignorance that we would
have by reflecting that if the computers were made mobile and physically
active, that is, if they were robots, we might not be able to tell whether an
entity was an alien or a robot that had been built by the aliens. It would
certainly be rash to decide on the basis of whether the important element
in the entity was carbon or silicon, or whether the entity moved around on
legs or on wheels, or whether entities of its type reproduced with one
mother per child. The facts about life on Earth that might support the use
of such clues would be too contingent to allow the clues to give us
trustworthy answers on different planets. We could not confidently say
which type of entity was the natural one, and which was the robotic one,
unless we found the factory where the aliens made their robots, or worked
out that entities of one type were too simple to have built entities of the
other type, or even to have built entities that might in due course have given
rise to entities of that other type.
Aliens might not be so different from ourselves. We might be able to
comprehend them, at least to a limited extent. But the point that matters
here is not whether there are in fact any wholly and permanently
incomprehensible aliens. What matters is that the reason why we are
entitled to say that nothing worth worrying about would be missing from
our natural history of incomprehensible aliens, a natural history that did
not impute propositional content, is that we could not grasp how they
thought. We would be confined to the intention-free naturalistic
conception. Thus we would not see the aliens as thinking in propositional
terms, a way of seeing them that would open the way to our seeing them
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as mentioning propositions and as taking up propositional attitudes. We
would indeed have no conception of any propositional attitudes that they
might have. Turning to our descriptions of them, they would be like
naturalistic descriptions of the world generally. We would use propositions.
We would also mention propositions as a way of capturing generalizations,
but we could embed those mentioned propositions in propositions that we
merely used, keeping the mentioned propositions safe from being potential
objects of our own propositional attitudes. Epistemological questions
could therefore be avoided without indulging in an unprincipled refusal to
philosophize, so long as we could simply set down our descriptions, and did
not have to debate which propositions stated truths about the aliens and
which ones stated falsehoods. (As with laws of nature, debate at some sub-
personal, non-self-conscious, level could be conducted without exposing
propositions to propositional attitudes.)
The perils of detachment
We can now consider the option of keeping epistemology at bay even
though we describe human beings rather than aliens, and the cost of
keeping it at bay. I have already moved beyond computers into the realm of
natural, but thinking, beings. We now enter the third area that I promised
to tackle, human thought. We need to consider whether we could describe
human beings in ways that we found adequate, without bringing
propositions into the picture in a way that would expose them to
propositional attitudes. If we could do that, we might keep epistemology
at bay. We were safe with incomprehensible aliens, because we could not
even characterize their thought in propositional terms. Human beings are
different, because we do characterize their thought in propositional terms.
We also see them as taking up propositional attitudes.
We might appear to have a choice, between not characterizing their
thought in propositional terms, and so characterizing it but refusing to see
them as taking up propositional attitudes. But the latter option would not
be available. When we consider human beings, both their awareness of their
own processes of thought and their self-consciousness must be taken as
given. We know that once human beings use propositions, they can
mention them, and that once they mention them, they can take up
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propositional attitudes toward them. It would not even be necessary for
someone who was seen as using a proposition to be seen as consciously
taking up a propositional attitude toward it himself. We could do so on his
behalf, imagining that we believed the same proposition and asking
whether we would know it. That exercise would allow us to imagine that
the person who was being studied consciously believed the proposition.
The similarities between human beings would ensure that such an exercise
was possible. So as soon as we see human thought in propositional terms,
we are on the road to epistemology. (We cannot avail ourselves of the
option of embedding all mentioned propositions in propositions that are
only used, thereby putting the mentioned propositions out of the reach of
propositional attitudes, because we must see the used propositions as open
to being mentioned, and therefore as exposed to propositional attitudes.)
If epistemological questions are to be avoided, we must not see people as
using propositions that we understand. But that would imply an unnatural
level of detachment from people. We would be as remote from them as we
would be from incomprehensible aliens. Could we manage that level of
detachment? And if we could, would we have an adequate view of human
beings?
Two preliminary points should be noted. The first point is that the
requirement would be to adopt the intention-free naturalistic conception.
(We could not use an intention-laden conception but regard the
propositions that people used as incomprehensible, because we know that
we can understand the propositions that people use.) Use of the intention-
free naturalistic conception is a matter of how the contents of the world are
seen, so it should not be confused with the objective conception of
observation, even though if we want to keep epistemology at bay, we must
also regard observation as apt to be brought under the objective
conception. Indeed, the observer of humanity who wishes to avoid
epistemological questions must go further and describe herself, as well as
other people, using the intention-free naturalistic conception, if she
describes herself at all. The second point is that because the objects of
study would be, like the observer, human beings, any need to see
propositions as potential objects of propositional attitudes that were held
by someone who was being studied would bring the questions of
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epistemology down on the observer. If we can ask whether any human
being knows a proposition that he believes, then questions as to the
possibility of, and the conditions for, knowledge become pressing for all
of us, in relation to all of our putative knowledge. This follows from the
fact that we have so many features of our mental lives in common.
The answer to the first question, that of whether we could manage the
level of detachment that would be involved in not characterizing human
thought in propositional terms, is very likely to be that we could not. We
could try to achieve such detachment, and perhaps we could manage it with
people we had only heard about and had never met, nor ever expected to
meet. But even then, it would be difficult. It is difficult to remain detached
even when reading a biography of someone who lived hundreds of years
ago. That is partly a consequence of the biographer’s art. A good
biographer will make figures from the past come alive for us. But even if we
read a dull encyclopedia article about a historical figure, an article that
merely recites a few facts, we see the person as one of us, so that we relate
to him as a fellow human being. We do not achieve total detachment. Peter
Strawson pointed out how difficult it would be to maintain an objective
attitude toward people around us (“Freedom and Resentment”, pages 9-
10). I am discussing an attitude of much greater detachment than Strawson
had in mind, because his objective attitude would still allow us to see the
trains of thought of the people concerned in propositional terms. So
complete detachment is probably beyond us. We do not, however, need to
settle the question in order to pursue the argument. We can move on to the
second question. Assuming for the sake of argument that complete
detachment were possible, would we have an adequate view of human
beings if we did not even impute propositional content to their cerebral
activity?
The view of human beings that was so given would strike an observer
as adequate, if and only if complete detachment into which the observer
was locked were achieved. Given that an observer was locked into such
detachment, she would be like we would be when studying
incomprehensible aliens, in that she would have and could have no idea of
what was missing. A description that imputed no propositional content
would then be as adequate as any description could be, and she would be
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unaware of its limitations in any more than the vaguest way. In fact, the
hopeless inadequacy of the postulated description screams out at us. But
that is because we are human beings who can see that other human beings
are like ourselves. We have not achieved the complete detachment that
would be required, so we can see that achieving it would entail a
catastrophic loss of understanding. We can see that, because we can see in
some detail what would be lost. We would lose the human point of view.
A catalogue of the regularities in changes in the states of people’s brains,
correlated with regularities in their outward behaviour, which did not
characterize their thought in propositional terms, would not allow any
appreciation of what it was like to lead a human life.
Detachment of the type that is demanded here means seeing beings as
mere physical objects in the world, and not as participants in our rational
way of life. This explains why detachment is easy in relation to parts of
the world that are devoid of human beings and of the kinds of animal that
we are tempted to anthropomorphize. We have no temptation to imagine
rocks or plants as being like us, so we can do geology and botany in a
detached way, as pure natural history, without feeling that anything is
missing. Not much changes if we move up the scale to insects. If we move
up to more sophisticated animals, particularly those that have cultural
significance for us, such as dogs and bears, the temptation to
anthropomorphize grows. If we move up to human beings, detachment
becomes practically untenable. It may not be absolutely untenable. Those
who are committed to all three of methodological, psychological and
logical behaviourism, and those who see human beings merely as huge
buzzing systems of atoms, might harden their hearts and maintain their
positions. But that would not be an easy thing to do, and the attitude would
not endure once the hard-hearted left their studies and conversed with their
friends.
Several philosophical views bear on the question of whether a
detached view of human beings, in my very strong sense, would be
adequate. Derek Parfit considers reductionist views of people, and
ultimately accepts them (Reasons and Persons, part 3, with the conclusion
on page 280). Such reductionist views would facilitate taking a detached
view. Quassim Cassam argues that we cannot give an adequate account of
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first-person thoughts without including persons in our description of the
world, so that a reductionist description would inevitably be an incomplete
description of the world (Self and World, chapter 5, section 3). We would
also, in Cassam’s view, lose the unity of a life (ibid., chapter 5, section 4).
Lynne Rudder Baker argues for the vital role of a strongly first-personal
perspective (Persons and Bodies).
My response to Cassam and to Baker is a shift of focus, rather than
any disagreement. The content of first-person thoughts would not feature
in a detached view that saw human beings purely as natural mechanisms,
and that did not see their thoughts in propositional terms. Only physical
states of human brains would feature. The incompleteness that concerns
Cassam and Baker would be part of what we were trying to achieve, the
elimination of propositions from our view of the world. If we were to
achieve that, our view of the world would be grossly impoverished, but it
would not be incomplete in the sense of missing out something that could
have been included in a detached view of the type that I am discussing.
Likewise, we would lose any sense of the unity of a human life as
something that made sense rather than its being a chapter of accidents,
and any sense of responsibility for past and planned actions or of
answerability to ethical standards, but these senses of unity, of
responsibility and of answerability are things that one would never expect
to see if one took a detached view. One would only expect to see the
creation, continuation, change and destruction of objects that were
characterized in intention-free naturalistic terms. We can also note that if
Cassam and Baker are right, and if in addition rational beings are
sufficiently diverse that the contents of some thoughts of some beings
could not be grasped by us, either while they were first-person thoughts in
some sense, or while they played some equally vital role in giving complete
accounts, then all of our descriptions of portions of the Universe that were
large enough to include such diverse rational beings would be incomplete.
The inevitability of epistemology
To sum up the argument so far, the questions of epistemology can be
dismissed if we can do all that we wish to do without mentioning
propositions in ways that expose them to propositional attitudes. But the
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price of avoiding epistemology would be a high one. It would be a wholly
inadequate conception of human beings. It is not merely that an inhuman
detachment would be imposed on us. We would also be unable to
appreciate our rational way of life. When we advanced our knowledge by
debating which propositions were true, and by implication debating which
propositions we knew or believed, we would have to refuse to take note of
what we were doing in conducting such debates. We would also be unable
to see people as deliberating by reference to evidence that they considered,
because that would involve seeing them as stating the evidence in the form
of propositions. If we could not see people as considering evidence, then
we would not be able to appraise actions as rational, because any such
appraisal would require us to see the subject as having applied appropriate
decision-making methods to considerations of which he was aware. Those
considerations would have to be seen as being in propositional form in the
subject’s mind, in order for us to consider whether he had made
appropriate use of them.
The inevitability of epistemology does not mean that we must worry
about epistemology all of the time.Most of the time, we ignore the subject.
We gather data, test our hypotheses and reason our way to conclusions
without worrying about the philosophical legitimacy of our procedures, as
distinct from their practical efficacy. If our procedures are known to yield
only approximate results, or if we know or suspect that they are liable to
error, we allow for that. We recognize the limits of what we do, but we do
not stop to ask whether the results that we obtain qualify as knowledge, or
whether the propositions that express the results are analytic or synthetic,
in the way that epistemologists ask those questions. We may notice things
that would also be relevant to the nature of our knowledge, for example as
a priori or as a posteriori. We may, for example, ask whether our results
follow from axioms of logic and mathematics, or whether we have made
essential use of empirical data. But we make such enquiries in order to
establish the degree of confidence that we may have in our results, and in
order to work out what sorts of checks for errors we should make, rather
than making the enquiries in order to lay philosophical worries to rest.
The fact that we ordinarily allow ourselves such a philosophically
easy time does not mean that we should do so. While it would be excessive
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to think about epistemological questions all of the time, there are good
reasons to pose questions of a broadly epistemological nature every now
and then. They prompt us to ask whether our procedures are really as good
as we think they are. Do we systematically overlook certain data? Do our
habits of thought lead us to ignore some possible interpretations of the
data? Do the conclusions that we proudly announce have substantial
content, or do we say very little because there are many free parameters in
our theories that can be given values in order to make the theories fit the
data? And so on. Such questions belong to scientific method, a discipline
that is adjacent to epistemology and that shades into it, and they are
undoubtedly worth asking. On the other hand, we would never get anything
done if we worried about such things all of the time. And the questions
cannot sensibly be posed in relation to the acquisition of everyday beliefs,
about how our nearest and dearest are feeling or about the time of the next
train, because the procedures by which we acquire such beliefs, and the
contents of the beliefs, are either too ill-defined for the questions to be
answered, or too straightforward for the questions to be serious.
5.2 Knowledge and deliberation with mastery
If we see ourselves as deliberating with mastery when we adopt some of our
beliefs, that ensures that we refer to propositions when characterizing the
mental processes of human beings, so that epistemological questions are
unavoidable. Any characterization of our deliberations that saw us as
considering reasons would have that consequence. But seeing ourselves as
deliberating with mastery has a further effect. It has a particular influence
on our concept of knowledge.
The traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief has been
known to be inadequate since the publication of Edmund Gettier’s paper,
“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, in 1963. Other proposed analyses
have mostly adopted one of two broad approaches. The first approach has
been to require that justification be appropriately linked to truth. This is
the approach of the prohibition on false lemmas, an approach that has
recently been argued to be relevant even to some Gettier cases that had
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been thought not to rely on false lemmas (Levin, “Gettier Cases without
False Lemmas?”). The second approach has been to bypass justification in
favour of some purely causal account, or to relocate it as justification for
our use of the methods by which beliefs are formed, rather than as
justification for specific beliefs. A leading strand within this second broad
approach has formed around Robert Nozick’s idea of tracking, the
application of which also rules out some claims to knowledge that rely on
false lemmas (Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, chapter 3, section 1).
Seeing ourselves as deliberating with mastery matters here because
on some, but not all, occasions, we see ourselves as freely considering the
weights to attach to pieces of evidence and the possible methods of
argument from evidence to conclusions, before we work out which beliefs
to adopt. If we ignored this view of the process, and always saw the
acquisition of knowledge merely as the mechanical execution of programs
that would produce correlations between states of brains and states of the
world, or that would produce appropriate dispositions in brains to respond
in certain ways to requests for information, that would not be satisfactory.
We would not have a picture of our acquisition of knowledge that
measured up to our self-conception, because we would not see a stage of
free contemplation of the evidence and of how it might be used. We would
see ourselves as no more than followers of programs, albeit sophisticated
programs that generated reasoned discourses.
We should, of course, require the existence of correlations or of
appropriate dispositions as a necessary condition of knowledge. If their
material existence were required, that would amount to requiring known
propositions to be true. If their counterfactual existence were required as
well, that would amount to imposing a tracking condition on the processes
by which knowledge was acquired. But it would not be satisfactory to see
our acquisition of knowledge merely, and on all occasions, as the execution
of programs that mechanically produced correlations or appropriate
dispositions. As I shall argue below, we take some of our sophisticated
knowledge to be obtained in ways that we see as going beyond the
mechanical execution of programs.
Correlations and dispositions can be engendered in brains by means
that do not even involve reasoned discourse. Any of our beliefs could be
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engendered by subliminal propaganda or by drugs, but beliefs that were
engendered in those ways would at least initially be regarded with suspicion
by anyone who was aware of their origins, even if the processes by which
they were engendered were considered to be reliable inculcators of true
beliefs. Beliefs that were engendered in such ways could qualify as
knowledge, so long as the processes were indeed reliable. Learning by rote,
which comes closer to such ways than it does to the reasoned discourse that
we expect in relation to sophisticated beliefs, does engender knowledge. I
do not propose to incorporate a new condition in the definition of
knowledge, a condition that a belief should be seen as adopted through a
process that involved mastery, or even reasoned discourse without mastery.
But there is one way in which we should see our concept of knowledge as
influenced by the idea of deliberation with mastery.
The influence is that while large amounts of knowledge can be seen
as engendered by mechanical processes (including reasoned discourses
generated by programs), the concept of knowledge can be a concept of
something rather more than true belief that has been acquired with due
care. If we saw all of our beliefs as engendered mechanically, we would be
limited to seeing anything extra, over and above reliably true belief, in the
relationships between our beliefs. We could not see anything extra in the
nature of the mechanism. The most that we could get from that would be
something close to a guarantee of the correctness of the beliefs that were
acquired by using the mechanism.
The relationships between our beliefs amount to more than
consistency. The truth of some beliefs explains the truth of other beliefs,
and there are relationships of logical implication between some beliefs. But
if we see some beliefs as adopted through deliberation with mastery, that
allows us to see something else, beyond the relationships between beliefs.
It allows us to see the beliefs as adopted in ways that make use of a special
capacity for free thought, involving a type of reflection that is beyond
mechanical computation. If we recognize that we see at least some beliefs
as adopted in that way, we can better understand why we regard knowledge
as something special, as having intrinsic value beyond the mere true belief
that Plato discusses (Theaetetus, 187-210), and why we esteem human
beings for possessing knowledge and for increasing our stock of it.
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The influence on our concept of knowledge is particularly strong in
connection with the acquisition of academic knowledge that is new, not
just to the acquirer but to humanity. If someone has learnt facts that are
already well-established, it does not matter much if we do not see him as
having adopted his new beliefs through deliberation with mastery. It does
not even matter if they were engendered by rote learning, a process that
patently does not involve reflection on the specific beliefs that are acquired.
Likewise, the routine acquisition of data directly from the natural world,
rather than from human teachers, can be seen as proceeding mechanically.
But when we are at the frontiers of human knowledge, we cannot know
whether any mechanical process would reliably guide us in the next steps,
except in a few special cases, for example, when we have devised a
computer program that generates new mathematical theorems, and we
have confidence in the results because we understand how the program
works. Given that there is in general no mechanical process, specified in
advance, on which we can rely, we naturally expect to use reasoned
discourse of a type that will allow us to break free of any particular
inherited mechanism. We expect to be able to stand back and consider all
of the available information, how to weight the evidence and which method
of argument to use, in a way that leaves open all of the options that are in
general available to us. We know that we cannot really do this, because we
appreciate the causal structure of the physical world and the dependence
of our mental lives on our physical brains. Despite these facts, we still only
consider ourselves to be acting ideally in the enlargement of human
knowledge if we do see ourselves as standing back in a way that leaves all
of the options open, that is, if we see ourselves as adopting our new beliefs
following deliberation with mastery.
In such contexts, we attach high value to new beliefs that we see as
acquired in that way. Seeing deliberation with mastery helps us to see
creativity. If the beliefs then stand up to tests of their correctness, we
consider them to be particularly admirable examples of new knowledge.
We would not be so impressed even if we saw a mechanical process of the
utmost sophistication that took us through all of the possible sets of
weights and all of the known methods, and that made selections with the
greatest sensitivity to clues in the evidence as to what it would be best to do.
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We even doubt the capacity of such mechanisms, because when we are on
the frontiers of knowledge, we are aware of the risk of not knowing which
clues are really significant. We can in fact do no better than use such a
sophisticated mechanism, and furthermore a mechanism that is, at the
highest level, not even chosen by us because the all-encompassing programs
that capture the entire contents of sets of rational antecedents are simply
foisted on us, but that is not how we want to see things. Our desire not to
see things in that light is encouraged by our awareness that only some
mathematical functions, the Turing-computable functions, can be
computed using methods that we have already defined precisely. We have
the hope, perhaps groundless, that other functions may be computable in
ways that are as yet undefined. By analogy, we are aware that some leap of
imagination that we cannot manage to see as emerging from a mechanism
may very well be necessary in order to advance our collective knowledge,
even though any actual leap would have to be made by physical entities
that were embedded in the causal network.
5.3 Rationally held beliefs
At the start of chapter 4, I turned from our view of the nature of processes
of deliberation to our appraisal of the content of the results and the
content of the processes. I shall repeat that move now, leaving behind the
nature of the process of adoption of beliefs and turning to the question of
whether we should regard someone as holding a belief rationally. I shall
take it that a belief is held rationally if it has been acquired rationally, and
if any challenges to it that have so far been mounted have been seen off in
appropriate ways, using counter-arguments that are generally accepted as
rational rather than relying on counter-arguments that do not meet that
standard or on a refusal to listen. What is at issue is the relationship
between the beliefs that are held and the evidence that is available to the
believer. It does not matter for this purpose if the process is seen as
mechanical. But three other requirements must be met. There must be a
process that is of sufficient complexity to support an interpretation that
ensures that the pieces of evidence, the method of argument and the
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conclusion are all represented. The interpretation must fit with the external
facts about how the subject speaks and acts more generally. And
application of the interpretation to the process must reveal the subject’s
reasoning as it is seen by the subject. (It must not reveal less than that. It
may reveal more, for example by revealing a selection stage of which the
subject was unconscious.) If these requirements are met, then it will be
possible to test whether a belief was acquired rationally. There is rational
acquisition when a belief is acquired by virtue of a process of reasoning,
and in addition the reasons are adequate and are used appropriately in
arriving at the belief. The reasoning can be indirect. One might, for
example, reason that a given source of information was reliable and that its
reliability could easily be checked, so that any drift into unreliability would
probably be spotted by someone. One could on that basis accept the
deliverances of the source, rather than reasoning about evidence that
related directly to specific potential beliefs. We should also note that as
with actions, we do not have access to external standards of rationality,
but only to the standards of our own community. “Rationally held belief”
must therefore in practice be read as “belief that is in our view held
rationally”. That is the intended reading here, except at the end of this
section, where I discuss the notion of standards of rationality that are
independent of culture.
I shall limit my attention to beliefs that are of a type that we expect
to be acquired following the consideration of evidence. Beliefs of an
academic or technical nature are paradigms, but more everyday beliefs,
such as a belief that one’s friend would arrive late, a belief that was
acquired on the basis of a report that train services were interrupted, would
be included too. A very wide range of simple everyday beliefs can be tested
by considering evidence if we so choose, and to that extent they can be
included, although they are not paradigms and it matters little whether
they are included or excluded. There are, however, some beliefs that it is not
sensible to think of as being acquired or tested by reference to evidence.
These are the absolutely obvious facts of life, partly because they are
obvious and partly because thinking that they should be acquired or tested
by reference to evidence would corrode our way of life, as Wittgenstein
argued (OnCertainty, sections 231 to 236, 253, 310 to 316 and 341 to 344).
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I shall refer to beliefs of the type that I have in mind, a type for which
academic disciplines provide paradigms, as evidence-basable beliefs. The
label is meant to reflect the reasonableness of adducing evidence for the
correctness of a belief, rather than the possibility of adducing evidence for
its correctness. The class of evidence-basable beliefs includes, but is not
limited to, the class of beliefs that was identified in section 1.1, the beliefs
that we expect to be adopted following systematic reflection. We only
expect systematic reflection when it is reasonable, as well as possible, to
consider evidence, and when the beliefs are also sufficiently sophisticated
and significant.
The element of justification in the traditional analysis of knowledge
has an important role to play here. A subject should be able to justify any
evidence-basable belief that she claims to hold rationally. To put the point
in the terms that are used by Duncan Pritchard, we expect reflective luck to
be minimized in relation to rationally held evidence-basable beliefs, even if
it cannot be eliminated (Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, section 6.5). That is, we
expect someone who rationally holds an evidence-basable belief to believe
propositions that are in fact evidence for the belief, and not merely to
believe propositions that she takes to be evidence for it. We test for
rationality by challenging the belief and considering the subject’s responses.
The subject should be able to defend the belief in accordance with accepted
standards of debate, such as the standards that are catalogued by Alvin
Goldman (Knowledge in a Social World, sections 5.1 and 5.2). Examples
are requirements that the premises that are offered be credible, that they
support the conclusion, and that the believer should respond to criticisms
in ways that are appropriate both to the seriousness of the criticisms and
to the audience’s receptivity to available responses. I leave aside for the
moment the question of whether justification as such should feature in a
definition of knowledge. My concern here is not with the criteria for
knowledge, but with the criteria for an evidence-basable belief to be held
rationally. I have borrowed Pritchard’s analysis of the role of reflective luck
for this purpose. He uses it in the analysis of the concept of knowledge
and in the analysis of responses to scepticism.
What is needed is not the ability to parrot a file of evidence in support
of a belief. Such an ability is not necessary. Someone may, for example,
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believe that Descartes was born in 1596, without having any specific
evidence in her head. She could still hold the belief rationally. She might
remember that she had read the date in a few places, none of which she
could now call to mind, and it might occur to her that the writers would
have been caught out if the primary sources had not supported their
assertions. More significantly, the ability to parrot a file of evidence is not
sufficient. Such a file could have been injected into the believer’s brain along
with the belief that the evidence supported, even if the believer had not
considered either the reasons for adopting the belief or the reliability of its
source, so that we could not regard the belief as having been acquired
rationally.
If something other than the ability to parrot a file of evidence is
needed, what is that other thing?Wemust distinguish between what would
be evidence that a belief was held rationally, and what is necessary for a
belief to be held rationally. I shall tackle evidence first, and then what is
necessary.
There is a straightforward alternative to requiring possession of a file
of evidence, which makes the test both more demanding and more
reasonable. This is to require an ability to respond to challenges that are
drawn from an indefinite range, a range that may not be infinite but that
is not delimited in advance. Then a file of responses that was prepared in
advance would not be guaranteed to be sufficient, even though it would be
a great help. Someone who claims to hold a belief rationally should be able
to do more than quote, or gesture in the direction of, a fixed body of
evidence. She should be able to respond to challenges like, “What if the
evidence were falsified?”, or, “Isn’t the evidence open to alternative
interpretations?”, or, “Your claim does not seem to cohere with other
claims that are generally accepted to be true”. What is required here is the
living word that is able to defend itself (Plato, Phaedrus, 276a). Responses
to challenges would, of course, have to be acceptable. I discuss standards
of acceptability later in this section.
It would be too harsh to require someone who claimed to hold a belief
rationally to have responses to all likely challenges in a file. This is the
respect in which the new test is more reasonable than a demand for a
comprehensive file of evidence. The believer that Descartes was born in
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1596 who could not produce evidence that would deal with all likely
challenges would fail a test that a file should be produced, so that test
would be unreasonable. But it would not be unreasonable to require her to
come up with responses to the challenges that were actually posed, given
time to formulate her responses. Thus the new test of requiring responses
to the challenges that were actually posed, those challenges being drawn
from an indefinite range, could reasonably be applied to her.
If several challenges to an evidence-basable belief are posed, and the
challenges are seen off satisfactorily, that at least shows that the believer is
rational not to discard the belief. But the fact that a belief survives
challenges is not enough to make it held rationally. It is also important that
the belief was acquired rationally in the first place, unless the range of
challenges posed is so extensive that the process of responding to them
itself involves the thoughtful consideration of a wide range of evidence.
Then the process would amount to the rational re-acquisition of a belief
that might at first have been a mere guess or a prejudice.
Although the fact that a belief has survived a number of challenges
does not guarantee that it is held rationally, we do not need to add a further
test. Responses to challenges that are drawn from an indefinite range may
themselves provide evidence that a belief was acquired rationally. That
evidence will often be good enough. The ability to respond could easily be
explained by rational acquisition of the belief in question, for several
reasons. First, someone who had reviewed arguments for and against a
given proposition would have considered at least some possible challenges
to the belief that she finally adopted. Second, if a belief had been acquired
rationally, it would have fitted in with the subject’s existing beliefs, often in
the sense of making her overall picture of the world more coherent and
satisfying, a sense that is intermediate betweenmere consistency and logical
implication. That integration with existing beliefs would make it easier for
the subject to bring some of those beliefs to bear when responding to
challenges. Third, if a subject had considered evidence for a belief and had
adopted the belief on the strength of that evidence, the evidence would
have satisfied the subject’s existing criteria for being good evidence,
otherwise she would not have adopted the belief. Furthermore, she would
understand why the evidence had satisfied those criteria, giving her further
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ammunition when faced with challenges to the belief. So a good
performance in a viva voce examination of someone who holds an
evidence-basable belief should be taken to indicate that the belief was
acquired rationally. Rational acquisition would be the best explanation of
a good performance, given that such an examination would probably be
failed by someone whose belief had been acquired in other likely ways.
Those ways are guesswork, the operation of prejudice, and reading one or
two expressions of the proposition that is believed without any
consideration of the grounds for believing it.
Responses to a finite sequence of challenges would not show
conclusively that a belief had been acquired rationally, because the
responses might be provided from a file of responses that had been imbibed
without reflection, along with the belief. One would need to enquire into
the educational history of the subject in order to rule out that possibility.
Even responses to an infinite sequence of challenges would not be
conclusive because one might, without reflection, imbibe both a belief and
a method of learning from challenges to that belief so as to respond to new
challenges, just as a chess-playing computer can develop its talents as it
goes along. I shall argue below that we could come to see computers as
acquiring beliefs rationally. But that point does not conflict with the point
that is made here, because we could see both computers and human beings
as having acquired beliefs rationally, even if equivalent performance in viva
voce examinations could have been achieved by other means. It would also
be important to allow, both in relation to human beings and in relation to
computers, that if a method of learning from challenges that was imbibed
along with a specific belief was of sufficiently general application, either
when it was imbibed or following its development through use, then the
fact that it was imbibed without reflection would not matter. If responses
to challenges were generated by such a general method, their generation
might well amount to more than the resourceful shuffling of a file of
evidence. The process of responding to challenges could then amount to
the rational re-acquisition of the belief that was being defended. Indeed,
the possession of such a method and its use in the defence of beliefs in
general would constitute part of the subject’s general rationality, a
rationality that would increase as the method was developed. The
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generality of the method would mean that it was not tied to the belief along
with which it had been imbibed. The fact that it had been imbibed along
with that belief, as opposed to having been imbibed on some other
occasion, would then be of no significance.
On the point that the rational acquirer of a belief would understand
why the evidence for the belief satisfied her criteria for being good evidence,
it is interesting to note an argument that if we were to take up an internalist
position, we could not require someone with justification to be aware of
that justification, although we could allow her to be aware of it. The
argument is set out byMichael Bergmann (“Reidian Externalism”, section
1.1). It is that if awareness of justification were required, a vicious regress
would ensue because the requirement for awareness could be re-applied so
that the subject would need to believe in the relevance of the justification,
and would need to have justification for that belief in its relevance, of which
she would have to be aware, and so on. (Bergmann’s argument relates to his
premise III, on pages 54 and 55. He is concerned with justification for the
purposes of claims to knowledge, rather than with the rational acquisition
of beliefs.) Bergmann is making a point against internalism. What is
interesting here is to see precisely how something external would come in
to block such a regress when an evidence-basable belief was at stake. The
practice of the community would be the external thing that would
underwrite the relevance of justifications for beliefs. It would simply be
accepted that some things justified given beliefs. The practice would be a
piece of Wittgensteinian bedrock (Philosophical Investigations, part 1,
section 217, page 72). It is not just a fact, but an important fact, that we
accept the role of these shared standards. As Jane Heal has pointed out, we
must presuppose shared standards like these if we are to have discussions
with a view to reaching conclusions (“Understanding Other Minds from
the Inside”, pages 43-44).
Beyond the question of evidence for the rational acquisition of beliefs,
and arguing for the intrinsic necessity rather than the evidential sufficiency
of the ability to respond to challenges, we can claim that the ability to
respond to at least some challenges, and to do so to a standard that satisfies
our norms, is required by our standards of rationality for evidence-basable
beliefs. The starting point of the argument is the fact that if an evidence-
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basable belief is to count as held rationally, then the believer should be
ready to defend her belief. The mere claim that a believer should be ready
to defend her belief does not take for granted the conclusion for which I
shall now argue, that she should be able to respond to at least some
challenges to an acceptable standard. A defence might not be an acceptable
defence. But if someone said, “I believe this, even though I am in no
position to defend my belief”, that would show that the belief was not held
rationally.
A belief may be held rationally even if the first response to a demand
for justification is something as feeble as, “Professor Smith told me so”,
but someone who met our ordinary standards of rationality would be able
to add something, for example, that Professor Smith was a renowned
expert on the subject. Someone who acquired evidence-basable beliefs
rationally would not accept everything that Professor Smith told her, on
all topics, unless she was prepared to claim that Professor Smith was a
renowned expert on everything, or, more realistically, that Professor Smith
was not the sort of person who would pronounce on matters that lay
outside his area of expertise. That is, someone who acquired evidence-
basable beliefs rationally would sometimes gather evidence herself, and
would sometimes rely on authority, but she would not uncritically plug
herself into a supposedly authoritative source and allow it to pump beliefs
on all topics into her brain. When she had found an expert in a field that
was of interest to her, she would not subject each separate pronouncement
by the expert to critical examination, but she would be aware that the
expert’s credentials had to be checked at the outset, and that the extent of
those credentials set a limit to the area within which pronouncements did
not need to be examined individually. That much is included in our
standards of rationality, along with the need to examine evidence and its
implications directly when we do not rely on experts. We are not
intellectually impressed by someone who does not exercise critical faculties.
We may admire people like that for other reasons. No general ethical
judgement is intended.Many people do great things because they put their
critical faculties to one side and act with confidence on beliefs, the
justifications for which they never stop to question. But while they may be
praised for their achievements, they cannot be praised for their rationality,
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except perhaps in relation to their initial decisions to set their critical
faculties to one side in order to achieve as much as possible.
The ability to respond to at least some challenges, and to do so to an
acceptable standard, follows directly from meeting our standards of
rationality. If a belief has been acquired following critical reflection on the
available support for it, the believer will be in a position to respond to
challenges in a way that we will recognize as acceptable. (Our generally
accepted standards also have a role at the earlier stage of critical reflection.
Complicated but meandering and disengaged thought would not put the
believer in a position to respond to challenges, but we would not regard
such thought as critical reflection.) This does not mean that all challenges
will be decisively repelled. To continue the above example, a claim that
Professor Smith was a renowned expert might be undermined by a
challenge to the effect that his popular reputation was based on work that
he had done 30 years ago, and that most experts had now moved on to
subscribe to newer theories which implied that Professor Smith’s views were
mistaken. This challenge might lead the believer to change her mind. The
ability to respond to challenges also does not mean that the believer would
have either the knowledge or the intellectual horsepower to pursue the
discussion of a challenge wherever it might lead. The discussion might get
too technical for her. But she would still be able to pursue the discussion for
a while, and recognize when and in what respects it was getting beyond her.
She could always at least start by saying that her reason for holding the
belief was X, and could add that X was a good support for the belief. Her
beliefs in the truth and the relevance of X would themselves be rationally
held beliefs. The believer would be able to defend them against at least
some challenges.
This does not mean that we are threatened either with infinite regress,
or with any circularity that should disturb us. We are not here engaged in
a foundationalist project to find, or to pursue into the distance, ultimate
grounds for all of our beliefs. Instead, we are identifying what is required
for the holding of a belief to qualify as rational. It may be enough to go
only a few steps beyond the initial belief. Correspondingly, all that has been
established here is that if a belief has been acquired rationally, then the
subject will be able to offer acceptable responses to some challenges. There
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is no implication that the subject will be able to dismiss all challenges
decisively. That would be too stringent. But if some significant challenges
could not be addressed, it might not be rational to continue to hold the
belief.
Rational computers
The uncritical imbibing of a belief, along with a file of evidence for it and
a file of responses to possible challenges to it, would not be enough to make
the acquisition of the belief rational, and therefore to make the belief
rationally held. The obvious analogy is that of loading beliefs, evidence
for them and responses to potential challenges into a computer. But any
suggestion that computers could do no better than record and repeat what
we gave them would do computers an injustice. We must consider what
more they could do, whether it might be right to see them as acquiring
beliefs rationally, and whether any such possibility should lead us to change
our notion of the rational acquisition of beliefs.
It is perfectly possible to supply a computer with a base of
information and a set of programs that will use that information creatively,
so as to expand the base by taking in new data and drawing inferences.
The computer would then be able to respond to questions to which it did
not have answers ready in advance. Such a computer could also review
existing beliefs, whether acquired as a consequence of the consideration
of data or placed in it by its programmers, and could accept, reject or
modify them in the light of new evidence or conceptual reflection, just as
we can. Expert systems are already with us, and we can expect great
progress in this field over the next few decades. A robot has done useful
work in genomics (King et al., “The Automation of Science”), and a
computer has deduced physical laws of motion from data on actual
physical systems, albeit laws that were already known to human beings
(Schmidt and Lipson, “Distilling Free-Form Natural Laws from
Experimental Data”).
Such computers can so far only display impressive capabilities in
limited fields. They perform best against human beings in fields that are full
of precise definitions and elaborate chains of reasoning, and in fields where
repetitive tasks of data collection and analysis must be performed
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accurately. But that does not matter. We should ask whether beliefs in some
limited field could be regarded as rationally acquired by computers, not
whether a computer could pass a test of the rational acquisition of beliefs
across all subjects. It also does not matter that the words “belief”,
“rationality” and “acquisition” might have to be used analogically in
relation to computers, although some would maintain that they could be
used literally. We do not need to decide that issue here, because the question
is that of whether our notion of the rational acquisition of beliefs is open
to challenge on the ground that a computer could do the things that we do
when we see ourselves as acquiring beliefs rationally, even though it is
natural to view computers as not engaging in reflection of the type in which
we like to see ourselves as engaging. It will be possible for the challenge to
get under way so long as computers could exhibit something that either
was, or was analogous to, the rational acquisition of beliefs.
The challenge can indeed get under way. It is entirely conceivable that
a computer could respond to an indefinite range of challenges to its beliefs,
and that it could do so just as well as a human being. Human consciousness
and thought are entirely dependent on brain cells and on the electro-
chemical processes that go on inside and between those cells. One physical
arrangement could be replaced by another. So a computer could do the
same job, although its internal architecture would be different from the
brain’s architecture, and although it might need to be an analogue
computer, rather than a purely digital one (Bains, Physical computation
and embodied artificial intelligence). The task of the builders and
programmers of computers would be made easier by the fact that a
computer would not have to give the same responses as a human being
would be likely to give. We should not impose the impersonation
requirement of the Turing Test (Turing, “Computing Machinery and
Intelligence”, section 1). The computer would only need to give responses
that we, applying our own standards of rationality, saw as acceptable
responses, whether or not we would have given the same responses.
If computers could defend their beliefs, we would have to choose
between two options. The first would be to amend our picture of the
rational acquisition of beliefs so that an ability to defend beliefs against
an indefinite range of challenges would no longer be taken to be, on its
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own, good evidence of rational acquisition. The second would be to accept
that computers could do something that was at least analogous to the
rational acquisition of beliefs. We should choose the second option, but
we should not fear that we would then have to share our status as human
beings with computers. There is a general reason why we would not have
to extend to computers our attitude toward human contributors to our
debates, whose views we ideally consider on their own merits and do not
ignore merely on account of our opinion of the contributors’ habits of
thought. There is also a reason why, over a wide field, we should not expect
computers to be sophisticated enough in their thinking for us to regard
their efforts even as decent attempts to acquire beliefs rationally.
The general reason why we would not have to treat the views of
computers in the sameway that we ideally treat the views of human beings is
that the rational acquisition of beliefs is distinct from their being adopted
following deliberation with mastery. We can attribute rational acquisition
when the process has sufficient sophistication, and when the background
speech and conduct of the subject are such thatwe can interpret what goes on
as representing an appropriate path from adequate evidence, via acceptable
arguments, to conclusions. We do not need to overlook the causal closure of
the physical, nor needwe see the process as anything other than the following
of a program. But if we do not see a computer as deliberating with mastery,
we have no reason to respect its views unlesswe can identify some other reason
to do so. If we think that it is good at reaching correct and useful conclusions,
we will generally make use of those conclusions. But its conclusions are
evidence for us to use, just like any other evidence. We can take them, leave
them or amend them as we wish. If we see something as a mechanism, there
is no call to be polite to it, or to ask its permission before changing its
programs or the contents of its memory by whatever method is most
convenient. There would be no need to limit ourselves to methods that
amounted to, or that resembled, rational persuasion. It would not be rational
for us to contradict the output of a reliable computer on a topic thatmattered
to us, unless we thought that it had not taken all significant considerations
into account. But if we did contradict it, that would be a failure of rationality
in ourselves, not a gesture of disrespect to the computer.
The reason why we should, over a wide field, not expect to have to
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regard computers’ efforts even as decent attempts to acquire beliefs
rationally, is that they would lack the understanding that is needed in order
to say much that is worthwhile in fields such as the humanities and
practical ethics and politics. On the one hand, computers can behave like
us within a limited but broadening field, and can out-perform us as rational
acquirers of beliefs in some parts of that field. On the other hand,
computers lack the experience of life, and the consequent interplay of
reasons, emotions and values, that we recognize in one another, a
recognition that persuades us to take note of one another’s views in the
humanities and in practical ethics and politics. The lack of experience
would obviously matter because it would leave open the way to logically
impeccable but unwise conclusions in practical life. But it would also
matter in relation to purely academic beliefs, on which no-one would act
beyond writing the next round of academic papers. Some propositions can
only be understood sufficiently well to acquire them thoughtfully, or to
defend them, if one has appropriate experience of life.
The relevance of such experience depends both on the topic and on
the style of the proposition. For propositions within mathematics and the
natural sciences, the relevance is nil or very small. The relevance is also nil
or very small for propositions within the humanities that are of a very
straightforward factual style, such as propositions that give the dates of
historical events. The relevance gradually grows as we move up to more
subtle propositions. Suppose that John asserts that Napoleon was in
complete command of his armies. He is challenged by Jane, who has read
the epilogue to War and Peace and who shares Tolstoy’s view that
Napoleon’s command was largely an illusion, depending as it did on
whether people whose conduct was outside his control acted in ways that
happened to correspond to his orders. John could only respond in a way
that we would recognize as satisfactory if his experience of life had been
rich enough to generate an appropriate interplay of reasons, emotions and
values within him. He would need to know what it was to be in command,
what it was to be obedient or wilful, and what it was to pursue one’s
existing course regardless of orders coming down from on high. John
would need to have at least some empathetic understanding of Napoleon,
of the various ranks of officer under his command and of ordinary
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soldiers, in order to use the historical evidence judiciously. Computers
would be most unlikely to be capable of this. To take an example that
would be even more likely to expose the limitations of computers, the claim
to be defended against challenges might be that the chief lesson that we
moderns should take from Pindar’s odes was that of the importance and
the fragility of personal triumph.
It does not follow that we could only see a computer as having
acquired beliefs rationally if the beliefs concerned the subject matter of
mathematics and of the natural sciences, or if they were straightforwardly
factual beliefs of types that could be recorded in catalogues. Rather, there
are degrees. A suitably informed and sophisticated computer could conduct
some respectable arguments about questions in the humanities. It is just
that it would fall short of what we could manage, both in the range of
arguments that it could conduct and in their quality.
The fact that computers would need to have certain experiences in
order to function well in some fields points to a reason why it might be
appropriate to contradict the conclusions of a reliable computer, if the
topic was of a certain type. We might say that the computer did not have
the understanding to make wise ethical or political decisions, or to reach
sensible conclusions in the humanities. This would be a different reason
from the one noted above, that we might rationally contradict the
conclusions of a reliable computer if we thought that it had not taken all
significant considerations into account. A lack of understanding is not the
same thing as the overlooking of a specific consideration, although the
former can very easily lead to the latter. Correspondingly, there is a range
of different reasons why it might be appropriate to refuse to regard a
computer, or a human being, as having rationally acquired an evidence-
basable belief. What matters for rational acquisition is that the belief should
be appropriately related to the evidence, with the relation being given by an
argument that is generated by the use of an appropriate method. A failure
to take all significant considerations into account would be a failure at the
stage of the weighting of evidence. A failure of understanding could lead to
the same type of failure, but it could also lead to a failure to use an
appropriate method of argument, not because the subject chose the wrong
method from the range that was available to him, but because the right
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method was not available to him. This would not be a culpable failure, nor
would its occurrence cast doubt on any claim that might be made to see a
subject as deliberating with mastery. But it would still prevent us from seeing
the belief in question as having been acquired rationally.
The strength of the argument from computers’ lack of experience of
life, and from their lack of our kind of interplay of reasons, emotions and
values, is contingent on the state of technology. Such deficiencies may well
be made good as computer science develops, especially if computers are
made mobile so that they can explore the world, and if they are put through
sequences of experiences that are analogous to growing up, rather than
springing fully formed from the factory. Alternatively, future computers
might go through different developmental processes, leading to new types
of difference from us. They might come to be on a par with us, but we
might not be able to appreciate that they were on a par with us, or be able
to see them as rational by our lights. They might come to have their own
questions in subjects that were analogous to the humanities. They, but not
we, might then be able to arrive at answers to those questions in ways that
were, by their lights, rational.
I shall now discuss what would constitute acceptable responses to
challenges, before turning to the long-standing problem of scepticism.
Acceptable responses to challenges
If an ability to respond acceptably to challenges that are drawn from an
indefinite range is of interest as good evidence of the rational acquisition
of at least some beliefs, it will be useful to understand the criteria for
responses to challenges to count as acceptable. It is not enough that
responses to a sequence of challenges be understood by the person who
hears them, or that they be recognized by that person as responses. They
must be sufficient to ward off challenges, although it may still be reasonable
for the challenger to persist by mounting fresh challenges. I shall take
responses to be acceptable if they meet this modest standard of warding off
challenges. If we only seek evidence of the rational acquisition of beliefs, a
demand that every challenge be decisively defeated would be too stringent.
In practice, we rely on the consensus of relevant members of our
society to give us standards of acceptability. But we can ask whether that
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is enough.Would a majority vote as to the acceptability of a response, even
a decisive majority of the experts in the relevant discipline, or a decisive
majority of all of us when the belief was not of a specialist nature, really
prove anything? What if we all used a mistaken standard of acceptability
of responses to challenges? An alternative worry is not that there is some
correct standard that we fail to grasp, but that there is no such standard at
all, and that the existence of a consensus would demonstrate nothing
because there was nothing to demonstrate. This latter worry would prompt
the fear that we should see a serious threat to our standards of rationality,
rather than an obvious truth about what we can access, in the claim that
“there are no context-free or super-cultural norms of rationality” (Barnes
and Bloor, “Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge”,
page 27). That would be an unnerving prospect for those who, like me,
believe both that there are, in a straightforward sense, true and false
propositions, and that we can act sensibly to discover which propositions
are true.
Fortunately, the threat can be addressed. We can see this by
recognizing that our standards of acceptability of responses are derived
from our standards of rationality in the acquisition of beliefs, and that
compliance with those latter standards is conducive to the acquisition of
true beliefs. The first stage in the argument is to note that responses to
challenges will generally be thought to be acceptable when the responses
are such as to disclose that rational acquisition took place. The responses
will be intended to be defences of the belief, rather than defences of the
claim that the belief was acquired rationally, but the best way to defend a
belief is to show how the proposition that is believed follows from some
evidence. In so doing, the respondent will indicate that the belief was
acquired rationally, because she will show a grasp of how one could arrive
at the proposition by applying an accepted method of argument to some
evidence. She might not have acquired the belief by that route, but her
knowledge of the route would reasonably incline us to the view that she
had taken it.
The second stage in the argument is to note that we do not seek to
acquire beliefs rationally purely for the pleasure of exercising our grey cells.
We seek true beliefs. We have discovered that the activities of weighing
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evidence and of choosing our methods in accordance with accepted
standards, activities that we regard as rational when so conducted, are
conducive to the acquisition of true beliefs. There is a link between the
rational acquisition of beliefs and their truth, but it is not a perfect link,
and the truth of a belief is not constituted by its mode of acquisition. If we
rely on consensus when stating what constitutes the rational acquisition
of a belief, or when stating how to recognize rational acquisition, and if we
thereby rely on consensus to determine standards of acceptability of
responses to challenges, that does not imply the reduction of truth to a
majority vote, or even to a unanimous vote. There may not be any norms
of rationality that are independent of culture. But that would not prevent
the existence of truth that was independent of culture, nor would it block
our access to such truth. Putting the stages of the argument together,
compliance with our consensual standards of acceptability of responses to
challenges indicates compliance with our consensual standards in the
acquisition of beliefs, and that latter compliance allows us to increase our
chances of coming to believe propositions that are straightforwardly true.
References in the course of this argument to true beliefs do not allow the
relativist to object that the argument is circular, because the aim is only to
show that the notion of straightforwardly true beliefs can be
accommodated in the absence of super-cultural norms of rationality. The
aim of the argument is not to refute relativism in general.
We can also take comfort from the fact that it may be possible to say
something that is independent of culture about the structure of standards
of rationality, even if not about their content. An example is given by
Michael Smith, in “The Structure of Orthonomy”. That paper is concerned
with rational action, and specifically with rational action that springs
primarily from the confluence of beliefs and desires, but one could
construct something similar specifically for adoptions of belief, where the
most natural desire would be to adopt true beliefs and to reject false ones.
In addition, we can take comfort from the arguments that are deployed by
Paul Boghossian to show that we could justify our own epistemic system
over at least some alternatives, if only by our own lights (Fear of
Knowledge, chapter 7). Boghossian also shows that even if relativism did
get a toehold, the impact of any plausible relativism would be severely
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limited. In particular, it is not plausible to claim that facts about the world
depend on our thoughts, in any way that should disturb us (ibid., chapter
3). More generally, we need not go so far as to abandon claims that some
propositions are definitely mistaken and that others are almost certainly
correct. We do not have to concede equal validity to different ways of
looking at the world. Perhaps we do exalt our own knowledge, but we are
not necessarily wrong to exalt it.
The only way in which we can actually test the acceptability of
responses to challenges is to take the opinions of people, possibly a select
group of experts or possibly the whole population, and to combine those
opinions in various ways, such as a simple vote or a weighted vote. In highly
technical fields, we might do something sophisticated. If, for example, a
new scientific theory were subject to challenge and its proponents had
offered responses, we might call an academic conference at which experts
who had not already taken sides would work through the arguments and
would debate whether either the challenges or the responses missed the
point. But we would still be taking people’s opinions, not referring to an
independent standard. There is no other method of testing, and there may
not be any other criterion of acceptability, even an inaccessible one
(assuming that the concept of an unusable criterion might be coherent).
But given that this does not put truth that is independent of culture out of
bounds, I am content to rest with a consensual standard of acceptability of
responses. This may not be ideal, but it is as good as anything that we can
do, and that may be so for deeper reasons than the practical one that we can
only ask people around us for advice. To go back from standards of
acceptability of responses to the standards of rationality in the acquisition
of beliefs that give rise to them, TimothyWilliamson offers an independent
argument for the conclusion that we may not know what we need to do in
order to act rationally in our search for knowledge (Knowledge and its
Limits, section 8.7). In his words, “Rationality may be a matter of doing the
best one can with what one has, but one cannot always know what one
has, or whether one has done the best one can with it” (ibid., page 179).
Williamson does not, however, counsel despair, any more than I do. As he
points out, we can usually manage pretty well, even within our limits.
My arguments here do not imply a position either for or against the
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existence of verification-transcendent truth. The identification of beliefs
that have been, and of those that have not been, acquired rationally does
not determine which beliefs are true, although the process of challenge and
response helps us to sort truth from falsehood. The concept of the rational
acquisition of a belief might very well be limited to what we could
determine, so that rationality of acquisition could not be verification-
transcendent. But the fact that truth was a separate matter from rationality
of acquisition would allow, although it would not imply, that truth could
go beyond any limits that applied to rationality and could be verification-
transcendent.
There is a positive aspect to the fact that the opinions of those around
us have a vital role to play in the formulation of norms of rationality in
the acquisition of beliefs. The foregoing remarks suggest that it is palatable
to abandon an aspiration to universal standards and to be pulled down to
culture-bound standards. But we also need to be pulled up from individual
standards, standards that could all too easily be quirky and unstable. We
need help from people around us. I would not go so far as to claim with
confidence that a lifelong solitary would be debarred from having any
standards of rationality. The pains and joys that he experienced, as a result
of his attempts to navigate through the world and to manipulate the world,
might provide enough feedback to make it clear to him whether he was
thinking and acting appropriately. (One would need to allow him to have
self-consciousness in order to make this possible, in defiance of Nietzsche’s
argument that he would not even have reflexive consciousness because he
would have no need of it (Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, section 354). He
might also not formulate the concept of rationality, because he would never
have his rationality challenged by others.) The necessary feedback might
even be available in relation to abstract thoughts that had nothing to do
with his daily life. He might, for example, recognize the thrill of success
that would come from formulating a concept that unified several areas of
mathematics, and he would rightly conclude that he was conducting his
mathematical arguments in an appropriate way. But if the arguments
against semantic individualism in Sanford Goldberg’s Anti-Individualism
are to be accepted, it is doubtful whether a lifelong solitary could engage
in an extended and successful chain of rational abstract thought. Success
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would depend on the transmission of information from the solitary at one
time to himself at a later time, and there would be no social calibration to
keep the mechanism of transmission in good working order. A. C. Grayling
would even deny such a lifelong solitary a language, despite the fact that
any such language would only be contingently private. Grayling’s reason is
that speaking a language requires following rules, and that speakers must
have the means to distinguish between following the rules and only thinking
that they are doing so (Truth, Meaning and Realism, pages 83-85). A
parallel argument for standards of rationality would be that a lifelong
solitary could not possess articulated standards that he could apply to his
own processes of thought independently of his feeling that a particular
train of thought had come out well, or his feeling that his planned
manipulations of the world had enhanced his comfort in the ways that he
had desired. Even without going that far, and even allowing that a lifelong
solitary might possess articulated standards of thought that we would
recognize to be appropriate to such an extent that we would call thought
that accorded with those standards rational, we can see that he could all
too easily wander off track, cease to meet the standards with which he had
started, and not notice that he had so ceased. Likewise, we non-solitaries
require regular input from others in order to be confident that we are
staying on track.
5.4 Scepticism
In this section, I shall move back from evidence-basable beliefs in general
to the class of beliefs that was identified in section 1.1, the beliefs that we
expect to be adopted following systematic reflection. I shall ask what the
sceptic can do to unnerve us as to whether we have enough justification to
make such beliefs candidates for the status of knowledge. I shall not
establish what other conditions there might be for beliefs to qualify as
knowledge, or whether it might be feasible for our beliefs to meet those
other conditions. There are those who think that we should concentrate
on justified belief anyway, and that we should not worry about knowledge
as something beyond that (Kaplan, “It’s Not What You Know that
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Counts”). As I concentrate on the sceptic about justification, my remarks
are just as relevant to that view as they are to the view that knowledge is
what matters but that justification has a lot to do with knowledge. One
other point is worth making in order to locate my remarks in relation to the
work of others. I shall make considerable use of our standards of rational
acquisition of beliefs. As we have seen, the ability to respond to challenges
can be used as evidence of rational acquisition. That ability can also be
used in the analysis of knowledge itself. This is demonstrated by Robert
Brandom’s use of his default-and-challenge structure of entitlement
(Making It Explicit, pages 176-178 and chapter 4; see also the use that
Michael Williams makes of that approach in “Responsibility and
Reliability”).
I shall start by setting on one side any demand for certainty. I shall
then touch on the relevance of justification, and outline the structural
attack on the worth of our justifications, the attack that is summarized in
Agrippa’s trilemma. The trilemma is only meant to be a decisive argument
against the possession of knowledge if knowledge requires legitimate
certainty, but even if we do not expect certainty, the trilemmamay still have
a power to unnerve us. The next stage is to argue that our standards of
rational acquisition of beliefs can themselves be a source of justification for
beliefs that have been acquired in accordance with them, and that the
sceptic about justification who wishes to unnerve us must therefore attack
the justificatory value of compliance with those standards.
The next stage is to argue that the sceptic must mount his attack in a
purely structural form. I first consider attacks on specific types of
justification for specific beliefs, and argue that if such local scepticism is to
be truly local, and if we do not expect certainty, it cannot be scepticism of
a philosophically interesting sort. I argue that this conclusion holds even if
types of justification are defined very broadly. An example is the type,
sensory perception. The sceptic is therefore driven back to the purely
structural form of his argument. Furthermore, the sceptic cannot use that
argument to attack the worth of the structured sets of justifications that we
offer for specific beliefs. The attack must be on the justificatory value of
our general methods of arriving at beliefs. Here the sceptic fails because he
takes too narrow a view of justificatory structures. In some disciplines, the
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predominant method is to build up theories from axioms. In others, it is to
argue in large circles. The use of either method can confer perfectly good
justification. Circular arguments can do so even though there may be
equally strong arguments for contrary conclusions, and constructions that
are founded on axioms can do so even though the axioms are unsupported.
It is important throughout this section to remember that rational
acquisition of the type of belief with which we are concerned is not merely
a matter of having an idea. A belief is only acquired rationally if the subject
has duly considered the evidence for and against the proposition that is to
be believed. That will always require the construction of arguments, and it
will often require active testing. So rational acquisition may in practice
follow some time after acquisition.
The sceptic and certainty
The sceptic is the perpetual bugbear of epistemology. Whenever we define
knowledge in a way that is commensurate with the status that it has for us,
we impose conditions on a belief’s being knowledge that make it all too
easy for the sceptic to attack the claim that any given belief counts as
knowledge. Sceptical attacks may fail, but we have a hard time fighting
them off and even then, the sceptic is soon back with another line of attack.
We can defeat the sceptic more decisively by defining knowledge in less
demanding ways, but then we run the risk of using a concept that is too
weak to correspond to our pre-philosophical notion of knowledge.
One line of sceptical attack is to point out that we cannot be certain
of the truth of any of our beliefs. There is always something that could
have gone wrong. Even confidence in one’s mathematical beliefs can be
undermined by the thought that one’s mind might have wandered when
devising or reading proofs, so that mistakes might have escaped one’s
attention. Once sensory data are involved, the possibilities for error
multiply. It is stretching credulity to think that all those who have ever
studied Pythagoras’s theorem, or all those who have ever observed that
elephants are larger than lions, have been mistaken. But the sceptic can
suggest that his interlocutor might be a brain in a vat, systematically
deceived about the whole world.
The standard, and in my view appropriate, response to this line of
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sceptical argument is to deny that knowledge only exists when the knower
can exclude the possibility of error, while accepting that there must be no
actual error. Those who insist that knowledge must be closed under
entailment, so that if I know that I am now at my desk I must know that I
am not a brain in a vat, are essentially re-packaging the view that the knower
must be able to exclude the possibility of error, although asDuncan Pritchard
points out, a principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment is
logically weaker than a principle that a knower must know that he is not in
error (Epistemic Luck, page 27). The denial of the need for the knower to be
able to exclude the possibility of error may be formulated directly or
indirectly. An example of the latter is formulation in terms of a requirement
only to consider epistemically relevant worlds, worlds that are near enough
to the world as we think it actually is (DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical
Problem”, sections 11 and 12). We should also note the difference between
certainty and the impossibility of error. Certainty requires belief in the
impossibility of error on the given occasion, and legitimate certainty requires
the actual impossibility of error on the given occasion, but the impossibility
of error does not require anyone to be certain of anything. Certainty would
only arise if someone consideredwhether error was possible, concluded that
it was not, and recognized the implications of that conclusion.
Justification scepticism
Another line of sceptical attack is to put pressure on the justifications that
we offer for the beliefs that we claim to be knowledge. No matter how the
traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief might best be
modified, it is likely to include something along the lines of justification. It
is only likely, and not certain, because there are arguments for a purely
externalist and reliabilist concept of knowledge, one that would attribute
knowledge to anything that absorbed and mechanically processed
environmental influences in ways that tended to improve its performance in
specified tasks, such as coping with threats or supplying accurate
information on demand. But such an extreme concept of knowledge is not
guaranteed to win the day. It clashes with our intuition that knowledge, and
certainly knowledge of a conceptually complex nature, should have been
acquired thoughtfully. If we consider other philosophical positions that limit
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the role of justification, we find that even TimothyWilliamson accepts that
justification can be significant, despite his argument that knowledge is not
to be analysed into components along the lines of justified true belief, and
despite his proposal to invert the analysis by equating a subject’s evidence
with his knowledge (Knowledge and its Limits, section 1.3, page 41 and
chapter 9). EvenWilliamAlston, when he argues that we should discard the
concept of justification, replaces it with a range of epistemic desiderata,
several of which have a distinct aroma of justification (Beyond
“Justification”). I shall therefore take it that justification, or something very
similar to it, is important. If that is so, then the sceptic has a line of attack.
I shall call the sceptic who pursues this line, the justification sceptic.
(Michael Williams uses the term “Agrippan sceptic” in chapter 5 of
Problems of Knowledge, but I shall range beyond Agrippa’s trilemma.)
A belief may be accompanied by a structured set of justifications.
There will be some justifications that directly support the belief, and there
may be others that support belief in those immediate justifications, or in
their relevance. The structure may continue through several levels of
support. The sceptic’s structural argument proceeds by identifying and
criticizing the possible structures. Do the immediate justifications for a
belief themselves have justifications, or not? If they do, are there
justifications below them, in an infinite downward tree, which would hardly
seem to be satisfactory? Or are there justifications at some basic level,
which do not themselves require justification? That would also seem to be
unsatisfactory, both in general because we should not be asked to take
anything on trust, and because specific examples of putative basic
justifications, such as beliefs that correspond to the direct deliverances of
our senses, could be mistaken. Another possibility would be for all of our
beliefs to be linked in a vast web of mutual justification, in which some
beliefs supported others but nothing supported the whole web. That too
would be an unnerving prospect. We would have only local, and not global,
justification. We could only hope that the whole web was not a large and
internally coherent mistake. Finally, if the immediate justifications for a
belief do not themselves have justifications, and if they are not basic
justifications that we can reasonably take on trust, how can we really have
any justification at all?
209
KNOWLEDGE
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 209
The options are neatly summarized in Agrippa’s trilemma. We have
a choice between infinite chains of justifications, mutually supporting
justifications and dead ends in chains of justifications. The trilemma only
purports to be a decisive refutation of any legitimate claim to certainty
that is based on justifications. But it looks unnerving even if we do not
claim certainty, but limit ourselves to claiming that some of our beliefs are
correct and that some of them, perhaps not all or only the correct ones,
have a reasonable amount of justification. If justifications do not
legitimately come to an end, or if they are ultimately only mutually
supporting, can they do anything much to engender confidence in our
beliefs? In the remainder of this section, I shall argue that the justification
sceptic cannot unnerve us in this way, so long as we do not expect certainty.
The rational acquisition of beliefs
The concept of a rationally acquired belief can help us to respond to the
justification sceptic. We recognize that some beliefs have been acquired
rationally. If we are in doubt about a belief that someone holds, we can
test for rational acquisition by challenging the belief and seeing what
responses are offered. But normally, we do not feel the need to check. We
are aware of how we think and of how we acquire beliefs, although the
details of the brain’s workings, and some of our biases, are hidden from us.
We know that we reach our conclusions on the basis of reasons, and while
we know that our reason can be subverted by propaganda and by
advertising, we regard such subversion as a failing that is to be avoided so
far as possible. Each of us has a sense that other people likewise reach their
conclusions on the basis of reasons. One person’s recognition that another
has acquired his beliefs rationally is a result of her grasping that he has
proceeded in a way in which she might also have proceeded, even though
she might have reached different conclusions.
Our standards of the rational acquisition of beliefs are not purely
individual. As noted in section 5.3, there are social standards. Individuals
apply the notion of rationality, but we do not have to accept the way in
which any given individual applies it. Most of us take it as part of rationality
for each person to reflect carefully on his own views, including his views on
rationality, if they appear to differ from those of the vast majority, not in
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order to submit uncritically to the majority but in order to consider whether
he might be mistaken. This, and rather more significantly the fact that our
understanding of rationality is shaped by an education to which many
people contribute, either directly as parents, teachers and the like or
indirectly through contributions to the culture in which we live, mean that
fairly stable standards of rationality are shared by a large number of people.
The fact that the criteria by which we recognize rational acquisition
are not primarily individual, but are largely social, gives us confidence that
our own standards of rationality are not mere personal quirks. This
confidence allows us to apply our standards to ourselves, with some
confidence that we are not simply licensing any old way of proceeding.
That in turn allows us to claim that we have justification for beliefs that are
regarded as acquired rationally.
We can claim to have justification because the notions of rational
acquisition and of justification are two sides of the same coin. We regard
each belief as acquired rationally if and only if we consider that we had
decent justification for it when we acquired it, whether justification that
related directly to the specific belief, or the indirect justification that would
come from the belief’s having been acquired from a reliable source. (When
justification evaporates, because new evidence comes to light or because a
defect in the original procedure is noticed, we do not re-write history and
say that the belief was not acquired rationally, but we may regard it as
irrational to continue to hold the belief.) Furthermore, the connection
between rational acquisition and justification is a connection of substance,
not a mere linguistic habit. The justification that is associated with rational
acquisition is worth something because there is a positive, if imperfect,
correlation between beliefs’ being regarded as acquired rationally and their
being true. We can also note a connection between rational acquisition and
the value of knowledge. The rational acquisition of true beliefs confers
resilience on those beliefs. That is, a believer who has thought about the
evidence is less likely than one who has acquired the same belief non-
rationally to be led to abandon the belief by misleading counter-evidence.
Miranda Fricker identifies this resilience both as a typical feature of
knowledge, and as central to the value of knowledge (“The Value of
Knowledge and the Test of Time”).
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Beliefs that are regarded as acquired rationally are not guaranteed to
be true, but our experience is that we do quite well. The sceptic can counter
that we only have inductive reassurance, and that standards of rational
acquisition that have worked well so far might start to lead us astray
tomorrow, but we can respond that this would not show that our standards
had not worked reasonably well so far. The sceptic can also counter that
any reassurance that we may have is based on our fallible interpretations of
what has happened so far. We only think that we have mostly done quite
well, and we might be wrong in so thinking. But this would be an attack
based on a supposed need for us to have certainty, not directly at the level
of our first-order beliefs about the world, but directly at the level of our
higher-order beliefs about the usefulness of our standards, and therefore
indirectly at the level of those of our first-order beliefs about what had
happened that supported those higher-order beliefs.
The sceptic who attacks our claims to have justification for our beliefs,
but who concedes that legitimate certainty is not essential for knowledge
to exist, therefore needs to attack the value of our use of the methods by
which we acquire beliefs. But we must first explore other lines of attack, in
order to show that the sceptic cannot get far either by attacking specific
types of justification, or by attacking the structured sets of justifications for
specific beliefs.
Specific types of justification
It might seem that the justification sceptic could win by concentrating on
the justificatory power of specific justifications for specific beliefs. The
sceptic can certainly argue for local scepticism by challenging specified
types of justification and showing, for example, that our habitual reliance
on certain scientific instruments is suspect. But such attacks are effectively
demands for a demonstration of the impossibility of error, except to the
extent that they are contributions to the improvement of our apparatus for
collecting and analysing data, or contributions to our understanding of
the limitations of our apparatus. That would not be scepticism of a
philosophically interesting sort. Thus a sceptic about the results of an
experiment in physics might point out that the instruments that took
measurements could have been affected by electromagnetic fields that were
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generated by other equipment, or that the instruments were only accurate
to within five milliamps. The appropriate response would be to turn off the
other equipment, or to include appropriate error ranges in the statement of
results, not to send for a philosopher. The philosophical sceptic is not
interested in that sort of case. He argues that our senses, or our scientific
instruments, or our faculties of mathematical reasoning, might be
systematically misleading, or occasionally but undetectably faulty, as
opposed to being occasionally and detectably faulty, or detectably limited in
their accuracy. The local sceptic would have us take such worries seriously,
and he can only make us do so, while remaining local in his scepticism, if
he first convinces us that knowledge requires legitimate certainty.
We can take the argument against local scepticism further. The sceptic
could not in general succeed if he attacked specific types of justification,
even if those types were defined in very broad terms, such as the type,
sensory perception. The argument here will show that it is no accident that
local scepticism is philosophically uninteresting if we have no expectation
of certainty, even when the localities in question are made very large by
defining types of justification very broadly. Suppose that the sceptic
challenged the use of justifications of type 1 (a set of justifications
considered together). We could then step outside that type of justification
and support the use of members of that set by citing other justifications of
types that were not under challenge, justifications of type 2 and of type 3
(a specific member or members of each set). For example, the use of
justifications of the sensory perception type (type 1) could be supported by
specific results from physics (type 2), which explained the transmission of
light, sound and other signals, and by specific results from human biology
(type 3), which explained how our sensory organs and our brains worked.
The justification sceptic could not simply respond by widening the type
under attack, type 1, to make it type 1-or-2-or-3, because the use of
justifications of types 2 or 3 (as whole sets) could be supported by specific
justifications of types 4 or 5 respectively, and the use of justifications of
those types (taken as whole sets) could in turn be supported by specific
justifications of other types. To pursue the example, the use of
justifications that were drawn from physics might be supported by the
coherence and fertility of its mathematical formulation (a justification of
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type 4), and the use of justifications that were drawn from human biology
might be supported by its success in helping us to devise treatments for
diseases (a justification of type 5). The debate would then move on to the
legitimacy of using justifications that were based on patterns in our
abstract reasoning (type 4), and to the legitimacy of using justifications
that were based on practical success (type 5).
The justificatory interdependences between types of justification and
individual justifications of other types mean that there are many ways of
justifying the use of justifications of a given type. We may expect that the
justification sceptic who started by attacking the use of a specific type of
justification to support a given belief would repeatedly find himself out-
manoeuvred by the defender of the belief, although the sceptic might well
be able to mount a fresh attack following each manoeuvre. I deny that the
sceptic could in general define a class of types of justification, such that if
he could attack the legitimacy of using justifications of each type, the
defender of the belief would have no further way of justifying his belief.
The sceptic would have to identify a class such that each of the available
sufficient structured sets of justifications for the belief included at least
one justification of a type that fell within the class, and had to include that
justification in order for the structured set to be sufficient. There might be
particular cases in which the sceptic could do that, but across most of our
knowledge, it looks unlikely that he could do so. The onus is on anyone
who wishes to maintain a general scepticism to show that it could be done.
My claim would be undermined if structured sets of justifications
were expected to guarantee the truth of the beliefs that they justified. If a
guarantee of truth were expected, it would be relatively easy to identify
specific essential underpinning justifications, such as justifications for
ignoring the possibility that one was a brain in a vat, or essential types of
justification, and to attack those essential justifications or the use of
justifications of those essential types. But I have already rejected the
demand for a guarantee of truth. And my claim will be enough for my
purpose, which is to drive the sceptic back to use of the purely structural
form of his argument. My argument does that because it shows that
sceptical attacks on the value of specified types of justification can in
general be expected to be open to counter-attacks. It is enough merely to
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drive the users of those attacks back to the purely structural form of the
sceptical argument, because if a sceptical attack is to convince, it must be
conducted against those of us who think that we have knowledge. There is
no need to drive anyone else back to the purely structural form, because only
the user of an argument against the value of specified types of justification
can engage with us. We could ignore anyone who claimed that there existed
some argument against the value of unspecified types of justification that
would undermine our supposed justifications. Arguments against the value
of unspecified types of justification cannot convince in epistemology, because
it is not a subject in which everything is defined precisely in advance within
a fixed structure. It is not like logic, in which we can rightly be convinced by
arguments of comparable generality, for example, arguments to show that all
consistent logical systems of a certain level of sophistication are incomplete.
If types of individual justification are not specified, then the sceptical
argument cannot convince if it is an argument against the value of individual
justifications of all types. The sceptic cannot rely on universal quantification
over types of justification. He must abstract from those types and give an
argument against the value of structures.
There may be more than one purely structural argument that the
justification sceptic could use. He might not have to argue that every
structured set of justifications suffered from the same structural defect,
such as the defect of not terminating in self-justifying justifications. (All
three of the types of structure that are identified by Agrippa’s trilemma
suffer from this defect. Infinite chains and mutual support suffer from it
because chains of justifications do not terminate at all.) He might be able
to categorize structures of justifications, and then assign different defects
to structures of different categories. But any such argument would still be
purely structural, in the sense that the categories would not be categories
of individual justifications, such as the category of sensory evidence or the
category of results that were drawn from biology. If the categories were of
that nature, then the sceptic’s argument would be vulnerable to the type 1,
type 2, type 3 argument that was deployed above.
Sets of justifications for specific beliefs
Having pushed the justification sceptic back to the purely structural form
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of his argument, I shall now argue that he cannot use attacks on structured
sets of justifications that are specific to given beliefs in order to establish
global scepticism, in the limited form of unnerving those of us who reject
the need for immunity to error. He will then have to fall back on attacking
the general methods by which we arrive at beliefs that we regard as acquired
rationally. He will have to try to show that those methods do not confer
enough justification to give the beliefs a chance of being legitimately
regarded as knowledge. Then I shall argue that he cannot succeed even in
that attack.
The justification sceptic cannot achieve his goal by attacking the value
of structured sets of justifications that are specific to given beliefs, because
while the standard of acceptability that he imposes on structures of
justifications would be appropriate if the role of justification were to
guarantee truth, it is too demanding for justification’s role in giving us as
much confidence in our beliefs as we can reasonably expect. There is the
negative point that it is not rational to expend disproportionate effort on
establishing the truth or falsity of propositions that have only limited
importance. That is not a very appealing point in isolation, because it
would be consistent with our capabilities being so limited that
overwhelming ignorance was our inevitable lot. But we can add the positive
point that we can have a fair amount of confidence in the outcomes of our
investigations of the world, so long as we do a reasonable amount of work
to establish the truth or falsity of each proposition with which we are
concerned. Our position is particularly strong when we justify our use of
some types of justification by reference to justifications of different types.
We may, for example, have, as our primary justification for a belief, some
output from an electron microscope. Wemay then justify both our reliance
on the use of that instrument, and our ways of interpreting its outputs, by
reference to independent physical theories.
Justification is cast in the role of a guarantor of truth in Scott
Sturgeon’s paper, “The Gettier Problem”. But that role is only a legitimate
one to impose on justification if immunity to error is a legitimate
requirement for knowledge. I have already rejected that demand. Sturgeon
imposes the role in response to Gettier cases. He does not do so as an ad
hoc solution, but on the basis that Gettier’s problem reveals something deep
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about the nature of knowledge. Even so, it is not at all clear that this is the
best way forward, once we weigh up all considerations. The imposition of
a condition of immunity to error would, as Sturgeon notes, leave us with
very little that would count as knowledge. That might turn out to be
correct. Our intuition that we know a great many things might need to be
discarded. But that intuition is very strong, and it should not be discarded
lightly.
Our methods of acquiring beliefs rationally
Moving on from the argument as it applies to structured sets of
justifications that are specific to given beliefs, the justification sceptic can
attack the general methods by which we arrive at beliefs. This is where he
fails directly, rather than failing by arguing that we lack legitimate certainty
when that is not needed anyway. He points out that we have to choose
between an infinite structure, a structure that relies on mutual support and
a structure with unsupported foundations, but structures of the last two
types can confer substantial justification. We can still be concerned when
we notice such structures in specific cases. Some people are disturbed when
they learn that mathematics is built on axioms that are simply accepted.
Bertrand Russell, on being told at the age of 11 that he just had to accept
Euclid’s axioms, saw his hopes of finding certainty crumble (“Why I Took
to Philosophy”, page 57). We do not accept circular arguments as deductive
proofs of the truth of their conclusions. And we can be unnerved when we
notice circles in our arguments, even when we do not seek deductive proofs.
But such concerns do not prevent us from accepting that significant
justification is conferred by the methods that we use, even though the use
of those methods creates sets of justifications that the sceptic would regard
as having objectionable structures.
To start with axiom-based knowledge, we accept mathematical
reasoning as perfectly adequate to justify belief in its conclusions. Ample
justification is given by the huge success of mathematics, as displayed in the
ways in which the discipline has unified large areas of our knowledge and
in the stunning structures that have been built on a base of simple axioms.
The tightly-knit logical structure of mathematics is a source of its fertility,
because it allows concepts and techniques from some areas to be used in
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what might at first appear to be unrelated areas. In physics too,
mathematical axioms and tight logical integration are conspicuous. It is
characteristic of physics to seek to explain everything within its scope in
terms of the most fundamental particles and forces, and the most general
characteristics of space-time. It is, however, true that observations become
just as important as axioms as soon as we step from mathematics into
physics. We need observations in order to select between possible
mathematical models, and in order to fix the values of parameters. And
the massive empirical success of physics is a vital source of justification,
alongside the fact that our physical theories are given in tightly-structured
mathematical forms.
In both mathematics and physics, we expect to show how the
immensely complex arises out of the very simple. It is not surprising that
we should end up with unsupported foundations, a structure to which the
justification sceptic objects. Indeed, if we are to get down to basics, they
have to be just that, basics, with nothing as yet found underneath, although
we may in due course dig deeper and find new basics. Our justification for
our selection of foundations is to be found not by looking further down,
but by looking up at the magnificent, and hugely successful, structures that
we have built on those foundations. If the justification sceptic will concede
that there may be some set of foundations that is correct, we can at least
say that there is no sign that we have made a foolish selection, even if the
history of science, with the fundamental changes of theory that have taken
place, may limit our confidence that our current selection is correct. (If no
set of foundations could be correct, any selection could only be
pragmatically acceptable.)
At the opposite extreme, arguments in the humanities, and practical
arguments about ethical and political questions, rest on hardly any
axiomatic foundations, and may very well turn out to be circular if one
analyses them carefully enough. (I refer to circular arguments because
although the relationships of support that exist in a full set of beliefs have
the form of a complex web, the arguments that are actually expressed for
specific conclusions have far less complexity of structure, even if their
structures are not quite as simple as mere circles.) We still regard such
arguments as justifying belief in their conclusions, both because the circles
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are large and bring many considerations to bear, and because the
conclusions really do deepen our understanding of the human world. The
role of circles is one reason why a Verstehen approach looks appealing,
although the use of such an approach is neither required, nor to any more
than a modest extent explained, by the fact that circles play a role. The
picture that I am painting is not intended either to posit or to supplant a
distinction between Erklären, explanation, and Verstehen, understanding.
There are many disciplines in between the extremes. There is a
gradual shift as we move through the natural sciences, from physics
through chemistry to biology and on to ecology, psychology and so on.
The acceptance of axioms, and their use in constructing tight logical
structures, become less significant, and large circles in argument become
more significant. There is also a gradual shift in the sources of justification
for the use of our methods of argument, whether axiomatic, circular or
mixed, from the measurable empirical success of comprehensive theories,
through the measurable empirical success of particular results, to the
deepening of understanding. These two shifts bear a complex relationship
to the balance between foundations and coherence that is captured by
Susan Haack’s idea of foundherentism (Evidence and Inquiry, chapter 4).
As we move up the scale of disciplines, we do not simply move from the
overwhelming importance of foundations in justification to the
overwhelming importance of coherence. Axiomatic structures are a key
source of coherence, and the success of theories in making sense of
individual situations, a foundational type of justification, is important even
in the least axiomatized disciplines. On the other hand, well-established
fundamental principles of a natural science can provide support for
particular beliefs within that science in a foundational way, and beliefs in
the humanities can be tested by asking whether the overall picture that they
give us makes sense, a coherentist criterion.
So we have justifications for many different types of belief. Even if no
structured set of justifications can guarantee the correctness of a belief,
that does not prevent structured sets of justifications from giving us the
level of confidence in beliefs that we require in order to regard those beliefs
as potential knowledge, so long as we do not expect certainty. Large circles
of argument, and arguments from sets of axioms that have proved to be
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fertile and successful, can confer plenty of confidence. They can certainly
confer the rational account that Plato put into play as one way of
distinguishing knowledge from true belief, although he ultimately rejected
that option (Theaetetus, 201-210).
Circular arguments and contradictions
There is a further sceptical attack to consider. If we accept that belief in the
conclusions of a circular argument can be regarded as justified by such an
argument, then we run the risk of accepting that belief in a conclusion can
be justified, even though belief in a contrary conclusion would have to be
regarded as justified to the same extent. (Rival conclusions tend to be
specific enough to be contraries rather than mere contradictories, but
contradiction is still the result.) That would appear to be most
unsatisfactory. We need to assess the level of this risk, and we need to
consider how best to deal with it.
The risk is significant. There are plenty of examples in the humanities
where two people start with the same data and, after conducting equally
careful arguments, reach contrary conclusions. This can even happen in
philosophy. (For some examples in another discipline, see Lamont (ed.),
Historical controversies and historians.) We live with such outcomes. In
contrast, if a contradiction arises in mathematics or in the natural sciences,
particularly in physics or in sciences that are close to physics, we expect
the experts to resolve the contradiction, or to advise us to suspend
judgement pending a resolution. This reflects the greater significance in
those disciplines of systematic structures that rest on axioms, or at least of
fitting results into such structures, even if the results were first established
by less systematic means. A systematic structure should be less vulnerable
to contradictions than a set of large and overlapping circles which link
propositions that are not structured in a clear hierarchy, so contradictions
in the natural sciences are more likely than contradictions in the humanities
to be regarded as symptoms of curable mistakes. Contrary conclusions in
the humanities can be regarded as symptoms of mistakes, but even if they
are, we may well see the mistakes as incurable, in the sense that it is not
within our power decisively to resolve a conflict between two conclusions.
Alternatively, but relatedly, we may see contradictions as the result of a
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certain looseness in arguments in the humanities. An argument with a given
starting point is not constrained by logic to move to only one possible
conclusion. One specific reason why arguments in the humanities are not
so constrained is that it is relatively easy to interpret evidence in a range of
different ways. In the natural sciences, on the other hand, theories tend to
come into collision with data in ways that make the collisions hard to
mitigate by proposing alternative interpretations of the data. The price of
re-interpretation can be a change in the foundations of the discipline. Given
that those foundations are indeed foundational, in consequence of the
hierarchical and tightly-knit logical structures that are the norm, such a
move is only rarely plausible.
It would be tempting to respond to this sceptical attack by saying that
as and when good arguments for a new conclusion that contradicted an
existing conclusion came to light, that would simply take away the supposed
justification for the earlier conclusion. That would be the right response in
mathematics and in the natural sciences, but it would be too facile in the
humanities. It is perfectly possible in the humanities for two people to adhere
to contrary conclusions, and for an impartial observer to regard both of them
as fully justified in holding their beliefs. The impartial observer might not
regard either belief as knowledge. But the issue here is not that of whether
beliefs do qualify as knowledge. It is that of whether they meet the standard
of justification that is required in order for them to be candidates for the
status of knowledge. Both beliefs could be candidates, without raising the
spectre of the contradiction that would follow from a claim that they were
both knowledge, and hence that they were both true. Furthermore, the
disputants need not be required to suspend judgement by any principle that
one should attach equal weight to the opinions of oneself and of one’s
epistemic peers. There is an argument that such a principle does not
necessarily require the suspension of judgement in the face of disagreement
on a contentious question. Disagreements on related questions can
legitimately reduce the status in one’s own eyes of those whom one would
otherwise regard as peers (Elga, “Reflection andDisagreement”, section 12).
The problem would not even be solved merely by saying that the
appearance of an equally justified contrary belief should be regarded as
negating the justification for an earlier belief. We must be able to handle
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claims that beliefs are justified when equally justified contrary beliefs have
not yet appeared, but when we know from experience of the discipline in
question that they may very well appear. In mathematics, physics,
chemistry and much of biology, this is not a great worry. Any existing
justified belief might be overthrown, but the structures of the disciplines,
and their high and well-defined standards of justification, make the risk
low. In the humanities, we know that the risk is significant. So how can we
ever claim that circularly justified beliefs in those disciplines are really
justified, when we know that we are at significant risk of finding equally
good justifications for contrary beliefs?
Everything hinges on whether we can maintain an extensional
distinction between guaranteeing that a belief is true and conferring sufficient
justification on that belief. The argument that the justification sceptic cannot
establish global scepticism by using the purely structural form of his
argument depends on our doing so. If the distinction can bemaintained, then
we can allow for some instances of sufficient justification for each member
of a pair of contrary propositions, without requiring both propositions to be
true and thereby generating a contradiction.Maintenance of the distinction
will however only be sufficient to allow us to handle pairs of contrary
propositions in this way, so long as they are proportionately rare. If we had
to say, of a high proportion of the propositions that we asserted, that belief
in a proposition and belief in a contrary propositionwere bothwell-justified,
we would not be able to regard our standards of justification as set high
enough to be much of a guide to truth. Then they would not be appropriate
standards to use in order to identify candidates for the status of knowledge.
The obvious argument against a distinction between guaranteeing
that a belief is true and conferring enough justification on that belief, is
that standards of justification would seem to be appropriate precisely when
they would only be met by justifications for true beliefs. At the very least,
the proportions of sufficiently justified beliefs in sets of beliefs should not
often be much greater than the proportions of true beliefs in those sets.
But we could meet that condition, even if sufficient justification did not
guarantee truth. We should start at the axiomatic end of the scale of
disciplines. If we can maintain the distinction there, we can be confident of
being able to maintain it in the humanities too.
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There are some disciplines, notably mathematics and some of the
natural sciences, in which the criteria for regarding a belief as sufficiently
justified to make it a candidate for the status of knowledge are so stringent
that their proper use comes as close as we can expect to guaranteeing the
truth of beliefs that satisfy the criteria. Despite this, we can still separate a
guarantee of the truth of beliefs from their having sufficient justification.
We can see this by seeing why justification without truth can be expected
to be rare in those disciplines. We do not simply work from foundations,
but work from foundations that are kept under review for what can be built
on them. Foundations that allow a great deal to be built are favoured.
Foundations that are unproductive, and foundations that lead to
contradictions or to results that are at variance with observation, are
discarded. That process of review bolsters the claim of beliefs that are
based on the foundations that we use to be well-justified. It also increases
the probability that those beliefs are true, because it incorporates into our
methods a process that we can expect to help us to sort correct from
incorrect foundations. In this way, we can give ourselves grounds to expect
that if a belief has enough justification to be a candidate for the status of
knowledge, it is also true. But we do not have to regard beliefs as
sufficiently justified only when their truth is guaranteed.We can explain the
link between justification and truth without incorporating a guarantee of
truth into our criteria of sufficient justification, because we can see that
the link is a consequence of the methods that we use. The relationship
between use of those methods and justification is necessary, in that we
regard beliefs in mathematics and in the natural sciences as justified when
and only when they have been acquired using those methods, methods
which in those disciplines include extensive requirements to test new results.
In contrast, their use bears only a contingent relationship to the truth of
our beliefs. Human fallibility limits the relationship to a contingent one, so
we can have no expectation that justification and truth should be perfectly
correlated. But a recognition of that contingency does not deprive us of an
explanation of the link between justification and truth.
Having established that the distinction between guaranteeing the truth
of a belief and its having sufficient justification can be sustained in the
natural sciences, we may conclude that the distinction can also be sustained
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in the humanities. The link between the use of certain methods and the
truth of the beliefs that are acquired by using them remains contingent.
The link between the use of those methods and justification is also
contingent in the justification to method direction in the humanities,
because we are more inclined than in the natural sciences to recognize the
worth of results that are substantiated in unconventional ways. We can
therefore claim to have defeated the sceptical argument that is based
directly on the possibility of good justifications for contrary conclusions.
But the sceptic would have one more line of attack.
This last line of attack would be to argue that the apparent scope to
accept that two contrary beliefs could both have sufficient justification to
make them candidates for the status of knowledge was simply a corollary
of the absence from the humanities of anything that was definite enough
to count as knowledge, aside from dates and other facts that could be
catalogued and that were uninteresting in themselves. Loose definitions
would be seen as the norm, alongside circular arguments. While the sceptic
could take this line, it would involve a shift away from justification
scepticism to something different. The claim would no longer be that for
a belief to count as knowledge, it would have to be justified in a way that
was not in fact possible. Instead it would be a claim that a belief could only
count as knowledge if it had very definite content. Such a claim was most
famously made by Karl Popper, with his criterion of falsifiability (The
Logic of Scientific Discovery, chapter 1, section 6). But Popper’s concern
was with the natural sciences, rather than the humanities. It is open to the
defender of the humanities to argue that they are not of the same nature
as the natural sciences. They deepen our understanding in ways that do
not depend on the making of strictly falsifiable claims. The study of history,
literature, music and so on, and the study and practice of philosophy, are
very effective in helping us to understand ourselves and our place in the
world. That is a sign, although not a demonstration, that our work in the
humanities is carried on in a rational way and that we should set some store
by the conclusions that we reach. It is true that results in the natural
sciences also deepen our understanding in ways that go beyond the factual
content of those results. They can have a profound impact on our attitudes
toward ourselves and toward the world. Darwinian evolution and quantum
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indeterminacy are cases in point. But although one reason why we take
seriously the broad implications of results in the natural sciences is that
the natural sciences do make falsifiable claims that have been tested and
that have not been falsified, it does not follow that only falsifiable claims
can deepen our understanding.
Furthermore, we can make sense of the humanities and of their
relationship to the natural sciences in terms of the scale to which I have
referred, rising from the axiomatic, the logically structured and the
precisely falsifiable claims of physics to the looser and occasionally
contradictory claims of the humanities, where arguments in large circles
are the norm. As we go up the scale, from physics to chemistry, biology,
psychology, sociology and history, one approach gradually becomes
proportionately more significant than the other.
I conclude that justification scepticism can be kept at bay, even though
sceptics will never be silenced.
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CHAPTER 6
Science
In this chapter, I discuss the sources of some questions in the
philosophy of science, and then give a picture of our place as subjects in the
objective world. In section 6.1, I outline the relationship between scientific
results and their interpretation. Interpretation gives rise to questions in the
philosophy of science, just as the exposure of propositions to propositional
attitudes gives rise to epistemological questions. In section 6.2, I discuss
the scope to avoid interpretation within part of physics. In section 6.3, I
argue that interpretation enters into the practice of science in the higher
sciences, so that it is inevitable. Our use of the concept of causation is a
particularly striking example. In section 6.4, I explore some links between
that concept and the concept of rational action. In section 6.5, I consider
the debate between realism, anti-realism and structural realism. Finally, in
section 6.6, I draw some threads together by discussing the relationship
between the scientific conception of the world and our status as subjects
within the world.
6.1 Science and philosophy
Science, like knowledge in general, is a fertile source of philosophical
questions. As with knowledge in general, we can think of ways in which
those questions might be avoided. To avoid epistemology, we would need
to avoid bringing propositions into the picture, in any way that exposed
them to propositional attitudes. We could not realistically manage that.
The natural sciences give us a species of knowledge, and the questions of
epistemology arise in relation to that knowledge. But other philosophical
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questions arise too. To avoid those other questions, we would need to avoid
any interpretation of our scientific results. That is, we would need to avoid
applying concepts such as those of reality and of causation. In this chapter,
I shall set out some reasons why that too would be beyond us, except in a
very limited part of science.
We must first distinguish between the discovery and the
contemplation of scientific results. My focus will be on the contemplation
of results, and on the interpretation of them that is needed in order to allow
that contemplation, rather than on their discovery. The distinction between
discovery and contemplation is reminiscent of the distinction that is often
drawn between the contexts of discovery and of justification. But it would
not be appropriate to use that distinction, because my concern is not with
the legitimacy of specific scientific results, but with some aspects of our
broader relationship to our scientific knowledge.
The degree of interpretation that is required as part of our
contemplation of scientific results depends on howmuch is expected of that
contemplation. We therefore need to set a standard, in order to give the
discussion definiteness. My standard will be that we must be able to
contemplate results in a way that will allow us to make the next scientific
advances. We must be able to make sense of what we know, in order to have
an idea of what to try next. To that extent, contemplation feeds into discovery.
The desire to understand the conditions of our being able to make the next
advances limits the scope of the discussion here and in sections 6.2 to 6.5. I
shall not be concerned with the general nature of the relationship between
knowing subjects and the objects of their knowledge, a concern that would
open up a whole range of philosophical concerns. I shall, however, discuss
the relationship between ourselves and the world that we study in section 6.6.
We need clear notions of uninterpreted and of interpreted scientific
results. Uninterpreted results are results that are not given in terms that are
appropriate to our direct experience of the world. The direct experience
that is meant here is experience of the world as one of objects that are real,
that we perceive directly, that act causally on us and on each other, and on
which we can act. Thus it is the experience that is available to perceiving
agents in general, including zombies. Qualia are not the theme here. Where
the terms that are appropriate to our direct experience happen to be the
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scientifically fundamental terms, the results will be regarded as interpreted,
even though there is no other formulation to be interpreted unless we go
out of our way to create one. This may seem odd, but the point is that our
use of terms that are appropriate to our direct experience is what gives a
number of philosophical questions their purchase.
We can see how easily our statements of results come to be put in
terms that are appropriate to our direct experience by considering
something as simple as saying that rainfall causes a plant to grow. In saying
that, we talk in terms of objects, their properties and causation. To hold
back from doing so, we would have to limit ourselves to saying that the
state of a whole system evolved in a certain way. In this example we would
have a system of water molecules, of soil particles and of plant cells.
Indeed, if we really wanted to drive causation out of the picture, we would
be driven back to describing the whole system in terms of elementary
particles, because any higher-level description would involve a view of
entities, such as molecules and plant cells, that were seen as independently
real, with their own properties, and as participating in causal chains.
The mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics would be one
example of uninterpreted results, but so would any formulation of results,
from any science, that was given purely in a formal language, where terms,
possible statements using those terms and the logical relationships between
those statements were defined, and a catalogue of statements that were
accepted as correct was given, but no more was added. The point is that the
formulation would only give the minimum that was needed to capture the
logical structure and the current content of the science. (The content would
be the set of statements that were accepted as correct. One must be wary
of labelling them as true, because doing so might, depending on one’s
theory of truth, entail suppositions as to reality.) The formal language
might be simple or complicated, and it might or might not allow for
vagueness or modalities. The use of a formal language would not be
necessary to ensure that only the minimum was included, but it would be
the safest approach. The use of an informal, natural language would bring
in associations that would be very likely to add extraneous elements to the
uninterpreted formulation of the results in question, leading us to state
those results in terms that were appropriate to our direct experience.
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The use of a formal language to state results in an uninterpreted form
would not remove the empirical element from science. We would say
certain things using the symbols of the language, and we would refuse to
say other things, in the light of the results of experiments. The things that
we would say would correspond to the results that we regarded as correct,
and the things that we would not say would correspond to the results that
we regarded as incorrect or as not established. But even though there would
still be a connection with experiments, and even though we might say that
a given result summarized or predicted the outcome of a given experiment,
we would not try to make sense of statements within the formal language
by invoking such concepts as reality, laws of nature, objects and their
properties, and causation. We would have no need to engage in that degree
of interpretation merely in order to relate our formal statements to
empirical data, so that we could use those data to sort the correct from the
incorrect statements. We would recognize that there were constants and
variables for individuals and for predicates in the formal language, which
it would be natural to interpret in terms of real objects, properties and
relations, and that there were universal statements, necessities and relations
of implication, some of which it would be natural to interpret in terms of
laws and causation, but we would not attach any significance to the mere
possibility of adopting those interpretations. There are, however, two
important limits to our freedom from interpretation. The first limit is that
if we were to dispense with all interpretation in terms that were appropriate
to our direct experience, we would place ourselves in a parlous state.
Without some connections between the world as directly perceived and our
words, our words would be bereft of meaning. The games in which we
manipulated symbols would then be too idle to be worth playing, and it
would become impossible to connect our games with empirical
observations. An ability to dispense with the given type of interpretation of
our scientific theories is parasitic on our practice, in everyday life, of linking
words to worldly objects, to their properties and to their interactions. The
second limit is that experimental practice implies suppositions as to reality
and causation, a point to which I shall return below.
There is a connection between interpretation in the sense of imputing
reality, objects, properties, laws and causation, and interpretation in the
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sense of painting mental pictures or devising analogies that are related to
our everyday experience. The latter type of interpretation implies the
former type. If we delve into quantum mechanics, and support our
understanding of the equations by seeing electrons as waves, then we take
for granted the reality of those waves, just as we take for granted the reality
of the ripples that we see when we drop a stone into a pond. If we
understand the Earth’s orbit by seeing the Sun as pulling the Earth toward
itself, so that the Earth does not fly off at a tangent, then we see gravity as
a real force that causes the Earth to change its course, just as we see the pull
of a long rein as a real cause of a horse’s trotting in circles round an exercise
yard. Such visualizations bring with them the presuppositions as to objects,
properties and causation that accompany any description in terms that are
appropriate to our direct experience.
Despite this connection, interpretation in the sense of imputing
reality, objects, properties, laws and causation is not the same thing as
interpretation in the sense of painting mental pictures or devising
analogies. If the latter were what mattered, the requirement for
interpretation would be unduly dependent on contingencies of our mental
capabilities, capabilities that varied greatly from one person to another,
with many people at each level of capability. Some people are much better
at thinking abstractly than others. The more skill and experience someone
has within a given field, the less he will need visualizations and analogies.
Another point to note is that the causation that we must avoid mentioning
if we are to avoid the interpretation that leads us into philosophical
questions is not merely the local causation that is most easily captured in
visualizations. There is also the influence at a distance that is one of the
obstacles to there being any adequate visualization of fundamental physics.
If we equated interpretation with the painting of pictures, we would be
likely to miss that point.
There is a further level of appreciation of scientific theories and
results, beyond not needing visualizations and analogies. People could
speak the language of mathematics, or some other formal language, as a
native language that captured their experience perfectly. Statements in the
formal language would amount to un-reformulated statements of direct
experience. The concepts of reality, objects, properties, laws and causation,
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with their usual senses, senses that reflect our everyday experience of the
world, would not then be used when thinking about parts or aspects of the
world that could be described in formal terms. That might be an ideal to
which we should aspire. But most of us are not, and are not going to
become, like that. If this special form of appreciation of statements in
formal languages exists at all, it is rare. Its rare existence would not make
the requirement for interpretation unduly contingent, in the sense of
making that requirement vary widely across the population. The following
arguments on the need for interpretation do not consider this possible
escape from that need. They are arguments that we, as we are or as we
might reasonably expect to become, mostly need interpretations of sorts
that require us to face up to philosophical questions. They are not
arguments that no conceivable rational being could dispense with such
interpretations, or even that no actual human being could dispense with
them. I shall also not concern myself with hypothetical people who would
directly experience the world in a form that broke free of the usual
ontology of objects that were clearly demarcated from one another and
that acted on one another only locally. Such people would have the
advantage that the form of their direct experience was more suited to an
appreciation of the quantum world than was the form of most people’s
direct experience. But as we shall see, it is in the higher sciences that
interpretation is in general impossible to avoid. That is where the talents of
native speakers of mathematics, or of habitual users of non-standard
ontologies, would, if they were widespread, affect the argument that
follows. And it is not clear that those talents could be exercised at all in the
higher sciences.
The point of avoiding interpretation
The appeal of uninterpreted formulations of scientific results is that if we
were to confine ourselves to them throughout the sciences, many questions
in the philosophy of science would fall away. Are hypothesized forces really
there, or are they just artefacts of our theories?We would not care, because
the results would come out the same either way. Do laws of nature follow
from the properties of entities, or vice-versa, or both, or neither? Again, it
would make no difference to the uninterpreted results. What is causation,
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and in what sense do causes necessitate their effects? These questions would
not arise, but we could still calculate that a system that was in a given state
would evolve into another given state after a certain time. And so on. We
use the concepts of reality, objects, properties, laws and causation in
interpreting our scientific results, not in giving their uninterpreted
formulations. Even if we use existential quantifiers in stating our results,
that does not in itself import the concept of reality. The quantifiers are
merely symbols in a formal game until we interpret them. (This is subject
to the point made above, that we must not let our games become too idle.)
Alternatively, we could stop at the interpretation of our scientific results,
and not go on to reflect on the significance of our interpretations. That
would also save us from philosophy. But that would be a wilful refusal to
philosophize, not the discovery of a principled reason not to pose
philosophical questions.
Uninterpreted formulations would also have the advantage that they
would help to confer the objectivity that is rightly craved by science. We do
not want a science that reflects our personal, cultural or even species-
specific inclinations. Our choice of areas to investigate will inevitably reflect
those inclinations, but whatever results we happen to obtain should not
reflect them. Uninterpreted formulations hold out precisely that prospect.
The use of a de-humanized language, the language of mathematics or of
logic, would be ideal for this purpose. Aliens might use different
mathematical and logical concepts, but if we ever met them, their and our
mathematical and logical languages would rapidly merge. What better
proof could there be of the de-humanization of our science than an ability
to share it with non-human rational beings, and to do so with no loss or
change of content?
The question is, could we manage this? Could we contemplate the
results of science in a way that avoided interpretation, and that therefore
allowed us to avoid many of the traditional questions in the philosophy of
science, while we kept enough of a grip on the content of the results to
allow us to make the next scientific advances? It depends on the type of
science. It turns out that we could do so, some of the time, within a narrow
field that I shall call equation physics, but that it would become both harder
and less important to do so, the further we moved away from that field.
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6.2 Equation physics
Some physicists prefer to avoid interpretation of their theories altogether.
They restrict themselves to generating more equations and solutions to
equations. Anyone who has tried to picture the results of quantum
mechanics will understand why. We cannot construct pictures that are
entirely faithful to the mathematics. Moving on to the sense of
interpretation with which I am concerned, we cannot even impute reality
and causation in their ordinary senses. Phenomena such as nonlocality
mean that our everyday understanding of reality and of causation would
just get in the way. If we try to interpret the results of quantum mechanics
in ways that are completely faithful to the theory, we both fail and give
ourselves headaches. We also run the risk of drawing conclusions from our
interpretations that do not really follow from the mathematics. So we had
better stick to the mathematics. Mathematics itself involves concepts, but
they are precisely defined within the theories that use them. That
conceptualization within a mathematical theory is to be distinguished from
the interpretation with which I am concerned, interpretation in terms that
step outside the theory.
The advantage to the working physicist of setting out results in an
uninterpreted form is that it allows him to get on with his job and to
communicate his results to other physicists, so that further progress can
be made. We can have confidence in the results, and we can use them to
derive other results and to make useful devices. If physicists would not go
beyond what they could interpret in terms that were appropriate to our
direct experience, they would make very slow progress. If they based
further conclusions on such interpretations, they would make a great many
mistakes.
That much makes an adequate case for avoiding interpretation. The
question is, can we do so?We largely can, to the extent that a mathematical
formulation says all that need be said in order to capture the full content
of the physics in question, while still being graspable by suitably trained
human beings in a way that allows them to make the next advances. I shall
refer to the part of physics in which a mathematical formulation is both
comprehensive and comprehensible as equation physics. I introduce this
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term in order not to bring in the assumptions about its extension that
would come with the use of an established term, such as “fundamental
physics” or “mathematical physics”. Equation physics is the part of physics
in relation to which we can adopt Heinrich Hertz’s view of Maxwell’s
theory of electromagnetism, “DieMaxwell’sche Theorie ist das System der
Maxwell’schen Gleichungen”, “The Maxwellian theory is the system of
the Maxwellian equations” (Untersuchungen über die Ausbreitung der
elektrischen Kraft, page 23).
There are two provisos to the claim that within equation physics,
interpretation can be avoided. The first proviso is that there is one
circumstance in which even results within equation physics definitely
cannot be contemplated, to a standard that allows the next advances to be
made, without leading us into interpretation. This is when in order to make
the next advances, we need to design experiments in which we see ourselves
as acting on entities, or see some entities or events that involve them as
causing events to occur. I shall return to this circumstance in section 6.5, in
connection with the debate between realism and anti-realism. The second
proviso is that even outside the context of such experimentation, physicists
who want to make progress may need to think in causal terms. Christopher
Hitchcock has pointed out that much depends on the state of the science.
He notes that references to causation occur often enough in scientific
papers, even in fundamental physics, and that only in phases of maturity
of a science, when most of the ground that it covers has been systematized
mathematically, may it be feasible to discard the language of causation
(“What Russell Got Right”, section 3.7). Furthermore, such phases of
maturity may be followed by fresh phases of immaturity, as physicists
introduce new theories or tackle new phenomena. Despite these provisos,
there are times when results within substantial parts of equation physics
can be contemplated, and the physics can be advanced, without the benefit
of interpretation in terms that are appropriate to our direct experience.
Even in a science’s mature phases, there is still work to be done to advance
the science, filling in the gaps and exploring tensions that may eventually
reveal the need for radical re-formulations that will plunge the science back
into immaturity. I shall use the term “mature equation physics” to identify
the part of equation physics that may be regarded at a given time as mature.
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There may be no time at which the whole of equation physics is mature, but
there will be times at which some parts are both mature and open to being
advanced. We should, however, note that not all philosophical questions
can be dismissed, even in relation to mature equation physics. One question
that cannot be avoided on principled grounds, even when we only reflect on
results within mature equation physics and do so without interpreting their
content, is the question of the general character of laws of nature.
The boundaries of equation physics are hazy. In some parts of the
natural sciences, we nearly always need interpretation in terms of reality,
objects, properties, laws and causation in order to have enough of a grip on
our results to be able to advance to the next results, or even in order to be
able to see difficulties with our current theories. Interpretation even enters
into the formulation of the theories themselves, as will emerge in section
6.3. But there is no clearly-defined point at which interpretation starts to
be required to any significant extent. We can, however, safely include some
current theories of fundamental forces within the scope of equation
physics. Richard Healey gives a thorough analysis of the state of play in
Gauging What’s Real. It becomes clear to a reader of the book that the
business of interpreting theories of fundamental forces is separate from
the business of formulating and using those theories. Engaging in
interpretation, Healey asks whether or not gauge theories push us toward
particular ontological commitments. His conclusion is that gauge theories
do not carry significant ontological implications (ibid., chapters 4 and 8),
and indeed that we have reason to be wary of any such claims that might
be made on their behalf (ibid., chapter 9). Healey does, however,
acknowledge that gauge theories have significant metaphysical
implications, ones that may astonish us when we reflect on the contrast
with our everyday experience (ibid., section 4.5). Two general points may
be noted. The first general point is that the possibility of avoiding
ontological commitments is not directly relevant to the thesis that there is
a part of physics that can be practised without interpretation, because the
question of ontological commitments only arises once we decide to turn
our minds to interpretation. But Healey’s conclusions are still reassuring,
in that they would limit the extent to which my thesis would need to be
revised if it should turn out to be impossible to avoid turning our minds to
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interpretation. The second general point is that Healey makes it possible
to argue for some of his conclusions by adopting a particular type of
mathematical representation of gauge theories, loop representations. This
indicates that the availability of philosophical results in this area can
depend on the contingencies of our mathematical progress. Such
dependence need not disturb us. It is, after all, only the achievement of a
certain level of mathematical sophistication in our formulation of physics
that allows us to identify equation physics as a distinctive part of natural
science at all.
We can also include in equation physics the classical mechanics of
macroscopic regions of space-time and of the macroscopic entities therein,
both in relativistic and in non-relativistic forms. Fortunately it will notmatter,
for the subsequent discussion, precisely how much of physics falls within
equation physics. All that matters is that there are some parts of physics that
are fundamental, that are the basis for a great deal of science, whether or not
a full reduction of science to those parts of physics is even theoretically
possible, and that do, in at least some of their phases, fall within the scope of
mature equation physics. (It might appear that classical mechanics, at least
when non-relativistic, should count as interpreted, as defined in section 6.1.
The fundamental formulation might appear to be in terms that were
appropriate to our direct experience, with objects being seen as moving
around and as being pushed and pulled by forces. But the more sophisticated
Hamiltonian formulation is given in abstract mathematical terms.)
The nature of equation physics makes it easy to see how questions in
the philosophy of science, as opposed to more general epistemological
questions, might come to be dismissed. If the mathematical description of
a system says all that need be said, many philosophical questions have no
purchase because the concepts on which those questions rely are creatures
of interpretation in terms that are appropriate to our direct experience.
They are not natural outgrowths of equation physics. There is no concept
of reality, or of causation, in the equations themselves. We cannot even
separate out objects and properties. There are simply equations that
describe a system. Those equations include a variable that is commonly
given the name “time”. Changes in the values of other variables that are
correlated with changes in that variable correspond to the evolution of the
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system over time. One striking piece of evidence for the avoidability of
interpretation is that we have now been doing quantum mechanics for
nearly a century without being able to decide, to everyone’s satisfaction,
whether it is about the world or about our knowledge of the world
(Goldstein, “Quantum Theory Without Observers – Part 1”, page 42;
Allori and Zanghi, “What is BohmianMechanics”). In the higher sciences,
it is much harder to avoid using the concepts that give philosophical
questions their purchase.
6.3 The higher sciences
It might seem at first glance that we could work with uninterpreted
formulations of scientific results in sciences other than equation physics.
We could define particular types of molecule, or species of animal, and
work with our definitions and the data that were gathered from
experiments, while excluding any interpretation that went beyond the
definitions and logical constructs that were based on those definitions. This
would amount to the extension beyond equation physics of the project of
Carnap, using Ramsey sentences and developments of them (Carnap,
“Testability andMeaning”; Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics,
chapter 26). There would be no desire to understand the significance of
our theories, merely a desire to get to grips with the observations and to
improve our ability to do so by improving our theories. That limited
ambition would enable us to avoid at least some of the philosophical
difficulties that surround Carnap’s project. In particular, we would not
have to worry about the reality of entities, even though Ramsey sentences
do implicitly refer to entities, by description, because we would abstain
from the interpretation of our theories. We would likewise be undisturbed
by the central concern that is set out in Cei and French, “Looking for
structure in all the wrong places”, that Carnap’s project would only give us
structuralism and would not give us realism.
Alas, such an approach would leave us unable to make the next
scientific advances. The use of uninterpreted results would become harder,
the further we moved away from physics in general and from equation
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physics in particular, both because it would become progressively harder to
give definitions of the relevant entities that were both precise and all-
encompassing, and because statements of results in purely formal terms
would become less and less comprehensible. There are few things to say
about an elementary particle, and they can all be said in precise,
mathematical terms. There are rather more things to say about a molecule,
and vastly more things to say about an animal. The uninterpreted statement
of results in a fully formalized theory might remain theoretically possible
in sciences that were distant from physics, but it would be completely
impractical. We need to speak more loosely when we practise the higher
sciences. That leads us to use terms that are appropriate to our direct
experience. It might be thought that we could stick to a loose, incomplete,
formal expression of a science, and steer clear of interpretation, but that
would not allow us to make the next advances. We need comprehensible
accounts that are full-bodied and definite, even at the cost of their being
incomplete and of their being given in terms that use broad-brush concepts.
We need such accounts both in order to formulate the next scientific
questions, and in order to comprehend the material that we already have
at our disposal and that we can use to help us to answer those questions.
We can get what we need by using the concepts that are appropriate to our
direct experience. We structure our information by talking about objects,
such as molecules or animals, and their properties. That gives us full-
bodied and definite pictures of the world, even though we are well aware
both that we do not know all of the properties of objects, and that the
properties that we do identify are multiply realizable at the micro-physical
level. We also use the concept of causation to tell comprehensible stories
about what happens. We notice when such stories are not fully satisfying
because not all significant causes have been identified, or not all of the
obvious potential interrupters of causal processes have been ruled out.
What happens as we move up the scale of sciences is that concepts that are,
in equation physics in its better moments, used only to interpret the science
and not to formulate it, come to enter into the formulation of the science.
The boundary between formulation and interpretation is broken down,
and the interpretation that leads to philosophical questions becomes
unavoidable.
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It is at this point appropriate to consider the implications of adopting
the ground for regarding interpretation as unavoidable that was mentioned
in section 6.1. Interpretation is to be regarded as unavoidable in the practice
of a given science when it is needed in order for us to be able to make the
next advances in that science. The adoption of this criterion might seem to
limit the significance of the need for interpretation. The use of
interpretation might seem to be a mere matter of convenience, of no
philosophical significance. Once the next round of advances had been
made, interpretations could be discarded. But the philosophical
significance of interpretation is not to be minimized in this way. I identify
the need for interpretation in order to identify a route that leads to
questions in the philosophy of science. Since we have a strong urge to
advance our scientific knowledge, we are led to those questions. The further
question of what status we should accord to the concepts that we have to
use, such as the concepts of reality, objects, properties, laws and causation,
is to be answered within the philosophy of science, once the practice of
that philosophy has been pressed on us. The fact that we were led to the
philosophy of science only by the practicalities of the scientific enterprise
would not in itself mean that we should assign to those concepts the low
status of mere crutches for our limited minds.
Fortunately, the formulation of results in terms that are appropriate
to our direct experience becomes both easier and less distortionary as we
move away from physics. Animals, for example, are objects of our direct
experience. We directly perceive many of the differences between them that
lead us to classify them in different species. Moving back down the scale of
sciences to chemistry, we directly perceive that immersion in hot water will
cause a sugar lump to break up, and that two given elements regularly react
with one another in constant proportions. (At least, we can perceive that, so
long as the elements are supplied in visible forms and quantities.) When
thinking about molecules, we can at least sometimes picture atoms as plastic
balls with holes in them, and the bonds between them as wooden struts that
fit into the holes, without leading ourselves into contradiction or doing too
much violence to the scientific theory. The fact that only limited violence
would be donemakes it less important than it is in equation physics to avoid
using terms that are appropriate to our direct experience. A significant
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diminution in the violence that is done to theories does not, however,
necessarily require a substantial movement up the scale of sciences. The
Newtonianmechanics of macroscopic objects can be stated in terms that are
appropriate to our direct experience, without doing violence to at least some
respectable mathematical formulations of the theory. There is also no
suggestion that the concepts that are appropriate to our direct experience
are adequate to state all of the results, anywhere on the scale of sciences. All
of the natural sciences include bodies of knowledge that are too
sophisticated to be expressed in such terms, and that can only be stated
mathematically. It is not that statements using the concepts that were
appropriate to our direct experience would be distortionary. There could
not be any such statements of the sophisticated results.
We cannot conclude from this alone that as we move away from
physics, there is a sharp diminution in the danger of drawing mistaken
conclusions from expressions of results in terms that are appropriate to
our direct experience. But at least the growing ease with which the
conclusions can be understood should increase the ease with which
mistakes can be detected. Eventually scientific disciplines shade into the
humanities, where definitions that are both precise and adequate to their
subject matter are neither expected nor feasible, arguments in large circles
take over from systematic deductions from basic principles, expressions of
results in terms that are appropriate to our direct experience are the norm,
and those expressions are adequate to the subject matter because the
subject matter is itself the social world in which we live and act, the world
that we routinely describe in such terms so as to conduct our lives. What
historian, for example, would venture to define the concept of progress or
the concept of class in a way that would allow his definitions to be used in
the construction of arguments with precise logical structures, with any
reasonable expectation that historians generally would agree that his
definitions were either acceptable or useful? Some historians do make such
attempts, but the results, while they may be philosophically significant, are
not impressive as works of history. Hegel and Marx both ignored
Aristotle’s injunction to adapt their expectations of exactness, of certainty
and of the universality of conclusions to their subject matter
(Nicomachean Ethics, book 1, section 3, 1094b11-27).
240
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 240
I shall now illustrate the significance of the distinction between
equation physics and the rest of science by reference to two topics,
causation and realism.
6.4 Causation
The concept of causation is fundamental to the conduct of most of the
natural sciences, even though it need not always be used in the mere
contemplation of a formal characterization of results. It is easy to make
causation disappear when contemplating results within mature equation
physics, but it becomes harder, and eventually impossible, as we move up
the scale of sciences. We cannot really avoid saying that the introduction of
a catalyst causes a chemical reaction to speed up, or that a change in
temperature causes a seed to germinate. Causation is also a concept that is
appropriate to our direct experience. And if we cannot avoid using the
concept of causation, then wemust face a range of philosophical questions
that relate to the nature of causation and the reality of the entities that
participate in causal events. We might avoid those questions so long as we
only used the concept of causation, and never mentioned it, but as soon as
we came to think about our scientific knowledge, we would be faced with
the questions. And not thinking about the concept of causation would
amount to an unprincipled refusal to engage with philosophical questions,
given that we had to use the concept.
There might or might not theoretically be some reductive account of
the results of the higher sciences that would take us back to a system of
elementary particles, the initial state and the evolution of which we could
describe mathematically without using the concept of causation. We
would need such a reductive account because the substantial entities that
are the subject matter of chemistry and of biology cannot be fully
characterized using precise definitions that capture every physical detail,
so long as we confine ourselves to the terms of those sciences. A system
that can only be described in one way in the terms of a higher science can
be realized in many different ways at the micro-physical level. But even if
a reductive account were theoretically possible, it would be wholly
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impractical. A reductive science of the objects that were the subject matter
of any one of our higher sciences would be quite different from that higher
science in its unreduced form. We need to work with selective and micro-
physically incomplete characterizations of the entities with which most
of our sciences deal, and we need to use the concept of causation in order
to stitch together the members of a temporal sequence of selective
descriptions of the world. The resulting narratives themselves only
mention a small selection of the causal relationships that could be
mentioned. The sense of selection that is meant here is not that of taking
a small proportion of the micro-physical facts, but that of selecting a few
of the many different higher-level facts that could be abstracted from the
entire micro-physical base. Incompleteness is therefore not the direct
correlate of selection, in the way that it would be the direct correlate if
selection meant that some micro-physical facts were selected and that
others were ignored. Rather, the incompleteness consists in the fact that
multiple realizability would make it impossible to determine all of the
micro-physical details, if one started with a narrative that was given in
higher-level terms.
The link between selective descriptions and our use of the concept of
causation is no accident. The concept of causation is ideally suited to the
task of arranging a sequence of selective descriptions in a coherent and
significant narrative, because it is a concept that we have developed in order
to state our direct experience.We have naturally developed for that purpose
concepts that help us to assemble narratives that report only the significant
facts. We say that one event causes another, as when we say that the impact
of a porcelain cup on a concrete floor causes the cup to shatter. In so doing,
we focus on particular features of the objects involved, the brittleness of
porcelain, the speed of the cup just before it hits the floor and the hardness
of the floor, in order to explain an outcome that is itself characterized in a
specific way, as the shattering of the cup, rather than by giving the positions
of all of the small pieces of porcelain around the room. (One interesting
view of the concept of causation that would be perfectly consonant with
its role in allowing the construction of coherent and significant, but highly
selective, narratives, while not being implied by the existence of that role,
is the view that the validity of causal judgements is not absolute, but that
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it is relative to the theories and situations in which the judgements occur.
See Menzies, “Causation in Context”.)
Causation and rational action
I shall now set out two connections between the concept of causation and
the concept of rational action. The first connection is that the practice of
rational action justifies the selection of facts and the use of selected facts
in constructing causal narratives. The second connection is that the practice
of rational action justifies our use of the concept of causal necessity. The
concept of rational action that is involved here is the concept that was
discussed in chapter 4, that of action that we regard as rational because it
has been chosen by a process that makes appropriate use of the evidence.
To be more specific than in chapter 4, I am here concerned with actions
that are both directed toward particular goals, and reasonably likely to lead
to the achievement of those goals.
There is no novelty in making connections between the notions of
action and of causation. The scope for a link was identified by Thomas
Reid, in the words, “The conception of an efficient cause may very
probably be derived from the experience we have had in very early life of
our own power to produce certain effects” (“Essays on the Active Powers
of Man”, essay 1, chapter 5, page 524). A different line of thought on the
connection between action and causation is represented by G. H. von
Wright’s paper “On the Logic and Epistemology of the Causal Relation”,
which cites the role of deliberate manipulation in identifying causal
relationships and in distinguishing causes from effects. That line can be
developed into an argument that agent causation is conceptually prior to
event causation, in that one must have a grasp of the former concept in
order to have a grasp of the latter concept (Lowe, Personal Agency, section
6.8). Several connections between our concepts of causation and of agency
are explored in Ahmed, “Agency and Causation”. But the focus of most of
the work of this nature has been on the analysis of causation and on how,
as a matter of psychology, we get to grips with the notion of causation.
My concern is rather to find justifications in our practice of rational action
for our practice of relying on highly selective accounts of the world, and for
our assumption that there is causal necessity to be found in the world.
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Rational action, selection and causal narratives
When we observe a cause and its effect, we observe a sequence. We may
observe a sequence many times, but we have no guarantee that the sequence
will always be the same. This is not to say that we are at all likely to be
mistaken in predicting effects in straightforward cases, such as dropping
porcelain cups onto concrete floors. If an expected effect did not follow,
we would rightly look for an explanation, rather than shrug our shoulders
and say that regularities were never guaranteed to continue. There is
nothing wrong with formulating laws of nature and expecting them to
apply in ordinary instances of causation. To return to the example of the
cup, laws of the mechanics of macroscopic objects allow us to calculate
the force of the impact, while laws of chemistry and of materials science
explain how molecules in a piece of porcelain are linked, and why the
application of certain forces will be followed by fractures. But this picture
is incomplete. We need to look at the ways in which laws of nature are
linked with one another.
The most basic laws are given at the level where the concept of
causation need not be used, in equation physics. Less basic laws, of
chemistry or of materials science, can be built up from those basic laws, but
they are not straightforward laws that apply universally. Rather, an instance
that conforms to such a law represents the confluence of applications of
several more basic laws, together with the absence of an indefinite range of
countervailing conditions, whether states or events, that might have
prevented the usual outcome. Thus the process of combining ingredients to
make porcelain will lead to the formation of bonds that give porcelain its
usual strength and brittleness, but only so long as the proportions of the
ingredients are right, there are no impurities of types that would interfere
with the formation of the bonds, the firing temperature is within a certain
range, and so on. Then we have laws such as the law that a porcelain cup
that is dropped onto concrete from a height of one metre will shatter. Such
laws represent a further stage in the combination of laws and the ruling
out of countervailing conditions, although the main possible countervailing
conditions may cover a narrower range, and may be more obvious to the lay
person, than at the previous stage where chemistry and materials science
came into play. It is when we move away from the basic level of equation
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physics, at which the concept of causation need not be used, that we have
to start formulating regularities that cannot be formulated as exceptionless
laws. This happens because the complexity of the objects that are involved,
and the complexity of the sets of basic laws that bear on an instance of a
regularity, both give wide scope for countervailing conditions to interfere.
The countervailing conditions that would need to be ruled out cannot all
be listed to allow exceptionless laws to be formulated, because their range
is indefinitely wide. This lack of exceptionless laws is a symptom of the fact
that the concepts that are used in the higher sciences are not appropriate
to the task of capturing every detail of the world. The concepts that are
used in equation physics are appropriate to that task. As we move up to
the higher sciences, the concepts that are used have to capture complex
interactions of the underlying mathematical laws, and they must do so in
a broad-brush way if the laws that use the higher-level concepts are not to
be hopelessly convoluted. The notion of “broad-brush” is given content by
defining it in terms of the multiple realizability, at the micro-physical level,
of a state of the world that is characterized in a single way when using a
given set of broad-brush concepts. The scope for unusual interactions of
the underlying laws, interactions that would be triggered by details that
were not captured by the broad-brush concepts, creates the scope for
exceptions to higher-level laws. The triggering details would be among
those of the countervailing conditions that would be hardest to foresee.
The account that has just been given may be compared with one that
is given by James Woodward (“Causation with a Human Face”, section
4.5). Woodward is, like me, concerned with the consequences of the coarse-
grained nature of the variables that feature in the higher sciences, and with
the scope there, but not in fundamental physics, for interference in causal
processes by extraneous factors that are not ruled out by descriptions of
systems in coarse-grained terms. It does not follow that the theories that are
enunciated in the higher sciences are hopelessly unstable. As Woodward
points out, coarse-grained specifications, both of causes and of their
effects, allow us to establish relationships between causes and effects that
are more stable than the relationships that would obtain between
incomplete fine-grained specifications (ibid., pages 88-89). Detailed
differences in the state of the world at an earlier time, differences that
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would only show up in a fine-grained description, may lead to differences
in the state of the world at a later time that would create exceptions to any
tidy laws that related incomplete fine-grained descriptions of the world at
earlier and later times. Coarse-grained descriptions of the world at earlier
and later times may obscure the detailed differences in such a way that laws
that relate coarse-grained descriptions are not particularly vulnerable to
exceptions that would be generated by such differences. Another interesting
point of comparison is the view that the occasional failure of laws in the
higher sciences should be attributed to the occasional failure of the
combinatorial laws that determine the resultant of a number of individual
forces (Rupert, “Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature
of Special-Science Properties”).
My remarks above show that it is not coincidental that the move away
from science that can be given wholly in terms of equations, and the move
away from exceptionless laws, occur together. Rising complexity drives
both moves. That complexity would make any putative equation science at
higher levels impractical to use in taking the next steps in the enlargement
of our knowledge. It would also make exceptionless laws in the higher
sciences impractically convoluted. The picture that is painted here is,
however, still one of causation as it features in causal explanations that
conform to the covering-law model. There is no move to singular causal
explanation, in the form in which it is seen as falling outside that model
(Woodward, “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation”, section 3).
Faced with the complexity of the everyday world, we must rely on the
selection of facts, and on the combination of the selected facts into
coherent and significant narratives that use the concept of causation. We
make sense of what happens to a particular cup by giving a highly selective
narrative, in which its being dropped and the consequent impact cause it to
shatter, but fromwhich most of the facts are omitted because their absence
does not detract from the narrative. We simply say that one event, the
impact, is the cause of another event, the shattering. Our selection of facts
is based on our interests. Variations in which factors matter to us? Are we,
for example, interested in changing the way in which we make cups, so as
to reduce the frequency of breakages? Or do we like porcelain sufficiently
to insist on continuing to use it, but wish to do something to avoid
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breakages? We have here a species of contrastive focus (Dretske,
“Contrastive Statements”). Wemay contrast porcelain cups with melamine
cups. Alternatively, we may contrast the dropping of porcelain cups onto
concrete with the dropping of porcelain cups onto carpet. We focus on one
type of fact, the composition of the cup or the nature of the floor. The
practical outcome may be that we change the way in which we make cups,
or that we resolve only to take porcelain cups into carpeted rooms.
We need something to justify the practice of selecting some facts and
not others. Here is the role for our practice of rational action. Our desires
to achieve certain results motivate our selections of some facts rather than
others: we concentrate on what matters. But we can analyse the process in
a little more detail, and thereby see how our success in rational action
justifies our practice, in our scientific enterprise, of selecting facts and of
using the concept of causation to stitch together selective descriptions of
the world in order to create narratives.
When we choose actions in order to achieve certain results, we ignore
many details. If someone prepares a budget for a business in order to
facilitate its management during the year, she will not pay any attention to
the type of spreadsheet program that she uses to do the work. Such details
are irrelevant because they only affect some equally irrelevant details of
the final result, such as the type of computer file in which the finished
budget is recorded. When we have a goal, we describe the goal in a way
that brings out what actually matters. We do not list all of the changes that
we might effect by achieving the goal. We then give equally sketchy
descriptions of the actions that we must perform in order to achieve the
goal. Nothing else would be practical. All of this is perfectly everyday. The
significant points are first, that it is the practicalities of getting things done
that drive us to be selective, to distinguish between what matters and what
does not, and second, that we still generally achieve the desired results.
Another essential tool in our getting things done is an understanding of
causal chains. We need to know what will happen if we initiate certain
changes. We need to identify the right causal narratives, the ones that take
account of the important facts and disregard the irrelevant ones. If we want
to remove ice from some machinery, it is useful to know that a local rise in
temperature will cause the ice to melt. It is also useful to know that some
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details are irrelevant, so that we do not waste time making choices in
relation to those details. We do not need to fuss over which source of heat
to use, because any source that will not damage the machinery will do.
Our experience of rational action draws our attention to the fact that
we can use limited information in order to bring about desired states of
affairs that are described in limited ways. The significance of this obvious
fact is that it shows us that selective descriptions can still be perfectly good
descriptions. We take risks by relying on selective descriptions. There may
on occasion be some unnoticed factors which mean that our usual ways of
achieving certain results will fail. But we know from experience that the
risk is low, and that we can get a perfectly good grasp of the ways in which
things work without burdening ourselves with too much information. (A
related point is that we can often get away with using fast and frugal
heuristics, which rely for their frequent but not universal success on the
fact that some cues are consistently useful indicators of the correct answers
to questions. See Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking, chapter 8, and especially
pages 175-177.) To put the point in mathematical terms, we learn that the
world is very often not chaotic, in the sense that ignoring some of the
available information does not place us at much risk of getting results of
our actions that are very different from what we intended. That discovery
justifies the conduct of sciences above the level of equation physics on the
basis of highly selective descriptions of the world, descriptions that are
then stitched together to give causal accounts in which only selected causal
relationships are mentioned. The descriptions and the accounts lack
precision, but that does not leave them devoid of accuracy.
We could equally well justify our presumption of the frequently non-
chaotic nature of the world by pointing to the fact that we are able to
construct elegant scientific theories that allow us to make a wide variety of
successful predictions. We should also note a certain interdependence
between the lack of chaos and our ways of selecting facts. If we approach
the world in the ways that we do, we find that we can achieve things. If we
were to select facts in different ways, we might find that we could not
achieve much at all. That is, the world may only come across as non-chaotic
if we approach it in the right ways, if we find the joints at which to carve
(Plato, Phaedrus, 265e). Our practice of rational action shows not only
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that there are right ways to be found, but that we have found some of them.
Finally, there is an anthropic argument that there must be some ways of
approaching the world that will make it come across as non-chaotic. If
there were no such ways, creatures of our sophistication would not have
evolved, and could not have survived for long even if they had somehow
come into being. But that argument, unlike our experience of rational
action or the content of our successful scientific theories, would give no
indication of what the right ways to approach the world might be.
Rational action and causal necessity
There is another role for our practice of rational action in relation to
causation. The practice can justify our use of the concept of causal
necessity, or of causal raising of the probabilities of given outcomes. (I shall
refer simply to necessitation. I wish to leave room for probabilistic
causation, but not to enter into the debate as to whether it exists.) The
justification is based on the fact that the notion of acting in order to achieve
a certain result makes no sense if we do not expect the world to have to
respond to our actions. There is another apparent justification, based on
the fact that we decide to act, which I shall examine because its limitations
reveal the benefits of being aware of when subject origination and the
boundary concept of the subject are implicitly invoked.
We have the concept of a chain of events, the strength of the links in
which goes beyond mere constant conjunction, even constant conjunction
that will prevail throughout the life of the Universe. The relevant sense of
justification is that of showing us that we are right to conclude that
instances of causal necessitation reflect the nature of the world. As with the
use of selective accounts, there are alternative justifications which do not
rely on our practice of rational action, and I shall set out one such
alternative. But it is vital that we should have some justification for our use
of the concept of causal necessity. A concept of causation that did not
incorporate the idea that causes necessitated given outcomes would not be
our concept of causation, as it is used in the conduct of our sciences and
in our daily lives. The challenge to which wemust respond was set by David
Hume, when he claimed that all that we ever sawwas constant conjunction
(An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 7, part 2).
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The justification that is based on our practice of rational action is
that there is a logical link between rational action and causal necessity. We
act in order to achieve specified results. It only makes sense to perform an
action in order to achieve a given result if we see the action, or some more
basic action that is involved in it, as bringing about the result, except when
the action is itself a basic action and the desired result is merely that the
action should have been performed. (A basic action is an action that the
agent performs directly, without having to do anything else.) Whenever an
action stands in a causal chain and there are subsequent links in the chain
that lead up to the desired result, we see the action as causing the desired
result. An action does not make the desired result inevitable, because things
can go wrong. But the action must be seen as pushing the world toward
the desired result. Rather than seeing the concept of causal necessity as
based on observations of constant conjunction, we can see it as a
depersonalized abstraction from our practice of action in order to change
the world. Then rather than be concerned, as Hume was, that we do not
observe the causal necessity that we believe to exist, we can see our
perception of the necessity as an outgrowth of our awareness that we must
assume necessity in order to make sense of the concept of rational action.
The concept of rational action is one that we understand not in the
abstract, but on the basis of our lived experience as agents. As Goethe had
Faust say, “Im Anfang war die Tat”, “In the beginning was the deed” (Faust,
part 1, “Studierzimmer”, line 1,237). We should, however, note that the
concept of causal necessity that is supported by this argument is defined by
the argument in terms of pushing the world. That is enough to capture our
everyday sense of causal necessity, but a more refined concept of causal
necessity would need a more sophisticated support. The argument that is
given here leaves the field open to a wide variety of different philosophical
accounts of causation. What this argument shows is that if we want to
make sense of rational action, we must philosophize about a concept of
causation that includes causal necessity.
Much would need to be added in order to complete the picture. I shall
here remark on only one piece of the jigsaw, although it is a large piece.
We would need to have senses of ourselves and of our actions before we
could use our understanding of our practice of rational action to justify our
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use of the concept of causal necessity. Fortunately, there is reason to think
that this would not be a stumbling block. We could adopt the approach
that is used by Lucy O’Brien. She gives a fundamental role to the agent’s
awareness of her actions, claiming that this awareness is an awareness by
means of the production of actions rather than by means of the reception
of data, and that this awareness does not presuppose a capacity for first-
personal reference and thought (Self-Knowing Agents, page 88). O’Brien’s
approach could supply the piece in the jigsaw that I would need because the
agent’s awareness of her actions does not depend on a prior grasp of the
concept of causation, so we would not be faced with circularity. The reason
why it does not so depend is that it includes awareness of basic actions.
Basic actions can, like non-basic actions, be followed by changes in the
external world. We can go on to identify those changes as effects, casting
our basic actions in the role of causes. (For our knowledge of basic actions,
and the significance to O’Brien of the category of basic actions, see Self-
Knowing Agents, pages 160-168.)
Another apparent justification for our use of the concept of causal
necessity that is based on our practice of rational action is worth
examination, but largely to reveal its limitations. The starting point is that
we deliberately initiate rational actions. As Wittgenstein remarked,
“Voluntary movement is marked by the absence of surprise” (Philosophical
Investigations, part 1, section 628, page 137). Going beyond the absence
of surprise, the agent decides whether, as well as when, to act. There are
then effects in the external world. The world responds to something that it
did not knowwas coming, even though the agent knew. So it does not seem
that the constant conjunction between an action of a certain type and an
effect of a certain type can be merely a constant conjunction between events
of the given types within the world. In order to make sense of the whole
picture of deliberate action by the agent that startles the world into a
response, we must suppose a stronger bond than that of temporal
coincidence within the world. That stronger bond can be described as
causal necessity.
This justification for our use of the concept of causal necessity can,
however, only show that its use gives us a picture of deliberate action that
broadly makes sense. If we bring all elements of the picture into sharp
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focus, we come to see unresolved difficulties. Specifically, the argument
relies on our seeing a deliberate action and an external effect. The action
and the effect are regarded as not apt to be seen as two members of a pair
of events within the world that, for all we can tell, merely coincide. But
they can only be regarded in the required way if we do not embed the
action, on all sides, within the world’s network of causes and effects. The
picture is implicitly one of the subject under the boundary concept,
engaging in subject origination from a place that is not within the world,
and thereby taking the whole world by surprise. But if that is the picture,
then we do not have a picture of one event within the world causally
necessitating a second event within the world. The second event is seen as
within the world, but the first one is not. So we do not properly justify our
use of the concept of intra-world causal necessity. There are delicate
questions here as to whether a movement of the agent’s body should be
counted as an action which is seen as not embedded in the world, or as an
effect within the world of a separately identifiable volition, but wherever we
drew any dividing line, the main point of the argument would stand.
Something would have to be seen as not embedded in the world, if it was
to be seen as taking the whole world by surprise.
I can now fulfil the promise that I made in section 2.4 to give a reason
why we cannot be sure that our concept of causation would be shared by
all rational beings, and hence why we cannot be sure that the content of our
natural sciences would be accessible to all rational beings. Necessity is
central to our concept of causation. A concept of causation that did not
incorporate some form of necessity would not be adequate to the conduct
of our sciences. We need to see natural laws as having the force of law,
entitling us to demand reasons for failures. It is possible that as a matter of
psychology, rather than of logic, we need to reflect on our practice of
rational action in order to get a grip on the concept of causal necessity. We
cannot be sure that all rational beings would conceptualize their lives in
terms of rational action, nor can we be sure that they would have
alternative routes to the concept of causal necessity. The risk of their being
cut off from a concept of causation that incorporated some form of
necessity may strike us as small, partly because an understanding of the
world that did not use such a concept would be one that would strike us as
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very strange, if indeed we could comprehend it at all. But the risk must be
noted.
I shall now turn to a justification for our use of the concept of causal
necessity that is independent of rational action, and that is preferable to the
extent that it works. Its starting point is the obvious first stage in a response
to Hume’s challenge. This is to remark that we can easily do better than
take at face value the conjunctions that are visible in everyday life. We can
explain those conjunctions in terms of finer details and underlying laws of
nature. Those details and laws may in turn be explained by even finer
details and even deeper laws. Thus the fact that an impact with a certain
force will cause a porcelain cup to shatter is explained by the arrangement
of the molecules, and by the laws that dictate how they are held together.
The molecules can then be analysed into atoms and the bonds between
them, while the laws that dictate how the molecules are bound to one
another can be explained by deeper physical laws that govern the behaviour
of electrons. Eventually we reach the fundamental level at which causation
can drop out of the picture and there are only the equations that describe
the evolution of systems, but most of the way down, we need to use the
concept of causation in order to give a comprehensible account.
The possibility of getting down to the level at which causation need
not be seen holds out one prospect of bypassing rational action in the
search for a justification for our use of the concept of causal necessity.
Suppose that we could, in theory, always get down to the level of equation
physics, even though we might not yet know how to do so. Suppose also
that we could regard the equations that governed the evolution of systems,
as described at that level, as brute facts that explained necessity at higher
levels but that were themselves a source of necessity that we could accept
without any explanation of how they managed to be such a source. Then
we would not need anything more to justify our use of the concept of
causal necessity. (The presumption of the necessity of the relationships
between basic laws and higher laws would need to be justified, but that
would not be a causal necessity. It would be more in the nature of a
conceptual necessity.) The claim that all instances of causation could be
appropriately related to processes that were the subject matter of equation
physics is open to challenge. But it is worth noting that some challenges to
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the ambitions of what might look like an impossible reductionist project
would not be in point, because all we would need would be a
correspondence between each token of causation at a high level and tokens
of low-level processes that ran in accordance with equations. Thus the
frequent lack of type-type correspondences would not be a valid objection.
It might in any case be possible to transmit necessity upward from equation
physics, even if it was not possible to reduce the higher sciences downward.
An account that was based on brute necessity at the level of equation
physics would have one great advantage over an account that was based on
our practice of rational action. It could explain the fact that causal
necessity existed, or if one preferred a different idiom, the fact that the
world was amenable to description by propositions, some of which started
with the word “necessarily”. An account that is based on our practices can
justify our use of the concept of causal necessity, but it cannot explain
necessity itself. To the extent that there is such necessity, it is independent
of our practices. It must be, because if it exists, it existed long before there
were any rational beings. It would be implausible to see it as created by our
thoughts, given that the evolution of our brains depended on the regular
behaviour of entities in accordance with natural laws. Having said all that,
it is still worth considering the way in which our practice of rational action
can justify our use of the concept of causal necessity. The generation of
necessity at the level of equation physics, or its transmission to higher
levels, might be found to be unsatisfactory for some reason.
6.5 Realism
I shall now turn to the debate between realists and anti-realists. Structural
realists have joined the party in recent decades, although structural realism
is heir to a philosophical tradition that stretches back a century or more.
Both realism and anti-realism encompass a wide variety of more specific
positions, but we can characterize them in broad terms. Realism is the view
that the unobservable entities that are posited by our theories really exist in
some sense, and anti-realism is the view that they should be regarded as
mere artefacts of our theories. I shall here identify two sources of the debate.
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The first, and indirect, source is that the concept of rational action
requires us to bring propositional content into the picture, because we see
ourselves as acting on the basis of reasons. The propositions that state our
reasons are in turn exposed to propositional attitudes. Once we bring
propositions into the picture in a way that exposes them to propositional
attitudes, we can go beyond a desire to knowwhat is the case and ask about
the significance of our claimed knowledge. We are rapidly, although not
inevitably, led to the question of whether our knowledge states how the
world is (realism), or whether it merely gives an empirically adequate
account of the world (anti-realism). The notion of propositional content
moves us up a level and leads us out of the network of theory-laden
scientific concepts within which Bas van Fraassen argues that we should
stay. He argues that if we do stay within that network, that will keep us
from taking a quizzical look at our science as a whole, thereby ensuring
that we avoid awkward questions about realism (The Scientific Image,
pages 80-83). But once we have a way out of the network, it is entirely
appropriate to take that way and see where it leads.
The second, and more direct, source of the debate is the inevitability
of our use of the concepts of causation, in the higher sciences and in
immature equation physics, and of action, in our life generally. Our use of
these concepts pushes us toward a realist view. The push might be resisted
on a careful examination of the connections between concepts, but the
push is still there. When we then reflect on realism, we find that it is not an
unproblematic doctrine.
The push toward realism that is supplied by the concept of action has
been clearly stated by Ian Hacking, in his famous remark about electrons
and positrons being fired at a ball of niobium, “If you can spray them then
they are real” (Representing and Intervening, page 23). It is very hard to
take the things on which we act, or on which we rely in our plans of action,
to be anything other than real, whether or not they are observable. Action
is distinguished from fantasy by the fact that it involves our changing a real
and often recalcitrant world. This does not make a knock-down case for
realism. It might be that our concept of action should be changed. But any
attempt to refute the case for realism would require us to enter into
philosophical debate.
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It is true that results, in any science, can be contemplated without
reference to the concept of action, and can be so contemplated in a form
that at least sometimes allows the next advances to be made. But the
concept of action has a way in, and can push us into the philosophical
debate, when the next advances must be made by carrying out experiments
in which we see ourselves as acting on entities that we see as referred to,
whether implicitly or explicitly, by our existing results. In the higher
sciences, entities tend to be referred to explicitly anyway, and we are already
faced with the question of realism for that reason. Experimental practice
just adds to the pressure. In equation physics, the concept of action is not
supported in its task of confronting us with the question by other explicit
references to entities. But it can still do the job. The type of contemplation
of existing results that is implied by the design of experiments exposes even
the practice of mature equation physics to the philosophical question of
realism. This does not, however, undermine the general claim that mature
equation physics has an interesting immunity to many philosophical
questions, including the question of realism. Mature equation physics can
often, although not always, be driven forward by theoreticians who stay
within the mathematics and who do not have any immediate need for new
experiments to be designed. The immunity is there, even though it is
imperfect.
The concept of causation also supplies a push toward realism. Unlike
the push that is supplied by the concept of action, this push exists even
when we merely contemplate results in any science in which we use the
concept of causation, even without thinking about new experiments. We
only expect real things, or events that involve real things, to cause other
things to change. Hegel has a nice line, “Was wirklich ist, kann wirken”,
“What is real, can have effects” (Wissenschaft der Logik, part 1, book 2,
section 3, chapter 2.B). We have a strong urge to turn this round and say,
“Was wirkt, ist wirklich”, leading us to take it that whatever we correctly
see as having causal powers is real. (The qualification of correctness is
important. It is not meant to put in question the existence of causal powers
in general, but it is meant to block an inference to the reality of imagined
causes.) Again, it might be possible to resist the push toward realism. But
again, it could only be resisted by entering into philosophical debate.
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Thus the question of realism is pressed on us by our use of the
concepts of action and of causation. We are pushed toward a broadly
realist view. We may wish to resist, either because we believe that there are
good arguments against realism, or because we consider that the push is
only a push toward a pre-philosophical type of realism that should be
replaced by a more sophisticated doctrine. But does our use of these two
concepts also lead us to a particular answer, even after the debate has been
conducted? The philosophical question is not that easy to answer. There are
complex considerations on both sides. But the attractions of realism, as
highlighted by the words of Hacking and the adaptation of Hegel that were
given above, are hard to ignore. It is also noteworthy that a leading attempt
to finesse the issue, Arthur Fine’s introduction of his natural ontological
attitude, has been forcefully argued to be a form of realism in disguise
(Fine, “The Natural Ontological Attitude”; Musgrave, “NOA’s Ark – Fine
for Realism”).
We should also consider structural realism. Whether it could satisfy
our natural hunger for something real would depend on what would need
to be seen as real in order to satisfy the hunger. We would need to consider
ontic structural realism. Epistemic structural realism leaves open the
question of what exists, so it would in itself neither feed us nor starve us.
Ontic structural realism comes in many varieties, from an eliminativist
version in which it is argued that there are no individuals, only relational
structures, through versions in which individuals have only relational
properties, or in which all irreducible properties of individuals are
relational, to versions in which the existence and the identity of individuals
depend on the relationships between individuals. It would be a considerable
step for most of us to come to be satisfied with the primary reality of
structures and relations, even if individuals were taken to have some derived
reality, but it would be a much smaller step for people who were already
familiar with contemporary physics.
Finally, it is not surprising that the debate over realism should have the
origins that are indicated here. The debate can be avoided within mature
equation physics, where we have no need to interpret the equations or to see
any causation. At least, it can be avoided if we leave to one side the indirect
source of the debate in propositional attitudes, and also refrain from
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designing experiments. If we wish to interpret our equation physics, that
is a different matter, and we are rapidly led into the debate over realism.
Beyond equation physics, the boundary between theory and interpretation
breaks down, leading us to make claims of reality within our theories. We
also need to use the concept of causation, both in the higher sciences and
in immature equation physics. Then the debate over realism cannot be
avoided on principled grounds, even by the practitioners of the sciences
concerned, although they may just assume realism in order to put the
debate on one side and concentrate on obtaining more results. One
interpretation of structural realism is that it is an attempt to exploit a
concentration on structures rather than on things in order to extend across
science the benefits of being in the safe zone of the practice of equation
physics, where the debate need not often rage. Specifically, structural
realists tend to identify structures that are given in mathematical terms.
This was so in John Worrall’s choice of the example of theories of light
(“Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”), and the tradition has
been continued through structural realists’ tendency to focus on physics. It
has been argued that structural realism in the form that is advocated by
Worrall is only suited to the mathematical sciences (Newman, “Ramsey
Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction”, pages
1,377-1,378). But there are also arguments that structural realism can be
applied to other sciences (Ladyman et al., Every Thing Must Go, chapters
4, 5 and 6).
6.6 The subject in the objective world
In this section, I shall return to the themes of chapters 2 and 3. I shall
identify a role for the boundary concept of the subject in making sense of
the relationship between the subject and the world as it is regarded when
we practise the natural sciences.
The scientific ideal is a view from nowhere, to borrow Thomas
Nagel’s title, although to be precise it is not a view but a conception,
because all views are from somewhere. This conception of the world is
detached in the sense that it keeps the observer, as observer, out of the
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picture. He is not assigned a location, and the act of observation is not
mentioned when describing the world. This notion of a detached
conception of the world must be distinguished from the notion of an
unbiased view of the world, a view of how the world is that is uninfluenced
by our theories, even though the two notions are often discussed together.
Hilary Putnam, for example, writes of the God’s Eye View (Reason, Truth
and History, chapter 3). As Putnammakes clear, the assumption that there
is such an unbiased view is the assumption that there is one true way that
the world is, carved up into objects and their properties in a certain way. But
Putnam also discusses the notion of a view from above the world, looking
down on, for example, lots of brains in vats (ibid., pages 49-52). That latter
notion is the notion of a detached conception, so long as we do not read
“from above the world” as assigning a location to the observer. Putnam’s
particular concern with the notion that we might all be brains in vats
creates particular connections between the notion of a detached conception
and the notion of an unbiased view, but in general, the two notions can
and should be kept separate. The English language does not help. The two
notions correspond to two senses of the word “objective”.
The difficulty with taking the observer out of the picture is that we are
aware that it is we who are the observers. We are subjects in the objective
world, and we should be able to connect the idea of our being subjects with
the notion of a detached conception of the world.
When we consider specific observations, there is no great difficulty.
We can both be, and see ourselves as being, in one part of the world while
studying something that is in another part, and the fact that we are in the
same world as the thing that is studied does not matter. We can distance
ourselves from the thing that is studied in a way that allows us to take
ourselves out of the picture. A geologist can study a mountain, and a
biochemist can study molecules, without any relationship between the
observer and the observed featuring in statements of the results, even
though the geologist may be standing on the mountain and the molecules
may be inside the biochemist’s own bloodstream. There is plainly no
problemwith taking the observer out of the picture here. At the same time,
there is no loss of contact with our lives as subjects. We can do science,
directly apprehend the objects of study and understand our apprehension
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of those objects, all at the same time. Even if some objects are too small or
too fleeting for us to see them unaided, so that we have to use special
instruments, we enter into a relationship with the objects that can be
grasped as a whole. We and the objects are both within space-time.We can
imagine both ourselves and the objects on that broad canvas, while still
being able to describe objects without mentioning our relationship to them.
As a useful bonus, a scientific account of that broad canvas, an account
that includes ourselves, our instruments and the objects of study, makes
perfect sense of our experience so far as it can be captured on the basis of
the naturalistic conception. If we see ourselves, our instruments and what
we observe together, we can fully understand the origins of the activity in
our brains that corresponds to our experience. The originator conception
still has its special role in doing justice to the experience of making free
but controlled choices, but the scientific account leaves room for that.
When we move on to our relationship to the world as a whole, serious
difficulties emerge. The concern is not with particular experiences, but
with the framework that makes experience possible. There are two possible
orders of conceptual priority. We can start with the subject and work
outward to the spatio-temporal world. Alternatively we can start with the
world, insert people into it and then establish their status as subjects. The
first option leaves us with two different relationships to the world. We see
subjects or we see the world in detail, but not both at the same time. I shall
explore this option first, before arguing that the second option can do the
job. The second option is intuitively more satisfactory than the first to
anyone who is innocent of philosophy. It aligns conceptual and historical
priority. This is an advantage if we seek a philosophy that will make us feel
at home in the world.
The first option is given to us in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. His
view of the spatio-temporal world goes hand in hand with his view of space
and time themselves. For him, space and time were pre-conditions of all of
our science, the very forms under which we apprehended the empirical
world. We could study space and time, but their fundamental role meant
that we were in great danger of falling into paradox. The risk of error when
thinking about space and time is demonstrated by the first antinomy, in
which a proof that the world had a beginning in time and has spatial limits
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is set alongside a proof that the world neither had a beginning in time nor
has spatial limits (Critique of Pure Reason, A426-433/B454-461). In Kant’s
view, those who fall into such paradoxes do so because they do not properly
understand the relationships between the subject who thinks and perceives,
the world as it is in itself and the world as we perceive it. His solution,
transcendental idealism, is set out briefly at A490-497/B518-B525, although
the full picture is given only by the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole.
One component is that the true thinking subject is not in the phenomenal,
spatio-temporal world. Another component is that we can, indeed must,
take everything in the world as perceived by us to be real, even though
things as perceived are not as they are in themselves. (I have no desire to
come down on one side or the other of the debate between those who
interpret the Kantian system as involving two worlds and those who
interpret it as involving one world. For a survey of the debate from a one-
world point of view, see Allais, “Kant’s One World: Interpreting
‘Transcendental Idealism’ ”.)
The Kantian system is a complete system, in which the subject keeps
in touch with the world. But the Kantian philosophy does not give us a
single relationship to the world. There are two relationships, that of the
philosopher and that of the perceiving subject. When we act as self-
conscious philosophers who both express and contemplate the whole
system, we have a conception of the subject, with his access to phenomena,
although we can say nothing about the subject. When someone acts as a
perceiving subject, he does not, as a subject, appear in his own picture of
the world at all, although he can observe his own body. This whole
approach might end in disaster, a possibility that I shall note here but shall
not pursue because my aim is to give the approach a fair wind, and then
argue that we can move beyond such a two-relationship approach. The risk
of disaster has been set out by Adrian Moore, who argues that it is
impossible for a Kantian coherently to state his conclusion that “we cannot
know anything or intelligibly say anything except from the point of view
of possible human experience” (Points of View, page 126). Moore can,
however, allow the conclusion to reflect limits on ourselves that can be
shown, even though they cannot be stated, and he can identify the utterance
of the Kantian conclusion as the outcome of an inevitably doomed attempt
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to state those limits, an attempt to eff the ineffable (ibid., chapter 7). An
alternative way forward would be to claim that when we acted as
philosophers and contemplated the whole system, we could become aware
of the fact that there were limits to what we could know, limits that
reflected the bounds of sense (both linguistic sense and sense-perception),
but that even as philosophers we could not see both sides of those limits,
and could not say what the limits were. Such an approach would not
vanquish the threat to the Kantian system that Moore identifies, but it
would confine the threat somewhat.
The nature of the two-relationship approach is brought out most
clearly by considering our relationship to space and time. We cannot
explore space and time while we remain in the philosophical relationship
to the world. We can set out their place in the system, as forms that allow
us to experience objects phenomenally, but in order to explore them, we
need to transfer to the empirical relationship and become subjects who
perceive objects. We then suspend our philosophizing and become true
scientists. Indeed, Kant stated in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation that
geometrical properties of space, such as its three-dimensionality and the
existence of only one straight line between two points, could not be derived
from a universal concept of space but could only be discerned concretely,
in space itself (Ak.2: 402-403). He made the same point in the Critique of
Pure Reasonwhen he stated that in order to do geometry, we need not just
concepts, but intuitions (A46-49/B64-66).
Any exploration of space and time that could be carried out on the
basis of the philosophical relationship to the world would be limited to the
identification of properties of space and time that Kant’s overall theory
required. Such an argument could not get far. At best, we could only argue
for a few topological properties. The leading candidate for a required
property would be that time should have only one dimension (compare
Critique of Pure Reason, A31/B47). Kant’s own forays into this territory
did not establish much in the way of specific properties. In his 1747
Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, he gave
scientific rather then philosophical reasons why our space had three
dimensions, but acknowledged that spaces with different numbers of
dimensions were possible (Ak.1: 24-25). In his 1768Von dem ersten Grunde
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des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, he argued for the existence of
absolute space on the basis of chirality, but even with this help from
intuitions of left and right hands, he did not argue for specific properties
of space. In the Inaugural Dissertation, he remarked on the continuity of
time (Ak.2: 399-400). We certainly could not go so far as to argue for a
particular geometry of space. Kant’s overall theory, abstracted from the
particular intuitions that we in fact have, would not require space to be
Euclidean. Having noted these limits on the conduct of geometry without
the benefit of intuitions, we should also note that in Kant’s view, given that
space did have whatever geometry it in fact had, that geometry was
inevitable. We could never find any objects that broke the laws of geometry,
because those laws gave the forms of all of our experience (Inaugural
Dissertation, Ak2: 404;Critique of Pure Reason, A22-25/B37-40). But even
the intuitions that we in fact have need not drive us to a Euclidean geometry.
We could recognize that our intuitions were consistent with a geometry
that was Euclidean locally, but non-Euclidean on a larger scale. It so
happens that in the century after Kant, his noun “Mannigfaltigkeit”,
“manifold”, came to denote a space that was Euclidean locally but that
was not necessarily Euclidean globally. One must however add both that
this possibility was not available for Kant himself to consider, and that if
he had been able to consider it, he would have been faced with the
challenging notion of a non-Euclidean geometry that was to be taken
seriously as a characteristic of the empirical world, but that was not
reflected in our intuitions because they were all local rather than global.
The Kantian system allows us a very limited appreciation of space
and time in our capacity as philosophers who grasp the human subject as
well as space and time, and a much fuller appreciation of space and time
in our capacity as human subjects who experience objects phenomenally.
(The limitation to human subjects was, for Kant, significant. He claimed
that we could not judge whether other thinking beings would be bound by
the same conditions as those that limited our own intuition: Critique of
Pure Reason, A27/B43.) The Kantian starting point is the problem of how
to make sense of the world as it appears to us and of our relationship to
that world. The starting point is not a world that we construct in a
theoretical way, without reference to any subject, a world under a detached
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conception. If we start there, difficulties initially fall away. It is not hard to
start there, but we then have to retrieve the subject. This is the second
possible order of conceptual priority that was mentioned above.
We can first construct a mathematical model of space-time and then
locate objects, including human beings considered merely as objects, within
that space-time. This gives us the world under a detached conception. Our
mode of access to the world as thus conceived is theoretical, not perceptual.
That will make it hard to retrieve the subject, but in the meantime it allows
us to dismiss the four antinomies (Critique of Pure Reason, A420-
461/B448-489). These puzzles arose because Kant wanted to make sense of
the world in terms that were appropriate to our experience, even though he
discussed things that were beyond direct experience, such as the beginning
of the world and the microscopic level of detail at which we might see
ultimate particles. The first antinomy is the clearest case. The proof that
time had a beginning relies on the argument that if it did not have a
beginning, we would have taken an infinite time to get to the present, and
that a completed infinity is impossible. But it is perfectly possible
mathematically for us to be located somewhere in particular on a line that
stretches away endlessly behind us. The proof that space is finite relies on
our inability to intuit the construction of infinite space from finite parts,
save in a disallowed infinite time. But if we take a mathematical model of
infinite space, and assume that this space exists independently of our
insertion into it and of our perceptions, we have no need to intuit its
construction. We simply give the mathematical formulation that defines it.
The proofs that time and space are infinite rely on the assumption that if
they were not, they would have to sit within empty time and empty space.
But there are perfectly good mathematical models of finite but unbounded
space-time, which do not imply that it sits within some larger space-time
that is otherwise empty. There are other ways to see off the first antinomy.
Peter Strawson gives some arguments (The Bounds of Sense, pages 176-
183). But while Kant’s specific arguments are vulnerable to detailed
criticism, only Kant’s own solution, or the alternative of first preparing the
spatio-temporal world, then inserting people, can protect us from the full
range of possible arguments in Kant’s style, arguments that start from the
subject and work outward to the world. Similar things can be said about the
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other antinomies. The second antinomy plays on our everyday
understanding of the notions of breaking down solid entities into parts,
and of constructing entities out of components. But we can give
mathematical formulations that capture infinite divisibility, and
formulations that capture the lack of it, without any reference to such
intuitions. The third antinomy plays on our everyday understanding of
natural causation and of freedom, but in a theoretical model of the world,
the former would feature as an idiom in which we could express regularities
in sequences of events, whereas the question of the latter would not arise.
The fourth antinomy plays on notions of the necessity of the world and of
things within it. It would not have any purchase in relation to a world that
was modelled theoretically. That world would simply be there.
We must now insert subjects into the world as modelled. The easy
stage is to insert human beings. If we do that, we can still have theoretical
rather than perceptual access to the world. We can work out what the
human beings could perceive and what they could do, given their locations
and their powers, and we can work out the corresponding perturbations in
their grey matter. Although we cannot in practice have a science of human
beings without using terms that are appropriate to our direct experience,
that practicality is not relevant to the central point, the contrast between
theoretical and perceptual access to the world. We can in the current
context use the terms that we also use to describe our direct experience,
without tainting the theoretical nature of the access to the world that is
posited here. Terms can be borrowed for new purposes without bringing
the implications of their original uses in their train. The practicality
matters more when we come to work out a route by which we might have
reached our current understanding of the world, and wish to avoid
circularity in that route. I return to that concern below.
The difficulty comes after we insert human beings. We need to make
this populated world our own, a place in which we live as subjects. We need
to create a satisfactory link between the world as conceived theoretically
and the world as experienced by ourselves, not just as experienced by
human beings who have been inserted into the world. There are three
separate challenges here. The first challenge is to explain how someone
realizes that she is herself a given human being within the world as
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conceived theoretically, someone who perceives that world and who acts
on it from a given location, and to explain how she aligns egocentric space
and objective space. I touched on this challenge in section 4.3, and shall
not discuss it further here, but shall rely on the rich literature that already
exists and that rightly places stress on the links between perception, action
and embodiment. The second challenge is to explain how a human being,
seen in the world as conceived theoretically and therefore seen as fully
embedded in the causal network of the world, can also be seen as a free
subject. The third challenge is to show that the easily-banished antinomies
do not return to exact their revenge, once we place ourselves as subjects in
the objective world.
The second challenge is the one that the boundary concept addresses.
If someone brings herself under that concept, she sees herself as a point of
origin, and therefore as free in her deliberations, as well as rational. Kant
would not have been able to use this approach. One reason why he could
not locate the intelligible subject in a pre-existing spatio-temporal world
was that the subject would then have been caught in the web of causation,
making freedom inconceivable. Actual freedom rather than the perception
of freedom was required, if we were to be potentially moral creatures. But
if we can make do with the perception of freedom, as has been argued here,
although it has been argued in relation to our self-conception generally
rather than in relation to our status as moral creatures, and if we can
tolerate the degree of mystery that follows from the lack of any account of
how people might manage to be points of origin, then we can locate
ourselves as free subjects within the spatio-temporal world. Use of the
boundary concept allows us to see ourselves, from the outside, as free
subjects, as centres of deliberation, choice and action who are not mere
links in causal chains. It gives each person a way to apply the status of a
subject to herself when she contemplates space-time with herself, as a
human animal, within it. The sense of being a boundary of the world,
rather than being within the world, is vital here. That sense prevents the
dissolution of the subject into a set of interacting components when we
look at the world as one big mechanism. It makes our status as subjects
secure. We can accord ourselves a substantial subjective presence, rather
than the non-presence of the Kantian intelligible subject. The benefit of
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that substantial presence can be felt not only in relation to our status as
free subjects, but also in relation to our status as rational subjects. This is
so even though that latter status can be sustained by models of our mental
processes such as the ones that have been proposed by Enç, Frankfurt,
Frankish and Bratman, and that were discussed in section 1.5, without
recourse to the boundary concept.
We can proceed in this way, without risk of circularity, because the
concept of the subject is not needed in order to state the most basic
scientific theories, the theories of equation physics, even though the
concept of the observer is needed to state some, but not all, interpretations
of quantum mechanics. The basic scientific theories are enough to give us
space-time and matter. We can therefore conceive the world according to
science, at least in the basic terms of equation physics, terms that do not
rely on the concept of causation and hence are not at any risk of reliance
on our sense of rational action. That is enough to give us a world in which
we can place human beings, although initially without any detailed
description of them because we do not yet have the full range of our
sciences. We can then draw on our sense of action, ascend to self-
consciousness, see ourselves as engaging in rational action and bring
ourselves under the boundary concept. We then have enough to align
egocentric space and objective space. We also then definitely have access to
the concept of causation, so that we can build up the full range of our
sciences and give detailed descriptions of human beings. (If the concept of
rational action is not needed in order to give us access to the concept of
causation, we can have our sciences at an earlier stage.) Our sciences allow
us to refine the alignment of egocentric space and objective space, as we
come to understand why it is that certain actions will lead both to certain
changes in the world, and to certain changes in our perceptions and in our
scope for further action. This account is not put forward as actual history,
but as a rational reconstruction in order to show that the final position
could legitimately be reached from the starting point.
The location of ourselves as subjects in the world may look like a
verbal conjuring trick, even the apparent content of which is obscure, never
mind the obscurity of what is really going on. In fact, there is no trick
because there is so little to do.We are simply aware of ourselves as subjects
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in the world, and continue to regard ourselves as subjects when we think
theoretically about the world with ourselves in it. Identification of the role
of the boundary concept does not change anything. It merely uncovers a
way in which we can regard ourselves as subjects in the independent world.
The third challenge remains. The antinomies melt into air once we
change our starting point from the subject to the pre-existing world that we
access theoretically. If we then insert ourselves as subjects, rather than
merely having a theoretical conception of human beings with their powers
of sense and of action, do the antinomies return?
They do not return. I shall not analyse Kant’s arguments in detail, but
shall indicate why there are no problems in the areas that he identifies. The
first antinomy can be dismissed both because if space-time is taken to be
primary, there is no need to intuit its construction, and because there is no
clash with our intuitions in the idea of a space-time in which our journeys
neither come up against some limit nor take us indefinitely far from where
we start. Making the theoretical conception of the world primary allows
us to dismiss the second antinomy, because the question of whether or not
objects are infinitely divisible is to be answered by reference to physics.
Faced with what is currently regarded as an ultimate particle, we can
visualize it as a ball and ask whether or not it could be cut in two. But that
would be an interpretation of the science in terms that were appropriate to
our direct experience, and it would distort the science. Physical theories
tell us that our intuitions should not always be used when discussing the
nature of the world. The third antinomy concerns natural causation and
freedom. Use of the boundary concept allows us to reconcile a supposition
of freedom with the fact that only natural causation exists. The fourth
antinomy draws attention to the fact that we want to explain the existence
of the world as a whole, but that all of our attempts to do so come to grief.
That is a disturbing truth about the limits of our knowledge. But all of the
explanations that we are ever likely to have will be scientific, and they are
only likely to give us relative necessity. We have to live with that fact.
Starting with theoretical access to the world may make it easier to accept
this limit on our powers than it would be if we started with perceptual
access. It certainly does not make it harder. It also changes the form of the
question from that in which Kant posed it. We are not tempted to give
268
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 268
answers in the style either of his thesis or of his antithesis. Instead we
transfer the question to cosmology, where it is both more tractable in detail
and more obviously unanswerable in principle.
If we use the boundary concept in the way that is proposed here,
adding a status but not adding any natural property to the human being as
an entity in the world as conceived theoretically, then we can both recognize
our status as subjects and recognize that this status depends entirely on
physical entities within the world, on our bodies and above all on our
brains. The structure and the spatial unity of each body and of each brain
explain the unity of consciousness, at a time and over time, which is an
essential part of our self-conception but which has sometimes puzzled
philosophers. That unity is primarily a philosophical puzzle, rather than
the scientific puzzle that is to be solved by noting the physical unity of each
human body and working out the operation of the extensive connections
that exist within each human brain, but not between brains. There are
significant questions about how bits and pieces of neural activity all over
a single brain are brought together in a unified consciousness, but it looks
as though it should be possible to answer those questions by scientific
means (Crick and Koch, “A Neurobiological Framework for
Consciousness”; Singer, “Large-Scale Temporal Coordination of Cortical
Activity as a Prerequisite for Conscious Experience”; McFadden,
“Synchronous Firing and Its Influence on the Brain’s Electromagnetic
Field”). If we can take it that such questions will eventually be answered in
satisfactory detail, and if we can see ourselves as subjects in the world,
rather than merely as objects in the world and as subjects in some strange
other sense, then there is no separate philosophical puzzle of the unity of
consciousness to solve. We can see ourselves as subjects in the world by
using the boundary concept because that gives us a special view of the
physical objects that we are. It does not give us things that are additional
to those physical objects, or additional properties. That restraint keeps the
subject as philosophers see it close enough to the animal as natural
scientists see it for philosophers to be able to rely on the consequences of
the physical unity of the animal. In the rare cases in which injuries or
malfunctions lead to a loss of unity of consciousness, the physical reality
and the concept of the subject stay in line. There is indeed a loss of unity,
269
SCIENCE
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 269
which may be either total or partial, both at the physical level and at the
formal level that interests philosophers, although the loss of physical unity
may reflect the loss of some co-ordinating function, rather than anything
so obvious as a physical break in a neural pathway. Our usual concept of
the subject must be modified for people with such injuries or malfunctions.
Susan Hurley uses rare brain structures to argue that there is no necessary
connection between neuroanatomical unity and the unity of consciousness
(Consciousness in Action, essay 5). But while the connection may not be
necessary, it is the one that in fact obtains in nearly all people. The analyses
of consciousness, and the explanations of its unity or disunity, that are
needed when neuroanatomical unity is lacking are special approaches that
are needed for special cases.
Armed with the boundary concept of the subject, we can start with
a mathematical model of space-time, then insert ourselves into the space-
time that we have modelled and instantly feel at home. That insertion of
ourselves as subjects into a pre-existing space-time allows us to see
ourselves as never having been fettered by the bonds that David Hume
identified with the words, “Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or
to the utmost limits of the Universe; we never really advance a step beyond
ourselves” (A Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 2, section 6, page
67). Furthermore, we can apply the originator conception and see ourselves
as deliberating with mastery, and hence as free and self-directed in the
exercise of our rationality. That goes along with application of the
boundary concept. In short, the boundary concept and the originator
conception of ourselves allow us to find a place in the world that is our
place, a place that does justice to our humanity.
270
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 270
Bibliography
No editions are specified for classic works that are available in many
editions, except when references in the text have been given in forms that
can only be used with specific editions. The online and the printed editions
of specific issues of journals occasionally have dates of publication that
are one month apart.
Ahmed, Arif. “Agency and Causation”. Chapter 6 of Huw Price and
Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of
Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. Oxford, Clarendon Press,
2007.
Aleksander, Igor. The World in My Mind, My Mind in the World. Exeter,
Imprint Academic, 2005.
Allais, Lucy. “Kant’s OneWorld: Interpreting ‘Transcendental Idealism’ ”.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, volume 12, issue 4,
November 2004, pages 655-684.
Allori, Valia, and Nino Zanghi. “What is Bohmian Mechanics”.
International Journal of Theoretical Physics, volume 43, numbers
7-8, August 2004, pages 1,743-1,755.
Alston, William P. Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic
Evaluation. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2005.
Anscombe, G. E. M. Intention. Oxford, Blackwell, 1957.
Aristotle.Nicomachean Ethics.
Bains, Sunny. Physical computation and embodied artificial intelligence.
PhD thesis, Open University, 2005.
Baker, Lynne Rudder. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Barnes, Barry, and David Bloor. “Relativism, Rationalism and the
271
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 271
Sociology of Knowledge”. Chapter 2 of Martin Hollis and Steven
Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism.Oxford, Blackwell, 1982.
Bekenstein, Jacob D. “Information in the Holographic Universe”. Scientific
American, volume 289, number 2, August 2003, pages 58-65.
Bergmann, Michael. “Reidian Externalism”. Chapter 3 of Vincent F.
Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in
Epistemology. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty”. Essay 6 of Berlin, The Proper
Study of Mankind, edited by Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer.
London, Pimlico, 1998.
Blackburn, Simon. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998.
Boghossian, Paul A. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and
Constructivism. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006.
Brandom, Robert B. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and
Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, MA and London, Harvard
University Press, 1994.
Bransen, Jan, and Stefaan E. Cuypers (eds.).Human Action, Deliberation
and Causation. Dordrecht, Boston and London, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1998.
Bratman, Michael E. Structures of Agency. Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2007.
Bruner, Jerome. “Life as Narrative”. Social Research, volume 71, number
3, fall 2004, pages 691-710.
Carnap, Rudolf. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. New York and
London, Basic Books, 1966.
Carnap, Rudolf. “Testability andMeaning”. Philosophy of Science, volume
3, number 4, October 1936, pages 419-471 and volume 4, number 1,
January 1937, pages 1-40.
Carroll, John W. “Nailed to Hume’s Cross?”. Chapter 2.1 of Theodore
Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.),
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Oxford, Blackwell, 2008.
Carter, Angela. The Passion of New Eve. London, Virago, 1982.
272
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 272
Cassam, Quassim. Self andWorld. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
Cassam,Quassim (ed.).Self-Knowledge.Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress, 1994.
Cei, Angelo, and Steven French. “Looking for structure in all the wrong
places: Ramsey sentences, multiple realisability, and structure”.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, volume 37,
number 4, December 2006, pages 633-655.
Chalmers, David. “The Hard Problem of Consciousness”. Chapter 17 of
Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell
Companion to Consciousness. Oxford, Blackwell, 2007.
Clark, Andy. “Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind”. Mind &
Language, volume 16, number 2, March 2001, pages 121-145.
Clarke, Randolph. “Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck”. Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, volume 86, issue 3, September 2005, pages
408-421.
Cohen, L. Jonathan. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1992.
Crick, Francis, and Christof Koch. “A Neurobiological Framework for
Consciousness”. Chapter 44 of Max Velmans and Susan Schneider
(eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford,
Blackwell, 2007.
Cromwell, Oliver. The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with
Elucidations by Thomas Carlyle, edition in three volumes. London,
Methuen, 1904.
Dahlbom, Bo (ed.).Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind. Oxford,
Blackwell, 1993.
Davidson, Donald. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Essay 1 of Davidson,
Essays on Actions and Events, second edition. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 2001.
Davidson, Donald. “Agency”. Essay 3 of Davidson, Essays on Actions and
Events, second edition. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001.
Davidson, Donald. “Mental Events”. Essay 11 of Davidson, Essays on
Actions and Events, second edition. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001.
Dawkins, Richard. Climbing Mount Improbable. London, Viking, 1996.
273
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 273
Dayan, Peter, and L. F. Abbott. Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational
and Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems. Cambridge, MA
and London, MIT Press, 2001.
Dennett, Daniel C. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and
Psychology. Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1981.
Dennett, Daniel C. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of
Consciousness. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT Press, 2005.
Dennett, Daniel C. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA and London,
MIT Press, 1987.
DeRose, Keith. “Solving the Skeptical Problem”. Philosophical Review,
volume 104, number 1, January 1995, pages 1-52.
Descartes, René.Meditations.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. “Das Verstehen anderer Personen und ihrer
Lebensäußerungen”. Part 3.1.2, pages 205-227, of Dilthey, Der
Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften
(Gesammelte Schriften, volume 7). Stuttgart, B.G. Teubner
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1958.
Dretske, Fred. “Contrastive Statements”. Philosophical Review, volume 81,
number 4, October 1972, pages 411-437.
Eilan, Naomi. “Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness”.
Chapter 11 of Anthony O’Hear (ed.),Current Issues in Philosophy
of Mind: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs, volume 41, issue 3,
September 2007, pages 478-502.
Enç, Berent. How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 2003.
Evans, Gareth.The Varieties of Reference. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982.
Fine, Arthur. “The Natural Ontological Attitude”. Chapter 1 of David
Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Fischer, JohnMartin. “Compatibilism”. Chapter 2 of JohnMartin Fischer
et al., Four Views on Free Will. Oxford, Blackwell, 2007.
274
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 274
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A
Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1998.
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”.
Chapter 8 of GaryWatson (ed.), FreeWill, second edition. Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”.
Chapter 16 of Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, second edition.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
Frankish, Keith.Mind and Supermind. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
Fricker, Miranda. “The Value of Knowledge and the Test of Time”.
Chapter 7 of Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Epistemology: Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplement 64. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
Gert, Joshua. Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”.Analysis, volume
23, number 6, June 1963, pages 121-123.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
Ginet, Carl. “Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist
Account”. Chapter 5 of Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of
Action.Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Faust.
Goldberg, Sanford C. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language,
Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
Goldie, Peter. “Emotions, feelings and intentionality”. Phenomenology and
the Cognitive Sciences, volume 1, number 3, September 2002, pages
235-254.
275
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 275
Goldie, Peter. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 2000.
Goldman, Alvin I.Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1999.
Goldman, Alvin I. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and
Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2006.
Goldstein, Sheldon. “Quantum Theory Without Observers – Part 1”.
Physics Today, volume 51, issue 3, March 1998, pages 42-46.
Grayling, A. C. Truth, Meaning and Realism. London, Continuum, 2007.
Haack, Susan. Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in
Epistemology. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
Habermas, Jürgen. “The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the
Problem of Free Will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled
with ontological monism?”. Philosophical Explorations, volume 10,
issue 1, March 2007, pages 13-50.
Hacking, Ian. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
Haugeland, John. “Pattern and Being”. Chapter 3 of Bo Dahlbom (ed.),
Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind. Oxford, Blackwell,
1993.
Heal, Jane. “Understanding Other Minds from the Inside”. Chapter 3 of
Heal, Mind, Reason and Imagination. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
Healey, Richard. Gauging What’s Real: The Conceptual Foundations of
ContemporaryGaugeTheories.Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press, 2007.
Hegel, G. W. F.Wissenschaft der Logik.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time.
Hendricks, Vincent F., and Duncan Pritchard (eds.). New Waves in
Epistemology. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Hertz, Heinrich. Untersuchungen über die Ausbreitung der elektrischen
Kraft (Gesammelte Werke, volume 2). Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius
Barth, 1894.
276
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 276
Hitchcock, Christopher. “What Russell Got Right”. Chapter 3 of Huw
Price and Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the
Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 2007.
Hollis, Martin, and Steven Lukes (eds.). Rationality and Relativism.
Oxford, Blackwell, 1982.
Hornsby, Jennifer. “Agency and Causal Explanation”. Chapter 12 of Alfred
R. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of Action. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition, edited by L.
A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1978.
Hume, David. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and
Concerning the Principles of Morals, third edition, edited by L. A.
Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1975.
Hurley, Susan L. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA and London,
Harvard University Press, 1998.
Hutto, Daniel D. Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis
of Understanding Reasons. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT
Press, 2008.
Hutto, Daniel D. “Impossible problems and careful expositions: Reply to
Myin and De Nul”. Chapter 4 of Richard Menary (ed.), Radical
Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus
on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2006.
Hyman, John, and Helen Steward (eds.). Agency and Action: Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
James, Wendy.The Ceremonial Animal: A New Portrait of Anthropology.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. How We Reason. Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2006.
277
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 277
Kafalenos, Emma.Narrative Causalities. Columbus, Ohio State University
Press, 2006.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. First edition (A), 1781, second
edition (B), 1787.
Kant, Immanuel. Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen
Kräfte. Ak.1: 1-181, 1747 (some sources give 1746, when the book
was submitted to the censor).
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ak.4: 385-
463, 1785.
Kant, Immanuel. Inaugural Dissertation (De Mundi Sensibilis atque
Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis). Ak.2: 385-419, 1770.
Kant, Immanuel. Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden
im Raume. Ak.2: 375-383, 1768.
Kaplan, Mark. “It’s Not What You Know that Counts”. Journal of
Philosophy, volume 82, number 7, July 1985, pages 350-363.
Kierkegaard, Søren.Kierkegaard’s Journals andNotebooks, volume 2, edited
by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al., Søren Kierkegaard Forsknings-
centeret. Princeton,NJ, andOxford, PrincetonUniversity Press, 2008.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, volume 18, edited by Niels
Jørgen Cappelørn et al., Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret.
København, Gads Forlag, 2001.
Kim, Jaegwon. “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”.
Chapter 11 of Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of Action.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
Kim, Jaegwon. “Reasons and the First Person”. Chapter 4, pages 67-87, of
Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action,
Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht, Boston and London,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
King, Barbara J. The Dynamic Dance: Nonvocal Communication in
African Great Apes. Cambridge, MA and London, Harvard
University Press, 2004.
King, Ross D., et al. “The Automation of Science”. Science, volume 324,
number 5,923, 3 April 2009, pages 85-89.
278
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 278
Korsgaard, ChristineM. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
Korsgaard, Christine M. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Ladyman, James, and Don Ross, with David Spurrett and John Collier.
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2007.
Lamont, William (ed.). Historical controversies and historians. London,
UCL Press, 1998.
Lange, Marc. Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Essais de Théodicée.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.Monadology.
Lemos, John. “Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent
causation”. Disputatio, volume 2, number 21, November 2006,
pages 69-90.
Lenk, Hans. “Humans as Meta-symbolic and Super-Interpreting Beings”.
Chapter 3 of Lenk, Global TechnoScience and Responsibility.
Berlin and Münster, LIT Verlag, 2007.
Le Poidevin, Robin, andMurrayMacBeath (eds.).The Philosophy of Time.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.
Levin, Michael. “Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?”. Erkenntnis,
volume 64, number 3, May 2006, pages 381-392.
Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph. Schriften und Briefe, volume 2. München,
Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971.
Lowe, E. J. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.
McDowell, John.Mind and World, edition with a new introduction by the
author. Cambridge,MAandLondon,HarvardUniversity Press, 1996.
McFadden, Johnjoe. “Synchronous Firing and Its Influence on the Brain’s
Electromagnetic Field: Evidence for an Electromagnetic Field
Theory of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies,
volume 9, number 4, April 2002, pages 23-50.
279
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 279
MacIntyre, Alasdair.After Virtue: A Study inMoral Theory, third edition.
London, Duckworth, 2007.
Mathiesen, Kay. “Collective Consciousness”. Chapter 11 of David
Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology
and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005.
Mele, Alfred R. (ed.). The Philosophy of Action. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Menary, Richard (ed.).Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology
and Narrative: Focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2006.
Menzies, Peter. “Causation in Context”. Chapter 8 of Huw Price and
Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of
Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007.
Montero, Barbara. “Varieties of Causal Closure”. Chapter 8 of SvenWalter
and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental
Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Exeter, Imprint
Academic, 2003.
Moore, Adrian W. Points of View. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.
Mortimer, Ian. “The Death of Edward II in Berkeley Castle”. English
Historical Review, volume 120, number 489, December 2005, pages
1,175-1,214.
Musgrave, Alan. “NOA’s Ark – Fine for Realism”. Chapter 2 of David
Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Nagel, Thomas. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1970.
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1986.
Newman, Mark. “Ramsey Sentence Realism as an Answer to the
Pessimistic Meta-Induction”. Philosophy of Science, volume 72,
issue 5, December 2005, pages 1,373-1,384.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Also Sprach Zarathustra.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft.
280
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 280
Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA, The
Belknap Press, 1981.
Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy, revised edition. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
O’Brien, Lucy. Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2007.
O’Connor, Timothy. “Agent Causation”. Chapter 10 of O’Connor (ed.),
Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and FreeWill.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
O’Connor, Timothy. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
O’Hear, Anthony (ed.). Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind: Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
O’Hear, Anthony (ed.). Epistemology: Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplement 64. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Olsson, Erik J. “The Place of Coherence in Epistemology”. Chapter 8 of
Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in
Epistemology. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
O’Shaughnessy, Brian. The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, second edition,
two volumes. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Ozon, François (director). Cinq fois Deux. Film, 2004.
Papineau, David (ed.). The Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons, corrected edition. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1987.
Perry, John. “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”. Chapter 10 of
Quassim Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1994.
Persson, Ingmar. “Self-Doubt: WhyWe are not Identical to Things of Any
Kind”. Chapter 2 of Galen Strawson (ed.), The Self? Oxford,
Blackwell, 2005.
281
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 281
Pettit, Philip, andMichael Smith. “Freedom in Belief and Desire”. Chapter
20 of GaryWatson (ed.), FreeWill, second edition. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Pindar.Odes.
Pirsig, RobertM. Lila: An Inquiry intoMorals, revised edition. Richmond,
Alma Books, 2006.
Plato. Phaedrus.
Plato. Theaetetus.
Popper, Karl.The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, Routledge, 2002.
Price, Anthony W. Contextuality in Practical Reason. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 2008.
Price,Huw, andRichardCorry (eds.).Causation, Physics, and theConstitution
of Reality:Russell’sRepublicRevisited.Oxford,ClarendonPress, 2007.
Pritchard, Duncan. Epistemic Luck. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005.
Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
Putnam, Hilary. “What is mathematical truth?”. Chapter 4 of Putnam,
Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume
1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Chapter 2 of
Quine, From a Logical Point of View, second edition, revised.
Cambridge, MA and London, Harvard University Press, 1980.
Quinton, Anthony. “Spaces and Times”. Chapter 12 of Robin Le Poidevin
and Murray MacBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of Time. Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1993.
Raffman, Diana. “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham
and Horgan”. Philosophical Studies, volume 122, number 2,
January 2005, pages 189-202.
Ramsey, William, Stephen P. Stich and Joseph Garon. “Connectionism,
Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology”. Chapter 9 of
William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich and David E. Rumelhart (eds.),
Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 1991.
282
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 282
Reid, Thomas. “Essays on the Active Powers of Man”. In The Works of
Thomas Reid, second edition. Edinburgh, Maclachlan, Stewart, &
Co, 1849.
Roberts, Geoffrey. “Postmodernism versus the Standpoint of Action”.
History and Theory, volume 36, number 2, May 1997, pages 249-
260.
Rovane, Carol. The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary
Metaphysics. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1998.
Ruben, David-Hillel (ed.). Explanation. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1993.
Rupert, Robert D. “Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the
Nature of Special-Science Properties”. Noûs, volume 42, issue 3,
September 2008, pages 349-380.
Russell, Bertrand. “Why I Took to Philosophy”. Chapter 4 of Russell, The
Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. London, George Allen &
Unwin, 1961.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London, Hutchinson, 1949.
Schlosser, Markus. “Agent-causation and agential control”. Philosophical
Explorations, volume 11, issue 1, March 2008, pages 3-21.
Schlosser, Markus. The Metaphysics of Agency. PhD thesis, University of
St. Andrews, 2006.
Schmidt, Michael, and Hod Lipson. “Distilling Free-Form Natural Laws
from Experimental Data”. Science, volume 324, number 5,923, 3
April 2009, pages 81-85.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation.
Searle, John R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT
Press, 2001.
Seigel, Jerrold. The Idea of the Self. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2005.
Shoemaker, Sydney. “Introspection and the Self”. Chapter 7 of Quassim
Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press, 1994.
Sider, Theodore, John Hawthorne and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.).
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Oxford, Blackwell, 2008.
283
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 283
Singer, Wolf. “Large-Scale Temporal Coordination of Cortical Activity as
a Prerequisite for Conscious Experience”. Chapter 47 of Max
Velmans and Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to
Consciousness. Oxford, Blackwell, 2007.
Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Smith, David Woodruff, and Amie L. Thomasson (eds.). Phenomenology
and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005.
Smith, Michael. “The Structure of Orthonomy”. Chapter 7 of John
Hyman and Helen Steward (eds.), Agency and Action: Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
Sosa, Ernest.AVirtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge,
Volume I. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007.
Sosa, Ernest, and Michael Tooley (eds.). Causation. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Stevens, Wallace. “The Man with the Blue Guitar”. The Collected Poems
of Wallace Stevens. London, Faber and Faber, 1955, pages 165-184.
Steward, Helen. “Fresh Starts”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
volume 108, paper 11. Oxford, Blackwell, 2008.
Strawson, Galen. “Against Narrativity”. Chapter 4 of Strawson (ed.), The
Self?Oxford, Blackwell, 2005.
Strawson, Galen. Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT
Press, 1994.
Strawson, Galen (ed.). The Self?Oxford, Blackwell, 2005.
Strawson, Peter F. “Freedom and Resentment”. Chapter 1 of Strawson,
Freedom and Resentment and other essays. London, Methuen,
1974.
Strawson, Peter F. The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason. London, Methuen, 1966.
Stueber, Karsten R.Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and
the Human Sciences. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT Press,
2006.
284
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 284
Sturgeon, Scott. “The Gettier Problem”. Analysis, volume 53, number 3,
July 1993, pages 156-164.
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1989.
Thrift, Nigel. “I Just Don’t Know What Got into Me: Where is the
Subject?”. Subjectivity, volume 22, issue 1, May 2008, pages 82-89.
Tolstoy, Leo.War and Peace.
Turing, AlanM. “ComputingMachinery and Intelligence”.Mind, volume
59, number 236, October 1950, pages 433-460.
Tversky,Amos, andDanielKahneman. “ExtensionalVersus IntuitiveReasoning:
The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment”. Psychological
Review, volume 90, number 4, October 1983, pages 293-315.
van Fraassen, Bas C. The Scientific Image. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980.
Velmans, Max, and Susan Schneider (eds.). The Blackwell Companion to
Consciousness. Oxford, Blackwell, 2007.
von Wright, G. H. “On the Logic and Epistemology of the Causal
Relation”. Chapter 6 of Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds.),
Causation. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.
Walter, Sven, and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.). Physicalism andMental
Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Exeter, Imprint
Academic, 2003.
Watson, Gary (ed.). Free Will, second edition. Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2003.
Weber, Max.Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Grundriss der Sozialökonomik,
III. Abteilung). Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1922.
Wiggins, David. “Wittgenstein on Ethics and the Riddle of Life”.
Philosophy, volume 79, number 3, July 2004, pages 363-391.
Williams, Bernard. “Deciding to believe”. Chapter 9 of Williams, Problems
of the Self. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Williams, Michael. Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to
Epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001.
Williams, Michael. “Responsibility and Reliability”. Philosophical Papers,
volume 37, number 1, March 2008, pages 1-26.
285
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 285
Williamson, Timothy. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig.OnCertainty, corrected edition, translated by Denis
Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford, Blackwell, 1974.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, third edition,
translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford, Blackwell, 2001.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig.Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Frankfurt amMain,
Suhrkamp, 1963.
Woodward, James. “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation”. Chapter
10 of David-Hillel Ruben (ed.), Explanation. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Woodward, James. “Causation with a Human Face”. Chapter 4 of Huw
Price and Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the
Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 2007.
Worrall, John. “Structural Realism: The Best of BothWorlds?”. Chapter 7
of David Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1996.
286
DELIBERATION AND REASON
BaronText-1-1:Layout 1  22/2/10  11:16  Page 286
